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Abstract 
Nepal is typically viewed as an aid-dependent country, where donors have a powerful role. 
They are considered to be able to influence the planning of development efforts and 
national priorities of the country, as well as having a lead in the management of the 
development work, leading to a weakness by the Nepalese bureaucracies to decide their 
priorities. This is further viewed to be influenced by the neopatrimonial governance style 
in the ministries and departments administering the development work.  
Donors that work in Nepal operate within their policy systems and priorities. These 
priorities are typically decided at the global level in international conferences and high-
level meetings. In the past couple of decades, the donors have been given an increasingly 
larger role in national policy making in the aid recipient countries. Initially, this took place 
through economic policy conditionalities attached to loans given to aid recipient countries, 
and has from there widened to cover governance reform and participation in the policy 
making processes through policy consultations.  
Under this situation, it is not clear through what kind of a process the national policies 
of aid recipient countries are actually formulated and how the national policies are 
influenced by donors’ policies. This thesis looks at policy making in the Nepalese rural 
water supply and sanitation sector from this perspective. It exposes the dynamics 
underlying the interaction between donors and the Nepalese water bureaucracies by 
focusing on the analysis of the roles, motives and interests of the sectoral actors in the 
making of policies. The study highlights the political side in the aid giving and receiving 
through making use of the politics of policy –theoretical perspective. The rural water 
supply and sanitation sector was chosen as the framework for this study, because of the 
important role that water has for Nepal – often presented as the blue gold of Nepal – and 
the multiple and powerful donors that are active in the sector, for whom the water sector is 
also an important investment target. The policy making process is analysed through a case 
study, the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Policy, Strategy and Action Plan formulated 
in 2002-2004 and funded by the Asian Development Bank.  
The empirical evidence of this study is based on the mixed qualitative methods 
research done in Kathmandu, Nepal, in the summers of 2009 and 2010. The core data is 
based on the interviews of 89 people, as well as water supply and sanitation related policy 
documents – draft versions, final policy documents and reports, prepared in the process of 
policy formulation. In addition, I have included a wide-ranging literature study.  
The research illuminates that policy making in the Nepalese rural water supply and 
sanitation sector is a game between donors and the water bureaucracies – both having 
political and economic interests that they aim to secure in policy formulation. Based on 
these interests, the policy actors manoeuvre in the policy negotiations. The aim of the 
donors is to legitimate their aid towards the donor headquarters through influencing 
national policy making into their preferred direction in order to keep their business 
ongoing. Yet, even though the donors are able to influnce policy making, the study found 
out that the Nepalese water bureaucracies are not powerless in front of the donors, but they 
have successfully adopted several strategies in manoeuvring the donor influence. Thus, 
even though the aid relationship is inherently unequal, is not only the donors that have 
 
 
 
 
interests and power that drive policy making, but also the water bureaucracies have their 
own incentive structures that shape the policy processes. The donor involvement in the 
policy process can be charctesised as a state of permanent negotiation, in which policy 
formulation is just a part of the further institutional entanglement by the donors. 
Additionally, it has been discovered that the donor participation in the policy making has 
implications on policy theories, and policy networks, suggesting that the logic of policy 
making changes, when the donors play an important role in it. The policies in these 
situations are formulated to legitimise donors’ agendas and interests and not because of a 
perceived need for a policy change stemming from the internal developments in the aid 
recipient country. Because of this, the application of various policy network theories 
becomes problematic, because they assume that the coalition building takes place around a 
domestic problem, which the coalition partners want to solve through their suggested new 
policy idea.  
 
Key words: policy process, aid, governance, Nepal, policy networks, politics of policy, 
water, water governance, water supply and sanitation, rural development 
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1 Introduction 
 “The term ‘policy’ is a word sanitized for polite company: it really is about power and the 
formula for its use. Since power, like procreation, is best exercised in society invisibly, 
policy discussions are notorious for what is covert and vaguely implied than for what is 
overtly laid out for public view.”  
 Dipak Gyawali (2010, 193), Former minister of water resources in Nepal  
This thesis discusses the interaction and dynamics between donor organisations and 
bureaucracies in policy formulation in a developing country: Nepal. There is plenty of 
research on policy formulation and implementation in both established democracies, and 
developing countries, that focus on the role of parliaments, politicians and civil society in 
the policy process. There is also research focusing on policy implementation and the 
issues standing in its way – particularly in developing countries, where open or hidden, 
political and economic interests have been analysed. Within the policy process, however, 
it is not well known how the donors influence policy formulation, when they participate in 
the process, and act as its funding agencies. Thus, I am particularly interested to analyse 
the interaction between the donor organisations and the Nepalese bureaucracies, and how 
the aid dependency of Nepal, combined with the assumed powerful position of donors in 
Nepal, shape policy formulation. In Nepal, it is thought that the interests of the donors and 
the power of aid money guide policy formulation, but a detailed analysis of the power 
dynamics between the donors and bureaucracies in policy making, is still missing. Thus, 
my study delves into the roles, interests and motives of the policy actors, to explore the 
policy dynamics in the rural water supply and sanitation sector, and draws conclusions on 
how donor participation in national policy making in an aid-receiving country influences 
the policy making process.  
Within the operating framework of aid, it has been shown that donors dominate aid 
and that the recipient countries have limited possibilities to influence the terms on which 
aid is delivered, or aid priorities are decided (Browne 2006; Killick et al. 1998; Panday 
1999). Furthermore, it has been shown that aid has its own political and economic 
interests that can conflict with those of the aid recipient country: the history of aid 
witnessing in many cases in which the aid is delivered, even though it did not respond to 
the needs of the recipient country – a well-known example being the case of Lesotho 
studied by Ferguson (1994). At the same time, the aid recipient country’s governmental 
agencies have their own interests that they pursue, and they try to direct the aid flow 
accordingly. Nepal is characterised as a neopatrimonial country, where patronage and 
clientelistic networks play an important role in resource allocation and shape the politics 
of the country (Baral 2000; 2008; Rose, Fisher 1970; Blaikie et al. 1980; Bista 1991; 
Panday 1999; Kumar 2000). Even though Nepal is an aid-dependent country, it cannot 
automatically be assumed that the country would be totally dominated by the donors. I 
hope to show that the relationships are not that simple, through a process of the deeper 
scrutiny of power relationships between donors and governmental agencies. Even though 
typically presented as weaker, the recipient countries can also possess powers that can 
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contest the powerful position of the donors. Therefore, I will analyse the relationship 
between donors and the Nepalese governmental agencies in the rural water supply and 
sanitation sector of Nepal: how they come together to decide about sector development, 
and how they interact in sectoral policy formulation. Because of the focus of interests, 
whether open or embedded, and the varying powers between the actors, aid is perceived 
here as political, not apolitical, as the donors themselves tend to present. Analogously, the 
policy making process is approached through a theoretical perspective that emphasises the 
politics of policy. 
1.1. Research Objectives and Research Questions 
The overall objective of this thesis is to provide empirical evidence and conceptual 
argument on how aid agencies participate in the policy formulation processes in a 
developing country – here in Nepal – which is dependent on aid and donor advice and 
characterised as neopatrimonial. More specifically, my aim is to explain the roles, 
interests, motives and strategies of the aid agencies and the Nepalese water bureaucracies 
in the water supply and sanitation policies’ negotiation process. For this, I will trace the 
policy process of the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Policy, Strategy and Action Plan 
using it as a case study.  
 
The central research question that I address in this thesis is the following: 
 
How has interaction between the Nepalese governmental agencies and the aid agencies in 
the rural water supply and sanitation sector been affected by the seemingly dominant 
policies and practices of the donors, taking into consideration Nepal’s dependency on 
foreign aid and advice and the characteristics of a neopatrimonial country with only a 
short experience in democratic governance? 
 
Within the frame of this central research question, some more specific questions are 
explored. 
 
 Why have the abundant water resources of Nepal not been tapped effectively 
enough to bring sufficient water for all? 
 Why have the Nepalese state, together with the donors, not been able to provide 
an improved water supply and decent sanitation for the citizens of Nepal?  
 How have water policies in Nepal been formulated in relation to international 
aid trends and the government’s own policy priorities? 
 What kind of strategies/mechanisms have the aid agencies and the Nepalese 
governmental agencies used to guard and promote their interests in water 
policy making in Nepal? 
 What kind of networks did the aid agencies and the Nepalese governmental 
actors establish in order to strengthen their position in the policy process? 
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 How did the Nepalese water bureaucracies cope with the demands set by the 
aid agencies, the government and the policy system? 
 How did the Nepalese water bureaucracies manoeuvre their priorities in policy 
formulation? 
1.2 Background to the Research  
Nepal has been presented as an aid-dependent country, which refers to the large and 
increasing amounts of aid that Nepal has been receiving since the early 1950s, combined 
with a dependence on donor advice in the implementation of development projects 
(Khadka 1991; Lohani 1999; Poudyal 1988; Panday 1999; Pyakuryal et al. 2008; Ghimire 
L.S. 2009a; Luitel 2009). Since the 1980s, aid agencies have increasingly taken part in 
national policy making in Nepal: first through the implementation of two Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in the late 1980s. and afterwards in the making of 
national policy, the policy reform being a conditionality for programme funding. The 
initial mechanisms were the conditionalities included in the economic reforms that the 
agencies funded, and later through the crosscutting agenda of good governance. Since the 
2000s, the new aid instruments of joint reporting, process conditionality, and policy 
dialogue have made national decision making in Nepal an issue that is not the 
responsibility of the government alone, but donors, among others, have also an important 
role in the decision making process (Bhatta 2011; Winter-Schmidt 2011; Panday 1999).  
In Nepal, several aid agencies, including the World Bank (WB), and the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), and UNICEF, all influential multilaterals, have funded the 
water policy formulation and implementation processes. Particularly in the rural water 
supply and sanitation sector have the donors been actively involved in policy making. As 
Nepal has been presented as very dependent on foreign aid and advice, I assume that the 
aid agencies have been able to influence policy making in a direction that corresponds 
primarily with their own policies and aims, and not necessarily with the needs of Nepal in 
mind. It has been further negatively affected by the neopatrimonial governance of Nepal, 
in which the political and bureaucratical elite seeks its own benefit, rather than that of the 
citizens of Nepal. Furthermore, the global domination of the aid thinking – decided in the 
high level meetings and conferences around the world, and then implemented as a 
blueprint for development in aid recipient countries – has influenced national policy 
making in Nepal.  
The rural water supply and sanitation sector of Nepal harbours a large number of 
actors: there is no single lead agency from the government side, nor is there a lead agency 
from the side of the donors. Instead, several governmental agencies are involved in the 
planning and management of the rural water supply and sanitation schemes, and many 
donors fund these agencies, or operate on their own in the same sector. All of these actors 
have their own interests to forward in the policy making, some of which are conflicting.  
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My aim is to understand the dynamics between the aid agencies and the Nepalese 
water bureaucracies1 in the rural water supply and sanitation policy making process – and 
to find out which mechanisms of interaction between the aid agencies and the water 
bureaucracies work in this kind of a situation, including how policies are negotiated, 
which actors take part in it, and which do not, and what motives, interests and issues they 
pursue.  
1.3 Framework of the Research 
In this section I will briefly outline the main debates within which this study operates. 
Many of these issues are analysed in greater detail in the chapters of this thesis. I limit 
myself here to only make a précis of the framework of my study. I have divided the fields 
into studies focusing on (1) Policy as a Process - and emphasising the role of politics in 
the policy making; including a glimpse on policy studies in Nepal; (2) The Role of Water 
in Nepal and - rural water supply and sanitation; and (3) The Aid Debate - including aid 
for Nepal. 
1.3.1 Policy as a Process with Focus on Politics 
My theoretical framework has been provided by policy as a process and the politics of 
policy - perspectives (Grindle 1999; 1989; 1977; Grindle and Thomas 1991; Thomas and 
Grindle 1990; Mollinga 2008b; Mollinga, Bhat 2010), which are elaborated in Chapter 
Two. This allows me to focus on how policies were formulated, and by whom, and on 
their interaction in policy formulation. Similar frameworks are included for studying water 
policy formulation and implementation in other parts of the world/in other water sectors 
(Ashtana 2008 and Mollinga 2008a on India; Mollinga and Bolding eds. 2004 on 
irrigation reform in developing countries; Suhardiman 2008 as well on irrigation reform 
on Indonesia and Nikku 2006 on irrigation reform in India, Whitfield 2006 on politics in 
the urban water reform in Ghana, and Reis 2012 on rural water supply and sanitation in 
Vietnam). Of these studies, the discussions of Suhardiman on the irrigation management 
transfter in Indonesia, the role of bureaucracies in policy making, and the application of 
Advocacy Coalition Framework in the policy process, have informed my study, both 
theoretically and empirically. Outside of the pure academic content, I also liked her 
argumentative style of writing. Reis, focusing on policy practices, rather than on policy 
formulation, also presents policy making and donor involvement as political; providing a 
critical perspective on donor support for the Vietnamese water supply and sanitation 
                                                 
1 I use water bureaucracies to refer to the main ministries and their departments that deal with water in Nepal 
– a concept that I use synonymously with the governmental agencies (in the water sector). Governmental 
agencies, however, are a wider term, which can also refer to other relevant actors (such as the Ministry of 
Health). Hydrocracies, a concept, which I will introduce in Chapter Four, refers to the ministries and 
departments that share the hydraulic mission: in the context of water supply and sanitation, this is the 
Department of Water Supply and Sewerage (DWSS).  
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sector. Furthermore, she illustrates the role of the state in the policy process, by tracing the 
policy decisions from national level to implementation. Whitfield, on the other hand, 
focuses on policy formulation and political interactions among donor, government and 
civil society in the privatisation of water in Ghana, showing how donors are embedded 
within the state – a topic that she elaborates further in the book ‘The Politics of Aid’ (ed. 
2009). These ideas I have adopted in my study and probed their applicability in the case of 
Nepal. The edited book by Mollinga and Bolding (2004) provides several case studies on 
water policy processes around the world, highlighting the polical aspects of the policy 
processes.  
In the Western context the aspect of politics in the water policy has been discussed in 
the special issue of Environmental Politics edited by Bressers, O’Toole and Richardson 
(1994), covering countries such as the Netherlands, Germany, the United States, England 
and Wales, the EU, and Hungary.  The case of Great Britain has been discussed lengthy by 
Maloney and Richardon in their book ‘Managing Policy Change in Britain: The Politics of 
Water’ (1995). One of the rare studies on the role of donors in the water supply and 
sanitation policy is from Seppälä (2002), who discusses the role of donors in the water and 
sanitation policy reform implementation. There is more literature available on policy 
implementation than on policy formulation in general, particularly in the case of 
developing countries.   
There are also some studies on policy formulation and implementation in Nepal, 
outside of the theoretical framework of policy as a process, or the politics of policy 
perspective, as well as outside of the water sector, but still providing me with a framework 
for my study. Schloss (1985) studied the politics of development in the transportation 
sector, focusing on the dynamics between bureaucracy and the aid system, including 
donors, and on the planning process in that sector. He highlights the roles, interests and 
actions by these actors in this particular field, and concludes the discussion on the 
interplay in terms of which roads were built by whom and where. It is one of the first in-
depth analyses on the role of donors in policy making in Nepal. Justice (1986) has studied 
the role of aid in the health sector and in its policy making. Her focus was on presenting 
the gap that exists between policy making and programme implementation. Her insights 
into action of the aid agencies in policy making still apply today, and provide reference to 
this research in this regard as well. The implementation of privatisation policy in Nepal 
has been examined by Paudel (2006). He shows that multilateral aid agencies had a 
dominant role in pushing for privatisation in the early 1990s, informing my account of the 
economic history of Nepal and the role of donors in the 1990s. 
1.3.2 Water in Nepal 
The water sector, being one of the most potential sectors in Nepal economically 
(HMGN/WECS 2002; Pun 2006; Dhugel, Pun eds. 2009), has gained a lot of researchers’ 
attention. As I cannot review all of the water-related literature in this thesis, the focus is on 
literature with topics that matter for social and political science, and in those books and 
papers that have a relevance for my political perspective on water.  
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Particularly, the hydropower and irrigation sectors have been analysed from various 
perspectives. The political side of hydropower development was the topic of the book by 
(eds.) Dhungel and Pun (2009), who provided a multi-perspective picture of the India-
Nepal relationship in hydropower development. In addition, the issue has been the focus 
of Upreti B.C. (1993); Rijal (1997); Dixit (1997; 2009); Gyawali (2003); Subba (2003); 
Upreti B.R. (2007); and Mirumachi (2010); and it has been discussed in numerous articles 
in the journal ‘Water Nepal’. Many of these books and articles discuss the role of 
multilateral banks that have had an active role in the hydropower sector in Nepal, thus 
informing my study about the role of aid in the water sector. The irrigation sector has been 
scrutinised from the social science perspective by Aubriot, Jest, Sabatier (2008); Lam 
(2006); Aubriot (2004); Shivakoti and Ostrom (ed.) (2002), Pradhan P. (1989) and Regmi 
(2007), who focus on the history of irrigation in Nepal and farmer-managed irrigation 
systems. These studies discuss the differences between farmer- and agency-managed 
irrigation systems practices, illuminating the evolution of hydrocracy in Nepal.  
The different meanings of water are highlighted in the studies by Rai (2005), who 
analyses dam development and the issue of resettlement. Upreti (2001; 2002; 2007), on 
the other hand, discusses conflicts in the water sector, whereas R. Pradhan et al. (1997) 
and Pradhan, von Benda-Beckmann and von Benda-Beckmann (eds.) (2000) include water 
rights into this discussion. Dixit (e.g. 2009; 2002; 2000; 1997; Dixit, Crippen 1993) and 
Gyawali (e.g. 2008; 2003; 1989) have written extensively about the water issues in Nepal 
and are the main advocates of small scale hydropower development in Nepal: opposite to 
those arguing for large hydropower projects (e.g. Mahat 2005). These works provide 
background information for my study by discussing the social, political and economic 
aspects related to water sector development.  
Rural water supply and sanitation is an under-researched topic in Nepal, particularly 
when having connections with aid and politics. The most important study in this field 
consist of the doctoral dissertation of Sharma (2001), which analyses a Finnish funded 
rural water supply and sanitation project and the traditions of water. Sharma shows how 
the role of donors in sectoral development have been decisive; particularly their priorities 
have influenced the making of national development plans. The same project has been 
studied by Saarilehto (2006) in his Master’s thesis, highlighting the power relations 
between the different actors within the project framework. Buddeke (2010) in her Master’s 
thesis analyses the sustainability of the water supply and sanitation projects funded by the 
Fund Board in Nepal. These studies focus on the micro level, discussing the project 
implementation. My study will complement these studies by focusing on the sectoral 
development at national level and analysing the donor influence from this perspective. 
1.3.3 Aid and Nepal 
The wide and diverse aid debate will guide my analysis on the role of aid in Nepal. 
Browne (2006) and Riddell (2007) present aid as a very complex set of processes, where 
no singular explanations can be given; thus, this corresponds with my understanding of aid 
having political motives. Within the aid debate Gibson et al. (2005); Haan and Everest-
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Phillips (2007); Araral (2008) and Whitfield (ed.) (2009) highlight the incentives and 
power embedded in the aid game, whereas Mosley et al. (1991); Killick et al. (1998); 
Harrison (2001); Bøås and McNeill (2003); Gould (ed.) (2005) as well as Whitfield (ed.) 
(2009) depict insightfully the evolution of the conditionality thinking among the donors. 
These studies inform my political economy view on aid, by scrutinising the political and 
economic incentives on the sides of national governments and donors, to participate in 
policy making, and their strategies to guarantee that their interests are taken into account 
in the policy making, as well as informing the study about their power in this game. The 
issue of power is further illuminated in the ethnographies of aid by Mosse (2005); 
Ferguson (1994) and Li (2007), showing that in the aid interface, power is multilayered 
and not unidirectional.   
The Nepalese debate on aid and development, (discussed in detail in Chapter Three) 
informing this research, consists of the works of Mihaly (1965); Stiller and Yadav (1979); 
Bista (1991); Khadka (1997); Shrestha (1998); Panday (1999); Sharma (2001; 2008) and 
Sharma et al. (2004). They all describe an important role for donors in Nepal and some of 
them even characterise it as aid-dependent Nepal. However, they have not defined it in a 
Nepalese context, but use it in very general terms. In addition, an important aspect of 
development thinking in Nepal is the discussion around the concept of bikas (meaning 
development commodities brought externally by donors, NGOs or bureaucrats), discussed 
in the works of Pigg (1992; 1993; 1995); Des Chene (1996); Shrestha (1998); Kamata 
(1999) and Sharma (2001). As bikas-thinking characterises all development efforts in 
Nepal, it is important that all studies discussing the role of aid in Nepal take account of 
this issue.   
1.4 Blue Gold: Meaning of Water for Nepal  
'Water is, unquestionably, Nepal's most important natural resource. Optimal use of this 
dwindling resource could be instrumental in substantially uplifting the quality of life of the 
Nepalese people.” 
S.B. Pun 2006, 128 
As stated in the quotation above, water in Nepal is popularly viewed to be the most 
important natural resource, having an enormous potential economically, leading to 
economic growth that will be broad-based, and consequently, reduce poverty, by 
providing opportunities for the poor to buy themselves out of economic hardship. Yet, 
researchers opine that the linkage between poverty reduction and water development is 
complex, and how the latter fits into a global or national poverty reduction agenda is not 
clear (Dixit 2000). The difficulty lies in the fact that linkages are not explicit, and in cases 
that are marginal, poor men and women using groundwater and land to create wealth 
(Shah 1998). Furthermore, poverty is not only about wealth, or cost-benefit ratios (Panday 
1999), but inclusion of identity and human dignity receive equal emphasis in today’s 
definition of poverty. However, in a general sense, it is clear that a lack of access to water 
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leads to impoverishment, and those who are poor have no access to a wholesome water 
supply (Dixit 2000).  
Despite of the abundance and potentiality of water, it has not been tapped effectively 
enough to bring prosperity to the people of Nepal. Here I show how the dominating view 
of water in Nepal it is of being 'blue gold' – viewing it as a natural resource, having an 
enormous economic potential for country – and that has shaped the politics of water in 
Nepal. Because of the potential that it includes, several organisations have been interested 
in having a share in its governance or control. In this section, I provide an overview on 
water as a natural resource in Nepal and on its meaning for the country culturally, 
politically and economically. 
1.4.1 Abundant but Scarce Water 
Nepal is a landlocked, predominantly mountainous country located between two global 
powers, China and India. It is situated between the Tibetan plateau and the Ganges plain 
along the southern slope of the Himalaya. This area is divided into five physiographic 
regions: 1) High Himalayas, 2) Lesser Himalayas (high mountains), 3) Middle Mountains 
(the Mahabharat Range), 4) Siwaliks (the Churia Range) and 5) the Tarai plains2. Due to 
extreme spatial differences, climate variation is large in Nepal – ranging from tropical to 
arctic climate within only 200 kilometres. Figure 1.1 shows these spatial differences 
(Buddeke 2010, 25; OECD 2003, 9).  
 
Figure 1.1 Topological Sequence of Nepal3 
                                                 
2 There is variation in the categorisation of Nepal in physiographic regions. Some divide Nepal into three 
regions, others in four. I use the categorisation by the government of Nepal (HMGN/WECS 2005).  
3 Source of the map: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Nepal_topo_en.jpg. Accessed on Sep. 4, 2013. 
The map has been created with the Generic Mapping Tools: http://gmt.soest.hawaii.edu/ using one or more 
of these public domain datasets for the relief:  
ETOPO2 (topography/bathymetry): http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/mgg/global/global.html 
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The country's physical setting contributes to a rich water regime, in which the dense 
network of 6 000 rivers has the largest water potential4. The total average annual runoff 
from all these river systems is estimated at about 225 billion cubic metres (bcm)5. All the 
river systems drain from north to south towards the Ganges River. The four major river 
systems originating in the Himalayas are the Mahakali, Karnali, Narayani (Gandaki) and 
Saptakosi and the medium rivers originating from the Mahabharat range are Kankai, 
Kamala, Bagmati, West Rapti and Babai. The southern rivers rising from the Siwalik 
range are smaller and have little water during the dry season. They can, however, cause 
flash floods during monsoon.  
 
Figure 1.2 Map of Nepal with Main Rivers  
Courtesy of the University of Texas Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin, source: 
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/cia12/nepal_sm_2012.gif 
 
The magnitude of the average availability of the water resources of the country can be 
misleading in terms of their actual utilisation. The variations of resource availability in 
terms of time and space are large. In the months of June to September the flow is high 
because of the monsoon, which brings about 80 per cent of annual rainfall (ADB 2009c), 
followed by a period of recession during the months of October to November. Flow 
becomes low during the months of December to April. Pre-monsoon rains, thunder and 
                                                                                                                                                   
GLOBE (topography): http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/mgg/topo/gltiles.html 
SRTM (topography): http://www2.jpl.nasa.gov/srtm/ 
The licence for the reproduction of this map can be found under:  
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/legalcode. 
4 In addition to the rivers, water is also available in the form of lakes, glaciers and groundwater. The 
country's major lakes are situated in the Western and Far-Western regions. The storage available in the lakes 
is estimated to be about two per cent of the annual run-off (Thapa, Pradhan 1995, 28). Groundwater is most 
available in the southern region of the Tarai. The Tarai is also a major zone for recharge of aquifers in the 
Indo-Gangetic plains. Hence, there is a potential of groundwater use in the form of shallow tubewells and 
deep tubewells (HMGN/WECS 2005, 4; Thapa, Pradhan 1995, 28).  
5 The estimates are based on available data of certain stations up to the year 1995 (HMGN/WECS 2005, 3). 
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squalls, generally increase the flows in May and early June and with the commencement 
of summer monsoon flow augmentation begins. Furthermore, the demand for water for 
domestic, industrial, irrigation, hydropower generation, environmental requirements, etc. 
does not necessarily match temporally or spatially, or both, with the available water 
supply, which has led the resource being categorised as 'scarce' rather than 'abundant' in 
terms of its temporal and spatial variations (HMGN/WECS 2005, 1-4; Thapa, Pradhan 
1995, 18-24; Bhattarai 2009, 69-71). Of the abundant 225 bcm of water available 
annually, only a small part (estimated at 15 bcm) has so far been utilised for economic and 
social purposes. Until now, Nepal has utilised mainly medium and small rivers for 
different uses such as drinking water, irrigation and hydropower. The larger and perennial 
rivers, except for a few run-of-the-river schemes, have been virtually left untapped 
(HMGN/WECS 2005, 4).  
The impact of global warning is expected to have severe effects on the Nepalese 
Himalayas and the most critical impacts can be expected to be on its water resources, 
particularly glacier lakes, and its hydropower generation. Water supply infrastructure and 
facilities are at risk from increased flooding, landslides, sedimentation and more intense 
precipitation events (particularly during the monsoon) expected to result from climate 
change. Greater unreliability of dry season flows, in particular, poses potentially serious 
risks to water supplies in the lean season. Hydroelectric plants are highly dependent on 
predictable runoff patterns. Therefore, increased climate variability, which can affect 
frequency and intensity of flooding and droughts, could affect Nepal severely. Glacier lake 
outburst floods and increased run-off variability threaten the potential for hydropower 
generation. Given that Nepal’s electricity infrastructure heavily relies on hydropower – 
nearly 91 per cent of the nation’s power comes from this source – a reduced hydropower 
potential might imply that Nepal will have to seek for alternative sources of power 
generation, including from fossil fuel sources (OECD 2003, 43). It is also estimated that 
monsoon rain will intensify, which is expected to enhance the variability of river flows. 
This trend has major impacts on hydropower, agriculture, infrastructure and human health, 
but also on Nepal’s ecosystems and biodiversity. As a consequence of heavy rainfall 
combined with severe thunderstorms, landslides and flooding are common in Nepal. 
Therefore many farmers see their fields flooded or washed away because soils can often 
not absorb the amount of water during monsoon months. With more intense monsoon 
rains, food security may become more challenged as well (Buddeke 2010, 25, cf. 
GON/WECS 2011). Yet, in the rainshade areas of Nepal, the opposite is the case. In these 
areas, there will be less rain expected, due to the diminishing snowfall in the Himalayas, 
because of raising temperatures. In these regions there will be less melting water flowing 
into the streams, leading to lack of water. It has even been reported that some villages will 
need to resettle because of this problem (Bernet 2013, 214-5). 
Outside of the threat posed by climate change, Nepalese water resources are also 
threatened by an increasing population and industrial expansion, together with a growing 
demand from urbanisation and the irrigation sector. Furthermore, Nepalese water 
resources are facing many environmental hazards. Suggested solutions to these problems 
are to switch focus on their management through the river basin approach or integrated 
water resources management (NENCID, undated, 13; HMGN/WECS 2002; 2005).  
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1.4.2 Economic Value of Water 
Water is the principal natural resource supporting the economy of Nepal. It is particularly 
important for two sectors: irrigation and hydropower. In the hydropower sector there is a 
magical number of 83 000 MW of potential capacity for electricity production that is often 
quoted6. Yet, as presented by Bhattarai (2009) (and many others) the technically and 
economically more feasible potential is about 43 000 MW. This is indeed quite a potential 
if one compares it with the current hydropower capacity of the system which is 556 MW7 
(Bhattarai 2009, 73; Pradhan 2009, 126-7). Sufficient electricity for industries would also 
boost the economic growth in the country.  
The development of the irrigation and hydropower sectors began in earnest in the 
1960s under the aegis of foreign aid institutions.8 Since then, water has been viewed as the 
main resource to lead the development of the country, including the naming of water as 
the 'blue gold' of Nepal9. The basic premise of this approach to development is that 
investment in constructing the physical structures required for altering the flow of water in 
space and time leads to high economic growth. Infrastructure is created for irrigation (to 
stimulate yields and production), hydropower (to provide reliable power for industrial 
expansion and revenue from export), navigation (to substitute land based transportation), 
access to domestic water (to save time collecting water) and industrial uses (to enhance 
production processes).  
Three early hydropower projects were built in the Trisuli, the Rosi Khola and the 
Sunkosi rivers with financial and technical assistance from India, the former Soviet Union 
and China respectively. Particularly in the post-1990 era the neo-liberal ideas, and striving 
for economic growth, facilitated by the new Hydropower Development Policy 1992 
(revised in 2001 and under revision in 2013), made Nepal to seek for further foreign 
technical and financial aid to study the feasibility of constructing large-scale hydropower 
projects which could export energy to the Indian grid. Most of these projects were 
conceived as multi-purpose projects: besides generating energy they would facilitate 
irrigation, flood moderation, navigation and inland fishery. India is extremely interested in 
buying electricity from Nepal as it also suffers from power deficit. Pun (2006; 2009) 
explains that despite the fascination for power export to the Indian grid and belief that this 
will lift Nepal into riches of the world, not one project dedicated to that aim has been built. 
Instead, Nepal imports electrical energy from India.10  
                                                 
6 This estimation derives from the doctoral dissertation of Hari Man Shrestha written in 1966 at Moscovsky 
Energetichesky Institute.  
7 Of total energy, actually only a small part is produced by hydropower. GON/WECS (2010) points out that 
the share of hydro-energy in the total energy consumption is only 0,6 per cent. Other means for getting 
energy are in the rural areas fuelwood, agri-residue and dung, which easily can lead to overexploitation of 
existing forest resources and decrease the yield of farmland, and in the urban areas diesel generators, 
although Nepal also suffers from shortage of petrol. 
8 For s short history of the irrigation and hydropower sectors, see Dixit (2000).   
9 Several authors question this popular view that water resources will lead to Nepal's development (Gyawali 
1989; Thapa 1997; Bandyopadhyay, Gyawali 1994; Rijal 1997).  
10 In 2007, this corresponded to 10.8 per cent of the energy consumed that year (Dixit 2009, 97). In 2005, 50 
MW of power exchange was being transacted between India and Nepal, through 'in principle' 150 MW of 
power exchange has been agreed upon the two governments (Pun 2006). For a review of the hydropower 
sector development, see Pandey (1998).  
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In the irrigation sector, water is required to stimulate agricultural production, which is 
the largest economic sector of the Nepalese economy and provides a living to large part of 
the population11. Therefore, the intensification of agriculture through irrigation is essential 
to increase food supplies and to strengthen the economic base of the country. Additionally, 
increasing yields through irrigation would improve the economy of the country, 
particularly if the agricultural surplus could be exported. Currently, Nepal has 2,64 million 
hectares of cultivable land and 66 per cent of this land, i.e. 1,76 million ha, is irrigable. 
Around 60 per cent of the irrigable land has some kind of irrigation facility, of which only 
41 per cent has round-the-year irrigation. Most of the irrigated area (about 74 per cent) is 
under farmer-managed irrigation systems (FMIs)12 and the remaining area falls under 
agency-managed irrigation systems (AMIs) (HMGN/WECS 2005, 5; Thapa, Pradhan 
1995, 79-83; Bhattarai 2009, 73). Outside the hydropower and irrigation sectors, water 
supply for domestic and industrial use is obviously one of the main uses of water. The use 
of water for water supply and sanitation is discussed in detail in Chapter Three. 
1.4.3 Political Water 
Due to the economic potentiality, water in Nepal has attracted the attention of those people 
who are politically motivated. This is highlighted in the hydropower sector and in the 
negotiation of water resources management with India, related to the transboundary rivers. 
In addition, due to the scarcity of water, conflicts over the use of water have arisen. These 
are manifested both at local and national level. The economic potentiality and scarcity of 
water have made water in Nepal a highly sensitive political issue. In this part, I first 
elaborate on the conflicts at the local level, showing how these relate to the availability of 
water and the political influence. After this, I turn to analyse the political aspects shaping 
water resources management at a national level and after this, elucidate the India-Nepal 
water relationship.  
1.4.3.1 Water Conflict at the Local Level 
Different kinds of water-related conflicts have been reported in Nepal (Upreti 2004; 
2007). Source disputes, the sharing of water for different purposes (for example, use of 
water for drinking water, irrigation, hydropower), and the payment of compensation for 
damage caused while constructing canals and laying drinking-water pipes, have frequently 
been reported. Similarly, conflict over contributions to the water supply and irrigation 
systems, and disputes among water users’ associations/committees on their roles and 
                                                 
11 Nearly four fifths of Nepalese households are essentially farm households (4.25 million households out of 
which 3.36 million have agricultural holdings), who derive nearly half of income from agricultural sources, 
consisting of farm income and agricultural wage income. Engaging two-thirds of labour force, this sector 
alone contributes some one-third to the GDP (Karkee 2008, 1).   
12 Some systems are being transferred wholly to the water users’ associations (WUAs) concerned for 
management, whereas some are being jointly managed by the government and the WUAs (HMGN/WECS 
2005, 5).  
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responsibilities, are other common water-related conflicts (ibid.). Earlier studies (Upreti 
2001; IMC 1990; Pradhan et al. 1997; 2000) have shown that water conflict is a normal 
phenomenon – in the absence of a clear provision of water rights – if the same source is 
used for more than one purpose. The occurrence and intensity of such a conflict is 
especially high when water becomes scarce in the dry season, whereas in the irrigation 
system, the disputes often relate to the head section limiting the supply (in terms of time 
and quantity) in the tail section (Upreti 2007, 20-21).  
Researchers have attached conflicts to a weak governance of water resources (Pradhan 
et al. 1997; 2000; IMC 1990; Upreti 2001; 2007). They have noted that conflicts are more 
common in agency-run irrigation and water supply systems than in farmer-managed 
irrigation systems and have shown that in several externally-funded drinking water 
projects, conflicts have erupted after a few years due to the scarcity of water, because of 
the increase in the population in the villages. This has been the consequence of 
technicians, who designed the project having ignored the potential future for water 
demand, citing financial and technical reasons. 
Upreti (2007, 23-24) also mentions that political interference and interests cause 
politicisation of conflicts. In water supply, this is elucidated in the question of where to 
put the tap stand. Due to the influence of politicians, or because of their own hidden 
interests, technicians locate the tap stand close to the houses of particular people (mainly 
rich and powerful – sometimes negotiated with a bribe), disregarding other people’s 
protests. Similarly, sharing the source is another problem in such projects. The decisions 
are decided on the basis of technical justifications, thus ignoring the existing use of 
patterns and the social context. Once the projects are built on these grounds – political or 
technical – without considering people’s needs and opinions, local people may damage 
structures built, and cause the conflict to escalate.  
1.4.3.2 Domestic Politics Shaping the Water Sector 
Water being a highly sensitive political issue is also highlighted in domestic politics in 
Nepal – especially in the hydropower sector. In this part, I show that the main interest of 
the domestic political players has been to get a share of the potential ‘hydro-dollars’ and to 
guarantee that each ministry dealing with water/hydropower has a position that allows 
them to join the governance game in the hydropower sector.  
This kind of a game is well illustrated in the political wrangling over the power 
balance in the administration of water resources that took place in 2009. Then the Ministry 
of Water Resources (MoWR) was abolished and two new ministries were created: the 
Ministry of Energy (MoE) and Ministry of Irrigation (MoI). The jurisdiction of MoWR 
was handed over to the Ministry of Energy. In addition to the power play within the 
coalition parties13, this decision relates to the typical view of water in Nepal as consisting 
of two economically potential sectors: hydropower development and irrigation. It was 
most likely considered that these two powerful sectors should not be under one minister, 
                                                 
13 This was explained to me in an interview by Pashupati Shmshere Rana, chairperson of RPP on Sep. 13, 
2010.  
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but should be divided to allow more distribution of the financial resource base and 
political power when deciding over finances. Institutionally, the splitting of the MoWR 
did not make much sense. It put the whole water sector into an uncoordinated state and the 
Water and Energy Commission Secretariat (WECS) as a coordinating agency – at that 
time heavily engaged in the Integrated Water Resources Management – in a fuzzy 
situation. This cross-sectoral agency, which previously was under the MoWR, became to 
be administered by a ministry that was solely responsible for the advancement of 
hydropower development. At the same time, there were four other ministries responsible 
for water-related issues, the MoE, MoI, Ministry of Physical Planning and Works 
(MPPW) and the Ministry of Local Development (MLD) and no institution with the power 
to coordinate them. A similar reasoning for the splitting ministries and their jurisdictions 
to avoid them becoming too powerful has been suggested to have taken place in the 
context of MoWR and water supply14. I was informed that water supply and sanitation 
used to be under the MoWR, but it was swapped under the MPPW, because otherwise the 
MoWR would have had too much funding and making it too weighty in comparison with 
other ministries.  
Politicisation of water in Nepal has not taken place only because of domestic politics, 
but these have been influenced through the global political setting. A well-known example 
of this is Arun III, a controversial hydropower project in Nepal, which has not been 
implemented because of opposition from civil society. This took place in the early 1990s, 
when the global focus on liberalism also paved the way for competitive politics in Nepal, 
and raised aspirations and public yearning for an improved performance in governance 
(Dixit 2000, 198). In this liberalised political environment, Nepalese citizens started to 
demand rights, as well as access to information, culminating in a public debate on 
hydropower development, which was seen to solely serve the purpose of the market-
economy's interests. Demands were expressed to first provide electricity to the Nepalese 
citizens, before exporting it to India, and to be transparent with the financial and 
environmental costs of hydropower development (see e.g. Dixit 2009; Dixit and Basnet 
2006). Thus, the operations of the project, led by its main donor, the World Bank, caused a 
wide political debate in Nepal15, leading to protests against Arun III.  
Upreti (2007, 25) shows how the interests of politicians and bureaucrats for kickbacks, 
in the water sector, have led to cases of corruption, and concludes that the cases of 
corruption and malpractice in Nepal’s water resource development is not that different 
from the findings of Robert Wade (1982), in the administrative and political corruption in 
the irrigation projects in South India. Gyawali and Dixit (1999) and Swain (1998) 
additionally suggest that political and not economic considerations have guided the 
selection of the proposed Pancheswar Project, whose implementation is set by the treaty 
between India and Nepal on the Mahakali River (cited in Dixit 2000, 218).  
                                                 
14 Interview with Pashupati Shumshere Rana on Sep. 13, 2010. A similar point related to avoiding the 
allocation of funds to a certain government organisation, in order to not make it too strong, was made by a 
NGO director, when speaking of urban water supply and sanitation.  
15 Different views on the Arun III case have been presented by Pun 2009: Mahat 2005; Gyawali 2003. There 
were similar parallel cases in South Asia: e.g., Farakka Barrage between India and Bangladesh, and Sardar 
Sarovar project in India. 
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Because of the issue of corruption, among others, there is a constant discussion going 
on in Nepal whether hydropower development should focus on the ‘World Bank 
approach’, meaning large projects as being the best solution for the economic 
development of the nation – mostly advocated by politicians – and scholars arguing for the 
development of less risky (smaller) hydropower projects, and consistently questioning the 
development of export-led large hydropower projects (for the first category see Mahat 
2005 and for the latter see Gyawali, Dixit 2001; Panday B. 1994). 
1.4.3.3 India-Nepal Water Relationship 
The politicisation of water is well manifested in the Nepal-India water relationship, which 
has been thoroughly researched by Nepalese senior water professionals, many of them 
having been involved in the negotiations between the countries on the water sharing 
agreements, in Nepal-India Water Relationship edited by Dhungel and Pun (2009)16. 
There are four water-sharing agreements on three of the rivers between India and Nepal. 
The general feeling in Nepal, is that in the making of the agreements, Nepal, on the one 
hand, was bullied by India and, on the other hand, the government of Nepal did not keep 
the side of Nepal in the negotiations. Thus, Nepal has failed to receive the due benefits 
from the projects agreed upon in the agreements17. Because of this, the attitude in Nepal 
towards new agreements on water sharing with India are skeptical18 (Shrestha H.M. 2009; 
Pradhan B.K. 2009; Dhungel 2009, 20; Iyer 1999; Pun 2006; Siwakoti 2003; Nepal 2005; 
Rijal 1997, 133). Siwakoti (2003) adds that opposition to these treaties has always been 
crucial in building strong, nationalist-minded politics in Nepal, particularly for the left 
movement19. 
The feeling of betrayal by their own government is viewed to derive from the fact that 
Nepal does not have a long-term strategy as to how it should deal with India, in relation to 
this sector (Upreti 2007, 28; Dhungel 2009, 67). Moreover, political parties follow one 
line of thinking while in power, and the opposite while in opposition. Dhungel (2009, 67) 
                                                 
16 The relationship has been an interest by the academic community for a long time already, and has been 
discussed by, (just to name a few), Upreti B.C. (1993); Rijal (1997); Dixit (1997; 2009); Gyawali (2003); 
Subba (2003); Upreti B.R. (2007); and Mirumachi (2010); and in numerous articles in the journal ‘Water 
Nepal’.  
17 This relates to the negotiation strategies, that India has negotiated, so that it only pays for the energy, but 
gets the irrigation water and flood control for free. Hence, Nepal has been faced with the problem of how to 
price its water resources. Interview with Dr Sudhindra Sharma (researcher) on Jul. 23, 2009.  
18 A current example in regard to the India's plans to establish a River Linkage Project. The countries 
affected by it, Nepal and Bangladesh, feel that this project is unilaterally launched by India, and that there 
are several benefits for India, deriving from the River-Linking Project, that are not openly disclosed to Nepal 
and Bangladesh (Siwakoti 2003; Shrestha H.M 2009). The aim of the project is to join major rivers in South 
Asia through a total of 30 links, which are divided into two connections – Himalayan connection with 14 
links and Peninsular Connection with 16 links. Of the 14 Himalayan Connection links, five affect Nepal 
(Shrestha H.M. 2009). 
19 Yet, at the same time, the same leftist forces repeated these mistakes by ratifying the Integrated 
Development of Mahakali River Treaty in 1996. The signing of the treaty not only led to the breakdown of 
the unity among the left forces in Nepal, but also to the split in the CPN-UML, allegedly related to the direct 
bribing of Nepalese politicians by India. Interview with Dr Sudhindra Sharma (researcher) on Jul. 27, 2009. 
For an analysis of the Mahakali Treaty see Gyawali and Dixit 2000.  
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explains that Nepal has always followed an ad hoc policy in reaching an understanding, or 
signing a treaty, or in picking projects for cooperation with India20. Compared to such a 
situation in Nepal, Dhungel finds India is guided by a long-term strategy: to get optimal 
benefits from the waters flowing from Nepal in meeting its own requirements, mainly 
irrigation requirements and the control of floods, as well as the power/energy to meet its 
growing energy deficit. Dhungel also pinpoints that India strategically aims to have a hold 
on all the rivers in Nepal discussing issues project by project, whenever Nepal thinks that 
its goals would be achieved. Thus, despite a long list of projects agreed for cooperation, 
only a few have been taken up so far. To ensure that this goal is not obstructed or 
challenged by Nepal, India has also followed the policy of raising objections to 
multilateral, or other funding agencies, whenever they decide to extend support to Nepal 
in the water resources sector, in the plea of prior use or on the grounds of causing adverse 
effects to the downstream flow from the proposed project(s) (Dhungel 2009, 67). A 
similar opinion is expressed in Nepal, where a shared view is that in the Nepalese water 
sector, the World Bank is in the first place looking after India's interest, not that of Nepal. 
The World Bank and the ADB would not fund any projects in Nepalese upper-riparian 
rivers, which would reduce the water in the lower riparian areas that are in India21.   
1.4.4 Cultural Significance of Water 
In general, the research on the cultural significance of water for the Nepalese people, that 
is available in English mainly limits itself to the studies of Sharma (1994; 2001), who 
attaches it to the religious significance and analyses the role of water within the overall 
development thinking in Nepal – the issue of bikas, which refers to the thinking of 
development being not something endogeneous, but brought into communities from 
outside. This is discussed in detail in Chapter Three. There is plenty of research available 
that is in Nepali or other vernacular languages, such as Newari. This literature was beyond 
my possibilities to delve into. Obviously, there is plenty of research on Hindu, Buddhist 
and other cultural aspects of water in documents discussing role of water in India, Sri 
Lanka and Thailand. Yet, here, I limit myself into the discussion available on Nepal in 
English language. In this part, I focus my analysis on the religious significance of water in 
Nepal, and present the legal regime in the water sector.  
                                                 
20 Subha (2001, 193) provides an example from 1991, when the then-government of Nepal tried to 'bypass' 
the parliament while finalising a river deal with India, through the decision by the Nepalese prime minister 
Girija Prasad Koirala to let India use a slice of Nepalese territory to make additions to the left embankment 
of the Tanakpur Barrage on the Mahakali river.  
21 Interview with Dr Sudhindra Sharma (researcher) on Jul. 23, 2009. 
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1.4.4.1 Religious Significance of Water 
In addition to having an economic value, water is also a multifaceted symbol in Hinduism 
– the dominant religion in Nepal22. Sharma (1994; 2001) explains that water is regarded as 
one of the panchatatva, i.e., five primeval elements of the universe, along with earth, fire, 
air and ether. Mythical-religious facts symbolised by water in Hinduism relate to water as 
primal matter, as an instrument of purification and atonement, as a unifying force, and as 
an enlivening element. The Hindu paradigm views water as a life giving substance and a 
purifying agent. Water is sacred, because it has the potential to wash away sins. It is 
because water purifies, that rivers are considered sacred, thus, Hindu pilgrimages include a 
bath in a sacred river (or in some cases a spring) (Sharma 1994, 69; 2001, 37-9). In 
addition, among Hindus, many of the daily, yearly, and life-cycle rites, such as bathing 
and cremation are conducted along the river banks (Sharma 2001, 37-9). Water, therefore, 
is closely linked to ritual cleanliness. Furthermore, the caste system of Hinduism – enacted 
in Nepal by the Muluki Ain (the national code) in 185423 – bases itself on the ritual purity 
deriving from water. Here the water lineage – groups distinguished on the basis of water 
acceptability – acted as a basis for the major demarcation (Sharma 2001, 43-4). These 
provisions relating to caste relations and hierarchy were not included in the new Muluki 
Ain of 1964 (Pradhan, Meinzen-Dick 2003, 47). 
Hydropower development actually brings together the two important roles of water in 
Nepal: economic and religious. The drive for economic development through building 
more hydropower in the country can actually pose a problem to the religion, because the 
places that are potential places for hydropower generation, are exactly the same places that 
are holy sites of Hinduism, namely those of the confluence of two or more rivers, and 
rivers passing through a gorge (Sharma 1994, 67).  
1.4.4.2 Legal Regime  
The modern legislation of Nepal views water as a resource and vests its ownership with 
the state. This contradicts with the customary water law24 and the religious significance of 
water. Water rights in Nepal have traditionally been linked together with land rights. The 
state has been relinquished rights over land, and at the same time, made water more 
                                                 
22 The largest religions of Nepal are Hinduism (78%) and Buddhism (10.5%). Others are Islam, Christianity, 
Jainism, Sikh and Kirant, all proportionately small (Dahal 2003). The role of water is the most significant in 
Hinduism; thus, the focus will be on that particular religion. 
23 This is the first comprehensive law of the Nepalese state, and it drew consciously from the holy Hindu 
texts (dharmashastras). It related primarily to the fields of administrative and personal law, and gave legal 
sanctions to caste norms. 
24 Von Benda-Beckman, von Benda-Beckman and Pradhan (2000, 10-11) write that the use of the word 
'customary law' in the context of Nepal is not without problems. For 'custom' and 'customary law' are usually 
associated with local tradition, sets of rules having their own basis of legitimacy in generally accepted social 
practice, distinct and different from the rules of the state with their own legitimacy. Actually, the 'customary 
law' based on rules that regulated the relationship between feudal lords and their fiefs, and hence, had more 
to do with the feudal state or state formation, than with local relationships per se (for case studies see 
Pradhan et al. 2000). 
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strongly controlled by the state. In the classical Hindu theory of kingship, the king was the 
'owner' of all land, as well as the natural resources in his kingdom. His subjects had 
different rights to the land, depending on the tenure that he bestowed on them. The rights 
to water were subsumed under, and acquired, through land rights (Pradhan 2000, 42-5). 
The Muluki Ain largely recorded and officially validated these rules25, basing itself on the 
Hindu scriptures. The Muluki Ain did not regulate water in detail, most likely because 
water was not considered as a source of major revenue, and as mentioned above, the rights 
to water were included under land rights.  
The legal regime concerning water began to be highlighted only when the state 
commenced to be heavily involved in the construction and management of irrigation 
systems and hydroelectricity, and when water was considered an important resource. The 
legal regime concerning water has developed through increasing regulation and control. It 
has evolved into a state of full state ownership for all water (Pradhan 2000, 39; Shrestha 
M.N. 2009, 38-9). The Acts legitimising the state's increasing control and regulation of 
water were the Canal Act of 1961, the Canal, Hydroelectricity and Related Water Sources 
Act 1967, and the Water Resources Act 1992 (Shrestha M.N. 2009, 39), which stipulated 
that the state owns all water sources, even the water sources such as springs on private 
land, rendering all individual water rights as secondary to the rights of the state. Before the 
Water Resources Act 1992, the water supply and sanitation sub-sector was not legally 
regulated, and these regulations have subsequently been developed, first in the 1990s and 
then in the 2000s. However, individuals, groups of individuals or the community, have a 
right to divert water from sources like streams, rivers or groundwater, to the extent that the 
extraction does not adversely affect the functioning of government irrigation schemes or 
hydro-power plants. Thus, people have use-rights to the water resources (Magar 2005, 
201). Modern legislation, and the Hindu scriptural view on water, are based on quite 
different value premises. Modern legislation does not take into account that in Hinduism, 
water is associated with cleanliness and ritual purity. By associating water with physical 
health, the state simultaneously disassociates water from ritual purity (Sharma 2001, 76)26. 
Local traditions, being influenced by both ecclestical canons and modern legislation, 
include elements of both. Sharma finds that modern legislation is visible through the 
pervasive influence of the ideology of bikas, which the state itself has propounded over 
the years.  
These developments in land and water rights are both part and the consequence of 
broader changes in the political economy. Especially after the so-called 'revolution' in 
1950-51, which ended 104 years of despotic Rana regime, replacing it by parliamentary 
democracy and constitutional monarchy, with a distinction between the king and the state. 
The nature and functioning of the Nepalese state changed from being mainly an 
instrument to maintain law and order and to collect revenue to one which also plans, 
regulates and implements developmental and welfare activities. New laws were enacted, 
empowering the state to increase its control and regulation of natural resources. Officially 
                                                 
25 It had only one chapter that detailed provisions relating to water, particularly for irrigation, and the 
provisions relating to water was part of a chapter mainly concerned with the reclamation and cultivation of 
land. For a detailed study of the Muluki Ain and the Nepalese caste system see Hofer (1976). 
26 See also Pradhan, Meinzen-Dick 2003, 47. 
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1.5 The Nepalese State 
To contextualise the Nepalese state as an actor in the water supply and sanitation sector, I 
provide a short overview of the political history in Nepal. This section shows that its 
administrative culture has long roots in the centralised style of administration, and that its 
political culture, particularly since over the past 15 years, has been characterised by 
political instability, which has not allowed democracy to consolidate. Furthermore, it 
highlights that old traditions of patronage and clientelism still characterise Nepalese 
politics. After my overview of the history of Nepal, I open up the concepts used in this 
thesis to characterise Nepal, namely, clientelism and patronage, neopatrimonialism and a 
hybrid regime.   
Since 1769, when Prithvi Narayan Shah brought more than seventy-five principalities 
together and formed what today is known as Nepal, the centralised nature of the Shah 
(1769-1846) and Rana (1846-1951) regimes has continued to characterise Nepalese 
political culture and administration. In 1951, the Ranas were pushed out of power and a 
multiparty system under the monarchy was introduced, only to be reversed in 1962 with a 
‘more suitable form of democracy’ than the ‘imported (Western) model’, namely the 
‘partyless Panchayat’ system27 (Panday 1999, 242). The partyless Panchayat polity created 
a rather façade of elected institutions, through the enactment of laws, and a high degree of 
centralisation, and the patrimonial practices remained both at national and local level 
(Borre, Panday, Tiwari 1994, 11-2). The kings manned the bureaucracy with their trusted 
people, making it the nerve centre of administration and political structure (Seddon 1987, 
223, cited in Pfaff-Czarnecka 1989, 113; see also Rose, Fisher 1970, 72-3). After the 
replacement of the Panchayat system with a multiparty democracy in 1990, political 
instability and a frequent change in government have characterised the governance. The 
reintroduction of a multiparty democractic governance, however, did not result in any 
substantial acceleration in the democratic development process of the country, nor was the 
centralised state apparatus capable of giving room for decentralisation. The frequent 
changes in government (Bharadwaj et al. 2004, 62-6; Poudyal 1995, 160-3; Hoftun et al. 
1999) placed a considerable amount of pressure on institutions and resulted in highly 
personalised conflicts within and between them. Researchers have come to see that the 
intra-party quarrels, and splits of parties following big personalities with a patron-client 
relationship, has led to factionalism, and to the belief among the people that democracy is 
not able to function in Nepal (IDEA 1997, 8).28 As Panday (1999, 282) eloquently puts it: 
“All major parties have been willing and equal partners in the enterprise, which props up 
their rent seeking interests, which may sometimes be disguised and presented as a political 
agenda”.  
This has led to the ‘politics of survival’ (Migdal 1988, 236) that prevent the state from 
enhancing its capabilities, by not allowing the development of complex organisations in 
state institutions, and to a ‘fighting of bushfires’ as expressed by Kohli (1991, 386), “the 
                                                 
27 The panchayat system (the Panchayat Raj) was modelled on forms of indirect or ‘guided’ democracy then 
existing in the Philippines, Pakistan, Egypt, Indonesia and Yugoslavia (Whelpton 2005, 101).  
28 See also the articles in Asian Survey on political and economic developments in Nepal in years 1994-
2006. ’Nepal in 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006’.   
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bulk of political energy is spent fighting one bushfire after another, guided by the central 
concern of how to hang on to power” (ibid.). The party politics also became dominated by 
the caste and ethnic group interests. There was no clear ideology behind their advocacy, 
but they relied on short-term benefits for the party or the party leaders. The parties are not 
focusing on promoting equality and participation of all population groups, but 
advancement of its own group's interest and their patronage-based networks29.  
Due to the focus on ‘fighting of bushfires’ and the tendency to favour one’s own 
group, the state has not been able to focus its work on delivering development and services 
to the country equally. Thus, there are still large parts of the country that have not even 
received basic services. These areas are normally inhabited by sections of people that have 
been historically excluded from political and social processes, and have not been able to 
have influence on the national political and bureaucratic offices. These groups were 
mobilised by the Maoists, (Upadhya 2002, 42; Sharma, 2007, 61) who launched a 
‘people’s war’ in February 1996 (Bharadwaj et al. 2004, 66), or are currently mobilising 
themselves to challenge the old political parties and political culture, having chosen 
identity politics as a basis for their argument (ICG 2012b, i).  
1.5.1 On State Definitions 
Nepal has been presented by many with patronage and clientelistic networks, (Rose, 
Fisher 1970; Blaikie et al. 1980; Bista 1991; Panday 1999; Baral 2000; 2008; Kumar 
2000) and as a state ‘captured’ by the elite through their patronage-based and clientelistic 
networks (Pfaff 1999; Pradhan 2002; Tamang 2002; Rai 2005). Eisenstadt (1973), 
Bratton, van de Walle (1997) and Erdmann and Engel (2006) conceptualise clientelism 
together with patronage, which I follow. Clientelism means the exchange, or brokerage, of 
specific services and resources for political support (in the forms of votes). It involves a 
relationship between unequals, in which the major benefits accrue to the patron, and 
redistributive effects are limited. Patronage, on the other hand, refers to the politically 
motivated distribution of ‘favours’, not to individuals, but essentially to groups, in the 
Nepalese context to one's caste or ethnic group. Clientelism, therefore, implies a dyadic 
personal relationship between a patron and client, while patronage refers to the 
relationship between an individual and a bigger group. Politically, patronage is important. 
                                                 
29 Traditional patronage networks have been manifested by the development and long-term functioning of 
the institution of Chakari, providing favours to a person in power, in the hope of receiving favours and 
assistance in return. The Chakari system has to a large extent become part of the present political system and 
Nepalese bureaucracy. It is deep-rooted, and according to the state-centric view, where aspects outside of the 
sphere of the state, should not interfere the decision making, as it stands in the way of the development of 
democratic practices. However, it is easy for the dominant groups to continue to perform their patronage 
based services to their supporters, as they are in control of resources, both economically and politically, at 
the centre and district levels. Bista (1991, 5) calls chakari as nepotism ‘originated in the religious ritual 
practice of obeisance, which was extended to the governing classes and then to all in certain positions of 
power’. Kumar (2000, 37) makes a separation with the clientelistic view of Bista and considers chakari as a 
political system for sustaining political elites and less of a patron – client system. Cited in Rai 2005, 46-7. 
Cf. Suhardiman (2008) on upeti system in Indonesia.  
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When a part of high-level politics, it is an important instrument in creating and 
maintaining political cohesion, i.e. a coalition of ethnic elite, which is needed to form and 
support a government or a political party. In contrast, clientelism concerns individuals 
and, thus, it is based on personal relations. Developing a clientelistic network is a means 
to gain protection, and to achieve goals in a situation of societal uncertainty created by 
public institutions, which may behave in ways that are not calculable (Erdmann, Engel 
2006, 21). Yet, clientelism can also be a transfer of public goods and services by the 
patron, and not only an exchange of private or personal goods and services (Erdmann, 
Engel 2006, 20). This is also the case in the Nepalese water supply and sanitation sector, 
where the patron can promise water supply and sanitation services to the people in a 
particular area, as exchange for votes or any other kind of support. 
Due to my focus on patronage as political power, I interpret the Nepalese state to be 
neo-patrimonial30, along the definition of Erdmann and Engel (2006, 18):  
“neopatrimonialism is a mixture of two, partly interwoven, types of domination that co-
exist: namely, patrimonial and legal-rational bureaucratic domination. Under 
patrimonialism, all power relations between ruler and ruled, political as well as 
administrative relations, are personal relations; there is no differentiation between the 
private and the public realm. However, under neopatrimonialism the distinction between 
the private and the public, at least formally, exists and is accepted, and public reference 
can be made to this distinction. Neopatrimonial rule takes place within the framework of, 
and with the claim to, legal-rational bureaucracy or “modern” stateness. Formal structures 
and rules do exist, although in practice, the separation of the private and public sphere is 
not always observed. Naturally these spheres are not isolated from each other; quite to the 
contrary, they permeate each other; or more precisely, the patrimonial penetrates the legal-
rational system and twists its logic, functions, and effects.” 
 
A special feature of the neo-patrimonial state is the combination of the state and economic 
power, depicted in the nationalisation of the economy, which gave all power to the 
governmental officials, who were often weakly prepared for this task (Leftwich 1993, 64-
5)31. After the arrival of the aid agencies, and even more after the privatisation of the 
economy, the rent-seeking among bureaucrats has essentially increased. Thus, for 
understanding the relationship between politics and economy in Nepal, a focus on the 
relevance of rent-seeking and rentier states is necessary. Boone (1990) defines rent-
seeking as “politically mediated opportunities for obtaining wealth through non-
productive economic activity” (Boone 1994, 427; Gallagher 1991, cited in Erdmann, 
Engel 2006, 26), which in this thesis mostly refers to kickbacks from procurement (aid 
money) or bribes paid within the bureaucracy for bureaucratic transfers.  
Van de Walle (2001, 55, 135) interlinks rent-seeking with state capacity. According to 
him, state capacity has been weakened by patronage and rent-seeking, and, on the other 
                                                 
30 There are several ways to characterise the Nepalese state, all of which encompass aspects of neo-
patrimonialism. These are: rent-seeking states (Krueger 1974), soft states (Myrdal 1970) and weak states 
(Migdal 1988, 1994).  
31 Others writing about the mutually reinforcing pattern of neopatrimonial governance and a rentier economy 
are Lewis (1994) and van de Walle (2001). 
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hand, low state capacity has facilitated various rent-seeking and corrupt practices. For 
him, as well as for Erdmann and Engel (2006), low state capacity derives from 
neopatrimonial rule. Others (Skocpol 1985; Midgal 1988; Kohli 1994) have viewed state 
capacity to relate to the relationship between the state and social forces – to the autonomy 
of the state to act without influence from other actors.  
To me, the identification of South Asian states as ‘soft states’ by Gunnar Myrdal 
(1968, 849-900, 1120), still captures the situation in Nepal. The soft state for Myrdal was 
characterised by a general lack of social discipline in underdeveloped countries, signified 
by deficiencies in their legislation and, in particular, in law observance and enforcement, a 
lack of obedience of rules and directives handed down to public officials on various levels. 
Often, collusion of these officials, with powerful people, or groups of people, whose 
conduct they should regulate, and, at bottom, a general inclination of people in all strata to 
resist public controls and their implementation. In these soft states, he continues, policies 
decided are often not enforced, if they are enacted at all, referring to low autonomy and 
capacity of the developing countries in the area of policy making, and particularly in their 
implementation. Myrdal additionally mentions that the administration is not mature 
enough to enforce these laws, it is typically corrupted, and the leaders of the state do not 
possess a full understanding of democracy. Most of the countries are nominally 
democratic, but practically not. 
Nepal has transformed from a purely authoritarian governance to formal democracy. 
However, democracy in Nepal is not consolidated. These states, which have not been able 
to consolidate democracy, but where formal transition to democracy has taken place, are 
defined as 'hybrid regimes', which brings together several of those characteristics that I 
have attached to Nepal above.32 The dual dynamics of a hybrid regime consist of a limited 
state capacity, which is exacerbated by the contest of rules of the game, and of new 
demands put on the state by actors that want to be included in the decision making. 
According to Fritz and Rocha Menocal (2006, 17-8) there is great variation between 
hybrid regimes themselves, however, some general characteristics can be observed. 
Hybrid regimes  
“tend to be characterised by populist politics,'delegative/strong-man leadership33 and 
decision-making processes, a sense of collective frustration among citizens about the 
failure of democracy to deliver tangible economic benefits, and disillusionment about what 
can be achieved through formal political institutions. Moreover, in these regimes, the rule 
of law is at best uneven. Clientelistic structures and high levels of corruption often persist, 
especially when citizens have few means of holding elites to account, except during 
election times. … The civil service often continues to suffer from a mix of 
ethnic/regional and political clientelism – ranging from creation of additional ministries to 
                                                 
32 See also Erdmann 2002; Karl 1995; Rüb 2002. Others have suggested placing these imperfect or flawed 
democracies as sub-types of democratic rule, such as 'delegative', 'illiberal', or 'defect' democracies 
(O'Donnell 1994; Merkel, Croissant 2000). For a critical review of democracies with an adjective see 
Collier, Levitzky (1997).  
33 The same remark has been made by Migdal (1988, 4-5). Fritz and Rocha Menocal (2006, 12) specify this, 
by writing, that leaders, who stay in power too long, tend to become increasingly erratic and ineffective. 
Indefinite leadership can be seen as an obstacle both to the political democratisation process and to social 
and economic development (making reference to van de Walle 2001; Grindle 2004; Birdsall 2006.) 
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accommodate important support groups to the abuse of civil servants to rally support for 
incumbents during pre-election periods.”  
 
In summary, I have described the Nepalese state as embedded in patronage and 
clientelistic networks, which together with the ratio-legal bureaucratic practice, makes 
Nepal a neopatrimonial country. I have shown that because of neopatrimonialism and rent-
seeking within the politico-administrative culture of Nepal, the governance capacity of the 
state has been weakened – having interlinkages with Myrdal’s definition of a soft state, 
and corresponding to Fritz and Rocha Menochal’s comprehension of a hybrid regime. 
1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
This introductory chapter has presented the main questions that this thesis aims to 
investigate, and has provided an introduction to the meaning of water in Nepal, showing 
that it has an economic potential, that has become a highly sensitive political issue, and 
that it has an important role for the main religion of the country – Hinduism. In addition, it 
has pinpointed that the country has long roots in a centralised style of administration and 
governance and that democracy is a rather new concept in Nepal. Exactly as in other 
hydrid regimes, Nepal’s democracy is still to be consolidated. The section also defines 
Nepal as a neopatrimonial country, where the legal-rational bureaucratic governance 
coexists with the patronage and clientelistic traditions.  
Chapter Two outlines the conceptual and theoretical framework, as well as the 
methodology used in this thesis. The central elements of the framework are the concepts 
of ‘policy as a process’ and ‘politics of policy’. Theoretically, the study makes use of 
policy network theories. Methodologically, this study is a case study research, focusing on 
analysing the policy making process of the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Policy, 
Strategy and Action Plan, finalised in 2004. The research methods were interviews, 
literature study and some participant observation.  
Chapter Three introduces the aid system and analyses the role of aid in Nepal. It views 
aid delivery as a game between the donor and the recipient government, rather than only 
as a benevolent deed done to improve the living of the people in the poorer countries. 
Thus, the chapter illuminates the different interests and incentives of the recipient 
country’s governmental agencies and the donors to gain and deliver aid.  It shows that the 
aid delivery is donor-driven and that the new aid instruments of process conditionality, 
policy dialogue, and sector-wide approaches – designed to increase ownership at the 
recipient government – have actually allowed the donors to increasingly involve 
themselves in the policy making in the recipient countries.  
Chapter Four provides evidence for the argument that water-related problems in Nepal 
stem from problems in governance, rather than from the scarcity of water. The problems in 
water governance has led to a huge variation in coverage of and accessibility to water 
supply and sanitation, among other problems. The chapter presents the institutional 
arrangements in the sector, and shows that governance problems relate to the centralised 
style of administration, called in the water sector as ‘hydrocracy’. The governmental 
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hydrocracy, the Department of Water Supply and Sewerage has been contested by several 
issues and actors, because of its inability to meet and adapt to the changing priorities of 
other sector actors. Furthermore, the chapter analyses the overlapping functions and 
duplication in jurisdictions between the two main governmental agencies – the DWSS and 
the Dolidar. These hinder the creation of effective institutional arrangements in the sector, 
the organisations’ capacity to govern the water resources, and the ability to lead priority 
setting in the sector.  
Chapter Five highlights the framing force of aid. It shows how the global thinking of 
how aid should be delivered determines how policy papers in Nepal have been formulated. 
It provides empirical evidence on this, by comparing the birth of global ideas with 
contemporary policy papers in Nepal. It shows that these development fashions trickle 
down into the national development plans and the policy documents in the water supply 
and sanitation sector. Further, is shows that there is little ‘own ideas’ from the side of 
Nepal in these documents. Conceptually, the chapter draws on the application of ‘policy 
narratives’ and shows that global ‘dominant narratives’ (Roe 1994) and ‘nirvana concepts’ 
(Molle 2008) also characterise Nepalese policy papers.  
In Chapter Six the main ideas are coming from global aid policy and characterising aid 
governance in the 2000s – the principles of the Paris Declaration, particularly 
harmonisation, coordination and sector-wide approaches – are investigated in the context 
of the water supply and sanitation sector in Nepal. It is found that the efforts at 
coordinating the sector are donor-driven, yet the aim of donors has not been to coordinate 
the sector, but to establish a national programme (sector-wide approach programme) to the 
sector. Central in this has been to secure a position as a sectoral leader and to legitimise 
their own story-line for the national programme through building alliances to support the 
legitimisation attempts. Therefore, the alliances formed for this purpose are called 
legitimacy alliances and their coming-together is analysed through making use of the 
concepts of policy network theories.  
Chapter Seven combines the arguments of the previous chapters with detail in the case 
study of this research: the policy making processes of the Rural Water Supply and 
Sanitation Policy, Strategy and Action Plan. It traces the policy formulation process and 
shows that the process was guided by the ‘project politics’ of the main funding agency, the 
Asian Development Bank. The chapter shows that the policy making process was donor-
centred, yet, highlighting the power of governmental agencies to manoeuvre their interests 
in the policy process and identifying strategies that the aid recipient country agencies can 
resort to when negotiating policy with a ‘powerful’ donor. The chapter concludes that 
policy making in the Nepalese rural water supply and sanitation sector is not a technical 
exercise, as presented by the donors, but a political struggle for power and resources.  
Chapter Eight concludes this thesis by confirming that the policy making process in 
the rural water supply and sanitation sector in Nepal is political. This is manifested by the 
actors involved in the aid, deploy aid-related concepts, to legitimise the aid activities. The 
chapter presents the aid relationship to base on the pattern of permanent negotiation, 
supported by the continuous negotiation of policies, programmes and aid modalities 
between the sectoral actors. Due to the permanent negotiation that the donors are active in, 
the national decision making in Nepal and their role is strengthened by the donor-
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dependency of Nepal, reformulating this into a case of interdependence. Additionally, the 
chapter presents the theoretical contributions of this study. The donor involvement in the 
policy making process has not been theoretically analysed, which particularly affects the 
applicability of policy network theories. It shows that the logic of most policy network 
theories is different from those policy alliances where donors are members, as these 
alliances do not aim to change policy, but to legitimise their own policy priorities and 
consequently the aid.  
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2 Theoretical and Methodological Framework  
2.1 Conceptual and Theoretical Framework  
The conceptual framework that I have used in this study aims to explain how the rural 
water supply and sanitation sector, and particularly the making of the Rural Water Supply 
and Sanitation Policy, is shaped by the policy actors34. Central in this analysis is the 
mapping of their dynamics, relationships, interests and strategies, in the policy process, 
and the alliances the actors build for influencing policy into their preferred direction. The 
selection of theoretical concepts follows a pluralistic approach to theory and is guided by 
the research questions rather than a single ‘grand’ theory. I have not hesitated to seek 
guidance from a range of theoretical traditions in order to help shape my analytical 
framework, yet, even though the theoretical framework encompasses several approaches, 
the unifying line in the conceptual and theoretical framework is viewing policy as a 
process, and emphasising the politics of policy -perspective.  
2.1.1 Policy as a Process 
Analysing policy as a process is the central aim of this dissertation. In a normative sense 
policy is presented as intention (rhetoric) rather than action (what actually was done) 
(explained by Colebatch 1998; Howlett, Ramesh 1995). My focus is on the latter, 
following the definition of Roberts (1971) and Jenkins (1978); policy being a “set of 
interrelated decisions taken by a political actor or group of actors concerning the selection 
of goals and the means of achieving them within a specified situation where these 
decisions should, in principle, be within the power of these actors to achieve”. In the case 
of Nepal, I take a delimited view on policy process; looking only at the formulation 
process of the policy, thus, excluding the implementation and how it shapes policy.   
My focus is on the structured interaction in the policy process. This allows us to 
analyse public policy through the participants, their understanding of the problem, the 
ways they interact with each other, and the outcomes of this interaction. Hence, policy 
formulation and implementation is not seen as a matter of instrumental and 
implementation technicalities, but as proposed by Long and van der Ploeg (1989), Grindle 
and Thomas (1991) and Hill (1997), policy making should be analysed as a continuous 
and contested process. Therefore, public policy is seen here as representing a balance of 
negotiated interests rather than the ‘expectations of society’ (Bolding, Manzungu, Zawe 
2004) or an ‘authoritative statement by a government about its intentions’ (Bridgman, 
Davis 1998).  
                                                 
34 My conceptual framework has similarities with the framework of Suhardiman (2008) and Reis (2012), 
who, in their dissertations, have also investigated policy making in the water sector. Suhardiman’s focus was 
on the irrigation sector in Indonesia and Reis studied the water supply and sanitation at grassroots level in 
Vietnam. 
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My interest in looking at the making of water supply and sanitation policies in Nepal 
lies in the process aspect, meaning how the policies were made and by whom, rather than 
looking at what was decided (Jenkins 1978; Thomas, Grindle 1990; Turner, Hulme 1997). 
My analysis adopts the part of the post-positivist concentration on the dynamics of the 
policy process instead of attempting to foresee the policy outcomes (Lasswell 1958; 
Pressmann, Wildavsky 1984; Kingdon 1995). This view contrasts with the linear model of 
policy making, which proposes a step-by-step progression from agenda-setting, to policy 
formulation via implementation to outcomes, after which one makes an ex-post evaluation 
to establish whether the objectives had been achieved (Mackintosh 1992). This view on 
policy making misses out on power- and authority-related aspects and neglects that a large 
part of policy making is not necessarily oriented to goals and implementation, but rather to 
the capacity to act and the conservation of power (Jann, Wegrich 2003, 96, cited in Reis 
2012, 7). Characterising policy as a process allows us to view policy making holistically, 
including looking at political, cultural, economic and institutional aspects of the society 
influencing the policy making. For instance, I analyse how the shifting trends of 
international aid have affected changes in Nepalese policies and how the institutional set 
up in the sector with bureaucrats’ social, economic and political motives have affected 
policy dynamics. The process approach also allows me to analyse water policy in Nepal as 
a series of decisions and actions, constructed by human agents who have multiple, often 
conflicting and sometimes changing perceptions and interests, instead of being constricted 
into the stages of policy formulation and implementation (Turner, Hulme 1997; cited in 
Suhardiman 2008, 9-10). I suggest that all policy processes create their own structures, 
which need to be discovered by looking at the dynamics of the policy process. 
Viewing policy as a process allows us to focus on what policy actors actually do, what 
kinds of roles they take, how they interact, as well as on the interests and motivations of 
relevant actors, or policy elites, as Grindle and Thomas (1991, 5) call them. They write,  
“Perceptions and behaviour of policy elites need to be explained systematically, as do the 
constraints on their action. A systematic understanding of the values, experiences, and 
perceptions of policy elites and the historical, political, and institutional context in which 
they operate is essential to understanding specific instances of reform”.  
 
Accordingly, I draw on the analysis of the policy elites beliefs, motives, incentives and 
strategies to be involved in policy making. This makes policy making contested, in which 
balances of power between different interest groups and individuals are negotiated, and 
intended and unintended outcomes produced. In short, in this research I focus on 
discovering and understanding policy actors’ strategies (as the representation of their 
policy perceptions and interests) and how these have shaped the actual making of water 
policies, the organisation of policy interaction in time and space, and the outcomes 
produced (Mollinga, Bolding 2004). The main policy actors researched in this study are 
the Nepalese water bureaucracies and aid agencies. I exclude the politicians from policy 
actors, because of their marginal role in the policy making process. The national level 
politicians do not participate in the policy consultations, policies are not discussed on a 
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regular basis in the parliament35, (currently called Constituent Assembly) and the 
politicians take little interest into the contents of policy – as long as it has limited benefits 
for their patronage-based purposes. The institutions (not people) that play the main role in 
the policy process are called policy elites. Together with the donor agencies the policy 
elite consist of the bureaucratic and governmental elite, whose responsibilities include 
policy making or participate in policy making, and implementing authoritative decisions 
for society. In this study they are mostly governmental organisations within the water 
sector. Policy elite in Nepal also tend to stem mainly from the elite of the country (e.g. 
high caste). Thus, through their positions in the bureaucracy, higher castes are able to 
shape policy making and to guard their own interests in the process.  
In the policy actor analysis I follow the definition of Mollinga (2007, 23-4) on donor-
centred policy process, which differs from the classic state- and society-centred policy 
processes. Mollinga writes that the state and society centrism in policy analysis (see 
Grindle 1999) implicitly assumes the existence of sovereign states within which these 
processes occur. But in the case of certain developing countries, the sovereignty might be 
undermined by an external actor, like an international donor36. This is also the case in 
Nepal, where aid agencies have increasingly influenced both the content of policies and 
the policy making and implementation structures (Panday 1999, 2001; Koponen, Sharma 
2004). This external influence on policy making has become dominant in the Nepalese 
water sector, particularly when compared to the domestic generation of policy dynamics, 
therefore, one can speak of a donor-centred policy process. 
2.1.2 Politics of Policy 
In recent debates on water policies it has been highlighted from various sides that politics 
is at the centre of ‘water governance’ (e.g. Franks 2004; UNDP 2004; Conca 2006; 
Plummer, Slaymaker 2007; Mehta et al. 2007; Mollinga 2008b). The concept of 
‘governance’, as used in the mainstream discourse, has been criticised for its reduction to a 
technical issue, neglecting the political aspect that determines outcomes (Plummer, 
Slaymaker 2007, 1; Mollinga 2008b, 9; cited in Reis 2012, 5). Hence, there is a growing 
concern for moving the debate towards a focus on the contested and political nature of 
water, discussing knowledge politics, social power relations, and the wider political 
economy related to water management (Molle et al. 2008; Mollinga 2008b; Mehta et al. 
2007; cited in Reis 2012, 5). For understanding the political side of the water policy 
making in Nepal, I use the ‘politics of policy’ theoretical perspective (Grindle, Thomas 
1991; Grindle 1999). Like the policy process analysis, the politics of policy theoretical 
perspective originates from the post-positivist approach in the study of policy making 
(Howlett, Ramesh 1998). It views policy as being politically contested by different interest 
                                                 
35 The discussions in the parliament are not open to the public; thus, it would not have been possible for me 
to observe these.  
36 Whether any of the countries in today’s world (characterised by global governance) have full sovereignty 
can be contested. In this thesis, I do not take a stand on this discussion. My point conceives only the 
possibilities of international donors in undermining the government’s power to decide about its own 
priorities.  
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groups at all stages of its existence, and with all interest groups trying to shape it in 
particular ways (Grindle 1977; Mollinga, Bolding 2004).  
My focus being on analysing the role of those actors that influence the governance of 
water supply and sanitation sector, and subsequently the policy making, necessitates 
having a broader view to governance. Thus, I do not use governance to refer to the state-
centred governance, which presupposes that, the state institutions have a monopoly in the 
governance, and therefore control other societal actors. In this thesis, governance refers to 
society-centred form of governance, which provides a role for actors outside the premises 
of the state to be part of governance and e.g. policy-making. These actors include donors, 
civil society, actors in the economy, networks, committees, and actors at local levels, 
among others.   
Similarly, the concept of politics in general use refers to official politics, that is, state 
and party politics. Here, politics is seen in broader sense, dealing with the mediation of 
social power, and the strategic action related to that mediation, namely, to the process 
through which the social relations of power, that shape resource use are constituted, 
negotiated, reproduced, transformed, or otherwise shaped (Kerkvliet 1990; Mollinga, 
Bolding 2004). My understanding of politics resonates with that of Leftwich (1983), who 
relates politics to “all activities of conflict, cooperation and negotiation involved in the 
use, production and distribution of resources, whether material or ideal, whether at local, 
national or international levels, or whether in the private or public domains”.  
Sketching water politics as a research field, Mollinga (2008b) suggested a typology 
identifying four domains, which are distinguished by differences in space and time scales, 
configurations or main actors, types of issues that make up their subject matter, mode of 
contestation and their sets of institutional arrangements: (1) the everyday politics of water 
resources management, (2) the politics of water policy in the context of sovereign states, 
(3) inter-state hydropolitics, and (4) the global politics of water. Drawing on the case of 
rural water supply and sanitation in Nepal at the national level, this study is foremost 
concerned with the second domain, the politics of water policy in the context of sovereign 
states. However, it also discusses the fourth level of the global politics of water by looking 
at the ‘journeying’ of policy ideas from the global policy level into the Nepalese national 
setting and by this contributes to the study of interlinkages between domains.  
Adopting a politics of policy perspective has three major conceptual advantages 
(Suhardiman 2008). Firstly, it suggests a continuous decision making process throughout 
policy formulation (and its actual implementation), and underlines the crucial role of the 
negotiation processes, resource allocations, and alliance formulation in these processes. 
Secondly, the politics of policy theory draws attention to the policy elites’ interests, 
perceptions, and strategies, in relation to the policy. Unlike theories, which presume 
rational decision making in policy processes, the politics of policy theory focuses on the 
way policy formulation and implementation is shaped by political practices applied by the 
policy elite. In addition, the politics of policy theory acknowledges the need to include 
other policy actors (including people at the local level, donors, civil society) as part of the 
policy analysis, despite the focus on the policy elites. The third conceptual advantage of 
the theory is, that it includes circumstances unique to a particular policy initiative as an 
essential part in the policy analysis. Here, the characteristics of the proposed policy 
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change are analysed in relation with other significant contextual elements, and thus, not in 
isolation from the existing power structures, relationships, and power struggles.  
The making of water policies in Nepal is highly political, due to the involvement of 
many different actors with different interests and motives, and the high stakes, due to the 
profitability of the water resources in Nepal. In this study, I view the negotiation processes 
as a game (Koponen, Sharma 2004) in which the Nepalese governmental actors and the 
donors have their own interests. In this game, each side has to allow ample room of 
manoeuvre for the other as both parties have certain interests at stake, and own ‘target 
groups’ to be kept satisfied. Thus, the rules of such a game are not explicitly discussed and 
agreed upon, but formed and changed by tacit agreement that generates a lot of friction. 
Furthermore, I suggest that the conditionalities set by the aid agencies have partly made 
the policy process political. In this thesis, the focus is on the conditionalities related to 
governance, policy making and the guidance provided for structuring the policy making. 
These appear to be very contingent on histories of conflict and structural characteristics of 
state-society relations and often conflict the aid recipient’s own priorities and means for 
achieving the desired development. The politics of policy approach will help me to unpack 
this black box.  
2.1.3 Power 
In this research, power is understood as social power (French, Raven 1959; Lukes 2005) 
referring to the social agents’ action over another or others, and to their capacities. Social 
power helps to understand the relationships between the different interest groups in the 
policy process. With social power I mean the ability of an actor or a group to change the 
incentive structures of other actors in order to bring about outcomes, and to influence their 
decision making by various mechanisms, for instance through manipulation, coercion, 
knowledge, and authority. Social power thus refers to the negotiation, struggle and contest 
in policy making. In these processes different policy actors mobilise different resources, 
interact in different ways and (re)shape policies. There are questions of 
inclusion/exclusion, open/hidden agendas, front/back room interaction, and the like 
(Mollinga, Bolding 2004, 298).  
However, power is not only seen to restrict in how hierarchies and hegemonic control 
demarcate social positions and opportunities, and restrict the access to resources. It is also 
the outcome of complex struggles and negotiations over authority, status, reputation and 
resources, and necessitates the enrolment of networks of actors (Latour 1994; Callon, Law 
1995, cited in Long 2001, 71). Such struggles are founded upon the extent to which 
specific actors perceive themselves capable of manoeuvring within particular situations 
and developing effective strategies for doing so. Creating room for manoeuvre implies a 
degree of consent, a degree of negotiation, and thus a degree of power, as manifested in 
the possibility to exerting some control, prerogative, authority and capacity for action, be 
it frontstage or backstage, for flickering moments, or for more sustained periods 
(Villarreal 1992, 256, cited in Long 2001, 71). Thus, as Scott (1985) points out, power 
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inevitably generates resistance, accommodation and strategic compliance, as regular 
components of the political action. 
Expert and coercive power are important aspects of social power for understanding the 
power of the aid agencies in Nepal. Expert power relates to the aid agencies’ power 
deriving from their knowledge, expertise and skills, as well as from the Nepalese state’s 
needs for those skills and expertise. This type of power is highly specific, and in the 
context of this study, limited to the areas of economic, public, and water sector 
development, in which the aid agency representatives are trained and experienced. 
Coercive power, on the other hand, refers to the ability to demote or withhold rewards. In 
the context of this study, these rewards are the funds provided by the aid agencies to the 
Nepalese state for its development activities. It is the desire of the state for valued 
rewards, or the fear of having them withheld, that ensures their obedience under the power 
of the aid agencies. Mollinga (2008b) has used the concept of ‘technologies of power’ 
(Foucault 1982) to refer to wide array of means and devices by which power is exerted. 
The examples range from physical force to legal procedures, to money, to discursive 
techniques, to lobbying, to modes of education, and socialisation, and many more. 
Technologies of power are consciously, as well as unconsciously, used by actors in social 
transaction. The means of expert and coercive power can be seen as technologies of 
power, particularly the policy narratives, as discursive power, and all aid instruments, 
including the conditionalities, set by the aid agencies, can be viewed as technologies of 
power.  
Within the context of the Nepalese society social power also refers to power based on 
social traditions and habits. These are the patronage networks, which have roots in the 
caste system and ethnicity. This power can be used as means of exclusion, and to protect 
the interests of the more powerful social group. Next, I shortly elaborate patronage 
networks before moving to policy network theories.  
2.1.4 Policy Networks and Subsystems 
I use parts of policy network theories to map the policy actors’ relationships in Nepal. 
Within the policy process I am particularly interested in the decision making process, how 
decisions were made, and by whom, and which were the factors influencing the decision 
making. Through the policy network theories, I aim to analyse the alliance formation of 
these actors, the formulation of policy goals, how they influenced each others decision 
making, and the bargaining and struggle over policy outcomes. The policy alliances are 
seen as interdependent, therefore, an important aspect is to look for the mechanisms that 
link the aid agencies and the Nepalese state in the making of water policies. In this study 
policy networks are defined as  
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“stable patterns of social relationships between interdependent actors, which take shape 
around policy problems or policy programs, and that are being formed, reproduced, and 
changed by an ecology of games between these actors. In these games, actors try to 
influence policy processes by strategic behaviour. A network is not a static entity, but 
changes over time as a result of the ongoing series of games.”37  
Klijn 1996, 97-8 
I use some of the concepts of the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) (Sabatier, 
Jenkins-Smith 1993; Jenkins-Smith, Sabatier 1994) and Kuhn’s (1970) broader 
sociological definition of a paradigm as ”an entire constellation of beliefs, values, 
techniques, and so on shared by members of a given community” to analyse formation of 
the alliances and reasons for why certain actors found other actors more appealing as 
alliance partners than others. Through the focus of the ACF on belief coalitions – a set of 
basic values, causal assumptions, and problem perceptions – I am able to identify the main 
reasons for the formation of different alliances within the water policy process in Nepal, 
that is, their core beliefs, which link them into an alliance. In my research, beliefs and 
causal assumptions are an important factor in explaining the understanding of the problem 
and the formulation of policy alternatives, for instance, why the aid agencies and other 
members of their alliance actively propagated neo-liberalism, privatisation and good 
governance, as the best solutions for the water sector reform, thus sharing a belief system, 
and how these issues became an important part of the policy struggle. For analysing the 
evolution of the thinking of the donors and their alliance partners, I apply the concept of 
story-line (Hajer 1995; Rein, Schön 1986).  
There are also other advantages of the application of the ACF for this study. First, it 
focuses on policy subsystems rather than on specific governmental institutions, as the 
principal unit for understanding policy change, and that these subsystems have an 
intergovernmental nature. Secondly, the ACF, like the politics of policy perspective, 
emphasises the importance of the external environment around the policy actors and 
coalitions. Issues are seen to emerge through changes in the environment, which causes re-
evaluation of the belief system about public policy, and new interest and interest groups 
can emerge. This supports my view of policy as a dynamic process and allows me to 
concentrate on assessing how changes in socio-economic and political contexts, outputs 
from other policy subsystems, and system-wide governing alliances affect or constrain the 
policy making and the resources of the policy actors. Thirdly, the framework focuses on 
the policy subsystems as composed of policy elites rather than members of the general 
public. Grindle and Thomas (1991) outline,  
 
                                                 
37 Klijn’s definition of game is “an ongoing sequential chain of strategic action between different players 
(actors) governed by formal and informal rules that develop around issues and decisions in which actors are 
interested. In these games, actors try to influence policy processes by strategic behaviour”. In this connection 
game refers to manoeuvring, struggle and strategic action. My reference to ‘game’ does not include a 
reference to game theory.  
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“policy choices are the result of activities that take place largely within the state and that 
are significantly shaped by policy elites who bring a variety of perceptions, commitments, 
and resources to bear on the content of reform initiatives, but who are also clearly 
influenced by the actual or perceived power of societal groups and interests that have a 
stake in reform outcomes”. 
2.1.5 Bureaucracy 
In the context of my study, I speak of bureaucracy and bureaucratic actors. I do not, 
however, view the bureaucracy as a collective actor, but consisting of various bureaucratic 
agencies with own interests that can conflict with each other. With bureaucracy I mean a 
form of rule and a category of governmental system, meaning government by officials 
rather than government by people, a single person, or by only a hereditary class.38 Like 
Beetham (1987) I view this bureaucracy to be “the accumulated product of social history 
of past policies [that] become congealed in institutional form and develop a network of 
interests around them, both inside and outside the bureaucracy”.  
Political and bureaucratic corruption is a widespread phenomenon within the Nepalese 
government. However, since the advent of the multiparty democracy, there has been 
growing public anger about corruption and the misuse of power, but the top of the 
administration has failed to respond to this anger (Gyawali 2004). This has contributed to 
the general distrust of state institutions and erosion of regime legitimacy. Within the 
bureaucracy, corruption is most obvious in the public works’ procedures and in the misuse 
of public office for personal gain.39 However, even though mostly used for private gain 
(Bardhan 1997), I refer with corruption to something more systematic, as illuminated in 
the system of payments made for bureaucratic transfers, promotions and positions 
(Theobald 1999; Davis 2004).  
2.1.6 Framework  
My conceptual framework tries to explain how, on the one hand, patronage-based social 
relations and a dependency on foreign aid influence decision making at the national level 
in the rural water supply and sanitation sector, and on the other hand, how aid agencies’ 
priorities shape the process. I hypothesise that in this situation, donors are able to use this 
weak negotiation position of the country to promote their own ends, which not necessarily 
correspond to the needs and priorities of the country. I want to understand what kind of 
means do the governmental actors have to overcome this influence. The framework helps 
to explain and explore the relationships and interactions for meaningful conceptual and 
theoretical propositions.  
 
                                                 
38 This is in contrast to the mainstream view of bureaucracy, in which it simply is used to refer to 
government administrative agencies staffed by public servants. 
39 For a detailed description of corruption within the public works see inter alia Wade 1982.  
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Figure 2.1 Conceptual Framework 
2.2 Methodology, Methods, Research Process and Data 
2.2.1 Introduction 
This thesis investigates the characteristics of policy making and water governance in the 
Nepalese rural water supply and sanitation sector. For this a case study approach was 
chosen, which serves to identify inductively variables, hypotheses or causal mechanisms 
that affect policy making (George, Bennet 2005, 74, cited in Reis 2012, 18). Within the 
various types of case studies, mine falls in the category of case studies, that use theoretical 
frameworks to provide an explanation of particular cases, which can lead as well to an 
evaluation or refinement of theories (Vennesson 2008, 227). The case of Rural Water 
Supply and Sanitation Policy is taken up in order to shed light onto the dynamics between 
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the different policy actors. The aim of this thesis is therefore, not to investigate the 
impacts of policy, but what were the mechanisms and issues behind the policy, leading to 
its formulation. Using the words of Mosse (2005, 2) it does not ask whether, but how, 
policy works. In this sense the research is open-ended, ‘soaking and poking’ for causes 
and effects; it is concerned with explaining a puzzling outcome without preconceptions 
about its causes (Gerring 2007, 71, cited in Reis 2012, 18). Just as it is not the goal of the 
study to evaluate policy impacts, its primary goal is neither to produce ‘policy-relevant’ 
outcomes.  
The basic methodological elements of my doctoral research are summarised in the 
table 2.1 in the previous page. Methodology can conceptually be understood as consisting 
of three levels: (1) the scientific model, which constitutes the epistemological and 
ontological foundation of the research, (2) the research method or strategy, and (3) the 
research techniques. Each of the levels is “filled-in” in relation to choices at the other 
levels, ensuring that there is (or should be) coherence between the scientific model, the 
research strategy and the research techniques, though there are no simple one-to-one 
relations between the levels. The methodology discussed here is the result of several years 
of designing and developing an appropriate methodological approach for the complex case 
study and challenging political and social environment in question.40 
 
                                                 
40 This table format has been used by Gert Jan Veldwisch in his doctoral dissertation (2008). I found it very 
useful in organising my thinking about methodology and have therefore applied it in my research.  
 
 
 
 
52 
Table 2.1: Three levels of methodology as applied in the research 
 
Model Basic elements Difficulties 
encountered 
Emphases and 
adaptations made in 
response to 
difficulties 
Scientific 
model  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Theoretical 
base 
Critical realist and 
sociological 
institutionalism, basing 
on postpositivism, and 
making use of 
constructivism.  
 
 
Policy as a process -
theory, policy network 
theories, theories on 
state capacities. 
Blurredness in 
identifying the right 
kind of mix in 
methodology, due to 
multiple research 
problems within the 
case. 
 
RWSSP policy process 
not fitting into the 
existing policy network 
theories; theories on 
state capacities focus on 
state-building, which is 
not the case of Nepal.  
Focus shifted from 
social constructivism to 
critical realism. 
 
 
 
 
 
Policy network theories 
not applied as such to 
analysing the sector 
dynamics, but used only 
as providing framework 
and leading to 
reformulation of the 
theories; emphasis on 
neopatrimonialism, 
instead of state capacity. 
Research 
methods/ 
strategies 
Case study research, 
process tracing, 
extended case method, 
interface framework, 
analysis of discourses. 
Several research 
strategies make it 
difficult to define, which 
of these is applied for a 
particular issue.  
Instead of strictly 
following one research 
strategy/method, 
emphasis put on a right 
kind of mix along the 
research questions.  
Research 
techniques 
Semi-structured 
interviews; dialogue 
with interviewees; 
participant observation; 
field note diaries; 
acquisition of secondary 
data.  
Building rapport with 
donor representatives 
difficult; reluctance by 
some of the interviewees 
to speak against either 
donors or government 
due to their dependency 
on those for living. 
More emphasis on 
finding written material; 
combining interviews 
with observation and 
contextualising 
interviews. 
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2.2.2 Scientific Model  
The scientific model underlying this research is chosen to meet the needs of the case study 
method, and to understand the social dynamics of the water policy processes and water 
governance. In the case study analysis, I follow the process tracing, as explained by 
Vennesson (2008). For this, I position myself nearest to critical realism, however, having 
ties to constructivism. These linkages between these two philosophies of methodology 
have been analysed by Delanty (1997), who visions a new approach called critical 
constructivism. Critical constructivism argues that empirical reality can only be known 
through our cognitive structures. It departs from the autopoietic versions of constructivism 
in which science, including social science, is perceived as a closed system of knowledge, 
disconnected from public discourse, and other forms of knowledge (Delanty 1997, 139-
141, cf. Vihemäki 2007, 46-7). 
Critical realism – basing on post-positivism – builds on the idea that there is a real 
world ‘out there’, but that we only know it through the constructions that people make of 
it – here coming close to constructivism. Critical realism holds that the goal of science is 
to find out what is the reality, even though acknowledging at the same that this can never 
be fully achieved. As it is not possible to know with certainty what has actually taken 
place, post-positivism emphasises the importance of multiple measures and observations 
and the need to use triangulation, because all sources can retain errors. The post-positivist 
approach also believes that all observations are theory-laden, and that scientists are 
inherently biased by their cultural experiences and world-views. The critical realism also 
takes a stand on the issue of cause and effect, by presenting that there is no linear relation 
between cause and effect, rather, the phenomena are governed by, at best, probabilistic 
laws. Hence, the mechanisms of change need to be studied in-depth in order to understand 
social processes of change (Veldwisch 2008, 44; della Porta, Keating 2008, 24). The 
critical realist approach puts emphasis on the analysis of both structure and agency, which 
are seen interlinked, giving better understanding for causality41 (Archer 1995, 1, 15). 
Here, I find, the other philosophy of methodology in my research, the new – 
sociological – institutionalism comes in handy: its focus on analysing the motivations and 
interests of the agents, an issue, that is central to my research. Sociological 
institutionalism shows how the institutions, in which an individual lives, through 
socialisation and learning, shape the very values of and desires of that individual (Keating 
2008, 104). It relates to a theoretical framework in my thesis, namely the policy networks, 
which I analyse through their shared understandings, values, and meanings. Sociological 
institutionalism has been shaped by culture studies, linking it with the third important 
factor in my study, the importance of contextualisation, which is emphasised by 
constructivism. Together with process tracing, sociological institutionalism allows me to 
reconstitute actors’ beliefs and perspectives, and to regroup them in a limited number of 
                                                 
41 Archer (1995, 15) writes: ’the interplay between structure and agency can actually be analyzed over time 
and space. It is based on two basic propositions: (i) That structure pre-dates the reaction(s) leading to its 
reproduction or transformation; (ii) That structural elaboration necessarily post-dates the action sequences 
which gave rise to it.’  
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categories, keeping in mind the evaluation of broader theoretical arguments (Vennesson 
2008, 234). 
The advantage of (social) constructivism, in addition to its focus on analysing agency 
(Kratochwil 2008, 86), is its focus on how social phenomena develop in particular social 
contexts through the self-transforming actions and perceptions of diverse and interlocked 
actors, and through the multiple forms of social knowledge and their relations with power 
(Booth (ed.) 1994; Long 2001). The advantage of this perspective is that it allows me to 
focus on the human and institutional aspect in the policy process, and to analyse how 
policies have been negotiated, and by whom, how they developed out of this negotiation 
process, and whether there are patterns of change, which have been induced or sustained 
by the water and sanitation policy. Constructivism also helps me in analysing the 
discourses in the Nepalese context by focusing on how these are constructed, 
reconstructed, and also deconstructed.  
These scientific philospohies help me in my ‘process tracing’: I aim to provide a 
narrative explanation of a causal path that leads to a specific outcome (George, Bennett 
2005, 176; Steinmo 2008; Vennesson 2008, 231, 235). By using process tracing I am able 
to assess theories by identifying the causal chain(s) that link the independent and 
dependent variables. My goal is to uncover the relations between possible causes and 
observed outcomes. This procedure can be used in theory testing and development 
(Vennesson 2008, 231), exactly as I have done with the policy network theories. Thus, the 
focus of this research is to trace the rural water supply and sanitation policy process in 
Nepal, the motives and incentives of the actors to participate in policy making, and to 
reflect on the dynamics between different actors. I have used the process tracing to 
discover a causal mechanism, and to show that a posited underlying mechanism 
connecting causal and dependent variables exists, and to demonstrate the conjunction and 
temporal sequence of variables (Vennesson 2008, 231, quoting Elman 1996, 17-18). 
Furthermore, it has provided me with means to learn and evaluate empirically the 
preferences and perceptions of actors, their purposes, goals, values, and their specification 
of the situations that face them. Process tracing helps me to uncover, directly and 
indirectly, what actors want, know and compute (Vennesson 2008, 233, quoting Simon 
1985, 295).  
There are two advantages of process tracing over story telling and different types of 
narratives. First, process tracing is focused. It deals selectively with only certain aspects of 
the phenomenon. Hence the investigator is aware that some information is lost along with 
some of the unique characteristics of the phenomenon. Second, process tracing is 
structured in the sense that the investigator is developing an analytical explanation based 
on a theoretical framework identified in the research design.  
2.3.3 Research Methods 
My aim is to provide an explanation of the dynamics of the rural water supply and 
sanitation sector, and of the sectoral policy processes in Nepal, through using an in-depth 
case study research, in which the case is studied over time, rather than at a single moment. 
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I go behind the myths, models and poses of water policy and institutions in Nepal, to 
uncover the dynamics of the making of these policies. I have approached my case study 
through process tracing (Vennesson 2008), extended case method (Burawoy et al. 1991; 
Burawoy 1998), and interface framework (Long 2001). Of these, the extended case 
method was used in the early phase of the study, particularly in the planning, and during 
the field work, whereas the process tracing and interface framework guided the later part 
of the field work and the analysis of the data. 
The main advantage of the case study research and the extended case method is that 
they allow me to concentrate on the reconstruction and consolidation of existing theory, 
rather than developing new or testing old theories. The theoretical construction is therefore 
not confined to the beginning of the investigation, but the researcher revises his/her main 
concepts because s/he is learning from the cases that s/he has decided to examine (Ragin 
2000, 31-2, cited in Vennesson 2008, 230-1). Theory-building is seen as a process in 
which case study evidence is examined for anomalies and refutations replicated in the 
case, theoretical positions are revised, and the evidence is examined once again from a 
new perspective, in this iterative mode. This perception proves particularly useful in the 
interpretation of policy process and politics of policy in the Nepalese context, illuminating 
the dynamics of how policies are formulated in Nepal – and why they are formulated – as 
well as the question of leadership in the sector and in policy development.  
The second advantage, presented by the approaches, is their emphasis on locating and 
explaining the case within its wider context (Hammersley, Gomm 2000; Burawoy 1998). 
Here, the emphasis is on situational analysis, which constitutes a social situation as 
unique, and pays attention to its complexity, depth and thickness. It takes the social 
situation as the point of empirical examination, and works with the given general concepts 
and laws about states, economies, legal orders, and the like, to understand how the case is 
shaped by wider structures. Here, the rural water supply and sanitation policy process is 
seen to have been shaped by the global policies of the aid agencies, the political, societal 
and economic context of the country, and the incentive structures of the policy actors.  
The third advantage is the emphasis on the processual aspect. This means that the 
focus of the analysis is on the sequence of events, over quite a long period of time, where 
the same actors are involved in a series of situations, in which their structural positions 
must continually be re-specified, and the flow of actors through different social positions 
specified. Thus, this enables me to trace how events chain on to one another, and 
therefore, how events are necessarily linked to one another through time.  
The fourth advantage is provided by the use of the extended case method –applied in 
the context of interviews and participant observation – to aim for dialogue with the 
interviewees. This has allowed me to more informally interact with the interviewees and 
build rapport with them.  
The interface framework analysis of the actor-oriented approach has also had a direct 
bearing on how I look at the sector dynamics and the policy process. Long (2001) argues 
that an actor-oriented perspective is to explore how social actors are locked into a series of 
intertwined battles over resources, meanings and institutional legitimacy and control. The 
interface in this research consists of the arena, defined as a social location or situation, in 
which contests over issues, resources, values and representations take place. Here, actors 
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confront each other, mobilise social relations, and deploy discursive and other cultural 
means, for the attainment of specific ends, including that of perhaps simply remaining in 
the game (Long 2001, 59). In this arena, aid agencies, Nepalese bureaucracies, and 
societal and economically interested actors, come together to decide on the future of the 
rural water supply and sanitation sector, as well as to formulate and implement relevant 
policies. Interfaces typically occur, according to Long (2001), at points where different, 
and often conflicting lifeworlds or social fields intersect, or more concretely, in social 
situations or arenas, in which interactions become oriented around problems of bridging, 
accommodating, segregating or contesting social, evaluative or cognitive standpoints. The 
social interface analysis aims to identify the organisational and cultural means of 
reproducing or transforming them (Long 2001, 65, 243). Therefore, through the interface 
analysis, I aim to characterise the different kinds of strategies used by the policy actors 
that reproduced or transformed these strategies. These are analysed as part of ongoing 
processes of negotiation, adaptation, struggle and transformation of meaning, which I view 
as socially constructed during the process.  
In the study policy, actors are presented as active participants, who process 
information and strategies in their dealings with other policy actors, as well as with 
outside institutions. They are viewed as interdependent, rather than independent, 
autonomous units, having relational ties for channelling resources between them. This 
continued interaction encourages the development of boundaries and shared expectations 
that shape the interaction of the participants so that the interface becomes an organised 
entity of interlocking relationships and intentionalities, which then develop into networks 
(Long 2001, 69). In this research, these are presented as social networks (Wasserman and 
Faust 1994) that concentrate around policy belief systems (Sabatier, Jenkins-Smith 1993).  
In the next section, I discuss my research path, including the explanation of the 
research techniques as outlined in table 2.1 above, as well as my data and the process 
leading to define my case study.  
2.2.4 Research Process, Data and Casing 
I started my research at the Center for Development Research, Bonn, Germany, in 2005, 
where I formulated my research proposal under the supervision of Prof. Peter P. Mollinga, 
who introduced me to the topic of policy processes. Initially, we were thinking of 
designing my research as a comparison of cases in Nepal and India, but soon realised that 
it might be better to focus on one of the countries. I chose Nepal, as I was familiar with its 
water sector, having administered a bilateral water supply and sanitation project for the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland. In 2007, I changed my enrolment to my alma 
mater, University of Helsinki, with Prof. Juhani Koponen as my second supervisor. After 
this, I was for years, periodically working on my thesis, or being employed in the field of 
development cooperation, due to my inability to secure funds for this research. This 
involved being far away from my supervisors and detached from the scientific community.  
In the summer of 2009, I was finally ready to go the field, where I spent 2.5 intensive 
months. Before entering the field, I sent a questionnaire to some selected organisations, 
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which purpose was to help me to design the interviews beforehand, however, I got little 
response on these questionnaires. Rather, the message from the people who answered me 
was that it would be easier to speak about the issue once I was in Kathmandu. I pursued 
my fieldwork in Kathmandu, where I focused my data collection on gathering knowledge 
on several water policy processes in Nepal, to understand the general dynamics in the 
water sector as a totality – particularly the role of the World Bank and the Asian 
Development Bank – and with the intention of comparing several water policy processes. I 
looked at the two-phased Water Resources Strategy, of which the first part was finalised in 
February 1997, and the second part in June 2002, as well as the Water Plan Nepal (2005), 
which was formulated to guide the implementation of the Water Resources Strategy – both 
funded by the World Bank. I also initially considered studying the policies funded by the 
ADB, namely those of the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Sector Policy, Strategy and 
Action, finalised in 2004, and the Urban Water Supply and Sanitation Policy, finalised in 
2009.  
Water is an important and highly politicised issue in Nepal. It involves complex issues 
of hydropower development, with possibilities for high returns, but is hazardous for the 
environment and the resettlement of people, the irrigation sector with reforms, and 
perspectives for agriculture, privatisation and liberalisation, particularly affecting urban 
water supply and sanitation, and the highly donor-dominated rural water supply and 
sanitation sector. I realised that working on the overall water policies would include 
making myself acquainted with all of these issues, which would be too many aspects to 
deal with within the framework this thesis, and to make the contextualisation of this thesis 
nearly impossible. Hence, I limited myself to concentrate on the urban and rural water 
supply sectors and their policy frameworks. I realised that policy formulation in the 
Nepalese water sector is tightly combined together with development project formulation, 
which was clearly depicted in the water supply and sanitation sector. Furthermore, the 
power dynamics between and within the different governmental agencies and donors, 
which I wanted to analyse, are issues driving the sector development forward. Hence, I 
abandoned my initial focus on policy conditionalities, and on providing generalisations on 
the role of multilateral funding agencies in national policy-making in an aid-dependent 
country, and decided to concentrate on analysing the power relations between those actors 
that play a role in water supply and sanitation sector policy making. In my investigation, I 
have specifically focused on the ADB-funded water supply and sanitation policies in the 
rural and urban sectors. Both of these policies seem to have links to development 
programmes: the rural policy to the Community-Based Water Supply and Sanitation 
Project, and the urban policy to both the Melemchi Water Supply Project and to the Small 
Towns Water Supply Project. In addition, both policies and all projects were funded by 
the ADB, which gave me a possibility to seek for common nominators in ADB’s 
involvement in the sector. 
After my first field period, I analysed the interviews tentatively and reflected the field 
results in a report, which I submitted to my supervisors. During this process, I found that I 
should still limit the scope of this thesis in order to be able to defend it one day. Thus, I 
needed to make a choice between the urban and rural water supply and sanitation sectors. I 
chose the rural warer supply and sanitation sector due to my own background in 
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community-based development. I understand its jargon better than that of the urban water 
supply and sanitation sector, which functions on very economic terms. I also changed my 
focus to researching the dynamics of the rural water supply and sanitation sector. I wanted 
to understand the wider context of policy making, as well as the donor-government 
relationship. I had gone to the field with the presumption that the donors dictate the sector 
development, but through my interviews, I got hints that I might be wrong with this. 
Hence, I wanted to look at the larger framework, in which the policies are made, and 
analyse where the influence on the sector development derives from, and what the 
mechanisms are behind it. In addition to my focus on the Rural Water Supply and 
Sanitation Policy, Strategy and Action Plan, my research became to include an analysis of 
how global changes in the thinking on issues in the rural water supply and sanitation have 
shaped the sector in Nepal. Therefore, I find that through the alternately proceeding data 
collection and analysis, the ‘right’ case got transfigured to me. 
The second part of my fieldwork, I carried out the next summer, in 2010 (2 months). 
This time, I had a clear idea of with whom to talk and what issues I needed to address: my 
main issues related to the sector coordination, power dynamics in the rural water supply 
and sanitation sector, the negotiation strategies of the government, and the donors in the 
policy process and detailed tracing of the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Policy, 
Strategy and Action Plan. In addition, I interviewed people both at the national and district 
levels on policy implementation, however, only with the intention of understanding what 
the main issues are that prohibit effective policy implementation – an issue that had come 
up in several of my interviews. The district interviews were carried out with Syangja 
district authorities (Western Nepal) and in Dhulikhel (Kathmandu Valley).  
Already during the first fieldwork, I had given up on my interview guide and opted for 
a more open way of interviewing. I rather had talks or discussions with my interviewees, 
not straightforward interviews. However, I tended to cross check issues mentioned in 
interviews with my other key informants. My key informants, whom I interviewed two to 
three times, consisted of consultants involved in the sector for several decades, some 
senior officials in the main government agencies in the sector, as well as retired officials 
and senior-level people in NGOs. I was not able to get any donor representative to become 
my key informant, due to their extremely cautious way of talking. Hence, for analysing the 
donors’ motives and interests in the sector, I needed to rely on a variety of sources, 
including their own policy papers, project documents, informal talks and on analysing 
what was not said by them. During both fieldworks, I got a good response to my 
interview/talk requests, and was able to carry out 102 interviews, thirteen of which I 
recorded.  
My main method for data collection was interviewing. Before starting with the 
fieldwork, I had operationalised my research questions (and sub-questions) and based on 
these formulated interview guides (Yow 1994, 35-38; Kvale 1996, 129-131) for each 
group (government officials, ex-officials, donor / NGO representatives, academia, media), 
I planned to interview with the intention of interviewing a number of people on the same 
topic, to reveal a range of opinions, attitudes and strategies (see table 2.2 below). 
However, I gave up on the questionnaire quite quickly, and before each interview, just 
noted down some main issues that I wished the interviewee to cover, moving between 
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semi-structured interviews (Kvale 1996), and interviews which can better be described as 
dialogue with the interviewee (Bailey 2007). This way, I was able to identify the main 
events, issues, and the dynamics in the sector, rather than forcing the respondent into a 
field that he / she did not feel important for the case. I also stopped recording, as I realised 
that people were hesitant to speak openly, as long as the recorder was running. I also 
realised that if I presented myself as a student, and did not try to prove my knowledge or 
familiarity with the topic, some people were quite open in their communication with me. I 
assume that they considered a female student not to be a threat to them and thus were 
willing to give their opinion.42 For instance, on the donor influence and on the nature of 
the government, including the lack of capacity on the side of the government to govern the 
sector. I was also presented with outright testimonies on corruption. However, those 
people that were in one way or another dependent on the aid for their living, were not 
willing to discuss the practices of the donors or the government. Through a snowballing 
method, I got to know of other people who were important for my study, and was able to 
accumulate and triangulate the information provided to me by previous interviewees. In 
getting the first interviewees identified, my local supervisor, Dr Sudhindra Sharma (and 
his contacts), was extremely helpful.   
 
Water resources and water governance 
 
1 What are the main issues in the Nepalese water sector? 
2 Are there some water related issues that cause disarray among organisations working in 
the water sector? 
3 How are Nepal’s water resources governed? 
4 How are Nepal’s governmental institutions governing the water resources interacting?  
Water policy formulation + politics around water 
 
5 Who all have been involved in the formulation of water policies? 
6 What is the regulatory framework for policy formulation in the water sector? 
7 Do politics play a role in the water sector? 
8 Who are considered as the main players in the water sector? 
9 How do the water policies get initiated? 
10 What kinds of meetings were organised during the formulation?  
11 What kind of a timetable was set for the formulation process? 
12 How was the progress of the formulation process monitored? 
13 What were the main obstacles in the formulation process? 
14 What were the issues that caused most discussion about? 
15 Was an agreement reached? 
16 What compromises were reached? 
17 How would you assess the policy paper? 
18 Who were the main participants in the process? 
19 What kind of committees were formed? 
20 Who were the most active participants in the process? 
21 Were all organisations/persons relevant to the topic invited to join? 
22 Were there any conflicts between the participants? 
                                                 
42 Or they tried to use me to convey their message to the public. This I have tried to avoid by contextualising 
the interviews.  
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23 How would you describe the negotiation style of different participants? 
Policy implementation 
 
24 Who is responsible for the monitoring of policy implementation? 
25 What have been the main obstacles in the implementation? 
26 What have been the main changes that were a consequence of this policy (and its 
implementation)? 
Table 2.2: Initial Questions Guiding Interviews 
Furthermore, I participated in seminars and thematic meetings, where either general water 
issues, or issues related specifically to water supply and sanitation were discussed. These 
included a conference on discussing sanitation related issues organised by the Finnish 
funded rural water supply and sanitation programme in Western Nepal, a district level 
workshop on WASH planning involving district level decision makers and representatives 
from the departments as well as programme staff, and the steering committee meeting of 
the same programme which included a vivid discussion on WASH planning and 
programme operations with participants from ministries, departments, aid agency, NGOs 
and district level officials. These events highlighted the main issues hindering policy 
implementation at the local level, and shed light on the power relations between 
departments as well as aid agencies and governmental agencies. Furthermore, I 
participated in a series of meetings related to establishing an M&E system within the 
MPPW, organised by the World Bank, and in a conference organised by the same. These 
events showed me how consultants work in the Nepalese context, their power vis-à-vis the 
government, and the indifference by the government to take ownership of the development 
efforts. These discussions further illuminated the political side of policy making, the 
struggle between governmental agencies and the donors, and assisted me in mapping the 
sector actors and issues.  
I also spent time in collecting written material from libraries and from private people. 
This took a lot of time because the documents were located here and there – there are 
mainly private libraries in Nepal – and because there were very few electronic copies of 
official documents, someone needed to get copies done for me. The main libraries where I 
found the relevant books and documents were the library of the Nepal Water Conservation 
Foundation (private research institute) and the library of the Water and Energy 
Commission Secretariat (WECS). The access to the first one was easy due to my links to 
the organisation, but the access to the latter one was more difficult. WECS is situated in 
Singha Durbar, which is a fenced area where several ministries and governmental 
departments are located. To be able to access it, one needs to have a pass to show at the 
gate, exactly as when one interviews people whose offices are in Singha Durbar. I never 
had an official pass, but after serious negotiations at the gate, and some telephone calls to 
important people, I found my way in the area approximately ten times during my 
fieldwork. I collected copies of all water supply and sanitation policies made in Nepal 
since the mid-1980s, as well as different drafts of these policies (when available), laws, 
regulations and government guidelines relevant to the sector development, reports 
analysing the sector development, documentation on the Rural Water Supply and 
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Sanitation Policy, Strategy and Action, such as workshop reports and background papers, 
development project documentation, general reports and books. 
 
Type of Institution Semi-structured 
Interviews 
Dialogue Based 
Interviews 
Aid agencies 26 3 
Civil society organisations  16 2 
Media 4 - 
Public sector officials 15 - 
Ex-public sector officials or ex-ministers, 
now either researchers or experts 
9 3 
Politicians (active) 3 - 
Researchers / experts / consultants 9 3 
District level interviewees 7 2 
Total number of people interviewed: 89 13 
Table 2.3 Type and Number of Interviews  
After the fieldwork, I wrote a report on my findings, as well as drawing an annotated 
outline of my dissertation, and submitted these to my supervisors, coding my data in Atlas 
TI. During the data analysis, which took place parallel to the writing of the first drafts of 
my thesis, I used different ways of approaching the material. The strategies were related to 
the type of material at hand, and the characteristics and quality of the material. I analysed 
the contents of the interviews and discussions I had had, with a focus on the issues, actors 
and processes that were of the most of interest to me, as well as the causes, consequences 
and relationships via content analysis and discourse analysis. This included 
contextualising my interviews by paying attention to characteristics of the discursive 
situation, e.g. from which position, or institutional context, the speaker was 
communicating. Due to the political interests of the sectoral actors, I was aware that my 
interviewees might be led by their own interest in how they answered my questions. The 
written material I used for either to triangulate the information, or to contextualise the 
interviews, and by this, to understand why and how certain issues were said.  
The exploration of the secondary materials, research literature and ‘grey documents’, I 
did through analysing discourses in the policy documents,43 i.e. focusing on the ways of 
defining the problem, goals and solutions. Yet, I also approached them as partial accounts 
of the historical events, changes and processes regarding the thinking on rural water 
supply and sanitation both globally and in Nepal. By discourse in the Nepalese rural water 
supply and sanitation sector, I mean a set of meanings embodied in metaphors, 
representations, narratives and statements that advance a particular version of ‘the truth’ 
about the water supply and sanitation policy and governance issues, and the relations 
between them, endorsed primarily by the aid agencies and Nepalese bureaucracy. Through 
the analysis of discourses I sought for ‘dominant’ discourses’ (Long 2001), and nirvana 
concepts, narratives and models (Molle 2008), and analysed how these are endorsed, 
                                                 
43 I did not do any discourse analysis per se, but aimed at understanding what the discourses in the policy 
documents were, where these stem from, and how they have influenced the Nepalese policy documents.  
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transformed or challenged, by providing the means to spell out the knowledge and power 
implications of the interplay, and the blending or segregation of opposing discourses. 
Molle (2008) gives ’sustainable development’, good governance’ and ’participation’ or 
’empowerment’ as examples of nirvana concepts. In the water sector, Integrated Water 
Resource Management (IWRM) is an example of a nirvana concept. Narratives or 
storylines in the field of development establish causal relationships between two negative 
aspects of a particular problem, such as waste (or pollution) of resources occur because 
insufficient pricing fails to reflect real costs (hence the necessity to price water) or the 
poor performance of water user groups, reflects lack of human capital or obstructive 
bureaucracies (training needed). People, promoting same kinds of narratives, form 
discourse coalitions. Models, on the other hand, are based on particular instances of policy 
reforms or development interventions, which ostensibly embody a dimension of ’success’ 
and qualify as ’success stories’. In the water sector, a good example of a ’successful policy 
model’ is the Mexican model of Irrigation Management Transfer, or certain models for 
river basin organisations. 
In addition, I was able to elucidate the power aspect of the policy struggle, and to 
analyse the direction of the influence in certain policy decisions, by comparing the texts of 
the aid agencies with those of the Nepalese government, and looked for discrepancies and 
similarities in the documents.  
During the writing process, I posed my data ‘why-questions’, which Alasuutari (1995) 
calls ‘unriddling’ or resolving the puzzle. I called this ‘detective work’ once I realised how 
from the bits and pieces – through the why-questions – the dynamics in the Nepalese rural 
water supply and sanitation sector started to emerge.  
2.2.5 Research Limitations  
The limitations of this study relate to two issues: (1) the data collection process and (2) the 
scope of data collection and analysis. Regarding the first, one of the main limitations was 
that it was difficult to get reliable information from one source only. The government and 
the aid agencies have also a very ambiguous relationship, on the one side they blame each 
other for various issues related to development work (e.g. the scheduling of work and 
sticking to it, work style, funds). This, however, is done very indirectly, not pointing at the 
issue or the person directly, and on the other hand, they present each other as partners, and 
do not want to say anything else but positive aspects of each other. In addition, as shown 
later in this thesis, both parties have their own incentives in the aid game, and therefore, 
had obviously an interest either to tell me what had happened or not. Therefore, I had 
interviews where I got little direct information, and interviews where the interviewee 
openly told me his/her point of view to the sectoral dynamics. Both types of interviews 
naturally required a critical examination on their parts. In this kind of a situation, it is very 
challenging to find out 'what really happened'. This was complicated by the fact that only 
a few international consultants were ready to talk with me. These people maybe had less at 
stake in the Nepalese context, and therefore, were able to speak about the situation in 
Nepal and criticise the Nepalese government. Yet, they were restricted to speak about the 
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aid agencies, who were their de facto employers. I assume, many of them had second 
thoughts about explaining internal issues involving their employer (the ADB or the 
government), or were afraid that they might end up in a situation in which they needed to 
criticise these.  
Regarding the second issue, I also realised that many of my interviewees were hesitant 
to speak openly when I had the recorder on, thus, I stopped using it in the interview 
situations. In case the recoding would have worked out, and people would have been more 
at ease to speak when the recorder was on, I could have been able to better analyse the 
interview situations, e.g., the way people answered the questions, pauses kept in the 
discussion, etc., and to draw my conclusions on these. This was not possible, because I 
had to concentrate on making notes by hand, on issues that the people were telling me. In 
addition, I had hoped to be able to get more observation-based data through attending 
meetings, conferences and being more present in the happenings, in order to familiarise 
myself better with the interviewees. However, during my two rather short fieldworks, I did 
not find access to large numbers of meetings, and only a few conferences took place 
during that period. I had to limit the fieldworks, due to family reasons; during both 
fieldworks I had my small son with me, and had to get someone to take care of him while 
I was working. This arrangement could not be organised for a long period of fieldwork. 
Furthermore, due to the limited period in the field, I decided to limit the analysis on the 
dynamics during the policy formulation process, and only had a glimpse of the issues of 
policy implementation. I think that a deeper analysis of the policy implementation, issues 
standing in the way of the implementation, and the linkages between policy formulation 
and implementation, would have provided important empirical knowledge on the policy 
dynamics, and brought this dissertation to a higher level theoretically. In addition, I could 
have explored how local level politics and aid practice affects policy priority setting, and 
received first-hand information on the role of global and national policies for donor-
funded development projects. This is a topic that should be explored in another research. 
Likewise, I have not analysed how Nepalese (party) politics shape the policy making, 
what kinds of motives parties have in the process or in setting the agenda, and what were 
their linkages with the aid agencies. This would have required a different kind of 
perspective, focusing on the political field in Nepal, and the functioning of the Nepalese 
state, and could have been linked with the study on how the economic factors affect the 
negotiation capacity of the government. I also decided not to discuss the influence of party 
politics on policy making, because it is a complicated field, having its own dynamics 
totally outside the donor-bureaucracy manoeuvring point of view taken in this thesis. Party 
politics in Nepal does not follow a clear pattern, but there is a disintegration of parties 
along strong-man personalities, and lately, it has witnessed a rise in many small parties 
along ethnic or regional interests. To be able to understand the logic behind any political 
organisation would have demanded much more time in the field, which I unfortunately did 
not have. A similar reasoning applies to the lack of focus given to NGOs in this thesis. 
The NGOs are typically politically affiliated, and thus their analysis would have required a 
deeper understanding of politics and how patronage and clientelism work in Nepal.  
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3 The Aid Game  
3.1 Introduction 
Aid has two sides. On the one hand, it assists recipient countries in their efforts to develop. 
On the other hand, aid actors have their own agendas and interests, some of which can be 
conflicting with the overall purpose of aid. In this chapter, I focus on the latter side of aid, 
arguing for a political economy view on aid and aid giving. I claim that aid should not be 
viewed as only a technical and altruistic way of bettering the life of the poor, but to realise 
that all actors have interests in the development process, including the ‘benevolent’ aid 
agencies. Hence, I illuminate the different incentives and interests of the developing 
countries' governments and donors to gain or deliver aid, and show what kind of 
implications these have had for both the government and donors. In my analysis, I 
emphasise aid for policy reform, which is the focus of this thesis. I deliberately use the 
terms ‘recipient’ and ‘donor’, rather than the more politically correct term ‘development 
partner’, which is commonplace in official aid documents. I view that the basic feature of 
aid relations remains unchanged – namely a transfer of resources in an asymmetric 
relationship between a donor and a receiver, where the donor has more power than the 
receiver (Jerve, Skovsted Hansen 2008, 3; Koponen, Seppänen 2007, 337), summarised by 
Quarles van Ufford (1988, 21),  
“Development organizations are directly affected by the basic contradiction of 
development goals (...). They are placed between different publics: (a) the public which is 
at the receiving end of aid, and (b) those who are allocating funds. These two parts of the 
environment are segregated from each other and do not overlap. The ambiguity greatly 
affects the ways development organizations operate. Because of this distance, it is difficult 
for the donor agency staff to tell whether progress is being made, what are the results of 
their development efforts and what kinds of impacts the projects and programmes are 
leaving behind.” 
 
The main arguments of this chapter are: 
 
 The traditional chain of aid delivery is donor-driven; the donors have designed the 
aid framework and aid is delivered accordingly; hence, the recipients have little 
power to direct aid delivery. 
 Aid has had an important role throughout the past sixty years in Nepal, which has 
led to a dependency on aid and donors at various levels. 
 Aid instruments of process conditionality, policy dialogue and sector-wide 
approaches, have been designed to increase ownership of the recipient government, 
yet, due to the way that they are designed, they actually allow the donors to 
increasingly involve themselves in policy making in the recipient countries. 
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 All actors have their own objectives in the aid game, thus, aid cannot be viewed 
simply as a benevolent act by the donors, but it has its own political dynamics 
deriving from these interests.  
 
This chapter is organised in six sections. After the introduction, in the second section 
some terminology is outlined, and the effectiveness of aid is analysed globally. The third 
section depicts the role of aid in Nepal, and shows that its effectiveness has also been 
contested. In the fourth section, the chain of aid delivery is shortly presented to guide the 
reader in the aid process, and in the fifth section, the focus is broadened to the means of 
aid, particularly in relation to policy reform, that is, the issues of ownership, conditionality 
and sector-wide approaches. In section six, the incentives of recipient countries, donors 
and consultants are elaborated, whereas section seven concludes this chapter.  
3.2 Effectiveness of Aid: Contested 
3.2.1 Some Definitions 
Most foreign aid (see box one below for definition) is designed to meet one or more of 
four broad economic and development objectives: (1) to stimulate economic growth 
through building infrastructure, supporting productive sectors such as agriculture, or 
bringing new ideas and technologies; (2) to strengthen education, health, environmental, 
or political systems; (3) to support subsistence consumption of food and other 
commodities, especially during relief operations or humanitarian crises, or (4) to help 
stabilise an economy of following economic shocks (Radelet 2006, 7). In this thesis, I deal 
with the first and second objective of aid, excluding humanitarian and economic aid.  
Aid can also be scrutinised from three perspectives, as presented by Koponen and 
Seppänen (2007): (1) as resource transfer from wealthier countries to poorer ones – being 
part of foreign politics or as a tool of foreign politics; (2) as planned development 
intervention – projects and programmes and as guidelines related to these; and (3) as a 
battle for resources between different stakeholders, in which one party will get more than 
the other. Shortly, aid and intentions for development can be either examined as being a 
well-meaning development intervention, or as an unplanned political and social game for 
resources. In this thesis, aid is examined comprehensively, referring to all perspectives 
outlined above. Above all, the aid actors are viewed having their own interests, which can 
lead to unplanned consequences both politically and socially.  
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Box 3.1: Definition of Foreign Aid 
Foreign aid is the generic term for all kind of international aid. In addition to official 
development assistance (ODA), as defined by the OECD-DAC44, consisting of aid provided by 
donor governments and multilateral aid agencies to low- and middle-income countries; I include 
in foreign aid also aid provided by NGOs, humanitarian organisations and private people for the 
purpose of ‘development’, which are excluded in ODA. These include both grants and loans 
given for infrastructure development, technical assistance in the form of international experts, 
and knowledge transfer. This definition reflects the use of term foreign aid in Nepal.  
 
The whole aid system and its dynamics can be examined through what Koponen (2007) 
calls developmentalism. It refers to the actors, institutions, structures, practices and 
models of thinking, that draw their power from the idea of development, meaning that 
with good intentions, having development intervention, one can reach an ideal 
development in societies45. Developmentalism is the framework of development discourse 
and action, which can also be called a development machine or a development industry 
(Koponen 2007, 60; Koponen, Seppänen 2007, 338). The idea of developmentalism 
evolved after the Second World War and was particularly influenced by the Point Four 
Speech by US President Harry Truman in 1949. From the speech stem by researchers 
coined concepts of ‘development imperative’ and ‘under-development’ and that became 
part of the jargon of international politics (Koponen 2007, 61). The actors, which can be 
seen to be part of the developmentalism drive, are driven by a moral imperative: they 
believe that by taking efforts for the sake of development, they will ‘do good’. Hence, the 
primary interest is not only to fulfil their institutional or personal interests, but to enhance 
the well-being in the world. From the perspective of developmentalism, a developing 
country is not anymore only a poor country or a country, which has not developed along 
the model of western countries. It is a country that is being developed, a target of external 
development intervention, and for receiving development aid, it is required to follow a 
predetermined policy. This thinking legitimises the development actors to interfere in the 
governance of developing countries and in the lives of their citizens (Koponen 2007, 62, 
64). Now, having presented the aim of the aid system, I turn next to assess whether the aid 
is achieving these goals – a highly disputed issue among researchers (for discussion cf. 
Koponen 2011).  
                                                 
44 The narrower ODA definition for foreign aid comes from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 
of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which defines it as financial 
flows, technical assistance, and commodities that are (1) designed to promote economic development and 
welfare as their main objective (thus excluding aid for military or other non-development purposes); and (2) 
are provided as either grants or subsidised loans. Grants and subsidised loans are referred to as concessional 
financing, whereas loans that carry market or near-market terms (and therefore are not foreign aid) are non-
concessional financing. Non-concessional loans from donor agencies are counted as part of official 
development finance, but not as official development assistance (Radelet 2006, 4). 
45 These actors, institutions, structures, practices and models of thinking include, among others, development 
aid, development cooperation, various actors such as the UN and the World Bank, development discourse 
and development studies.  
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3.2.2 Contested Aid Effectiveness 
There are researchers who speak for aid, claiming that just by scaling up the funding for 
development and investing in all kinds of 'capital' – physical, human, institutional and 
natural, the aid will ultimately reach its goals. The most prominent of these researchers is 
Jeffrey Sachs, who advocates for market economy and believes that through economic 
development, the development in developing countries will take off on its own (Sachs 
2005). An opposite view to Sachs' advocacy for making aid more effective by increasing 
funds for it, has been presented by Moyo (2009). She claims that development aid 
suffocates development in Africa and should be terminated. Instead, she suggests, one 
should rely on international financing markets, investments from China, micro-finance and 
funding from Africans living abroad46. Tandon (2008) is similarly very critical about the 
donor-driven international aid system, which he views as pursuing an imperial project, 
impeding the homegrown attempts for development by the aid recipient countries, by 
reducing policy space. He, like Moyo, calls for the ending of the aid business. Easterly 
(2006), on the other hand, is more consistent in his criticism on aid than Moyo. He views 
poverty as a complex net of political, social, historical, institutional and technical issues. 
This net needs to be solved, problem by problem, and preferably through homegrown 
development efforts. The aid as is currently delivered has failed, because of the white 
man's burden, and the feeling by the western countries that they need to provide answers 
to the development problems faced in the developing world. Hence, merely increasing the 
aid flows cannot solve the problem of poverty. Collier (2008), another opponent of Sachs' 
view, claims that aid tends to speed up the growth process, but at the same, it suffers from 
diminishing returns. According to his research, there needs to be a right kind of an 
instrument to a specific situation (he calls these traps: conflict, natural resource, bad 
governance, landlocked traps). The leftist criticism, which has ended up in the margins in 
the aid discussion, because of the dominance of the mainstream writers, such as Sachs, 
Easterly and Collier, believes that aid sustains and even strengthens those economic and 
social structures that cause poverty, and market forces are seen as part of those structures 
(see e.g. Thérien 2002; Sachs W. 1992; Escobar 1995).  
Since the 1990s, it has been increasingly argued that too much aid is detrimental to 
development, as it encourages recipients to depend continually on aid as a source of 
finance, thereby discouraging the expansion of domestically created revenue and self-
sustaining development (Azam et al. 1999; Riddell 2007, 38). In addition to financial 
dependence, recipients can also suffer from a dependence on the technical advice provided 
by the donors. Nepal, to which I turn next, has been referred to as an aid-dependent 
country in several studies (Khadka 1991; Lohani 1999; Poudyal 1988; Pyakuryal et al. 
2008; Ghimire L.S. 2009a; Luitel 2009). 
Generally, aid dependency has been defined in the context of Sub-Saharan countries 
(Collier 1999b; Harrison 2001; Sobhan 2001; Moss, Pettersson, van de Walle 2006; 
Whitfield 2006; Morse, McNamara 2012). The closest to the situation in Nepal comes 
                                                 
46 Both Moyo and Sachs have been criticised of their view on developmental problems has been judged as 
simplistic (Koponen 2011, 17-8; Riddell 2007, 165) Riddell (2007) adds that in the assessment of the impact 
of aid there are some methodological challenges and data-gaps, which are difficult to overcome.  
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Bräutigam47 (2000, 1-6, 9) who defines it as “a situation in which a country cannot 
perform many of the core functions of government, such as operations and maintenance, 
or the delivery of basic public services, without foreign aid funding and expertise”, 
referring it to large amounts of aid delivered over long periods, and creating incentives for 
governments and donors, that have the potential to undermine good governance and the 
quality of state institutions. She continues that these incentives are not always acted upon, 
but when they are, large amounts of aid may reduce local ownership, accountability and 
democratic decision making, while fragmenting budgets and lowering the tax effort. Large 
amounts of aid, delivered to countries with weak institutions, create some of the 
institutional problems that lead to ineffectiveness. In aid dependent countries, donor 
agencies and foreign experts, often take over many of the critical functions of governance: 
substituting their own goals for an absent leadership vision, using foreign experts and 
project management units in place of weak or decaying public institutions, and providing 
finance for investments whose operation and maintenance is neither planned for nor 
affordable. A long-term dependence can create disincentives (perverse incentives) for both 
donors and recipient governments in managing their engagement. 
3.3 Aid in Nepal 
Foreign aid has been an integral part of the Nepalese political and economic scene for 
more than half a century. During this time, the volume has grown exponentially48 (see 
table 4.1 in part 4.3.1). The all-time high was reached in 1989 when the aid amounted to 
80 per cent of the country’s development expenditure and 14 per cent of its GNI. After 
that the amount has declined gradually, but the per capita amount of about US$ 19 
received is still highest in South Asia (Stiller, Yadav 1979, 79-80; Sharma et al. 2004, 2-3; 
Saarilehto 2006, 24). Thus, on the surface, Nepal has become a highly aid-dependent 
country and its relationship with its donors appears asymmetrical. However, the partner 
relationships forged during this time have created spaces for different working modalities, 
and the Nepalese have found strategies through which they can manoeuvre in the aid game 
(cf. Sharma et al. 2008, 133).  
Nepal’s development efforts are commonly taken to have begun in January 1951, with 
Nepal’s agreement for Technical Cooperation, as a consequence of President Truman’s 
Point Four speech, and after this India, China and the Soviet Union entered with their 
development projects. US aid – aimed at keeping up the frontline against Communist 
China and Soviet interests in Asia – was directed to agriculture, rural development and 
improving the infrastructure to maximise growth, whereas India concentrated on 
administrative reform, transportation and communication during the 1950s. Irrigation, 
water and education were added in the 1960s. Indian aid was motivated by security issues 
                                                 
47 For more general definitions see e.g. Lensink and White (1999) and Riddell (1996).  
48 Aid volume grew fast until the 1990s, but due to the Maoist conflict in Nepal, most aid agencies decided 
not to make any new commitments for development projects, which turned the aid flow down. After the 
settlement of the conflict, aid volume has started to increase again.  
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linked to China and by acting as a counterweight to US influence. Also, maintaining close 
trading relations with Nepal was part of the motivation. China focused on transportation 
and industry, motivated by preventing Nepal’s meddling in the issue of Tibet and the 
border disputes with India, countering Soviet, US and India influence, and tightening 
economic ties (Saarilehto 2006, 24 quoting Khadka 1997, 94-95, 136, 149, 224, 285, 292; 
Sharma, Koponen 2004, 2-5; cf. Baidya 1984; Stiller, Yadav 1979). According to Mihaly, 
(1965) the effectiveness of aid during the early decades was hampered considerably by 
frequent changes in the Nepalese government, and its incapable long-term planning and 
the implementation of projects and programmes. Development aid supported this 
dysfunctional system.  
Foreign aid to Nepal was not simply directed by the donors’ strategic, political, and 
economic interests. King Mahendra (1955-72) and King Birendra (1972-2001) actively 
exploited Nepal’s strategic position between India and China, to make the major powers 
compete over influence in the country. This helped siphon in aid money to support the 
regime, and the influence of other major countries also helped Nepal to counter India’s 
dominant economic and political role in the country. The kings and ruling elite used 
increasing aid from multiple sources to support their own claims for power, and aid can be 
considered as one of the reasons that the partyless system could be maintained for such a 
long period (Saarilehto 2006, 24-25; Khadka 1997, 349-351; cf. Justice 1986, 33). 
The country had gained membership of the United Nations in 1955 and of the Bretton 
Woods Institutions – the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund – in 1961. 
However, it was only from the early 1970s onwards, that the multilateral lending agencies 
began their activities in a significant manner in Nepal, following the waning of the 
strategic interests of the major powers in Nepal. This increased the number of loans 
financing development efforts, including two structural adjustment loans provided by the 
World Bank and the IMF (1985-1991). The process of structural adjustment was 
completed in 1994 with mixed results (IIDS 1996). The World Bank concentrated on 
irrigation, agricultural production, energy, water supply and sewerage, and the Asian 
Development Bank mainly on agriculture, industry and transportation. The UN agencies 
UNDP, UNICEF and ILO also worked actively in Nepal (Sharma, Koponen 2004, 5).  
The restoration of democracy in 1990 opened the doors for the entry of international 
non-governmental organisations (INGOs), which started a steady increase in their 
disbursements over the years (Sharma, Koponen 2004, 5-6)49, as well as allowing the 
establishment of national NGOs, whose growth in numbers has been phenomenal50. Japan 
emerged as the biggest aid contributor to Nepal in the 1990s, and also ‘small’ European 
countries became important donors. Multilateral actors – the World Bank and the ADB – 
increased the amount loaned to Nepal, and during the 1990s, loan aid rose to three times 
                                                 
49 The sources are not unanimous regarding the disbursements from INGOs. For instance, according to 
UNDP’s Development Cooperation Report, in 1999, INGOs disbursed around US$ 24 million while Social 
Welfare Council shows INGOs committing some US$ 20 million for the year 2000. While the UNDP lists 
only 21 INGOs providing assistance to Nepal, the Social Welfare Council (SWC) shows 96. The SWC 
should, therefore, show a larger disbursement from INGOs, but that is not the case. Acharya (2002) rightly 
notes that these figures cannot be taken at face value.  
50 By 2000 over 11 000 NGOs had been registered compared to only a few hundred that existed in 1990 
(Shah 2002, 144).  
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the amount of grant aid, and the debt burden of the country increased considerably 
(Sharma, Koponen 2004, 5-6). Transportation, hydropower and irrigation continued to 
received the lion’s share of the external assistance. Despite a growing emphasis on the 
social service sectors, these never received the kind of a development budget allocated to 
the transport and power sector, and were left primarily to the INGOs (Bonino, Donini 
2009, 13). 
From the beginning of the 1990s, in line with global trends, many of Nepal’s donors 
began to emphasise local ownership and the people’s participation, as essential 
components for an effective allocation of foreign aid. In the second half of 1990s, 
participation started to be linked with social inclusion and donors began to address caste 
and ethnic-related issues, and, generally, the social dimensions of ‘development’. The 
global trends of country ownership, participation processes, poverty reduction, result-
oriented programmes, and above all improved governance, were enshrined in the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), drafted in the early 2000s (Bonino, Donini 2009, 13). 
However, as globally observed (see Chapter Five), also in Nepal only technocrats were 
involved in the PRSP finalisation process and “rhetoric apart, the PRSP has failed to 
become a participatory process and a shift in donors’ behaviour was not apparent in the 
Nepalese context.” (Khanal et al. 2008, i, cited in Bonino, Donini 2008, 14).  
The escalation of the Maoist conflict (2002-2006) was seen by the international 
community as Nepal becoming a ‘fragile state’, which can generate instability and trouble 
not only for itself, but also for its surroundings. The events in Nepal led donors to the 
rethinking of their role in the conflict-torn country. They faced the ultimate question in the 
developmental partnerships at country level: if the partnership is ideally between ‘people’, 
who is entitled to claim the representation of the ‘people’ and forge partnerships in their 
name? Each of the donors had originally entered into a partnership with the Nepalese 
government of the day, but what was to be done when the nature and legitimacy of the 
government itself was being called into question? The donors decided to freeze all new aid 
projects until elections had been held, but to remain in the country and try to influence the 
events, yet, they acted in a very differentiated way51 (Sharma 2007; Sharma et al. 2008, 
140-1).  
More recently, new debates have arisen in the wake of the 2005 Paris Declaration on 
Aid Effectiveness and its drive towards aid harmonisation, and the formulation of the 
OECD Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States. In the case of 
Nepal, these debates have informed recent discussions on contending/complementary aid 
paradigms, such as humanitarian assistance vs. development assistance, withdrawal or 
further engagement of donors, project-based vs. programme-based aid, and budgetary 
support (Bonino, Donini 2008, 14), all part of the debate in the water supply and sanitation 
sector, as will be shown in the coming chapters.  
                                                 
51 For example, India suspended its arms deliveries to the Nepalese army, China said that the whole issue is 
Nepal’s internal matter, the EU, as a whole took, the line that on-going activities would be continued, but 
new ones would be put in hold. DANIDA, the Danish development agency, even announced a suspension of 
aid to the Nepalese government.  
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3.3.1 Bikas Thinking and Aid Dependency 
In Nepal, development thinking is a crosscutting issue having effects from the national 
level to the villages. It is known better with its Nepali word, ‘bikas’. In Nepali language, it 
signifies growth, and evolution – just as its English equivalent ‘development’ does. In 
everyday parlance, however, bikas for the most part means things: especially commodities 
that come from elsewhere. Development is delivered from outside with outside help, such 
as the state, an aid agency or an NGO, and is not part of ‘traditional’ living. Examples of 
these kinds of issues are non-local issues such as water supply, road, irrigation, electricity, 
schools and health posts. It is the non-local origin of these things that makes them bikas 
(Sharma 2006, 205, citing Pigg 1993). Hence, in the water and sanitation sector, piped 
drinking water and sanitation facilities, which were introduced by the Kathmandu based 
(presenting bikas) governmental agencies and donors, get associated with the notion of 
bikas. Bikas-thinking has affected the readiness of the people to initiate themselves in 
development efforts, and put their share of work in the, for example, the provision of 
material for water supply schemes or latrines. Rather, they tend to wait for the people who 
represent bikas, to come and bring bikas to them, depicting a dependency on those that are 
typically seen to provide financial and technical assistance. K.M. Dixit (1997, 175,178) 
explains,  
“Foreign assistance has created a dependency syndrome right from the central secretariat 
to the village roundtable – as represented in the government’s inability to mobilise 
“domestic resources” (through taxation, incentives, philanthropy etc.) as well as loss of 
cooperative spirit among villagers. Whereas earlier, the rural peasantry would come 
together to build a suspension bridge or maintain a cautara (trailrest), the overwhelming 
tendency now is to wait for the “project appraisal team” of a governmental agency, ingo, 
ngo.” 
 
Pigg (1993) further argues that development language provides new categories in which 
existing social differences are understood. It fosters an ideological representation of 
society through an implicit scale of social progress. Nepalese people categorise themselves 
as depending on the level of bikas (or modernisation) that is available in their location 
(Pigg 1992; 1993). This thinking has become powerful, because the terms are compelling 
within the Nepalese context. The notion that some people are inherently more ‘developed’ 
than others, echoes Hindu concepts of caste superiority. The markers of class differences 
also match images of what characterises ‘development’. Pigg’s point is that development 
further intensifies social differences in Nepal. Pigg (1997) and Sharma (2001, 76) also 
explain that through the comparison with other near localities having more or less bikas, 
the local areas internalise to varying degrees the global narrative on development, and 
hence the local traditions get mixed with development thinking.  
Outside the use of bikas by an anthropologist, it has also been used to refer to the 
capitalist aid industry by Des Chene (1996), who similarly to Pigg, argues that as any 
capitalist enterprise, achievement of its goals entails the reproduction of social inequality. 
Her point is that the bikas industry presents itself as a form of social welfare – as an aid to 
poorer nations, when initiated from abroad, and as a means of self-improvement when 
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Nepali-organised, following the logic of developmentalism, – not as a business, thus, the 
gaps between its rhetoric and its realities are yet vaster than in many other capitalist 
organisations. 
I find that there are two kinds of interwoven aid dependencies in Nepal that are being 
debated. One is the above-mentioned dependency on those who are considered to possess 
the means for development, deriving from bikas-thinking. This translates into two levels, 
depending upon where the aid system operates. At a national level, the governmental 
agencies are dependent on donors and consultants in aid management, whereas at the 
village level, people expect that the donors, NGOs or governmental agencies will take care 
of the task, thus, no own initiative is required. This thinking has been facilitated by the 
competition between donors in Nepal. If one donor has not been willing to take care of a 
sector/project area, another donor has jumped in.  
The second type of aid dependency stems from large aid flows. This relates to the 
point mentioned by Dixit above: a lack of domestic income generation from various 
sources, which again has led to higher levels of aid. The poor domestic economic 
performance has been explained by several factors. Geographically, Nepal is a landlocked 
country between two big countries – India and China – which has contributed to its weak 
economic performance. The trade with its main economic partner, India, has not taken 
place on equal terms (Dahal et al. 1999, 20), because of which Nepal has strategically 
aimed to increase aid flow. This has also been an attempt to free itself from the economic 
dominance by India52. In addition, the mountainous geography of Nepal has made it 
difficult and expensive to maintain an effective infrastructure network, which has made 
the access of people and the transport of goods cumbersome. The weak development 
possibilities for the economy53 again have increased the amount of aid in funding the 
development efforts (see table 3.1 below), and a larger say for the economically interested 
multilaterals in Nepal, again leading to aid dependence (Khadka 1991; Lohani 1999; 
Poudyal 1988; Pyakuryal et al. 2008; Ghimire L.S. 2009a; Luitel 2009). Aid has also been 
claimed to be fulfilling increased aggregate demands in the economy in the short-term, 
benefiting mostly the elite, without a noticeable contribution towards sustainable and 
long-term development (Khanal et al. 2008, ii).  
Furthermore, as will be presented in the next part, the role of donors has also 
contributed to Nepal’s dependency on aid. Their perverse incentive to disburse their 
allocated budgets, and a failure at times to monitor the aid money, has made it easier for 
the Nepalese government to borrow more money from the multilaterals. Also, it has led to 
bikas thinking, in which people rather rely on others to lead the development efforts than 
to do this by themselves. Thus, the donors of Nepal have also been confronted with two 
general aid related dilemmas: Samaritan’s and Patron’s dilemmas (see e.g. Araral 2008, 
856). In the Samaritan’s Dilemma (Gibson et al. 2005) the donors are in the dilemma of 
stopping aid, particularly when there is so much dependency on aid, that stopping it would  
                                                 
52  Personal communication with researcher Dr Sudhindra Sharma on Jul. 23, 2009. 
53 Panday (1999) gives as reasons the extent of resource endowments, the “macro-economic fundamentals”, 
the extent and character of the entrepreneurial class, the state of technology, the character of development 
institutions and practices including the capacity of the civil service, the extent of infrastructure, and the level 
of human resources development.  
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and Integrated Development System55 (1984), arguing that Nepal had been ill-prepared to 
deal with foreign aid. Mihaly (1965) argues that many of the problems of foreign aid at the 
time of writing were political rather than economic in character, since aid was used as a 
political device to woo underdeveloped countries confronted by a revolution of rising 
expectations. Mihaly concludes that donors to Nepal, with a few though significant 
exceptions, failed to achieve what they set out to accomplish. The failure is attributed less 
to weakness in implementation than on the very assumptions on which aid rested. The two 
primary assumptions Mihaly found seriously flawed are: 1) belief in the readiness of 
Nepal for social, economic and political change; and 2) belief that the government was 
able and willing to administer development and that the existing defects in the 
administrative body could easily be remedied through training, the same point highlighted 
by Stiller and Yadav (1979), who suggested that to view foreign aid as an input into 
Nepal's own development drive was ridiculous (cited in Sharma 2001, 5-6). The study 
made by Integrated Development System (1984) links the criticism with the bikas 
discussion, by arguing that in Nepal, development (bikas) is as old as aid (vaideshik 
sahayog), and in fact the two have become virtually indistinguishable from one another. 
Furthermore, it proposes that one of the underlying motivations for receiving aid on the 
part of the Nepalese state has been its claim to being civilised. The intention of the 
government was to enhance its external legitimacy by demonstrating its commitment to 
economic development as something that is expected of a civilised government, and this 
was possible only through aid (Sharma, Koponen 2004, 11-12). 
I, among other researchers, see that there is a two-fold reason for the ineffectiveness of 
development and Nepalese government’s ill preparedness to deal with foreign aid. First, is 
the inability of politicians and the bureaucracy to deal with development challenges (as 
well as with the aid agencies) and second, the position of the donors. This has led to the 
donors’ leadership in the development process, which has broadened their role and power 
in the country, and has consequently led to dependence on aid. There are also other factors 
that have been attached to the failure of development, and before moving into analysing 
the role of aid agencies in the development efforts, I will shortly outline the social, 
geographical, political and economic factors. The multiple issues affecting the 
effectiveness of development efforts can be read in the government's Draft Foreign Aid 
Policy (GON/MOF 2008)56. Exactly the same reasons, (written word by word), were 
                                                 
55 The document is a proceeding of a seminar aiming to provide an independent stocktaking of achievements 
and weaknesses with regard to the utilisation of aid in Nepal. 
56 The Draft Foreign Aid Policy (GON/MoF 2008) states that there are many country specific constraints in 
Nepal, such as such as widespread poverty, deep-rooted socio-cultural and economic exclusion and inequity, 
fragility of state institutions, poor governance, ineffective delivery of public goods and services, 
geographical inaccessibility, high rate of population growth and urgent environmental concerns, among 
others, which pose daunting challenges to development and the effective absorption of aid. Furthermore, 
Nepal is in the process of state and nation-building which should be recognised by donors when examining 
the problems relating to foreign aid. It also mentions that among the major concerns identified by the donor 
community have been the following: lack of ownership by the Government of development projects and 
programs, particularly those financed by donors; lack of leadership and direction by the government, 
particularly in expenditure prioritization and taking more responsibility in designing, preparing and 
implementing projects and programs; a poor, often unrealistic, and top-down planning and budgeting 
process with little involvement of other stakeholders, including local level institutions, community groups 
and beneficiaries in program preparation and implementation; pressure to increase development projects and 
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already given in the Foreign Aid Policy 2002 (GON/MOF 2002), suggesting that no real 
change had occurred in the past six years. 
The reasons related to social factors have been most influentially expressed by Bista 
(1991), who attempts to explain Nepal's lack of development with a reference to cultural 
factors: in spite of the heavy inflow of aid, Nepal remains backward due to the dominance 
of a particular value system, which he associates with Hinduism, particularly 
Brahmanism, and calls it the culture of fatalism. Kamata (1999, 74-5), moderating Bista’s 
strong position, adds that fatalism is a precondition, but not a sufficient condition of 
underdevelopment in the context of Nepal. He agrees that the cultural and social habits, 
such as chakari and afno manchhe57, have contributed to the failure of development efforts 
in Nepal, but opines that there are other reasons as well. He writes, “aid and projects for 
development have reinforced a sense of powerlessness and, as a consequence, reinforced 
hierarchic fatalism.” Shrestha (1998), on the other hand, claims that the Nepalese have a 
colonial mindset, and have fallen for the seductive power of development, in which 
foreign aid has acted as an irresistible bait. Because of the bikas thinking development that 
has turned into a corrupted form in Nepal, in which people have lost the fidelity of the 
concept's original meaning (Panday 1998; cited in Sharma 2001, 12).  
Several researchers point to the role of the Nepalese state in making the aid fail to 
achieve its aspirations. Mainly, the criticism dwells around weak political leadership and 
the economy, which have opened the doors for donors in the development process in the 
country (see e.g. Dhamadasini 1994). On the political front, the failure is seen to derive 
from the confusing and unstable political situation that the country has been witnessing for 
decades. This has not enabled Nepal to mature as a democracy, but has led to short-sighted 
politics, with leadership without vision, and a tendency to promote own interests, rather 
than the interest of the people (Panday 1998; Panday 1999; Dahal et al. 1999, 143-4; Dixit 
2000, 198). Instead, parts of this money have been used ineffectively, alas for purposes 
that it was not granted for (Dahal et al. 1999, 26). According to Koponen and Sharma, 
(2004, 243-244) the macro-impacts of aid have been more influenced by its overall 
existence, than its specific modalities and effects; aid for any purpose relieves the 
government from the obligation to invest for that same purpose. Thus, the Nepalese 
governments have not even had a strong interest in influencing the channelling of aid and 
the donors have mainly dictated its direction.  
Weak political leadership has also allowed the donors to enter policy making through 
their focus on governance issues. Panday (1999) writes that policy formulation in Nepal 
has been an exogenous and not an endogenous process, due to the strong position of the 
donors and the depoliticisation of policy making. In Nepal, donors seemed to have a larger 
                                                                                                                                                   
programs beyond the levels that can be effectively handled within the constraints of country's limited 
institutional and absorptive capacity; poorly functioning institutions, particularly a dysfunctional and under-
paid civil service, with little incentives and motivation to improve its performance, and poor program 
supervision and monitoring, leading in turn, to lack of accountability and transparency, leakages and misuse 
of resources. 
57 Afno manchhe relates to the institution Chakari, which refers to providing favours to a person in power, in 
the hope of receiving favours and assistance in return (see footnote 29 on page 36). Afno manchhe, on the 
other hand, is ‘ones own people’; those that help oneself in reward of being favoured in various situations 
(Bista 1991, 158). 
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role in the development and economic policy formulation than the political parties, which, 
as in a democratic polity, should formulate policies since they are responsible for their 
constituency (Panday 1999; Panday 2001; see also Mishra 1997). Furthermore, the 
bureaucracy of Nepal has not only been criticised for not leading development policy 
formulations, but also of being nonchalant regarding the implementation of the policies, 
(Panday 1999) and relying on donor assistance in aid administration and management.  
The donors have been said to be partly at fault for the ineffectiveness of aid globally, 
as well as in Nepal specifically. The criticism relates to the aid delivery process. In Nepal, 
the donors have been accused of their tendency to reinvent the wheel (Panday 1999, see 
also Chapter Five on the changing development fashions and Chapter Six on the 
coordination attempts), and their need to disburse their budgets, rather than ensuring that 
the projects have met local needs, and were sustainable over the long term (Blaikie et al. 
1980, 71-2), and that their bullying behaviour and demands have been forced on the 
government through the setting of conditionalities on aid funding58 and the non-
compliance with government’s policies, budgeting and planning tools (Ghimire L.S. 
2009b). These issues are taken up in more detail in this chapter. Outside the criticism of 
the aid delivery process, as shown afore in this section, the donors have also been accused 
of having political and foreign policy related motives.  
3.4 Chain of Aid Delivery 
After having introduced aid in Nepal, I move back to analyse the aid system. In this part, I 
aim to shed light on how aid works in a developing country. I present here the chain of aid 
delivery, consisting of setting up an operating framework, between the recipient 
government and the donor, choosing the right modality for delivering the aid, and the form 
of funding. As aid modalities, I present the project approach, whereas the more recent 
trend of establishing sector-wide approach programmes is the focus of the next section. I 
argue that aid delivery is donor-driven, because the donors have designed the instruments 
for aid delivery, and these serve their needs more than those of the recipient government.     
The aid delivery process is traditionally perceived as if it was a linear chain, that links 
a donor government to a recipient country via the various intermediary organisations that 
can include the recipient’s government ministries and agencies, non-governmental 
organisations, other donors, and private implementation contractors (see figure 4.1 below). 
This presents the logic in aid delivery as perceived (and imposed) by the donors. There are 
other models that contest this linear model of aid delivery (see e.g. Gibson et al. 2005, 64). 
                                                 
58 Interview with two ex-high-level officials on Jun. 26, 2009.  
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Figure 3.1 Chain of Delivery (source: Gibson et al. 2005, 62) 
The chain of aid delivery starts from discussions between the donor headquarters and the 
recipient government, in which their cooperation is outlined for some years ahead, 
including the types of projects to be funded and the budget59. These discussions take place 
every couple of years. The framework is usually presented by the donor to the counterpart 
ministry of the recipient government. Its purpose is to build the needed organisational 
capacity, to carry out the chosen policies, and to coordinate the joint allocation of 
government and donor funds accordingly (Gibson et al. 2005, 120, 122-3). In Nepal, the 
frameworks normally align themselves with the priorities of the national development 
plans60. However, as will be shown in Chapter Five, the national development plans are 
strongly influenced by donor priorities, and tend to cover nearly all aspects of 
development, because of which the claim to support the government priorities is not valid, 
at least when based on the national development plans. This leaning on the government 
strategies and policies by the donors in their country frameworks or operating systems can 
be seen as a consequence of the global trend in aid that pushes for more country ownership 
and donor harmonisation. 
 
                                                 
59 This framework is called either Country Framework or Medium-Term Budget Framework. This country 
framework guides the individual projects and programmes, whereas the Medium-Term Budget Framework 
guides sector-wide approaches of the donor.  
60 The funding agencies of the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Policy, Strategy and Action Plan process 
also have their own country frameworks in Nepal. The ADB calls this 'country safeguard systems' (ADB 
2005), as it is supposed to guarantee that national laws, regulations, procedures and standards are followed 
and that the country's institutional capacity for implementing these is strengthened. In addition to country 
safeguard systems, the ADB has a Country Strategy for aid recipient countries, covering a five year period. 
UNICEF's strategy in Nepal is part of the UN's general 'United Nations Development Assistance 
Framework' in Nepal, and DFID has its own Operational Plans normally for a five-year period. 
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Box 3.2: Projects  
Project aid is typically a short- to medium-term intervention in the recipient country, hence, 
remaining relatively distinct and limited. Some projects are called programmes by the donors, to 
refer to larger projects, which are carried out at provincial level, generally including several 
districts. Nowadays, all multi- and bilateral projects are aligned with national policies and 
development targets. The usual purpose of a donor project is to set in place physical and human 
capital, that the recipient is otherwise thought to be not willing or able to procure or fund. It has a 
set of activities with predefined objectives and outputs. 
 
After the framework in the recipient country is set up, the donor country office 
(multilateral agencies) or the embassy (bilaterals) starts identifying possibilities for 
projects, and together with the donor headquarters, hires consultants for the project 
preparation. Normally, it is the donor agency that leads the project identification and 
design processes. Once the project has been designed, it needs to be approved by the 
recipient government, and the headquarters of the donor agency, and the funding form 
needs to be decided. This can be either grants or loans (credits). The approval by the donor 
headquarters is normally a rigorous process, in which it is inspected that the project is in 
line with the policies of the donor agency. After the approval, the project is carried out by 
the donor and the recipient government. In some cases, neither of these is implementing 
the project itself, but a consultancy company, or a NGO, is contracted for this purpose. 
The institution responsible within the recipient government is often the agency, or a line 
ministry, that holds the portfolio most relevant to the project, although quasi-
governmental61 and non-governmental organisations can also be made responsible for the 
implementation (Gibson et al. 2005, 120-21; Foster, Leavy 2001, 5). In these 
circumstances, a donor project operates as an enclave and is not integrated in the 
governmental budget. Due to the strong position of the donors in project implementation, 
the donor-demanded ownership by the recipient government has not materialised in many 
of the projects, but instead, the projects have remained to be seen as 'donor projects'62. 
Next, I will move on to the inspection of aid, to aid thinking, and to instruments that were 
to answer the problems of project aid. These culminate in ownership and conditionality 
thinking.  
3.5 Donors Searching for Recipient Ownership: Conditionality 
and Policy Dialogue 
The implementation of development efforts through the project modality did not bring 
results that the aid agencies had hoped for. Rather, the ownership problem, by the 
recipient government in the project design and implementation, as well as the weak 
                                                 
61 The quasi-governmental organisations are typical examples of donor-driven parallel systems, in which the 
donor has taken the lead in design and appraisal, has decided the inputs, which will be provided, and uses its 
own disbursement and accountability procedures, and not those of the government (Radelet 2006, 5; Gibson 
et al. 2005, 115-8). In Nepal, this is the case in some of the rural water supply and sanitation programmes; 
particularly the Fund Board is an example of a parallel system. 
62 Interviews with an official at the Embassy of Finland on Aug 5, 2009 and a NGO director on Jul. 6, 2009. 
 
 
 
 
79 
maintenance of the aid efforts, marked nearly all development efforts. This thinking was 
also influenced by the donors’ belief that the development efforts were not effective 
enough, because of the wrong kinds of economic policies in the recipient countries. It 
made the donors to rethink their aid instruments, and to design others, which they 
considered more sustainable, and able to guarantee the ownership by the government in 
the development efforts. Over time, this led to a policy dialogue with the recipient 
government, in which the donors aim to influence the economic and social policy of the 
recipient country. First, this was tried through conditioning the aid to ‘right kind of 
policies’, later moving towards selectivity, and currently conditioning aid to planning 
processes. In this chapter I elaborate the policy dialogue, and the sector-wide approaches, 
and show that these two instruments follow the pattern of the projects as donor-designed 
aid instruments, even though they were created to overcome exactly this problem. 
However, before moving into the particular instruments, I will elucidate the issue of 
ownership, which underpins all of these instruments.  
3.5.1 Ownership 
Ownership is a factor that is presumed to reduce the inherent asymmetry of an aid 
relationship. In aid literature, it has various meanings, but generally, it refers to the roles 
and responsibilities, and ultimately, the power, and denotes a bundle of rights in a process 
of planned development: in setting the agenda, in allocating resources, and in designing 
and implementing development programmes (Jerve, Skovsted Hansen 2008, 10-1). In this 
thesis, however, I find the definition by Whitfield and Fraser (2009a, 3) more convincing. 
They write that there are two competing, and potentially contradictory concepts: 
“ownership as commitment to policies, however they were arrived at; and ownership as 
control over the process and the outcome of choosing policies”. The authors think that in 
much of the current literature, these two distinct contradictory concepts are confused63. 
Recognising the complexity in the ownership question, Whitfield and Fraser (2009a, 4) 
define ownership as “the degree of control recipient governments are able to secure over 
implemented policy outcomes”. Thus, their definition aims to analyse whether policy 
decisions reflect freely made choices on the part of the recipients: is the recipient country 
able to minimise foreign influence over its policy making. 
Defining ownership as ‘commitment’ is preferred by donors as this does not question 
whether the reform agenda is predetermined or externally determined, as long as the 
recipient country shows commitment to the agenda agreed upon (World Bank 2005c 11-2; 
IMF 2001, 3-7). Furthermore, this definition of ownership allows different stakeholders 
(recipient governments, donors, NGOs, etc.) to include themselves into the policy 
                                                 
63 Whitfield and Fraser refer here to Morrissey and Verschoor (2006) and Paloni and Zanardi (2006). Yet, 
they comment on that Johnson (2005) is aware of this elision and notes two possible definitions: (a) a right 
to choose the policies to be implemented; and (b) an obligation to accept responsibility for implementing 
them. However, Johnson argues that assessing the ability of aid recipients to claim their right to choose is 
too difficult because their choice is constrained by so many other factors that understanding how any 
particular negotiation affects their choices would require detailed contextual and historical knowledge (cited 
in Whitfield, Fraser 2009a, 3-4). 
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discussions, and by this show their claimed right to influence policy (Whitfield, Fraser 
2009a, 4). In many situations, donors consider themselves one of the major ‘stakeholders’ 
in the planning process, and thus take an active role in the consultations, injecting their 
own views of what is ‘realistic’ and what is ‘best practice’ on a process advertised as 
allowing local actors to develop their own solutions64 (Fraser, Whitfield 2009, 84). 
Whitfield and Fraser (2009a, 13) also point out that aid agencies claim to intervene in poor 
countries in the name of development, or in the name of the poor, however, not 
acknowledging that they cannot claim to be representatives of recipient country 
populations and they cannot be held accountable by them. They write,  
“The very idea that external actors can create ownership hints at the way that, in defining 
ownership as commitment to externally defined reform agendas, donors have denuded the 
concept of the key source of its progressive content: its potential to attach to popular 
aspirations.” 
 
If recipient governments do not have sufficient room to decide about their development 
strategy and priorities, due to donor demands, or if they cede responsibility for policy 
choices and their outcomes to a donor, then aid creates additional obstacles for citizens in 
holding their government accountable. The ownership discussion is closely linked with 
conditionality – an aid instrument meant to improve it. Next, I will elaborate the different 
aspects of conditionality, presenting first, the economic and governance based 
conditionalities, and then moving on to the process conditionality, linking this with the 
idea of policy dialogues between recipient governments and other stakeholders, including 
the donors. 
3.5.2 Conditionality  
Conditionality seeks to move leaders in developing countries to adopt economic and/or 
political reforms, by using donor aid as both a carrot and a stick, hoping to provide the 
necessary incentives and pressures, to encourage proper behaviour in the targeted aid 
recipient. The first generation, the economic conditionality, introduced by the IMF and the 
World Bank, required that loan recipients implement specific economic reforms (SAPs) in 
order to facilitate the loan repayment. The SAPs broadened the scope of the 
conditionalities attached to the loans, from the sectoral or sub-sectoral, to the national 
macroeconomic level. Hence, several researchers view that the purpose of conditionality 
was not to maximise the probability of repayment of the loan, but rather to enable the 
borrower to remove its perceived fundamental policy-induced obstacles to economic 
growth. (Mosley et al. 1991 27-8; Bøås, McNeill 2003, 63-4; Emmanuel 2010, 857-8). 
Others have presented similar views: Killick et al. (1998, 9-10) do not only criticise the 
concept of conditionality, but also present arguments that question its existence. They 
                                                 
64 Fraser and Whitfield (2009, 84) give as an example of this the two massive volumes of guidance 
developed by the World Bank called the ‘PRSP Sourcebook’, which gives the recipients a clear lead on the 
kind of issues a PRSP hoping to win World Bank support might cover.  
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argue that the aid agencies, by claiming that the conditionalities are agreed among the 
donors and the recipient government, do not logically make sense. “If consensus were the 
rule, why should credits not be paid 100 per cent up-front”, they ask. Likewise, Browne 
(2006, 50) questions the concept of conditionality by writing that “By its very nature, in 
seeking to impose policy direction outside, conditionality undermines the domestic 
accountability it seeks to achieve.” Rather, the setting of preconditions can be seen as the 
ultimate signal of distrust, and the absence of consensus, a device for maximising financial 
leverage, which would be redundant if there were a genuine meeting of minds. 
 
Box 3.3: Conditionality 
 
Conditionality can be presented from several perspectives:  
(1) to give government an incentive to implement during the time period specified in the 
programme with a different set of policy measures than it would otherwise have chosen; (2) to 
record the understanding between government and donor partners on those policy measures, 
which will be undertaken by government; (3) 'bribing' with promises of aid a government to 
undertake policy measures with which it actively disagrees; (4) to use conditional offers of aid as 
an incentive to government to advance the timing of policy measures which the donor regards as 
critical; (5) to signal and give an indication to other donors and the private sector that the reform 
programme is sincere; (6) to monitor, when donors want to disburse their aid where it will do 
most good conditionality can provide a mechanism to ensure that aid is going to the 'right' 
countries; and (7) to support some reforms that may need financing; (8) paternalism, where 
donors believe they know what is best for the recipient65. 
 
Sources: Bräutigam and Knack 2004, 257; Foster and Leavy 2001; Collier and Gunning 1996; 
White and Morrisey 1997; Nissanke 2008, 31. 
 
However, by the late 1980s, a new consensus among multilateral lenders emerged, 
concluding that economic conditionality alone was insufficient in obtaining sustainable 
economic growth in developing countries. This change culminated in 1989, when the 
World Bank began to argue that development was not being achieved in the South, 
primarily due to 'adverse political environments' (World Bank 1989a), implying that the 
reason for the failure was found not in the conditionalities, and the programmes itself, but 
in the governance problems of the recipient countries: the recipient governments were not 
committing themselves to the reforms66. That is to say, democracy and good governance 
                                                 
65 Harrison (2001) categorises the research on conditionality and the relationship between donors/creditors in 
three broad approaches: (1) deriving from rational choice and principal-agent models, the model of the state 
and external institutions meeting as self interested individuals (Killick 1997; Mosley et al. 1991); (2) 
deriving from radical International Political Economy (IPE) and African nationalist camps, the notion of IFI 
involvement as a new imperialism, creating a dichotomy between internal and external interest (Mengisteab 
and Logan 1995; Onimode 1989); (3) deriving from the organic intellectuals of the World Bank, the idea 
that external involvement (not intervention) reflects the liberal nature of globalisation, producing 
partnerships between states and donors, collectively charting a course of common sense and progress 
through policy-based lending (Bhatnagar and Williams 1992; Picciotto 1995; Rietbergen-McCracken 1996).  
66 These policy recommendations dovetailed with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the rise of the perceived 
dual hegemony of multiparty democracy and liberal economics (Doornbos 2001, 93; Emmanuel 2010, 858). 
Stokke (1995, 9) pinpoints that the changes in the Second World towards the end of the 1980s triggered the 
Western governments to pursue basic political concerns -relating to governmental system and human rights, 
in addition to the principles of the prevailing Western economic system, in these countries. 
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reforms started to be viewed as imperative for economic development. Through the focus 
on governance, the donors also entered into policy making – a field outside their previous 
economic policies – in the recipient countries. The move to governance-related issues, 
created a new 'sector' for the aid agencies to fund, and in order to qualify for the funding 
for other sectors. In the process of receiving aid for other development sectors, such as the 
water sector, the political conditionality included reforms inter alia in the water resources 
administration, human resources and the funding system. The governance reform became 
to include restructuring state bureaucracies, reforming legal systems, supporting 
democratic decentralisation, and creating accountability-enhancing civil societies, and that 
subsequently led to the formulation of a new buzzword 'good governance'. Additionally, it 
made governance a technical issue, that could be corrected by advancing technical 
solutions, to solve embedded political problems, and by this, circumvented politics that are 
part of institutional development (Santiso 2004). This is particularly visible if one looks at 
how the multilateral development banks have formulated the concept of 'good 
governance’. The donors justified the change by arguing that they know what are good 
policies for the country, and because of their new focus on capacity building, they 
considered that they needed to facilitate the policy formulation processes, in order to 
‘build the capacity’ of the local government officials and other stakeholders, to take over 
the policy formulation some time later. Fraser and Whitfield (2009, 99) suggest that this 
has increased institutional entanglement between donor structures and practices and 
recipient political and administrative systems. Later, this has been increased through the 
new aid modalities of sector-wide approach and budget support, which ensure that there is 
a constant donor presence throughout the budgetary process. This kind of institutional 
entanglement – illuminated in the policy dialogues created by the donors, in which 
policies of the recipient country are discussed together with its donors, was an attempt by 
the donors to increase the government’s ownership on the policies (cf. Whitfield et al. 
2009).  
3.5.3 Policy Dialogue and Process Conditionality 
The policy dialogue system was based on another influential change that emerged out of 
the donors’ learning suggests that the ex ante conditionality should be replaced by ex-post 
conditionality. While ex-ante conditionality sets aid allocation ‘incentives’ based on 
promises of policy change, ex-post conditionality is claimed to rely on ‘selectivity’ based 
retrospective assessments of performance. That is, in place of using conditionality to 
induce policy change, it is suggested that aid should be used to target financial flows to 
those governments that have already established good policy environments, practically 
meaning those that are in line with the priorities of the donors (as argued in World Bank 
1998b; cited in Nissanke 2008, 23-4; see also Haan, Everest-Phillips 2007, 1-2; Gilbert et 
al. 1999; White, Morrisey 1997, 503-4; Browne 2006; Koponen, Seppänen 2007, 352). 
The idea of policy dialogue included that policies are planned jointly, and in consultation 
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with other stakeholders67, thus, even if aid was to be given to countries with ‘good’ 
policies in place, this did not exclude the involvement of donors in the policy processes. 
Nor can one argue that the policy priorities would have been coming only from the 
government, as both the recipient government, and other stakeholders, know throughout 
the planning process, that much-needed aid may not be available if the plan does not, in 
the end, confirm the demands of the donors (see i.e. Nissanke 2008, 32, 35).  
Fraser and Whitfield (2009, 85) call this ‘process conditionality’ referring to the 
demands for participatory planning and consultation in the policy making. They write,  
“Despite significant change in the planning process, conditionality remains a central 
technology of the contemporary aid architecture, supplemented by the continuing use of 
funding tranches, deepening surveillance of recipients, increased donor coordination, more 
extensive participation of donors in the policymaking process, and more emphasis on Bank 
and Fund analytical work as a means to influence recipient policies (stressing the ‘expert’ 
and this authoritative development knowledge of these institutions).” 
 
They reveal that the ideas of process conditionality and selectivity embody a difficult 
contradiction: while recipient governments can write their ‘own’ policies and strategies, 
donors will still seek to influence the process, in order to make sure that the product is one 
which the donor can agree. At the same time, through the ownership thinking that is 
required, that local actors drive the project, but as the donor behaviour shows, they have 
little confidence that the local actors are willing or able to do so (Fraser, Whitfield 2009, 
93). The policy dialogue gives the government little room to reach policy decisions 
independently (in the public realm, at least) and then negotiate with donors. The 
consultative planning process and aim for consensus make it harder for the government to 
change its policy position later on. Additionally it locks both government and donors into 
a rigid framework. The increasingly coordinated nature of donors reduces the flexibility 
that governments have to seek alternative sources of finance, among traditional donors, as 
well as alternative development strategies (Whitfield 2009b, 353-4).  
Yet, the recipient governments are not void of strategies in dealing with the donors in 
the conditionality game68 and can also be successful in keeping up their sovereignty in the 
negotiations with the donors. This has been seen to derive from the confidence by the 
recipient government69 to translate a country’s conditions into a negotiating capital that 
makes the difference (Whitfield 2009b). The less aid dependent countries have been 
presented to adopt three strategies in negotiating with the donors. First, they can 
                                                 
67 Gould (2006, 83) calls the consultations as a ‘new form of politics’ that empowers certain state agents 
(Ministry of Finance and Planning, central government in general), domestic groups (‘elite’ NGOs), and 
external actors (donors) within the context of public policy formulation. This can be seen as part of a generic 
trend of privileging large (often donor-funded) public policy programmes vis-à-vis the budgeting process.  
68 Mosley at al. (1991, 68-9) also present this view calling conditionality negotiation as ‘bargaining game’ 
and portrays it to consist of three 'acts', with each of them including a 'dance' between the donor and the 
recipient. 
69 This confidence can come from various sources, such as ideology of the government, the background of 
the ruling party and political leaders, and the degree of popular legitimacy and support that the government 
enjoys (Whitfield 2009b). I would also add to the list the size of the economy of the recipient country, which 
for example, in the case of India, is an important factor providing confidence to the country. 
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strategically settle on a project-by-project mode of managing donors, hence, avoiding the 
infringement of donors on overall national policy making (Jerve and Skovsted Hansen 
2008, 8). Second, the governments can threaten (and have threatened) to rollback 
previously undertaken reforms, as a way of countering donor pressure (Collier 1999a). 
Third, the countries can also breach the aid contract, as there is normally no cost to 
defaulting on the promises of policy reform due to a moral hazard70. The donor often 
relaxes enforcement of the terms of aid contracts, if the recipient shows some sign of 
making good on promised reforms. The recipient, on the other hand, can withdraw these 
after the aid has been disbursed, which at the end, is crucial for the donors (Araral 2005, 
149; cf. Collier 2000). This relationship between donors and recipients has been succinctly 
described by The Economist (1995) as ‘the Kenya-Fund dance,’ the dynamics which is 
played out as follows: 
“Over the past few years, Kenya has performed a curious mating ritual with its aid donors. 
The steps are: one, Kenya wins its yearly pledges of foreign aid. Two, the government 
misbehave, backtracking on reform and behaving in an authoritarian manner. Three, a new 
meeting of donor countries looms with exasperated foreign governments preparing sharp 
rebukes. Four, Kenya pulls a placatory rabbit out of the hat. Five, the donors are mollified 
and the aid is pledged. The whole dance starts again.” (The Economist, 19 August 1995) 
 
The weaker countries, on the other hand, have been identified to have five strategies in 
dealing with donor influence. These donor-dependent countries normally possess less of 
their own negotiating strength, perpetuating weakness. Contrary to what donors argue, 
there is indeed a trade-off between recipient ownership on the one hand, and partnership 
with donors on the other (Whitfield, Fraser 2009a, 21; Fraser, Whitfield 2009, 98; cf. 
Jerve, Skovsted Hansen 2008). Some of these strategies have been analysed within the 
Nepalese context in Chapter Seven, where policy negotiations between the governmental 
agencies and donors are analysed. In this part, I present the generic strategies as identified 
in the literature. First, by the strategy of non-implementation, the governments hope that it 
would be possible to get away with not implementing, or revising, policy commitments 
made during negotiation, and still getting the money from the donors71. Without access to 
alternative sources of finance, or the political will to risk losing aid resources, this strategy 
does not allow governments to set a policy agenda, although it gives them some control 
over what aspects of the donor-driven agenda get implemented and when. Second, some 
of these countries have been attempting a different strategy, which is based on embracing 
donor interest in ownership, fully committing to new aid modalities, and turning 
significant governmental energy towards the task of constructing the kind of depoliticised 
states and administrative systems to which donors find it easiest to ‘align’, and transfer 
‘ownership’. The hope is that by playing along with the ownership game, will bring less 
negotiating with a wide range of donors, and show that the country has been a ‘good 
                                                 
70 Moral hazard generally refers to post-contractual opportunism (Gibson et al. 2005, 42-3). 
71 This kinds of arguments are presented by Radelet 2006; Kanbur 2003; Svensson 2003; Easterly 2001; 
Gibson et al. 2005; Killick et al. 1998. Some researchers have linked the non-implementation with the 
incompetence of the country and viewed them to be corrupt or driven by the logic of neo-patrimonialism. 
See Hyden 1983; Callaghy, Ravenhill 1993; cited in Whitfield, Fraser 2009b, 29.  
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reformer’ and a ‘good partner’, and hence donors should not back off. Third, the 
government can put the blame on the donor for the hardships caused by reforms. 
Popularity at home can be gained by making the donor out to be the ‘bad guy’72. In these 
situations, leaders are less motivated to develop the domestic consensus needed for 
reform, restructuring, or belt-tightening to be effective (Collier 1999, cited in Gibson et al. 
2005, 113). The fourth strategy is the lack of prioritisation, which means that the 
government refuses prioritisation of the huge shopping lists of potential projects that 
emerge from the planning process, that may allow a recipient government to formally 
meet the needs of donors for a plan, but to retain some flexibility about which aspects to 
actually implement. On the other hand, it may allow the bilateral donors that come in to 
fund such processes more space to pick and choose those aspects of a national plan that 
they are willing to support, leaving recipient government priorities (typically infrastructure 
and defence) unfunded (Fraser, Whitfield 2009, 97-8). The fifth strategy is to play the role 
of reluctant reformer as if to wring more concessions out of the donor.  
One common strategy for all recipient governments could be to rely on the donors not 
following their own principles, as often has been shown to happen73 (Gibson et al. 2005). 
Many donors continue to disburse aid, even when the recipients fail to meet conditions, 
sometimes repeatedly so. Donors are faced with their own internal incentives to continue 
to disburse aid74; hence, the recipient governments can strategically manoeuvre their way 
out of unwanted policy principles, by using the above-mentioned strategies. At the same, 
because the aid money is normally conditionalised to the formulation of the policies, and 
not on their implementation, the government officials have little incentive to delay the 
policy formulations, as their primary interest is to guarantee the arrival of the development 
funds. This can be interpreted as donors 'buying' reforms with project aid, as is the practice 
of the ADB in the Nepalese water supply and sanitation sector (these manoeuvring 
strategies are elaborated in Chapter Seven).  
In the following part, we focus on the new aid instrument, the sector-wide approach, 
whose origin is in the policy dialogue thinking, and on the push for more ownership by the 
recipient governments in the policies and programmes.  
                                                 
72 Killick et al. (1998, 16) call this scapegoating: a tendency for some borrowing/recipient governments to 
use it as a convenient whipping-boy, as a foreign force for the government to blame for unpopular measures 
in order to deflect criticism from itself.  
73Albeit officially only funding countries with good policies in place, even aid agencies’ own research 
shows, that policy reforms are funded in states with 'bad/weak' governance states, which have demonstrated 
limited commitment to the reform, or even realised that no policy reform is possible (see World Bank 
1997b). An example of this is Nepal, which remains to be seen as a state with 'bad/weak' governance, but 
still is a beneficiary of governance-based aid (see e.g. Chhetri 2004 on governance reform programme in 
Nepal). 
74Bilateral donors have, in the past couple of decades, moved into a limited number of core countries with 
their fund development efforts. As they only have a small amount of countries, where the funds flow, it 
becomes problematic for them, if in even one country where there are problems in the disbursement, leading 
to surplus in their budget. For multilateral donors, this is not as big of a problem, because they tend to fund 
development projects on a much larger scale.  
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3.5.4 Sector-Wide Approaches 
The sector-wide approach programmes (SWAPs) are an attempt to move away from the 
isolated project aid, the uncoordinated donor programmes, and a lack of sustained impacts, 
towards building a long-term approach to donor-recipient development cooperation under 
a single programme based on common values and policy in one sector75, as well as to 
coordinate the sectoral actors by bringing all donors under one 'roof': in donor language, to 
harmonise the aid practices, and to align at policy level (Foster 2000, 7-8; Haan, Everest-
Phillips 2007, 4; Riddell 2007, 195-8; Koponen 2011). Hence, the SWAPs were planned 
to address exactly the same problems as with conditionality, making the sector-wide 
approach a new solution for old problems.  
 
Box 3.4: Budget Support, Sectoral Budget Support, Sector-Wide Approach and Basket 
Funding 
General budget support is applied to cross-sectoral frameworks and typically in the context of 
fiscal reforms or adjustment, debt relief and the PRSP. Within the PRSP framework, the budget 
support is provided to the recipient country’s Ministry of Finance and directly to the 
governmental budget. In sectoral budget support, on the other hand, the funds can be 
earmarked to certain sectors, to help finance the sector expenditure plan, and is disbursed and 
accounted for through government systems, possibly with some additional sectoral reporting.  
Before moving to the full-scale sectoral budget support, a sector-wide approach programme can 
be implemented.  
SWAP refers to funds provided to the recipient country’s ministry, which is responsible for that 
particular sector, for administering the jointly agreed plan of action (based on a jointly agreed 
policy). Hence, the defining characteristics of a SWAP are that  
 all significant public funding for the sector supports a single sector policy and 
expenditure programme; 
 it is under government leadership;  
 it adopts common approaches across the sector; and  
 progresses towards relying on government procedures to disburse and account for all 
public expenditure. 
 
The aim of SWAP is to eventually reach a stage where all sector finance goes through the budget 
and uses the same procedures, which is the practice of sectoral budget support. Before this, the 
SWAP is normally a hybrid of funding forms. It can also be funded through the ‘so-called’ 
basket funding, which is a form that can development into full-scale budget support. The 
difference with sectoral budget support, is that the money from basket funding is not spent 
following the beneficiary partner country procedures. Generally, expenditure in a certain 
(sub)sector is financed via a joint bank account, held by a group of donors (not a Ministry of 
Finance bank account of the beneficiary country). In doing so, specific procedures are followed 
that have been agreed by the participating donors and the beneficiary government. Basket 
funding is used whenever the donors want to channel the resources directly to the specific 
expenditure of a particular ministry, because they still have insufficient faith in the ability of the 
Ministry of Finance to earmark the funds for priorities in the poverty reduction strategy.  
Sources: Foster, Leavy 2001, 4-9; Haan, Everest-Phillips 2007, 4; Koponen, Seppänen 2007, 
353-4; website of the Belgian Development Agency 
                                                 
75 In addition, to uncoordinated projects and programmes, another problem was the fragmentation in the 
budgeting process, with much spending being outside the government budget, and with reliance on donor 
rather than government financial management (Foster 2000, 7-8; Haan, Everest-Phillips 2007, 4). 
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There are several constraints that relate to SWAPs and their donor-initiated origin. Here I 
identify those that inform the attempts to establish a SWAP in the Nepalese rural water 
supply and sanitation sector (these are elaborated in Chapter Six). Due to donor interest in 
order to establish SWAPs in the aid recipient countries, the SWAPs have easily led to a 
strong donor involvement, even though their primary aim is to promote government 
ownership. This kind of strong donor involvement through institutional entanglement may 
lead to ‘top-down delivery systems’ and to greater administrative centralisation. There is 
often a fragmentation of government (Foster and Leavy 2001, 8), meaning that issues dealt 
within a sector do not all fall under one ministry, but are covered by more than one 
government ministry and department, including local governments, and both private sector 
and NGO participation. By placing the SWAP under (a donor-chosen) ministry, this can 
worsen the domestic power balance between ministries that operate in the sector (Gibson 
et al. 2005, 123; see also Lipton 1993). This also characterises the Nepalese rural water 
supply and sanitation sector, where responsibilities are at least officially divided among 
the MPPW, MLD, DWSS, Dolidar, their agencies at the local level, and the local 
governmental bodies (DDCs, VDCs and municipalities), and where the SWAP has been 
planned under the MPPW, making it much stronger than other agencies in the sector. 
Ideally, government, donors, and other stakeholders, would agree an effective framework 
of policies and management arrangements. In practice, for reasons of manageability, 
sector programmes have often defined themselves around the area of responsibility of a 
lead ministry, and have not been comprehensive in meeting sector needs. On the other 
hand, the strong donor permanence within a SWAP framework may also lead an aid 
recipient to contribute less effort, and consequently, hinder the maturing of the recipient 
government to take ownership in the process. 
Furthermore, as explained above, the establishment of a SWAP requires the 
cooperation and coordination among donors and the government. However, specifically in 
case of Nepal, the leadership question within the coordination has turned out to be 
problematic, having led to competition between different donors – what Koponen and 
Seppänen (2007, 355) describe as ‘donors putting up their flags’. In Nepal, this has 
become visible in the parallel policy dialogues led by various donors, who have wished to 
have their own assessments of the policy environment, and suggestions for policy 
priorities (see Chapter Six)76. Due to the competition, the recipient government has few 
incentives to build its own capacity for project implementation, or to gather more 
ownership in the development efforts, as required by some of its donors. The government 
can rely on that in case one donor decides to drop funding, due to differences between the 
donor and the government, another donor will jump in to fill the financing gap77. As noted 
                                                 
76 Foster and Leavy (2001, 12-3) continue to point out that there will never be total agreement on policy, not 
total satisfaction with implementation, nor complete agreement on every allocation within the budget. The 
judgement, which donors need to make, is whether the final outcome following dialogue is sufficiently 
beneficial to the poor to be worth supporting, which includes a judgement on whether the allocation of 
resources is moving in favour of increased and more effective spending on poverty reduction (Foster, Leavy 
2001, 12-3). 
77 In an interview, a government official explained me that the government does not need to care about the 
sustainability issues related to new units within the ministry set up by a donor, because there will be another 
donor willing to take care of them, if the other donor withdraws (an interview with a high-level official at 
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by Knack and Rahman (2004, 25) “Competitive donor practices (…) erode administrative 
capacity in recipient country governments. In their need to show results, donors each act to 
maximise performance of their own projects, and shirk on provision of the public sector 
infrastructure essential for the countries overall long-term development”.  
Donor dominance in the sector-wide approaches has also become visible through the 
conditionality related to it. The overall strategy and operational plans for the sector often 
include agreed targets, and agreed 'rules of the game', setting out how government and 
donors agree to behave in implementing the sector-wide approach78. Particularly in 
countries with a weak governance and dependence on aid, the SWAP modality – 
especially when driven by the donors – has not proved to be effective. It has placed strains 
on the government with increased planning operations, and demands for aid coordination. 
Even though there have been attempts to establish a sector programme in the water supply 
and sanitation sectors in Nepal since the mid-1990s, the project and programme aid has 
still been dominant, due to the donors' stance that through these modalities, they are able 
to be in control of the funds and the implementation of the projects. Nevertheless, due to 
the global push for sector-wide approaches, the SWAPs have recently started to become 
more common in Nepal, and for some years, these are being implemented in the education 
and health sectors. Studies on SWAP in the education sector have found it to be 
dominated by the donors, and donor-led joint missions with the government (Bhatta 2011; 
Winther-Schmidt 2011), impacted by the various views of the donors, on how to structure 
the education sector (Hautaniemi 2011), and has led to less participation by the Nepalese 
in managing donors (Sharma et al. 2008, 148); showing that the SWAP, even when 
formed under a single ministry, might end up being dominated by the donors’ interests.  
In addition to ownership, an important part of the sector-wide approach is the idea of a 
partnership between the donor and the recipient government (OECD 1996; Wolfensohn 
1998). Actually, in the definitions of the aid agencies, these two are intertwined79. Even 
though the SWAP was designed to increase ownership in the recipient countries, many 
researchers consider that it is actually a terminological Trojan Horse (Fowler 2000, 7; 
Pender 2001, 408-9; cited in Crawford 2003, 142); being an instrument for influencing a 
country’s development choices, and for a path in a far more all-encompassing way; being 
similar to the relationship between the concepts of ownership and policy dialogue. 
Koponen and Seppänen (2007, 355-6) explain that in the sector-wide approach and the 
budget support, the duality of the partnership concept, and the particular definition of 
ownership get accentuated, as through these alone, it is believed that sustainability can be 
achieved. Yet, when a single donor does not have visibility in those programmes anymore, 
                                                                                                                                                   
MPPW, Aug. 4, 2009). This is a general problem in Nepal – often talked about informally among donors; 
however, it was difficult to get other people to talk about this problem in an interview. Thus, I have only one 
reference for this issue, even though it would require more evidence. 
78 They typically include matters such as agreement to a defined procedure for reviewing and modifying the 
sector plan and budget, including monitoring and reporting requirements, and may include specific 
undertakings agreed in the initial sector planning documents, or in subsequent joint reviews. 
79 OECD (1996) defines partnership following: ‘each developing country and its people are ultimately 
responsible for their own development’. Thus, the ‘basic principle’ put forward was that ‘locally-owned 
country development strategies … should emerge from an open and collaborative dialogue by local 
authorities with civil society and with external partners’ (in Crawford 2003, 140-1).  
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all donors are collectively able to exercise more pressure on the recipient government than 
previously. Furthermore, there is a danger that through sector-wide approaches and budget 
support the donors are forcing a blueprint model on the recipient governments.  
Until now, I have argued that in addition to the project modality, a move to the more 
recent aid modalities of conditionality and sector-wide approach, the aid modalities have 
been donor-driven, and despite their rhetoric for improving government ownership, and 
responsibility in the management of aid and policy making, the influence by donors has 
not decreased. To the contrary, donors have increasingly been involved themselves in 
policy making in the recipient countries. Next, I will illuminate the different incentives 
that the recipient country, and donors, have in aid management, and by this, highlight the 
political side of aid giving.  
3.6 Incentives in the Aid Game 
As seen from the choice of aid modalities, there are embedded incentives in foreign aid for 
both donors and the recipient government. These incentives are important in explaining 
why aid has not always been effective, and why it is difficult to make development, 
among other things, sustainable. These incentives actually guide more the delivery of aid 
than the stated 'official' developmentalist principles. In this section, I analyse the 
incentives of the parties involved in aid delivery, focusing first on the interests and 
incentives within recipient countries, like here in Nepal. After this, I turn to the incentives 
for donors to provide aid. This includes a discussion on the role of consultants. I have 
excluded NGOs, as their role in policy making in the Nepalese rural water supply and 
sanitation sector has been limited, especially when donors and government have had an 
interest in a particular policy. This is elucidated in the case of the policy for water 
harvesting which was formulated by the NGO Forum for Urban Sanitation. The 
government had little of its own interest to formulate this policy, as water harvesting does 
not involve large investments, hence allowing an NGO to take the lead. Yet, during the 
preparations for the Urban Water Supply and Sanitation Policy, funded by JICA, and 
paving the way for the Melamchi Water Supply Project with large investments, NGOs 
were not included in the consultations, and efforts were made to keep them in the margins 
of the process80. Also, in the formulation of the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Policy, 
Strategy and Action Plan, they did not play a prominent role. This does not mean that they 
would not have own incentives for involvement in the development efforts, but that in the 
‘aid game’ in Nepal, the role of donors and the government is more significant.  
With incentives, I refer to instrumentalist factors, such as strategic, economic and 
political motives of the actors in the aid game. Spiller and Tommasi (2004, cited in Gibson 
et al. 2005, 9) refer with the term to either external stimulus or to internal motivation. The 
external stimuli include rewards and punishments, that individuals perceive to be related 
to their actions and those of others. The payments people receive, or costs they have to 
pay, the respect they earn from each other, and the acquisitions of new skills or 
                                                 
80 Interview with a NGO Director Jul. 6, 2009.  
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knowledge, are all external stimuli that may induce more of some kinds of behaviour and 
less of others. Donors use a variety of external stimuli in their effort to change the 
behaviour of officials and beneficiaries in recipient countries, including the allocation of 
monies, and the creation of institutions, that will provide incentives for certain types of 
actions. Internal motivation, again relates to the perceived rewards and punishments that 
can motivate individuals to take actions which are either productive for all, or only for the 
individual alone. Incentives, which lead the individual to avoid engaging in mutually 
productive outcomes or to take actions that are generally harmful for others, are called 
perverse incentives (de Soto 2000, cited in Gibson et al. 2005, 9). 
3.6.1 Recipient Country    
Even though the overall aim of the government is to provide welfare to its citizens, this 
has not necessarily, in all situations, guided the decision making of the bureaucrats and 
politicians in the country. Researchers leaning on rational choice theories have analysed 
that public offices are driven by the same factors that drive the behaviour of the private 
firm: self-interest (Araral 2005, 140; quoting Tullock 1965; Niskanen 1973; Dunleavy 
1973; Downs 1967; Parsons 1995). This view suggests that bureaucrats are mostly eager 
to maximise their own interest rather than public interest (Araral 2005, 140). Here, I first 
discuss the incentives at the government and bureaucracy level, and after that, show what 
kind of incentives guide the thinking of the politicians, and how the decision making of 
both government officials and politicians is impacted by the patronage-based governance 
culture that exists in Nepal.  
The self-interest of bureaucrats is illuminated in their desire to increase their own 
welfare. The low pay received by government officials in developing countries has 
attracted many talented individuals to work rather for a donor, for a much larger payment, 
than to opt for government employment81. This has several implications. First, the donors' 
aim for sustainable changes in the country, which would be best achieved through 
enhancing the capacity of the recipient government, is hindered by the practice of hiring 
locals as consultants and experts (Gibson et al 2005, 44; see also Wade 1985, 1989). 
Hence, the combination of having government officials, with a low payment, and 
development aid, with large budgets, and an in-built need for a local workforce at the 
national level, has led to a problem of inviting the government officials to work less for 
their actual job, and more for the donors, leading to increased levels of corruption and 
corrupt behaviour. On the other side of the coin, Knack (2000, 5) has found that foreign 
aid, through presenting a potential source of rent, has made people seek for an 
employment in the public sector, because of the large amounts of money transferred to the 
ministries via aid. Knack explains that aid is commonly used for patronage purposes, 
subsidising employment in the public sector, or in state-operated enterprises, as foreign 
aid can provide funds for the government to undertake investments that would otherwise 
                                                 
81 There are employment possibilities in the donor country office, or as a local consultant in the donor paid 
consultancy missions. Some officials have devoted their working time to running their own businesses, such 
as consultancy companies, that provide services for donors.   
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be made by private investors. As rent to those controlling the government increase, 
resources devoted to obtaining political influence increase; thus, a pervasive consequence 
of aid has been to promote, or exacerbate, the politicisation of life in aid-receiving 
countries82 (Bauer 1984, 38; Knack 2000, 6; Degndol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen 
2003, 273, all cited in Haan, Everest-Phillips 2007, 10). This problem also relates to a lack 
of commitment to development goals and efforts, which are particularly demanded by the 
establishment of sector wide approaches. If the government of the recipient country is one 
that owes its continuity in office to its distribution of benefits to key supporters, no 
investment has to be made in establishing a strong, independent, public service, capable of 
making coherent long-term policies, and designing and implementing good projects. As 
long as donors are willing to lend funds, the recipient can get by with promises and 
commitments, without any real commitments to any externally or internally imposed 
reforms (see Pedersen 1996; 1998; Gibson et al. 2005, 81).   
Once in power, the officials have different incentives, depending upon their position 
within the bureaucracy. In general, top-level bureaucrats are interested in expanding the 
scope and scale of their empires, as well as rising in the bureaucratic hierarchy. Thus, they 
are more interested in projects that extend their duties, staff, and budgets (Cerny 2001, 
401). They might also be interested to gain aid funds in one area, in order to be able to 
allocate government's funds into another area83. Lower-level bureaucrats, meanwhile, see 
donor-funded aid projects as career opportunities, and as opportunities for getting extra 
(legal or illegal) income (Moe 1990a; 1990b; Gibson 1999; cited in Gibson et al. 2005, 
59). In addition, donor organised workshops provide 'perks' to the officials at all levels: in 
some cases, public employees vie to attend workshops, because they involve an 
allowance, a stay in a prestigious venue (an international hotel or conference centre), and a 
good buffet or meal. It has even been realised that if department heads try to reduce the 
costs of workshops, by reducing allowances, or holding the sessions within their own 
buildings, it is far more difficult to get people to attend (Harrison 2001, 674). 
Furthermore, aid money provides many other fringe benefits, such as vehicles, study tours, 
salary increments etc., that would not otherwise be available to officials in low-income 
countries (Bräutigam, Knack 2004, 263). Haan and Everest-Phillips (2007, 10) assess that 
donors have failed to acknowledge the importance of these incentives for local 
government officials, which has been one reason for the ineffectiveness of aid. Civil 
servants can also support donor initiatives in order to access the benefits of the aid 
industry, but they may also comply with the proclivities and preferences of donors, 
because it makes life easier to rely on donor commissioned experts, or to download and 
                                                 
82 By making control of the government a more valuable prize, aid may even increase political instability 
(Grossman 1992, cited in Haan, Everest-Phillips 2007, 10). 
83 This is so called fungibility problem. Foster and Leavy (2001) define it following: Aid is said to be 
fungible when government offsets donor spending on a particular purpose by reducing its own expenditure 
on the same purpose. Fungibility means that total public spending (both government and donor financed) is 
adjusted to reflect the priorities of the national government rather than the uncoordinated preferences, which 
emerge from large numbers of donor projects. If government and donors are in agreement on budget 
priorities, then fungibility is welcome, and ensures that the agreed budget priorities can implemented. If 
donors disagree with government spending priorities, they can try to influence them through policy dialogue, 
conditionality, or by earmarking their aid.  
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slightly rework, the ‘best practice’ documents that donors produce (Mkandawire 2007, 
cited in Fraser, Whitfield 2009, 99). 
There are different incentives for the recipient government, depending on how the aid 
money has been granted to the recipient – as a grant, credit or a guarantee, as shown by 
Gibson et al. (2005). This incentive effect of grants, however, can evaporate in the aid 
context, when a recipient government swaps all, or some portion, of its own contributions 
to the organisation carrying out the project with that derived from donor funding – the 
issue of fungibility. The incentive value of credits depends on how well recipient 
ownership is rooted. When ownership is separated from its associated responsibility, the 
incentive effects of credits become obscured. If repayments of credits taken to finance 
particular development projects in recipient countries are derived from the country's 
general tax base, (as is usual), rather than earmarked from the income generated by the 
funded project, there are fewer financial stakes for the project owner or recipient 
government in the success of a given development project. Incentives also weaken when 
donors extend credits as programme assistance. Macro-economic programme aid credits 
are designed to prompt recipient governments to adopt good policies, and to make national 
investments needed for high rates of economic growth and human development. The 
short-term political imperatives of recipient country officials may overtake the objectives 
of such long-term financing, leading recipient government officials to make promises to 
donors to secure the credits, only to later backtrack on these commitments. In Nepal, the 
government has tended to prefer loans over grants, even though these are not 'free money'. 
Loans are perceived freer, leaving more jurisdiction for the government, as they are not 
monitored as tightly as grants. In addition, loans tend to fund large infrastructure projects, 
in which the kickbacks are easier to channel through procurement practices.84 In grants, 
this is not the case, because a large part of the grant is allocated to technical assistance 
(TA), basically meaning the salaries of consultants. 
Politicians in centralised political systems – such as Nepal – without the check of 
meaningful democratic elections, and governance arrangements at multiple levels, are 
more likely to use their power over the distribution of development aid to enhance or 
maintain their status as a patron (e.g. Coolidge and Rose-Ackerman 2000; Gibson and 
Hoffmann 2005; Joseph 1987; Robinson 2003; cited in Gibson et al.  2005, 58). In such 
cases, politicians will use aid to distribute as rewards to clients and followers. In countries 
where representative elections are seen as legitimate, politicians may seek to target 
development projects in certain electoral districts – a phenomenon better known as pork-
barrel politics (Mayhew 1986; Stein and Bickers 1995; cited in Gibson et al. 2005, 58). In 
Nepal, where ethnicity and caste are important in national politics, politicians have tried to 
deliver the benefits of development aid to their clan, tribe and caste (see e.g. Panday 
2002).  
                                                 
84 Interview with researcher Dr Sudhindra Sharma on Aug. 12, 2010.  
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3.6.2 Donors 
Donors have a variety of motivations for providing aid, only some of which are directly 
related to economic development or poverty reduction. There is little question that foreign 
policy and political relationships are the most important determinants of aid flow85. 
Foreign aid is still used as a tool to gain political influence, hence the countries getting aid 
from a particular donor have been chosen carefully, and through a political process. In 
addition, often, economic interests of the donor country direct the aid flows, or at least are 
taken into consideration, when deciding upon future aid commitments86. Lancaster (2007) 
adds to this list cultural reasons to promote e.g. a language and values. Multilateral aid is 
naturally less prone to these pressures, although by no means immune (Radelet 2006, 6; 
Gardner, Waller 2005, 88). Those motivations, which are not linked to economic and 
political factors, have been identified by Gardner and Waller (2005, 88) as altruism and 
warm glow87. These are guiding the moral imperative of the aid agencies, as explained in 
the developmentalism discussion; caring about those less fortunate is a commonly thought 
to be a task of the developed world and their aid agencies. However, in this thesis, I argue 
that the motivation of the donors to provide aid has its own political and/or economic 
interest; not only because of altruism or warm glow.  
Once the funds have been earmarked, the most pressing need for the donor agencies is 
to disburse these. Hence, they have an incentive to keep the projects and programmes 
progressing, and are on a constant search for new possibilities to provide funds for. They 
need to spend the money that is allocated in one budgetary cycle, as parliamentarians are 
otherwise likely to interpret thast unallocated funds as evidence that the funds are not 
needed and can be cut next year (Wildawsky 1984; Catterson and Lindahl 1999; E. 
Ostrom et al. 1993; Gibson et al. 2005; Mosley et al. 1991). Bilateral donors, in particular, 
are also influenced by the perceived return to aid in terms of economic and political 
benefits, and the direct tying of aid to its own national suppliers (Jerve, Skovsted Hansen 
2008, 10). Indeed, this need to ‘move the money’ is a universal incentive in all public 
bureaucracies. Such an incentive can lead to particularly perverse outcomes in the context 
of development cooperation where projects are sometimes selected by the donor country's 
agency, because they involve a large sum of money without the need for an equivalently 
large amount of time and energy on the part of an agency's officials. The ability to spend 
the budget – or even better to increase the budget – labels the perception of how successful 
the donor has been. Hence, it is often considered that the amount of the budget tells how 
powerful the donor is. There seems to be concurrence between the donors in a recipient 
                                                 
85 During the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union used aid to vie for the support of 
developing countries with little regard as the whether the aid actually was used to support development, in 
2002, Iraq became the largest aid recipient in the world and still today, many donors provide significant aid 
to their former colonies as a means of retaining some political influence (Radelet 2006, 6). 
86 The economic interest by the donors has led to the development of tied aid – aid that requires the recipient 
to contract with the donor country for supplies and staff – can be interpreted as a form of rent-seeking from 
the side of the donor. By offering tied aid to recipient countries, the donor country is effectively subsidising 
their export of goods and services since the recipient country must purchase these from the donor country 
(Jones 1995; Gibson et al. 2005, 55).  
87 With this the writers mean that the citizens of the developed country will feel good simply from the act of 
giving, whether they get any results or not (Gardner, Waller 2005, 87-8).  
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country on the position of a 'lead donor' (see Chapter Six on description of this in the case 
of Nepal; cf. Dixit K.M. 1997). A similar competition can be observed within an aid 
agency, where different departments compete with each other over their position and 
power in the agency – based on the size of their budgets88. Therefore, as the interest of the 
aid agencies is to have power in the recipient country, their incentive for this is to hold on 
to their budgets and if possible, increase the funds. Harrison (2001, 671) depicts this issue 
by explaining that the principal aim of the resident representatives of the World Bank 
country offices is to spend money during their residency, because a resident representative 
is evaluated largely according to the amount of programme funding that he or she can 
arrange. The same can be observed among the officials of a donor agency, who are 
responsible for the implementation of the development projects. They are under pressure 
to keep these running and the money flowing, as their own success in their job is assessed 
through the spending of the money (Killick et al. 1998, 149; Mosley et al. 1991, cf. 
Kanbur 2000; Araral 2008). 
In addition, the staff members of donor agencies have an incentive to elicit adherence 
to global development fashions (see Chapter Five) as they are often assessed against this. 
Their incentives, therefore, include increased chances to be hired, advancement of their 
own career, the ability to publish in donor agency publications, and in general to be 
assessed positively. The association of hefty salaries, lucrative bonuses for successful loan 
placement, post-retirement schemes, and contracts that are temporary in nature, act as 
‘golden handcuffs’. They tend to generate conformity, limiting “dissent by increasing the 
‘opportunity costs’ of any dissidence” (Broad 2006, cited in Molle 2008, 146), thus, the 
staff members understandably are not very keen to jeopardise their gains in social status 
and salary for the sake of a mundane doctrinal disagreement (Molle 2008, 146).  
Furthermore, for donors, which have invested much capital in recipient countries, the 
costs of a substantial decline in these states would be high indeed, for which reason they 
are hesitant to show publicly if their operations have not gained those results as expected 
(Browne 2006; Fukuyama 2004). The same applies to malpractice, which might have 
arisen in the recipient country, such as corruption, ineffective governance, etc. In case 
these issues would be raised to the public, the support for development funding might 
decrease. This would also negatively affect those development efforts that have been 
positive and making the good sides of development in the future impossible to continue. 
Hence, there is an interest from the side of the donor, to keep quiet on those issues that do 
not work as well as planned in the developing countries.  
                                                 
88 This is the writer's own experience while working in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) of Finland in 
the department for Asia and Oceania, which was in competition with other departments administering 
development programmes in Africa and Latin America.  
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3.6.3 Consultants 
Development consultants89 are hybrid aid actors, in the sense that their incentives and 
interests relate to serving both the donor as well as the recipient government. The normal 
practice – exercised in Nepal as well – is that the consultancy firm is paid by the aid 
agency funding the project, but the consultants officially report to the recipient 
government. Problematic in this relationship, is that the interest of all parties has some 
overlap, but also considerable divergence on how the project should be designed or carried 
out. In addition, the loyalty of the consultants depends upon their own interests, e.g. the 
international consultants rely on the donors for future assignments, thus, they tend to 
follow the wishes of the donor, whereas the national consultants rely on having good 
relationships with the local officials90, and therefore, are keen on securing the officials’ 
interests in the project. Both international and national consultants naturally rely on 
development projects for their future income, and hence, have an incentive to design the 
project, so that the donor is happy with it, and hesitate to recommend anything that would 
be against their continuation. Instead, negative findings, if any, are formulated to justify a 
new phase of the project, or presented in a positive way: once corrected within the current 
project, the project will be even more successful than that as planned91. This is also 
pinpointed by Stirrat (2000, 42) who writes that consultants’ reports should never leave 
loose ends, but they always include a closure. There is a demand for tidy reports, not 
characterised by problems but by solutions.   
Generally, both donors and the recipient government are for the use of consultants in 
the preparation and implementation of development efforts, because it saves their own 
resources and often they are lacking the specific knowledge on the issue. However, 
particularly in Nepal, the government officials often complain that too much of the 
development budget goes into the payments of the consultants, particularly the 
international consultants, whose payments are high, and that the work could as well be 
done by national consultants. They opine that the national consultants are equally capable 
in carrying out the work, and that this money could be used more effectively, as the 
payments made to the national consultants are much smaller. The donors, on the other 
hand, prefer to have someone 'from their side' to monitor the use of the funds and keeping 
an eye on the implementation, thus, they continue arguing for having at least some 
international consultants in the teams. The vested interest of the recipient government 
behind this idea is to have the money allocated for the technical assistance (particularly for 
the payment of the international consultants) to be shifted for investments in 
infrastructure, due to possibilities for kickbacks and taking away pressure from the budget 
of the government of Nepal to invest in those sectors (see fungibility of aid in this 
                                                 
89 In this context, the consultants refer to people that are hired by an (international) consultancy company to 
design, implement or evaluate a development project/programme.  
90 The national consultants can be viewed as officials’ 'trusted men' due to their close relationship to the 
officials. Here, one can speculate of the possibilities for designing the project budget, and the budget 
responsibilities, so that there is a possibility for a kickback to government officials. This could be a feature 
of patronage-based relationships.  
91  Stirrat (2000, 41) adds, “Frequently it appears that they are hired to tell their clients what the clients want 
to hear, and even more frequently their advice or their findings are ignored.” 
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chapter). However, confusingly, in some of my interviews, as well as in the aid literature, 
it has been presented that the government officials prefer the hiring of consultants. I find 
two reasons for this. First, it can be that the officials want to avoid having to do the work 
themselves, and second, the government officials might think that the consultants are 
closer to the donor, and hence know better the wishes of the donor. This is important as 
the aim of the officials is to secure the development funds, and for this they need to follow 
the requirements and ideas of the donor. Therefore, under these circumstances, it is easier 
for the government to let consultants decide on these issues with the donor.  
3.7 Conclusions 
In this chapter, we have seen that aid has a double-faced character: it is both a planned 
development intervention, but also a negotiated process, and a battle for resources. 
Accordingly, I have presented donors as political actors whose work is not only guided by 
altruistic motives based on their developmentalist beliefs, nor are they neutral or rational 
actors that would linearly follow the development blueprints. The aid agencies consist of 
people (bureaucrats and consultants) and their work is guided and supervised by 
politicians, who all have their own incentives in the development process. These 
incentives might have little to do with the actual developmental goals, and more to do with 
their personal or institutional gains that can be reached through aid funds, or how the 
development process is organised. As pinpointed by Haan and Everest-Phillips (2007, 15) 
“Donors like to perceive themselves as the friends of the poor; but donors are (also) 
political actors – without adequate political checks and balances of transparency”. Thus, 
for donors, the main motivation to provide aid is not based on their altruism, but relates to 
the political and economic interests that they have globally and in the recipient country. 
They also have their own institutional needs to keep the aid business going, thus, aid is not 
necessarily delivered based on the demand of the developing countries, but on the 
requirements of the aid agencies.  
However, my point here is not to label the donors as the only actors with perverse 
interests in the development cooperation, but I have also argued, that the bureaucrats, 
politicians and consultants in the recipient countries, have own incentives that guide their 
participation in the development efforts, contradicting the official line of improving the 
life of the poor. These perverse interests do not encourage action that promotes equality, 
and the well-being of all citizens of the country, or the developmental goals set for this 
purpose. Rather, due to the various incentives, aid promotes the well-being of selected 
citizens. For the recipient government, the incentives relate to two issues: money and 
power. The donor money brings certain incentives for bureaucrats at different levels and 
for politicians. Through money, they are able to gain more power, either in their position, 
or among their clientele. In addition, as will be shown later in this thesis, these actors have 
been able to contest donor dominance in the recipient countries, through manoeuvring in 
the development process. Therefore, I am suggesting that development efforts, and aid, 
should be viewed as a game between the donor and the recipient.  
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The game aspect is continued in the aid instruments, particularly in the conditionality 
and policy dialogue. These instruments have been designed by donors, to increase 
recipient government ownership in their development efforts. However, the donors’ 
perverse incentives have affected the way the instruments are designed: even though they 
are meant to strengthen the government’s negotiation and administrative capacity, and the 
ability to take their own decisions with responsibilities, the instruments have actually 
allowed the aid agencies to increasingly involve themselves in the aid administration and 
policy planning. This is also highlighted in the case of Nepal: donors have moved towards 
joint reviews with the government, common coordination efforts and have shown interests 
for establishing a SWAP. With all this partnership thinking, they have aimed to increase 
the government’s ownership on development efforts; however, their institutional 
entanglement has led to a manoeuvring on both sides, rather than to a sincere common 
interest to improve the living conditions of the poor in Nepal. This means that the 
recipient countries, such as Nepal, are not at the mercy of the donors, but that these 
countries have found ways to manoeuvre their interests in the aid game. This will be 
further elaborated in the coming chapters.  
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4 Governance of Water Supply and Sanitation 
4.1 Introduction 
Water in Nepal is considered to be the most important natural resource, having an 
enormous potential economically. Despite the abundance and the potentiality of water, it 
has not been tapped effectively enough to bring prosperity to the people of Nepal, and 
adequate water to the kitchens of Nepalese homes. In this chapter, I aim to present why the 
delivery of domestic water has not succeeded, despite of its ‘abundance’. My discussion is 
centred on the concept of ‘water governance’, and presents that the sectoral actors – the 
government institutions, donors and NGOs – in the water supply and sanitation sector 
have failed to govern the resource for the benefit of the whole country. I particularly focus 
on the role of the government, where the competition over power and resources, by the 
two leading agencies, characterises the sector government. I claim that the DWSS – 
clinching to its hardware-focused view of expanding the water supply and sanitation 
services – has remained in the era of ‘hydraulic mission’ and hence, has not been able to 
conform to the demands of today. However, before going into the analysis of the sectoral 
actors, I will show how problems in the water supply and sanitation sector stem from a 
lack of governance in the sector. Thus, this chapter has two parts: first it discusses the 
problematical issues in the sector and then debates sector governance.  
 
The main conclusions of this chapter are:  
 The inability of the water supply and sanitation sector to bring water to the people 
derives from problems in the governance of water; the inability to effectively plan 
and manage the water supply and sanitation schemes has led to a huge variation in 
the coverage of, and the accessibility of, the water supply and sanitation schemes, a 
weak water quality, an inability to keep the schemes functioning properly, and an 
imbalance between the water supply and sanitation to the advantage of the water 
supply. 
 The ‘lead’ agency in this sector, the DWSS, is a hydrocracy, fulfilling its hydraulic 
mission, with the interest of extending the piped water supply network. 
 The hydrocractic identity of the DWSS has been contested by several issues and 
actors. Central in this contestation is the increased focus on rural water supply and 
sanitation – pushed by the donors, which again has brought new actors to the field. 
 
This chapter is divided into four sections. After this introductory section, the second 
section provides an overview on the generic problems in the water supply and sanitation 
sector in Nepal, outlining the lack of coverage, bad accessibility, a weak water quality, 
problems with the functionality of the water supply and sanitation schemes, and a 
misbalance between the water supply and sanitation, as the main deficiencies. It argues 
that these problems stem from problems in the governance of the water resources. The 
third section describes the field of water supply and sanitation in Nepal, and outlines that 
the lead agency is a hydrocracy, that has been contested from several sides; however, there 
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are discernible strategies that it has used to overcome this contestation. Section four 
concludes the chapter by relating the discussion of water governance in Nepal to the 
general governance debate contrasting the ‘old type of governance’, with the ‘new forms 
of governance’, and discussing the perspective of a polycentric governance in a Nepalese 
context.  
4.2 Generic Problems in the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation 
Sector 
I deal with four issues in the water supply and sanitation sector that have been named as 
problems: (1) coverage of the water supply and sanitation system, (2) accessibility to 
services, (3) water quality (4) functionality of the system, and (5) misbalance in the 
funding between water supply and sanitation. These issues have been raised by the donors, 
NGOs and governmental agencies in their analyses on the sector development (WaterAid 
Nepal 2010b; NMIP/DWSS 2011; ADB/MPPW 2011; GON/MPPW/WSSD/SEIU 2011; 
Sharma 2000, 126). As can be interpreted from the issues, I claim that the problems 
related to these issues stem from problems in governance, not from the lack of water. 
Naturally, the high variability of precipitation, flow and sedimentatation – all natural 
causes – also affect water governance. These issues were explained in the introduction, in 
which water resources were discussed; here the focus is on the water supply and sanitation 
sector.  
4.2.1 Coverage of Water Supply and Sanitation 
The Government of Nepal has signed up to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 
under which it needs to achieve 73 per cent drinking water coverage and 53 per cent of the 
population has to have access to improved sanitation by 2015. It has also declared that it 
will achieve universal access to water and sanitation by 2017 (WaterAid Nepal 2010a, 5, 
16). Before 2011, the coverage of water supply and sanitation service was difficult to 
assess, because there was inconsistency in numbers due to the differences of definition and 
survey methodology (WaterAid Nepal 2010a, 18; NMIP/DWSS 2011, 3). To tackle this 
problem, the National Management Information Programme (NMIP) was set up to collect 
and publish coverage and scheme functionality related information in a database92. As per 
the NMIP/DWSS estimates, the coverage in water supply is 80,4 per cent, and the national 
sanitation coverage is 43 per cent of the population (2011). One can see that there is still a 
long way to meet the sanitation MDG, as out of the 43 per cent of the population having a 
latrine, 22 per cent have been observed to have a latrine, that can barely be used 
                                                 
92 As an example of the difficulties in the governance of water supply and sanitation, an international 
consultant explained to me that his team had tried to get data from the NMIP, but the DWSS official in 
charge had refused to do this, unless a bribe was paid. He justified this with the higher salaries given to the 
consultants. Interview on Nov. 22, 2012.  
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(NMIP/DWSS 2011, 33). One reason for the slow progress in providing sanitation is the 
policy and funding bias towards water supply (see figure 4.1 in part 4.2.5).  
 
Year Urban Rural 
Total House 
Connections 
Total House 
Connections 
% % % % 
1990 96 43 74 5 
1995 95 45 78 7 
2000 94 48 81 8 
2005 93 50 85 9 
2008 93 52 87 10 
Table 4.1: Water Supply Coverage (Percentage of Population) (UNICEF/WHO JMP 2010; 
ADB/MPPW 2011, 22) 
Yet, there are some shortcoming in this official measurement of coverage93. Officially, 
only piped water supply is considered safe water supply, notwithstanding the fact that it 
might have been contaminated by sewerage inflow, or that traditional spring sources might 
have cleaner water. Furthermore, even though many of the villages still rely on their 
traditional spring sources, these are not included in the official statistics but are ignored. If 
these sources were included in the official statistics and the quality parametres of piped 
water were adhered, then the coverage number of drinking water in Nepal would most 
likely look different.    
Sanitation has not always been an integral part of water supply, but has been attached 
to it by the donors. The International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade, 
declared by the UN, introduced the linkage between water supply and sanitation (see 
Chapter Five). The donors realised that an improved water supply alone, would not be 
enough to improve the health situation in developing countries, and thus, sanitation was 
integrated to water supply: it was later added with a focus on hygiene.  
Currently in the sanitation sector, in addition to increasing the number of people using 
sanitation facilities, the aim of the government, and the donors, is to provide ‘an improved 
sanitation’ for the citizens, instead of ‘an unimproved sanitation’.94 Nearly 60 per cent of 
the Nepalese people do not have any sanitary facilities, but practise open defecation95, 
which is considered an unsanitary practice (ADB/MPPW 2011, 38-40). The urgency for 
improved sanitation – resonating with ‘donor speak’ – stems from the high rate of child 
                                                 
93 For this remark I am grateful to Dipak Gyawali.  
94 This includes flush or pour-flush latrines to piped sewer system, septic tank to a pit, ventilated improved 
latrine, pit latrine with a slab and composting toilet, whereas unimproved sanitation, includes flush or pour-
flush toilets to elsewhere (excluding aforementioned systems), pit latrine without a slab or open pit, bucket, 
hanging toilet or hanging latrines, no facilities or bush or field. 
95 This is particularly a problem in the slums and shantytowns in the urban areas and in the rural areas. In the 
urban areas, the share of people without sanitary facilities is 20 % and in the rural areas 67% (DWSS 2008, 
cited in ADB/MPPW 2011, 39). The amount of people living in urban areas is going up, thus, the pace of 
urbanisation is putting pressure on the provision of sanitation facilities in these areas.  
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morbidity and mortality in the country96, as well as other diseases, such as diarrhoea and 
seasonal cholera outbreaks. Even though there are serious problems in the functionality of 
the sanitation system97, the main issue in this sector is to motivate the people to have 
latrines and use them. To change their behaviour has turned out to be the main challenge. 
This includes teaching about the importance of washing hands with soap and water after 
defecation and before meals (SACOSAN 2003, 3). 
 
 
Year Urban Rural 
Improved 
% 
Shared 
% 
Un-
improved 
% 
Open 
defecation 
% 
Improved 
% 
Shared 
% 
Un-
improved 
% 
Open 
defecation 
% 
1990 41 24 5 30 8 2 5 85 
1995 44 26 4 26 13 3 6 78 
2000 47 27 4 22 19 5 5 71 
2005 50 29 3 18 24 6 6 64 
2008 51 30 4 15 27 7 6 60 
Table 4.2: Sanitation Coverage (Percentage of Population) (UNICEF/WHO JMP 2010; 
ADB/MPPW 2011, 38) 
4.2.2 Accessibility to the Water System  
The lack of full coverage in water supply and sanitation can also be explained through the 
unequal geographical distribution of agencies and water supply and sanitation 
programmes; an issue that is not highlighted by the donors and governmental agencies, 
opposite to the issues of coverage and low functionality (Sharma 2006), because of their 
own hesitations to extend the coverage to remote areas. Therefore, the tendency by the 
donors and governmental agencies has been to cover areas that are easily accessible.  
The remoteness and relatively inaccessible hilly terrain of Nepal makes it more 
difficult and expensive for governmental and aid agencies to reach settlements in those 
locations. The agencies are required to provide services at the lowest possible cost, which 
has made these agencies fund and implement projects in areas which are easier to reach. 
This has led to several programmes being financed in one district, to a high per capita cost, 
and obviously to an imbalance in the coverage (WaterAid 2010b, 12; Domenech Pretus et 
al. 2008, 6). Particularly the two largest projects in the sector, the Fund Board and the 
CBWSSP, have been accused of not covering remote areas. In the case of the Fund Board, 
this is the consequence of the tight budget given to the NGOs implementing the projects. 
As the cost of covering more remote areas is higher, the budget framework given by the 
Fund Board does not allow the NGOs to work in the more costly, remote areas. Similarly, 
                                                 
96 This is assessed by WaterAid Nepal (2008) to be 10 500 children in a year. These children die needlessly 
from disease related to inadequate sanitation and high-risk hygiene practices.  
97 In a study made in 2000 it was found only 17 % of the people having a latrine maintained it properly 
(SACOSAN 2003, 3).  
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the ADB argues that it does not want to continue funding the Community-Based Water 
Supply and Sanitation Project (CBWSSP), as this means that the ADB needs to start 
putting more focus on the really remote areas, which are geographically difficult to 
monitor.98 Due to the disinterest by the large donors to work in the remote areas, these 
areas have been covered by (I)NGOs. Yet, these organisations have a limited capacity and 
budgets to deliver services, and cannot, therefore, be made responsible for servicing the 
relatively inaccessible regions.  
Clearly, as a result of this problem, the urban areas are better serviced than the rural 
areas. However, this does not imply that the urban areas would have an uninterrupted 
water supply; in reality, it is actually the opposite. In the urban areas, water is supplied 
only for some hours in a week. Because of this, water is pumped into a tank on the roof of 
the house, from where it is accessible during the times of interrupted water delivery. In 
case this water is not enough for the family’s needs, water can either be bought privately, 
or fetched from a well in the yard. Water availability is additionally worsened by leakage 
and misuse in the distribution network99.  
4.2.3 Water Quality 
Outside of the problems of coverage, and accessibility to water system, there are also 
problems with water quality. The bad water quality relates only partially to governance 
problems, because in the Tarai, the problem with water quality stems from natural arsenic 
pollution in groundwater. In the populous Tarai, more than 95 per cent of people use 
groundwater as source for drinking water, requiring special treatment to make it safe for 
drinking purposes (Nepal 2005, 3).  
Otherwise, water pollution in Nepal derives from the unhygienic practices of people. 
Standards of hygiene remain low, due to a lack of awareness, crammed living spaces, and 
inadequate mechanisms to dispose of human and other waste (WaterAid Nepal 2010a, 17; 
Dixit 2000, 203). Because of these practices, the donors are increasingly resorting to 
various methods of hygiene education, such as the Open Defecation Free (ODF) areas, and 
emphasising the importance of hand washing.  
Water pollution and contamination remain among the most serious of public health 
problems in Nepal. Therefore, the government, with assistance by UNICEF, formulated 
the Water Quality Standards in 2005. The agencies considered that the international 
standards set by the WHO were not applicable in the Nepalese situation, nor were they 
able to enforce for better water quality – the WHO standards being only a guideline.100 
                                                 
98 Interviews with one NGO leader in Kavre district on Sep. 7, 2010, a representative of WaterAid Nepal on 
Aug. 20, 2010, and some staff members of the CBWSSP on Sep. 5, 2010.  
99 It was explained to me that the leakage in Kathmandu could be as high as 30-40%. Interview with a 
DWSS official on Aug. 11, 2010 (see also Dixit, Pradhan 1999).   
100 Interview with a representative of UNICEF on Aug. 20, 2009.  
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Users tend to see water and water supply schemes as a free service, and not as an 
economic good that needs regular tending and care. Gyawali (1992) relates this with the 
earlier discussed bikas thinking, according to which the people in Nepal consider the 
scheme as a gift, and not as something to be built from within. He views that because of 
this kind of thinking maintenance is not considered by the people as their task. Dixit 
(2000, 207-7), on the other hand, relates this with the hydrocratic style of the DWSS. In 
this approach, the DWSS has not tried to establish any dialogue, or cooperation with 
beneficiaries but has focused on building schemes by itself through its staff. Under these 
circumstances, the people have perceived that maintenance, repair and replacement, as 
being the responsibility of the DWSS, the agency that built the system in the first place. 
Thus, users are reluctant to deposit up-front capital and provide a monthly O&M tariff, 
and the mechanism to raise and manage funds is often not systematic, and is rarely 
effectively practised. Initial problems in a regular water supply trigger the default of 
regular payments of non-receiving users, starting a downward spiral and further 
degradation of scheme functioning (Dixit, Crippen 1993; SEIU 2010b, 14). At the same, 
implementing agencies appear to focus more on project completion, than on the entire life 
cycle of water supply schemes.  
In addition to the problems at the local level, the functionality of the system is 
impacted by a lack of functional and workable institutional arrangements at the national 
level, to provide effective monitoring, and backstopping support, after the construction of 
water supply schemes. The general political situation in Nepal with the decade long 
conflict that formally ended in 2006, has had a considerable negative effect on the 
sustainability and functionality of water supply schemes. In the past, the tendency by the 
government agencies and donors has been to orientate on projects, where the focus has 
been to start new projects, instead of taking care of the constructed schemes to stay 
operational. There are also institutional, organisational and managerial reasons for the 
weak functionality of the system, deriving from the overlapping in their roles and a lack of 
adherence to their given roles and responsibilities, weak monitoring and a lack of 
enforcement in the implementation of policies (SEIU 2010b, 14). The institutional issue is 
elaborated in the next section.  
4.2.5 Imbalance Between Water Supply and Sanitation 
Even though the donors have been advocating for an increased focus on sanitation since 
the early 1980s, in Nepal this has not yet fully materialised. There is still an imbalance 
between allocations for water supply and sanitation, where the water supply receives much 
large funds than does sanitation (see figure 4.1). It is a rather Western view, that sanitation 
is an integral part of water supply, stemming from the water closets used in the Western 
world. However, in developing countries, and particularly in the countryside, this not 
necessarily the case. Toilets are normally dry toilets, and outside of towns, there is no 
central sewerage. I assume that the Western origin of linking water supply with sanitation 
has not been totally embraced in Nepal. A problem according to the donors and NGOs in 
increasing the allocations for sanitation, has been that the government has not had separate 
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supply and sanitation, the DWSS, and how it has responded to the challenges it has been 
presented with.  
4.3 Contested Hydrocracy 
4.3.1 Hydrocractic DWSS 
The governance system in the Nepalese water supply and sanitation sector can be analysed 
through the concept of ‘hydrocracy’ referring to powerful state water bureaucracies, which 
embraced the ‘hydraulic mission’ (Allan 2003; Rap et al. 2004; Molle et al. 2009, 328). In 
Nepal, the hydraulic mission points at the importance of developing hydropower, 
irrigation and water supply under the state-led agencies created for this purpose, such as 
the Department of Irrigation and Water Supply in 1966, separated into the Departments of 
Irrigation and Water Supply and Sewerage in 1972. These followed similar developments 
in other parts of the world (Molle et al. (2009, 332; Molle 2009; Wester 2009).  
The governance structure of hydrocracy stems from the centralised governance of 
Nepal, providing these agencies with large powers, spanning from national to village 
level. In this section, I will analyse the Nepalese water supply and sanitation hydrocracy 
through the framework provided by Molle et al. (2009), who discuss the general trends in 
the irrigation hydrocracies around the world, and analysing the transformations in the 
sector: from the emergence of the hydraulic mission and associated water bureaucracies to 
their adjustment and responses to changing conditions. Generally, hydrocracies tend to 
resist change and despite reform programmes, they continue to persist. This tendency is 
explained through the concept of path dependency (Hall, Taylor 1996; Sehring 2009, 64), 
which implies that the direction and scope of institutional change cannot be easily, or 
costlessly divorced, from its early direction (North 1990; cited in Araral 2005, 154).  
There are long roots of centralisation in Nepal, as described in the introduction to this 
thesis. The first modern water schemes were constructed by the Rana Prime Minister 
Bhim Shumshere in Kathmandu Valley during the late 1880s, to bring water to his palace. 
The access to piped water during the Rana days was a status symbol, and only few 
families, with a close connection to the Rana Prime Minister, had drinking water taps in 
their houses. It was simply not thought of as an essential service, necessary for the 
sustenance of human life, much less an area that the state should be actively engaged in 
for the sake of the welfare of its citizen. For the administration of the water systems, Bhim 
Shumshere instituted water offices known as Pani Goswara, in three cities in the 
Kathmandu Valley and other districts (Sharma 2001, 84-5; 2000, 120).  
Traditionally domestic water has been available from various sources. In the rural 
(hilly) areas of Nepal the sources for domestic water consist of dhunge dhara (spring 
source with a stone carved-spout), kuwa (a spring source covered and collected in a small 
pond), padhero (an uncovered spring source), inar (man-made well usually with brick) 
and kal dhara (piped taps). For bathing and religious purposes, nadi (river), khola 
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(stream), kunda (spring water source in a pilgrimage site) are employed. For other 
household purposes such as cleaning utensils and washing clothes, pokhari (a tank or pond 
usually of still water collected from excess water during the rainy season or from the run-
off of another source), khare (stream active only during the rainy season) and kulo 
(temporary irrigation ditch) may be used (Sharma 2001, 52; Bennet-Capbell 1973).  
Centrally organised drinking water supply development efforts in Nepal started more 
seriously in the 1970s, with the establishment of a governance structure, mediated by the 
vocabulary of welfare. On the part of the modernising elite, the rationale for the creation 
and expansion of a modern bureaucracy, has been justified, by emphasising the lack of 
scientificity of traditional bureaucratic practices (Sharma 2000, 199 quoting Khanal 1977). 
This was facilitated by a dominant international thinking of the time that conceived of the 
possibility of a strong, interventionist state acting as the agency of development and 
modernisation (Sharma 2000, 127). In the water supply sector, including sewerage, 
(sanitation as a theme emerged only later), the leading ministry was, at first, the Ministry 
of Water Resources, which was responsible for the Departments of Irrigation (DoI) and 
Water Supply and Sewerage (DWSS) until they were set up under separate ministries103: 
DoI remained under the Ministry of Water Resources and the DWSS shifted under the 
Ministry of Housing and Physical Planning (MHPP) in 1984 (Prasain 2003, 107-9). In the 
operation of the DWSS continued a strong emphasis on providing drinking water services 
to urban centres, though the less urbanised district headquarters also began to receive 
attention (Sharma 2000, 122).  
The DWSS adopted the identity of a construction-oriented agency. In its work, it 
emphasised the hardware component over the software, because of its staff coming from 
engineering schools. Its solutions to the problems of water supply, sewerage and sanitation 
were technical. It followed a provisional approach to implementing programmes, in which 
the department assigned local consultants to survey and design drinking water supply 
systems, following its procedural strategy. Hired contractors undertook the contruction of 
the schemes, and the department fulfilled a supervisory function. The DWSS only 
maintained a few of the completed schems. In this approach, the beneficiaries were 
passive recipients (Dixit 2000, 206). Thus, its organisational culture resembled that of a 
hydrocracy, as described by Molle et al. (2009). The hydrocratic agencies were leading the 
water sector development and their professional ethos was pervaded by a sense of 
hierarchy, a faith in planning, and the belief that considerable technical expertise was 
needed to address water issues insulated engineers from public and laypersons’ scrutiny 
(Molle et al. 2009; see also Watson et al. 2009; McCulloch 2009). 
Sharma (2006, 218) suggests that the identification of the sector problems, such as 
inadequate coverage and low service, further made possible, the continuation of state 
structures and aid agencies, in expanding water supply and sanitation coverage, and 
                                                 
103 Sharma (2001, 86-7) mentions that drinking water and irrigation were, during the first development plan 
period (1956-1961), subsumed under the Public Works Department, which, in turn, was under the Ministry 
of Agriculture, Transport and Construction. The shift under Ministry of Water Resources took place in 1972 
(HMGN 1987). The DWSS was established in 1972 and began its operation from 1974 onwards (Sharma 
2000, 122).  
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enhancing the service levels. By this, they justified their own existence and kept their 
‘business’ going. He explains (ibid.), 
“The global concern for safe water as a component of basic needs and the role of the state 
in ensuring essential services for the welfare of its citizens was construed by the state as 
one entailing expansion in the coverage of piped distribution network. How to deliver 
water through pipes became a hydrological and consequently an engineering exercise with 
health and hygiene becoming peripheral. Thus, the issue of providing safe water to the 
people was subsequently framed along purely technological terms. Civil engineers became 
the cadres for ensuring that piped network expanded throughout the country, while the 
responsibility of providing such services was given to the technical Department of Water 
Supply and Sanitation Sewerage. Thus the formulation of the problem as one of 
expanding piped coverage subsequently led to institutionalization of practices along a 
certain trajectory in Nepal.” 
 
This view also matched with the interest of the construction-oriented DWSS, because the 
expansion of the network included a large amount of procurement. The DWSS was an 
overmanned and underpaid bureaucracy, whose main surplus income was in the form of 
commissions associated with procurement104 (Sharma 2006, 218). This bureaucratic rent-
seeking by government officials, to attempt to gain as much private gain as possible 
(primarily in the form of financial enrichment, but not limited to it), from their 
bureaucratic positions, also characterises other bureaucracies in developing countries 
(Suhardiman 2008 on Indonesia; Davis 2004 on South Asia; Araral 2008 on the 
Philippines). In Nepal the bureaucratic corruption also essentially includes payments made 
by an official to his/her superiors for appointments, transfers and promotions within the 
bureaucracy. This often relates to a patron-client relationship between high officials and 
their staff105 (Davis 2004, 60-61; Grindle 1997, 487).  
The extension of a piped network throughout Nepal also required the DWSS’ presence 
in the districts, for which a system of DWSS line agencies was established in the districts. 
This corroborates with the view of the DWSS in that through a centralised system of line 
agencies, the development in the regions was best driven forward.   
The position of the DWSS as a lead agency in the sector began to be contested from 
the 1980s onwards, first through the pressure set by the UN International Drinking Water 
Supply and Sanitation Decade (1980-89), which forced the DWSS to widen its focus on 
the rural areas, and by opening the sector to new actors. After this, the pressure on its 
identity as the lead agency for water supply and sanitation was further contested by the 
neo-liberal lexicon, which talked about dismantling the developmental state, and that 
increasingly made its way into the development vocabulary, becoming the dominant 
paradigm during the 1990s (Sharma 2000, 128 quoting Cameron 1995). This new 
conventional wisdom was operationalised in the sector through calling for the DWSS to 
limit itself to policy formulation, regulation and monitoring, with a private sector 
participation taking care of the rest. Additionally, the DWSS was also supposed to regard 
its role in the sector as a facilitator, instead of that of an implementer (Sharma 2000, 129).  
                                                 
104 Similar observation was expressed in an interview with a consultant in the WSS sector on Aug. 18, 2010.  
105 Ibid. and interview with a NGO director on Jun. 20, 2009.   
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4.3.2 Contestation by Setting Focus on Rural Areas 
Since the early 1970s, there had been, broadly speaking, two programmes for providing 
drinking water services within Nepal. One was the DWSS, with the mandate to provide 
drinking water supply to communities of more than 1,500 population. The other was 
UNICEF, and later also Helvetas (a Swiss NGO), supported Community Water Supply 
(first CWS, later changed to CWSS) programme implemented by the Ministry of 
Panchayat and Local Development, which was responsible for community-based water 
supply systems for those with less than 1,500 population. From the 1980s on, facilitated 
by the International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade, the emphasis on 
servicing the rural areas through community-based approaches grew. The Community 
Water Supply approach, emphasising the importance of decentralisation, and community 
participation, in the rural water supply and sanitation, challenged the DWSS’ engineering-
based approach, with a top-down delivery modality. The support of the aid agencies in the 
community-based approaches, brought financial resources, and different expertise along, 
including the possibilities to expand the staffing of agencies, thus, raising other agencies 
as powerful contesters to the DWSS.  
The UN decade on water supply and sanitation also emphasised the inclusion of the 
sanitation sector in the realm of water supply. By the 1990s, all major drinking water 
projects were supposed to have a sanitation component (at least officially) (WaterAid 
Nepal 2010a, 18), highlighting the donor origin of integrating sanitation into water supply. 
Sanitation was not part of the DWSS’ thinking of water supply, because of the focus on 
the softside issues of hygiene, and awareness raising, instead of engineering skills 
demanding development of a piped water supply network. The donors have been in the 
driver’s seat in setting more focus on sanitation, through introducing new approaches to 
sanitation, and bringing in ‘international best practice’. Particularly active in this field has 
been UNICEF. Examples of these practices are school-led sanitation, child-to-child 
sanitation, child-to-home outreach approaches, community-led total sanitation, and the 
ODF areas (WaterAid Nepal 2006b; Steering Committee for National Sanitation Action 
2009).  
4.3.2.1 CWSS and Dolidar 
While the DWSS was focusing on the urban areas and district headquarters, the CWSS 
and the MPLD were made responsible for providing a water supply to rural areas not 
covered by the DWSS. In the 1970s, particularly UNICEF, together with some other 
international donors, had paid attention to the fact that a large section of the population 
was without access to piped drinking water supplies close to their homes, and that health 
conditions in the country were abysmal. Because of the incidendence of high child 
mortality, UNICEF and other donors became involved in drinking water initiatives by 
supporting the CWSS (Dixit 2000, 208). Furthermore, they demanded that the DWSS 
move towards a community-based approach. In the mid-1980s, the CWSS was set 
administratively under the DWSS, making it an agency operating in the rural areas as well. 
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The approach of the CWSS was quite different from that of the DWSS, emphasising local 
efforts in the construction and maintenance of the schemes. In rural hilly and mountainous 
regions, the provision of drinking water generally focuses on the use of springs and small 
sized gravity water supply schemes, and the preference is for one scheme that serves 
clusters of villages from a central reservoir. Subsequently, smaller schemes, in conformity 
with size and capacity of the community to operate and maintain, began to be built. In the 
Tarai lowlands the focus is on the use of groundwater (Sharma, Dixit 1998, 1-2). The 
Department for Local Infrastructure Development and Agricultural Roads (Dolidar), 
which was established in 1997 under the Ministry for Local Development (MLD), the 
successor of the MPLD (after the failure of the Panchayat system), has continued to focus 
on the rural areas, and implement projects in coordination with local communities and 
local bodies, challenging the hydrocratic approach by the DWSS.  
Since then, there has been a rivalry between Dolidar and the DWSS, both of which 
deal with the rural water supply and sanitation administratively and operationally. The 
DWSS operated under the renamed Ministry of Physical Planning and Works (MPPW)106. 
The MPPW is officially responsible for the policy formulation in the water supply and 
sanitation in close cooperation with the National Planning Commission (NPC) and the 
Ministry of Finance (MoF), which allocates the budget, whereas the MLD is in first place 
responsible for the works and administration at the local level (local governance). As 
shown later in this thesis, there is no clear demarcation regarding the responsibilities of 
these two departments. The latest policy, regulating the sector, the Rural Water Supply 
and Sanitation Policy from 2004, outlines that the DWSS is responsible for projects, with 
over 1000 beneficiaries, whereas the Dolidar is responsible for those with under 1000 
beneficiaries. However, in practice, this demarcation is not functioning, and both agencies 
are managing smaller and larger projects (discussed in detail in Chapter Seven).  
The duplication of functions between the DWSS and Dolidar and the restructuring of 
the urban water supply and sanitation sector107 has led to a situation of institutional 
fuzziness in the sector. The two departments are both yearning to be the sectoral leaders, 
unwilling to look for solutions on the issues of overlapping jurisdictions, because of their 
fear for a requirement to compromise, and through this, loosing power and position in the 
sector. They follow ‘path dependency’, where they again use those identities that once 
proved to be successful, and that are established in meeting new challenges. The 
                                                 
106 In 2012, the Ministry of Urban Development became responsible for water supply and sanitation and the 
DWSS was moved under it (from the MPPW). This decision set the department officially responsible for 
rural water supply and sanitation under a ministry, which is responsible for urban development only. 
According to an international aid worker based in Nepal, behind this decision was the interest of the Maoist 
leader, Baburam Bhattarai, to have urban development, including water supply and sanitation, under a 
ministry for urban development, which is his specialisation as an urban planner. The ministry is 
unsurprisingly led by Bhattarai, who at the same time acts as Prime Minister of Nepal (Personal 
communication with a group of professionals in the Nepalese water supply and sanitation sector on Aug. 20, 
2012 in a workshop on sanitation in Tampere, Finland. 
107 In this overview on water supply and sanitation governance I have not discussed all actors in the urban 
water supply and sanitation sector, as these are not necessary for the arguments of my thesis. Just to depict 
the fuzziness in the sector some further actors are still named: Water Supply Tariff Fixation Commission, 
Water Nepal Supply Corporation, Kathmandu Valley Water Supply Management Board, Kathmandu 
Upatyaka Khanepani Limited, Department of Urban Development and Building Construction and Town 
Development Fund. All these still have their own projects in the sector funded by various donors.  
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competition leads to a situation where they marginalise the other actors in the political 
processes, who may have an interest in alternative institutional arrangements. Thus, they 
not only perform a certain function, but they also serve certain interests (Sehring 2009, 64-
5 quoting Streeck, Thelen 2005).  
4.3.2.2 Donors and Their Agencies 
The donor involvement not only contested role of the DWSS through the emphasis on 
rural areas and community-based approaches, but also through the setting up of competing 
agencies to administer development projects. The first of these was the World Bank 
funded First Water Supply and Sewerage Project, which started in 1974, and demanded 
that an executive agency for the project is set up. In response, His Majesty’s Government 
created a Water Supply and Sewerage Board (WSSB) in 1973, which has presented as an 
institutional by-pass around the existing bureaucratic mechanism with the objective of 
disbursing large sums of money (HMGN 1987). The WSSB has been renamed to Nepal 
Water Supply and Sewerage Corporation (NWSC) in 1989 to correspond the new focus on 
privatisation of water resources management. The NWSC has been responsible for water 
supply, sewerage and drainage services in five main municipalities within the Kathmandu 
Valley and in 23 urban areas outside the Valley. According to WaterAid Nepal (2006a, 5), 
it has not been able to deliver efficient services on a sustainable basis, even though it has 
been supported by a number of development agencies for almost three decades.  
Similar structures have been set up in the urban water supply and sanitation sector, 
particularly after it was realised considered that the NWSC is not able to effectively 
manage the existing water supply and wastewater systems. Subsequently, donors of Nepal 
have initiated urban institutional reforms, and introduced private sector participation 
modality, for managing and improving the water supply and wastewater services in 
Kathmandu Valley108. These institutions are contesting the DWSS on the urban water 
supply and sanitation front. Because of their increasing responsibilities in the sector, the 
DWSS seems to have become insecure about its role as lead agency in the water supply 
and sanitation. This particularly affects its unwillingness to move away from being an 
implementer in the rural water supply and sanitation sector, as it might then confront 
demands to cut responsibilities on both urban and rural spheres of water supply and 
sanitation.  
Furthermore, the DWSS was contested by the Water Supply and Sanitation Fund 
Development Board (the Fund Board) that was established in the mid-1990s by the World 
Bank, as a semi-autonomous body, to administer a rural water supply and sanitation 
project funded by it, also bypassing the governmental system. The World Bank did not 
want to work within the governmental framework, and opted for the design of a project 
                                                 
108 Since 2006, the water supply in the Kathmandu Valley has been operated by the Kathmandu Upatyaka 
Khanepani Limited (KUKL), under the Kathmandu Valley Water Supply Management Board (SEIU 2010c, 
9). This was established as an autonomous and independent entity under Water Supply Management Board 
Act (2006) and is the owner of all water supply and sewerage facilities of the Kathmandu Valley and 
responsible for developing and overseeing service policies (SEIU 2010c, 9). 
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that was able to overcome the integration to the government system. The implementation 
modality of the Fund Board goes through the NGOs: the Fund Board organises a bid for 
the NGOs centrally, and then contracts the selected NGOs to carry out the World Bank 
designed water supply and sanitation schemes in their regions. Thus, with this 
arrangement, the World Bank was able to bypass the government, both at the central and 
local levels (the case of the Fund Board is discussed in detail in Chapter Six, cf. Buddeke 
2010). 
4.3.2.3 Local Bodies 
The global thinking in the 1990s emphasised the need for decentralisation – an issue that 
in Nepal has been pushed forward by donors. This push has posed a challenge to the 
DWSS, because in the name of decentralisation, it has been required to withdraw from 
local level implementation, and scale down its presence in the districts. The donor view on 
organising rural water supply and sanitation is to give more power to the elected local 
bodies, the District Development Committees, Village Development Committees and 
Municipalities. The Local Self-Governance Act (LSGA), enacted in 1999, provided these 
institutions with increased jurisdictions on planning, programming, and management of 
water supply and sanitation. However, both ministries dealing with rural water supply and 
sanitation, that is the MPPW(DWSS) and the MLD(Dolidar), had interests to have their 
own line agencies in the districts. District Technical Offices (DTOs, previously District 
Infrastructure Development Offices, DIDOs, renamed as DTOs in 2003), under the 
Ministry of Local Development (MLD), were established in 2001 in all districts, and were 
planned to be subsumed under the DDCs. However, this did not take place, but they 
became independent technical offices in the districts, administered by Dolidar, making 
DTOs in effect hierarchically higher than the DDCs (ARD Inc. 2003f, 8). For me, this is a 
sign of MLD’s and Dolidar’s attempt to abide with their power at the district level, and as 
a consequence of the competition between Dolidar and DWSS over budget allocations and 
presence in the regions.  
At the local level, the DWSS was faced with the demand to withdraw from the rural 
areas, meaning to abolish the Water Supply and Sanitation District Offices (WSSDOs), an 
issue which did not match with the interest of the DWSS. As presented by Molle et al. 
(2009), water bureaucracies, like all bureaucracies, have adopted several strategies to 
secure their interests, or reinvent themselves when faced with host challenges.109 DWSS’ 
strategy against this demand was to restructure its governance at the local level. Hence, it 
renamed some its local level offices, having after this two types of local offices: the 
WSSDOs (district offices) and Water Supply and Sanitation Subdivision Offices 
(WSSSDOs). Through this reorganisation process, the DWSS remained present in all 75 
districts of Nepal, thus, de facto changing nothing in its organisational set-up at the local 
level. Because of the competition between Dolidar and the DWSS, there is a double set-up 
                                                 
109 See also Mollinga, Bolding 2004; Gottlieb 1988 and McCool 1994 for case studies on various strategies 
that hydrocracies have adopted for maintaining their command-and-control and construction oriented style.  
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of offices dealing with water supply and sanitation in the districts, meaning obvious 
inefficiency in the use of financial resources and manpower.  
The contest to the DWSS is further strengthened by the donors’ tendency to implement 
the water supply and sanitation projects through the local bodies, or NGOs, as explained 
earlier in the case of the Fund Board. The Finnish support of water supply and sanitation 
focuses on strengthening local government capacity, for the implementation of the rural 
water supply and sanitation schemes110 (WaterAid Nepal 2006a, 5-6), exactly the same as 
UNICEF, which emphasises sanitation in its work, and supports government in policy 
formulation in the sector. The only aid agency that is administratively under the DWSS is 
the ADB. It implements two water and sanitation projects: one in small towns111 and the 
second in rural areas, called the Community Based Water Supply and Sanitation Project 
(CBWSSP, stopped in 2010). The ADB has a similar implementation modality to the Fund 
Board; however, it relies on local bodies in the selection of the sites to be funded 
(WaterAid Nepal 2006a, 5).  
4.3.2.4 Water Users’ Groups 
In addition to the demand to decentralise the management of water supply and sanitation 
to the district level, the donors have also demanded for an increased role for water users’ 
groups112 in the management of water supply and sanitation. These groups are responsible 
for providing water supply and sanitation services and have the lead role in construction 
and implementation of the projects. Furthermore, the users' groups are supposed to ensure 
that local communities have access to water supply and sanitation schemes, and to bring 
issues, problems and social disputes to service providers, as well as making the 
community's voice heard, which challenges the expert knowledge of the DWSS, in 
knowing what are the best solutions for the communities. It rather corresponds to the 
community-oriented expertise of Dolidar than the technical skills provided by the DWSS. 
However, the field reality shows that donors and governmental agencies, and international, 
national and local NGOs, are the primary designers and implementers of water supply and 
                                                 
110 It currently implements two projects: Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Programme – Western Nepal 
concentrates on nine districts in Western and Mid Western Nepal and emphasises sanitation in its approach. 
Rural Villages Water Resources Management Programme II covers four zones of Far Western Nepal and 
concentrates on the multi-purpose use of water resources, including water supply and sanitation (SEIU 
2010c, 10). 
111 Under this programme, the plan is to provide water and sanitation facilities in 50 urban communities in a 
phase-wide manner. However, the progress has been substantially delayed. The ADB also supports an Urban 
and Environment Improvement Project, which aims to facilitate sustainable urban development in about 6-
10 selected urban growth nodes of Kathmandu, by addressing critical environment improvement needs 
through institutional strengthening and capacity building at the town and community levels (WaterAid Nepal 
2006a, 5).  
112 Also known as consumer groups or users' committees. In Nepal Water Users’ and Sanitation Committees 
(WUSCs), consisting of 9 users (at least three females), are established during construction and become 
responsible for O&M after completion of the scheme. This responsibility also includes organising, managing 
and increasing the O&M fund for payment of the village maintenance worker, and regular repair and 
maintenance. The formation and operation of Drinking Water User Associations is regulated in the Water 
Resources Act 1992.  
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sanitation programmes, with water users’ groups and community members playing an 
active role. The role of local bodies in coordinating, implementing, and monitoring 
activities, is still weak in many districts, which is partially a result of the continued 
absence of elected officials at the local level (Domenach Pretus et al. 2008, 5-6; WaterAid 
Nepal 2010b, 8).   
The unwillingness of the national level players to give up their power at the local level, 
and allow decentralisation to fully take place, by ‘building up the capacity’ of the local 
level actors, has hindered them to take up the responsibilities allocated to them. Therefore, 
in practice, most of the users' groups are incapable of bringing issues to the attention of 
service providers. They are normally not knowledgeable about the schemes and budgets 
allocated to their VDC, and are not given an opportunity to plan, monitor and decide on 
their development needs. Seeing this problem, the Nepal Water for Health (NEWAH – an 
NGO) and WaterAid Nepal started a campaign in 2001, for establishing an umbrella-
organisation of drinking water and sanitation users' groups in Nepal, with the aim of 
empowering them through being a member of a federation. The Federation of Drinking 
Water and Sanitation Users Nepal (FEDWASUN) was established in 2003. It additionally 
advocates for sustainable policies and programmes in the water supply and sanitation 
sector and promotes practices of good governance in the sector (WaterAid Nepal 2008). 
However, the capacity of FEDWASUN is still limited113, and among donors and 
governmental agencies, it is not yet viewed as an important player114. Like many other 
NGOs in Nepal, it currently leans on one charismatic leader who leads the organisation, 
and it is party-affiliated (UML). Because loyalty toward the party supersedes the 
importance of the common cause – the use of water and sanitation – there are actually 
several water supply and sanitation federations in Nepal115. However, only FEDWASUN 
is large enough to have a voice at the national level. The dynamics between the national 
and local level actors highlight the political side of water governance in Nepal, and depict 
the struggle that takes place over power, resources and the position between the DWSS, 
Dolidar and donors, as well as the institutions set up at the local level.  
These institutions are depicted in the figure 4.2 below, showing the situation as of 
2006. The organigramme of the whole water sector can be found in the annex 1. It depicts 
the institutional setting in 2004, when the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Policy, 
Strategy and Action Plan were formulated. 
                                                 
113 During my fieldwork, I tried to track down one document (a budget analysis) written by FEDWASUN, 
which is cited in a WaterAid Nepal's document. At FEDWASUN’s office, I was told to ask for the document 
from WaterAid Nepal directly, as I was informed that it had actually been written by WaterAid Nepal, and 
not by FEDWASUN. In the end, the document was not available at WaterAid Nepal's office either.  
114 FEDWASUN was, for example, not included in the official talks in the process of formulating the Rural 
Water Supply and Sanitation Policy, Strategy and Action Plan. 
115 Interview with a consultant in the WSS sector on Jul. 23, 2009.   
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Figure 4.2. Institutional arrangements at national and district level (modified from HMGN/WECS 
2002, 25) 
4.3.2.5 NGOs 
Centralised water bureaucracies have also been challenged by civil society. The number of 
NGOs in Nepal has expanded dramatically since 1990, when liberalisation opened doors 
for other actors outside of the government and large donors, to participate in the sector 
development. Since then, different (I)NGOs and externally funded national NGOs 
implement and/or facilitate small scale water supply and sanitation schemes, and since the 
early 2000s, more and more (I)NGOs have entered the field of lobbying, advocating, 
formulation, review and updating process, for various general and sectoral policies (SEIU 
2010c, 10), and by this, influenced the change in the focus in the sector towards a 
community-based approach. The two largest and most vocal NGOs are WaterAid Nepal 
and Nepal Water for Health (NEWAH), established by WaterAid Nepal. They are both 
linked with many other NGOs, such as FEDWASUN, NGO Forum for Urban Sanitation 
and Lumanti.  
Since the 1990s, the aid agencies have argued for a wider participation in development 
efforts, including civil society and the private sector in the planning and implementation of 
development projects. These actors have entered the field as partners of the aid agencies. 
Because of this, they compete over the donor funding with the DWSS and other 
governmental agencies, and pose a threat to the already – by DWSS perceived – 
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diminishing role in the water supply and sanitation sector. The NGOs in Nepal are 
strongly affiliated with the donors that fund them, which becomes visible through the 
inspection of how their networks are organised. Some of these networks are close bodies, 
and are only for NGOs funded by a particular donor. One interviewee explained to me that 
this makes participation in the networks partly political and increases competition between 
them. The dependency on the funding institution also makes it more difficult for new 
members to enter116. However, common to all of these networks is that they originate from 
an international NGO network, or a partnership initiative. Thus, the NGO organisation in 
Nepal is taking place because of external influence that involves Nepalese NGOs in the 
global and regional networks. Thus, even though there are several, also larger, NGO 
networks in Nepal, these do not coordinate the sectoral issues within all Nepalese NGOs, 
but rather network at the international level. 
The most significant of the networks is the Nepal WASH Group, which is part of the 
UN-funded Water Supply and Sanitation Collaborative Council (WSSCC). The Council is 
a global multi-stakeholder partnership organisation that works to improve the lives of poor 
people, by enhancing collaboration among sector agencies and professionals around 
sanitation and water supply. It has National Coordinators and National Coalitions in 36 
countries, Nepal being one of them. The National Coordinator in Nepal is the director of 
NEWAH, who acts as the focal point for country-level activities, and is the convenor of 
the Nepalese national coalition, named as Nepal WASH Group. The Council has a Global 
Sanitation Fund (GSF) to support national efforts to attain sustainable access to basic 
sanitation, and to adopt good hygiene practices. Nepal received funds from the Fund in 
2010.117 Nepal WASH Group’s membership is wide, consisting of donors, NGOs, and 
government departments, such as the DWSS. The other open networks are the WaterAid 
funded and with it linked 'End Water Poverty' (EWP) Campaign and the 'Freshwater 
Action Network' (FAN). The most recent initiative is the 'Sanitation and Water for All 
Alliance in Nepal' (SWAAN), which links itself with the high level meetings on 
'Sanitation and Water for All'. There seems to be cooperation among the main networks, 
visible in the SACOSAN civil society movement, because of their common goals for 
highlighting the role of sanitation and hygiene in the sector, advocating for a right to water 
supply and sanitation, and for larger budget allocations for the sector, particularly for 
sanitation. However, not all NGOs are members in a network.118  
                                                 
116 Interview with a NGO Director on Sep. 9, 2010. Due to the difficulty to enter these networks, some 
smaller networks have been established in Nepal, such as Nepal Node for Sustainable Sanitation (NNSS) – 
cooperation between the NGO Environment and Public Health Organisation (ENPHO) and its Swedish 
funding agency the Stockholm Environmental Institute (SEI). The purpose of the NNSS is to promote 
knowledge sharing. Interview with a representative of ENPHO on Aug. 19, 2010. 
117 WSSCC’s website <http://www.wsscc.org/resources/resource-news-archive/nepal-global-sanitation-fund-
programme-seeks-sub-grantees>. Accessed on May 26, 2011.  
118 Interview with a NGO director on Sep. 9, 2010.  
 
 
 
 
117 
4.3.2.6 Supra-National Layers of Governance 
The last threat to centralised hydrocracy is presented to come from the supra-national 
layers of governance119, also known as metagovernance (Molle et al. 2009, 341; Bell, Park 
2006; Scharpf 1994; Jessop 1997; Whitehead 2003). In the context of Nepal, I refer with 
this to the various attempts to establish new forms of governance above the national level, 
mostly in the form of networks, alliances and committees. All of these attempts derive 
from a donor-initiative, either as a response to a required policy conditionality, or to recent 
efforts to establish a national programme in the water supply and sanitation sector, in the 
aid jargon, better known as sector-wide approach (see Chapter Six for an analysis of the 
set-up of a national programme). These attempts have aimed to move the sectoral decision 
making to a number of actors, singling out governmental agencies as the only decision-
makers. One motive for the donors, in the context of Nepal, to push for metagovernance, 
can be the institutional fuzziness at the national level, and the competition between the 
DWSS and Dolidar on sectoral leadership. The concept of metagovernance can be linked 
with donor demands on building up partnerships, among the governmental agencies, civil 
society and donor representatives, in which policy decisions are discussed and decided.  
In Nepal, in addition to the networks and alliances built by donors and their partners, 
within the government system, is that there are several intra-governmental committees, 
some including members from donor and civil society communities, that have been 
created to provide guidance to governmental decision making. The National Water Supply 
and Sanitation Coordinating Committee (WSSCC) was designed to consist of various 
government agencies dealing with water supply and sanitation. It was also designed to 
have a corresponding structure at the DDC level (D-WSSCC). However, an interviewee 
mentioned that the central level committee has never been functioning and the committees 
at district level exist, but many of them are not active120. As a sign of this problem, several 
aid agencies have tried to revitalise the district level committees, such as the UNICEF 
funded Decentralised Action for Children and Women (DACAW), which has funded the 
committees in 22 districts121, and the Finnish funded rural water supply and sanitation 
project in Western Nepal, which plans to establish a WASH unit under the DDC122. Even 
though the Finns have had good intentions to organise coordination at a district level, it 
has, in the end, led to confusion123. Sanitation related issues are dealt with in the Steering 
Committee for National Sanitation Action, chaired by the director general of the DWSS. It 
                                                 
119 Molle at al. (2009, 341) give EU’s Water Framework Directive as an example of this level of governance.  
120 Interview with a consultant in the WSS sector on Sep. 3, 2010.  
121 Interview with a NGO director on Sep. 1, 2010.  
122 In addition to the WASH Unit, the project plans to reform water administration at district level by 
introducing a WASH Plan as well as a WASH Fund at district level, and to reorganise the coordination 
mechanism at district level. This includes renaming the committee as D-WASH-CC (District WASH 
Coordinating Committee) and changing its composition (District Coordination workshop organised by 
RWSSP-WN on Aug.27, 2010).  
123 In a district level workshop, some officials explained that there is a conflict at district level, because not 
all districts want to change the name, and therefore split the committee. The aim of the RWSSP-WN was to 
discontinue WSSDO's role as the member secretary in the D-WASH-CC. As not all of the districts agreed 
with this, it has led to a situation, in which there are two committees in one district. (District Coordination 
Meeting organised by Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Programme – Western Nepal on Aug. 28, 2010. 
See also RWSSP-WN 2009, 40.) 
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was formed in 2000 to coordinate concerned stakeholders. The sectoral issues are 
discussed in the Sector Stakeholder Group (SSG), which is chaired by the MPPW. Of 
these two coordinating organisations, the Steering Committee meets regularly, whereas the 
SSG has been less active.  
4.3.3 Conclusions 
In this section, I have shown that the governance of water supply and sanitation has been 
characterised to a large extent by the role of the DWSS and its hydrocratic view of sector 
development. This has aggravated decentralisation of service delivery and has caused 
competition between the different actors in the sector, because of their differing views on 
how sector development should proceed. The path dependence of the DWSS has, 
therefore, been contested by various sides, particularly by the donor advocated focus on 
rural areas, including a decentralised administration of service delivery. This has brought 
new actors, to challenge the leadership of the DWSS, and has led to a rivalry with Dolidar. 
Furthermore, a new form of governance called metagovernance has emerged to coordinate 
the actors in the sector, who as a group, can exercise pressure on the DWSS’ advocated 
path of construction and centralised administration. 
As shown here, the DWSS has been unwilling to compromise on its construction 
oriented view of water supply and sanitation, and has resisted demands to change, by 
manoeuvring out of the changes initiated by its partners in development – the aid agencies, 
thus following its path dependency. The strategy it has applied to fight back is called 
“diverting, neutralising and reconfiguring institutional reform efforts” (Molle et al. 2009, 
343). Here, reform programmes have been implemented, as part of loan (grant) packages, 
as provided by aid agencies, with substantive elements of such reforms often strongly 
shaped by multilateral funding agencies, with more or less the support of sections of 
national government depending on the case. In Nepal, as will be elaborated in the coming 
chapters; this has indeed been the case. The governmental agencies involved in the 
reforms, and benefitting from the related development projects have normally agreed with 
the reforms conditioned in the aid packages. However, there has been a tendency to try to 
neutralise those effects that go against the interests of a particular government agency, 
such as the DWSS. As has been presented in the previous chapter, another reason for 
resisting changes, and contesting organisational reforms, is bureaucratic rent-seeking. The 
fate of the ministries depends on state budget allocations and donor funding. To get money 
from the state, or from a donor, the ministry needs functions and competencies. All 
ministries want money, hence, they want more responsibilities, or at least not to lose any 
of those that they already possess (Sehring 2009, 71).  
Furthermore, I have argued that the governance problems at the national level derive 
from institutional fuzziness, which affects the institutions’ capacity to manage the sector, 
and has led to duplication in their work. These affect their ability to plan, coordinate, fund 
and monitor the activities in the sector, leading to a weak service delivery and problems of 
functionality. Furthermore, the similar fuzziness also characterises the governance 
structures at a district level, because of the inability by the actors at the national level to 
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4.4 Conclusions 
4.4.1 Governance Debate and Water Governance 
I view that the problems of governance relate to the character of the water supply and 
sanitation bureaucracy, which follows a hierarchical model, with strong centralisation and 
lack of horizontal coordination, corresponding to the state-centred governance thinking 
(Rose 1978). The DWSS – following its hydraulic mission-based path dependency – 
considers that the government should exert control over the rest of government (local 
bodies, etc.), and the economy and society. Therefore, it has not been able to view other 
forms of governance as supplementing the traditional, institutional channels of 
governance, but it has considered them to contest its position. According to this, the 
DWSS has not been able to adapt to external changes, because it failed to understand that 
governance, in the thinking of its ‘partners’, consists of more common, generic, and 
societal problems, which can be resolved by political institutions, but also by other actors 
(Pierre 2000, 4).  
This state-centred governance has been contested by new forms of governance 
(Kooiman 1993; Rhodes 1997; Peters 2000; Pierre 2000; Conca 2006), which stem from 
the rapid ascendance of neo-liberal regimes in the 1980s and 1990s, that define the state 
and its modus operandi, not as the solution, but rather as a chief source of several 
problems in society (Pierre 2000, 1). This is illuminated in the case of the DWSS, which 
in the 1980s, was sharply criticised by the donors (the World Bank), and as a consequence, 
was suggested to adopt the role of a facilitator – corresponding the neo-liberal view for a 
state institution – and to phase out from the implementation of water supply and sanitation 
schemes. Furthermore, autonomous, or semi-autonomous agencies, were established to 
bypass the government system. The donors advocated instead for the decentralisation of 
governance. They suggested that power should be devolved to lower levels, and to new 
actors, of which civil society and the private sector get most visibility in Nepal. Even 
though, advocating for a role for new actors in governance, the society-centred view to 
governance does not necessarily refer to a ‘hollowing out of the state’ (Rhodes 1994). 
However, the state should redefine its role in society, and find ways to cooperate with the 
new actors, and to coordinate them, manifesting in different types of networks and 
partnerships (Rhodes 1997), and characterising the supra-national level of governance. 
The new actors see themselves as representatives of citizens, and therefore, believe that 
they also know what the people want, highlighted in the aid jargon, where donors make 
priorities, and in the language and action of the civil society. With this argumentation, 
they justify their participation in the governance of common resources (Peters 2000). 
There are attempts in Nepal for moving the governance of water supply and sanitation to 
the supra-national level; however, the government has not been very active to take up the 
coordinating role envisaged for it by the society-centred view to governance. 
Conca (2006) shows how there is no single ‘governor’ of water at any level anymore. 
He identifies global regimes that have come to contest the state-centred governance 
conception. He writes (ibid., 381), “governance of water occurs at several nodes and sites 
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of political life, few of which reside fully within the administrative apparatus of the state.” 
In detail he explains this by writing that,  
“Agendas are established, legitimized, and actively changed over time. Authoritative 
knowledge is created and wielded to shape national policies. Management practices and 
objectives begin to be drawn toward convergence as standards and techniques come to be 
universalized and externally legitimized. Governance as the inscription of rules snakes 
across borders, along with the governing acts.” 
 
Even though Conca generally speaks of transnational, or global governance, his findings 
correspond to the situation in Nepal. Similarly, external forces – outside of the state 
jurisdiction – have increasingly shaped the governance of water supply and sanitation in 
Nepal, both in practical work, and at the legal and policy level.  
Yet, even though the state-centred path dependency of Nepalese water hydrocracy 
does not seem to be ‘winning’ the game against the new actors in governance, it has not 
been totally without means to contest the contestation. Rautanen (2007) explains how the 
bureaucrats, relying on a neopatrimonial governance style, within which the gains for 
one’s own ministry, department, party, ethnic group, caste, or other reference group, can 
be secured, still using the old patronage systems, for taking care of those newer 
institutions, such as donors, and new forms of governance, such as water users’ groups, 
and are harnessed for clientelistic purposes. However, as shown in this chapter, this does 
not mean that formal changes would not have any meaning in Nepal. Rather, the water 
bureaucracies have been able to find strategies to contest the meant change. This finding 
will become clearer in Chapter Seven, which discusses the intended changes in the rural 
water supply and sanitation sector through the formulation of a new policy framework. 
4.4.2 Institutional Fuzziness and Polycentric Governance 
In this chapter, I have argued that the institutional fuzziness of the rural water supply and 
sanitation sector has stood in the way of governing water supply and sanitation effectively. 
The theoretical perspective of polycentricism argues the opposite, by claiming that the 
duplication and overlapping jurisdictions can also be seen as a natural and healthy 
situation, not only as a ‘pathological phenomenon’ (Aligica, Tarko 2012, 241). The 
developers of the concept of polycentricity (Ostrom, Tiebbout, Warren 1961; Ostrom 1972 
in McGinnis 1999) have argued, that there are some prerequisites that need to be fulfilled 
in order for polycentric governance to be successful. These are summarised as (1) many 
centres of decision making; (2) ordered relationships persist in time; (3) many legitimate 
rules enforcers; (4) single system of rules; (5) centres of power at different organisational 
levels; (6) spontaneous order resulting from free entry and exit; and (7) the alignment 
between rules and incentives (Aligica, Tarko 2012, 253). Because of this, there should be 
one, or several institutions (some of them governmental), that work in an accountable 
manner and within an accepted set of rules. 
I claim that this is not the situation in Nepal: the various centres of decision making are 
all following an ‘own rules’, or twisting the rules for their benefit, without an agency able 
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to act as an enforcer. I consider that the situation in the rural water supply and sanitation 
sector – having a large number of actors from the government, aid and civil society, 
competing with each other over power and resources – requires one leader to coordinate 
them, and to provide rules, and mediate in the conflict situations. Here, I find the 
arguments of the opponents of the polycentric school of thought more appealing. They 
highlight the role of state in coordination, provision of information, adjudication, and 
resourcing of governance arrangements (Bell, Quiggin 2008; Bell, Hindmoore 2009).124 
Thus, I argue, that the sector is better characterised as being beset with fuzzy institutional 
structures, with a duplication of functions and an overlapping of jurisdictions. The concept 
of polycentricity was developed and tested in the first place to explain the governance of 
urban public goods, including aspect of maintenance of competition in a market economy, 
and later has been applied to explain governance of complex natural resources (river 
basins, forestry), normally involving all levels of governance (see e.g. Andersson, Ostrom 
2008; Molle et al. 2007; Bruns 2003; however, it has also been used to analyse the 
Namibian rural water supply sector by Falk et al. 2009).  
                                                 
124 For a discussion on this, see Neef (2009).  
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5. The Framing Force of Aid 
The Global Shaping of Nepal’s Water Supply and Sanitation 
Policy Narratives 
5.1 Introduction 
Policy ideas do not emerge in void (Grindle, Thomas 1991). The Nepalese national 
periodic plans (Five-Year Plans) and water supply and sanitation policies are shaped by 
the concepts and strategies of global policy trends introduced in Nepal by the aid agencies. 
The aid agencies have initiated, and formulated, new policies to correspond with policy 
change at global level, and their priorities are derived from these narratives. Thus, in this 
chapter, I link policy evolution in Nepal, with international policy trends in water supply 
and sanitation, and show that donors have dominated policy formulation in Nepal.  
The chapter focuses on the following questions: What is the policy origin of Nepal's 
water supply and sanitation policy, and in what way has it changed since policy planning 
started in the 1950s? What are the factors and forces that initiated policy change, and 
subsequently, advocated for its adaptation? Who are the policy change-makers in Nepal? 
What has been the role of the aid agencies and water bureaucracy in policy making in the 
Nepalese water supply and sanitation sector? My aim is not to analyse the policy 
narratives, and their usefulness, success, or failure in Nepal, but to focus on how they were 
introduced and by whom. Theoretically, I aim to identify dominant policy narratives (here 
called approaches), in the Nepalese water supply and sanitation policies (Roe 1994). These 
are simple, causal, and explanatory beliefs, presented as blueprints, that are aimed to be 
legitimised in the recipient countries, underpinned by nirvana concepts, that embody an 
ideal image of what the world should tend to do (Molle 2008). My analysis starts with the 
identification of global narratives in the Nepalese water supply and sanitation sector, 
searches for their critique or counter narratives, and shows in the conclusions, how the 
narratives have formed a metanarrative.  
 
The main findings of this chapter are: 
 Policy making and priority settings in Nepalese development plans, as well as in 
the water supply and sanitation sector since the 1950s, and how is influenced by 
global policy trends and donors’ policy principles.  
 A policy change in Nepal takes place on the initiation of a donor and as a 
consequence of changes in global level thinking, such as global level academic 
criticism, or a global level conference, normally organised by donors. After this, 
the donors initiate policy formulation in Nepal, often linking this with the planning 
of a new development project. This, however, has not taken place without 
resistance from the DWSS, when the policies have gone against its interests.  
 There are three approaches to water supply and sanitation that can be identified. 
These have existed sequentially, or parallel, and some have characterised the sector 
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development more than others. The approaches are (1) the state-led approach, (2) 
the community-based approach, and (3) the composite approach.  
 The main characteristics of the approaches are: the state-led approach emphasises 
state leadership, and planning in all development efforts, culminated in the 
periodic development plans, and centralised administration; the community-based 
approach contests the state-led approach and places the responsibility for the 
development activities at the local level with the users; whereas the composite 
approach is a mixture of community-based approaches supplemented with new 
priorities of environmental protection, water as an economic good, good 
governance and capacity building.  
 The state-led approach to sector development is the dominant narrative in practical 
terms – advocated by the DWSS – whereas as the composite approach is the 
official dominant narrative at policy level – mainly advocated by the donors.  
 
This chapter has four sections. After this introductory section, section two outlines how 
global policy narratives have influenced priority setting in the Nepalese periodic plans 
generally, and in the water and sanitation sector in particular, comparing the way policy 
problems and their strategies have been defined globally, and in Nepal’s periodic 
development plans. Section three focuses on analysing how policy change in the water 
supply and sanitation sector has been influenced by international aid donors. Section four 
provides an analysis on the dominant narratives in the Nepalese water supply and 
sanitation sector and presents the conclusions of the chapter.  
5.2 Influence of Global Policies in Nepalese Periodic Plans 
In this section, I argue that global policy narratives, on how world development should 
proceed, have guided general development policy in Nepal. I examine their influence, by 
comparing them with Nepalese periodic development plans, and in section 6.3, I widen 
my analysis to assess how these approaches have been embraced in Nepalese policy 
making in the water supply and sanitation sector. There are plenty of similarities in how 
the text has been formulated and which issues have been prioritised. Due to the similarities 
in prioritisation, and the sequential introduction of new themes, I conclude that there is 
strong evidence for an influence by the international aid agencies in national level policy 
making in Nepal.  
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5.2.1 State-Led Water Supply: State in Charge of Planning and 
Implementation  
The state-led approach to aid was coined by two international plans: the Point Four 
Programme125 (1951) (Bøås, McNeill 2003, 51; Nustad 2003, 15; Sharma 2001, 86), and 
the South Asian equivalent, the Colombo Plan126, which Nepal joined in 1952. These 
plans emphasised infrastructural development through technical assistance to accelerate 
economic growth127, along the modernisation thinking that viewed that all countries will 
proceed from traditional to modern through different stages (Rostow 1960)128. The plans 
also supported state leadership in the form of governments' plans and policies into 
programmes of action (Turner, Hulme 1997, 12, 139-40). This thinking was made globally 
prominent by US President Harry Truman, who, in his inaugural address of January 20, 
1949, said:  
“We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific 
advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of 
underdeveloped areas. (…) With the cooperation of business, private capital, agriculture, 
and labor in this country, this program can greatly increase the industrial activity in other 
nations and can raise substantially their standards of living”129.  
 
It was believed that 'infant industries' needed to be protected from external competition in 
the early stages, and these doctrines were amply illustrated in the protectionist five-year 
plans of the developing countries130 (Kanbur 2003, 4). These became also the backbone of 
Nepal’s centralised planning after 1951, when the country opened up for foreign aid. 
According to the state-led approach, the state bureaucracy was made responsible for the 
delivery of water to people. In the first decades of centrally planned water supply, the 
focus was put on the urban areas. The First Five-Year Plan (1956-61) and the Second Plan 
(1962-1965)131 focused on the same areas outlined in the Point Four Programme, 
                                                 
125 The Point Four Programme served as a framework for American aid, which started in Nepal in 1951. 
Nepal's interest for cooperation with the USA was economic and USA's interest for cooperation with Nepal 
was strategic (Khadka 1997, 110-30).  
126 More on the Colombo Plan see the Colombo Plan Secretariat’s website: http://www.colombo-plan.org. 
Even though it is called a plan, the Colombo Plan is an organisation with the intention of helping its member 
countries in the priority areas of its work.  
127 This was supposed to follow the Keynesian paradigm of active interventionist economic policy (Bøås, 
McNeill 2003, 55-6).  
128 This thinking was theorised by Walt W. Rostow (1960) in his book The Stages of Economic Growth. He 
claims that all nations will go through same stages in their development, starting from the traditional society, 
the preconditions for take-off, the take-off, the drive to maturity, and the age of high mass-consumption.  
129 Public Papers of the Presidents. President Truman January 20, 1949, Inaugural Address. Cited in Rist 
2008, 71.  
130 Kanbur (2003, 4) presents India as an example, and explains that throughout the 1950s and 1960s western 
aid was helping to finance these plans, with the objective of keeping India out of the clutches of 
communism, based on the argument that economic development would keep developing countries in the 
western camp, and the further argument, that aid for centrally guided capital accumulation would help 
economic development. 
131 The Second Plan was devoted to reviewing the progress so far. It was a preparatory plan to create the 
basic preconditions for a comprehensive countrywide plan, and therefore, it was not made to cover full five 
years (Pant 1966, 627). 
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1974; Rist 2008, 140-43). Hence, emphasis on redistribution, growth, basic needs, and 
collective self-reliance became the new policy prescriptions of international aid 
institutions (Khadka 1988, 556). This policy line, called the basic needs approach134, was 
developed by the World Bank135 and the ILO136, and followed by other donors137. The 
approach was widened to tackle poverty more directly as opposed to the 'trickle-down' 
from general growth (Kanbur 2003, 5). It did not replace or challenge the state-led 
approach, but refocused it towards servicing rural areas and poor people, as specified by 
the ILO Declaration of its 1976 World Conference on Employment:  
“Basic needs, as understood in this Programme of Action, include two elements. First, they 
include certain minimum requirements of family for private consumption, adequate food, 
shelter and clothing, as well as certain household equipment and furniture. Second, they 
include essential services provided by and for the community at large, such as safe 
drinking water, sanitation, public transport and health, education and cultural facilities”  
International Labour Office Bulletin 1977, 84 
This general change in the donor policy was not reflected in Nepal's Fourth Plan (1970-
1975), by specifically mentioning the basic needs, probably because the plan was written 
before the official formulation of the basic needs approach, and therefore, there was a time 
lag in the translation of global priorities to national policy making (NPC 1970). In 
addition, the ultimate goal of the donors actually remained the same: to increase growth 
and improve the infrastructure. Sharma (2001, 88) mentions that when the plan was 
formulated, social services were assigned as fourth priority, but in terms of actual 
expenditure, it achieved third position. He believes that this might refer to a shift in 
priorities after the finalisation of the plan, a shift, that can have been induced by a change 
in the donor priorities in the early 1970s. Furthermore, Sharma opines that during this plan 
drinking water got a higher priority due to two reasons: First, in earlier plans it had been 
subsumed either under public works or under irrigation, but from this period onwards, it 
was included under social services, and second, a separate department called Department 
of Water Supply and Sewerage (DWSS) was established in 1974. I hesitate to make this 
kind of conclusion. I doubt that the fact that water supply and sanitation was subsumed 
under social services, made any difference in the approach taken to sector development 
because the DWSS was an organisation that had an interest to engineer water supply, 
particularly in the urban areas. I rather view that the increased expenditure in the sector 
                                                 
134 The basic needs were defined as nutrition, housing, health, literacy, and employment (Rist 2008, 162-5). 
135 See Chenery et al. 1974. However, before this publication, the concept had appeared at the annual speech 
of the President of the World Bank to its Governors, given in 1972, by Robert McNamara. He concluded 
that the governments of developing countries should give greater priority to establishing growth targets in 
terms of essential human needs (McNamara 1981, cited in Rist 2008, 162-3). 
136 See Ghai et al. 1980.  
137 Riddell (2007, 32) writes, that the United States and the United Kingdom followed these multilateral 
institutions and changed their policies respectively from growth to the fulfilment of 'basic human needs', and 
to ‘More Help for the Poorest’ (Ministry for Overseas Development 1975). Riddell (2007) does not expose 
his source on the change in the US approach, but mentions that the change took place in 1973. Kanbur 
(2003, 5) adds, that the UN agencies followed the basic needs based approach, led by the World Bank, 
making it the new orthodoxy of the development doctrine and the aid doctrine.  
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relates to a donors’ role in providing more funds for sector development. During the Plan, 
the World Bank entered the water supply and sanitation sector with two lage projects138.      
The Fifth (1975-80) and the Sixth (1980-85) Plans reflected much more the new 
emphasis in development thinking, having the slogans of 'meeting basic needs' and 'self-
reliance' as catchwords in development planning. These two plans emphasised the same 
issues as the ILO and the World Bank in their manifestos, by focusing on the use of labour 
effectively (ILO), and putting more emphasis on regional balance (the World Bank) (NPC 
1975; Thieshusen 1976, 628-9, referring to Chenery et al. 1974). In the drinking water 
sector, the Plans rationalised investing in drinking water and sewerage as essential to good 
health and cleanliness (conceived as a core basic need), by making drinking water services 
available to more people, implementing projects through people's participation, and 
maximum mobilisation of local resources, skills and labour, and finally, developing 
sewerage systems in the urban areas (NPC 1980; 1985; Sharma 2001, 90-91).   
The basic needs approach supplemented the state-led approach, by refocusing it on 
human needs. In Nepal, however, it did not have a long-term influence, and was not able 
to establish itself as a working modality in the water supply and sanitation sector. Its 
contribution to the sector was setting the focus on poverty. In the official Nepalese policy 
framework, there was a change towards the basic needs approach – all of the main 
government policy documents mirroring its line of argument – but practically there was 
little change in the government approach to water delivery. Even the World Bank, which 
was the prime advocator of the basic needs approach, did not change its implementation 
modality in Nepal. Together with the DWSS, it continued to follow the infrastructure-
based, urban-focused approach, that materialised in its Water Supply and Sewerage 
Projects. UNICEF, together with the Ministry of Panchayat and Local Development, was 
the only donor that applied the basic needs approach – in the Community Water Supply 
(CWS) programme –  and rationalised its engagement with water supply and sanitation as 
essential for reducing child mortality (Sharma 2001, 88). Only in 1986, the government 
launched a government-led Basic Needs Programme, with the aim to meet the minimum 
basic needs of all Nepalese by the year 2000. Ironically it was abandoned four years later, 
in 1990, after the restoration of democracy in Nepal (NPC/ADB 1995,13).  
                                                 
138 The World Bank had entered the water supply sector in 1973, with the formation of a Water Supply and 
Sewerage Board. After this, it started to fund the First Water Supply and Sewerage Project in April 1974, 
with the aim of improving Kathmandu's and Pokhara's drinking water and wastewater services under the 
DWSS. The Second Water Supply and Sewerage Project was already conceived by the World Bank in 1973, 
since the work volume of the First Project was insufficient to meet its objectives. The Third Project ran from 
1980 to 1988, and it was a continuation of the traditions of the First and Second Projects, despite their 
obvious shortcomings, as presented by the Pokharel Commission (HMGN1987). The Commission had been 
formed to review the World Bank's involvement in the water supply and sanitation sector of Nepal. 
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Document 
Plan 
World Bank: 
Redistribution 
with Growth 
ILO: The Basic 
Needs Approach 
The Fourth Five 
Year Plan 
1970-75 
The Fifth Five 
Year Plan 
1975-80 
The Sixth Five 
Year Plan 
1980-85 
Objectives Increase 
productivity of the 
poorest; 
redistribution of 
income; increase 
employment 
possibilities; meet 
the basic needs of 
people. 
Economic growth 
with better income 
distribution; create 
employment 
opportunities for 
all; meet the basic 
needs of people. 
Increase 
production; create 
physical 
infrastructures; 
promote, expand 
and diversify 
international trade. 
Increase production 
useful for people; 
maximum use of 
labour power; 
regional balance 
and unification. 
 
Increase the rate of 
production; provide 
opportunities for 
gainful 
employment; fulfill 
minimum basic 
needs. 
 
Priority sectors Social services: 
nutrition, housing, 
health, literacy, 
employment. 
 
Social services: 
food, shelter, 
clothing; drinking 
water, sanitation, 
public transport, 
health, education, 
culture. 
Transportation, 
communica-tion & 
power; agriculture 
& irrigation; power, 
commerce & 
industry. 
 
Agriculture & 
irrigation; 
transportation & 
communica-tion; 
industry, commerce 
& power. 
Agriculture & 
irrigation; industry, 
commerce & 
power;  social 
services. 
 
Table 5.2: Comparison of the World Bank and ILO approaches to Basic Needs with the 4th and the 5th plans of Nepal
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5.2.2 Community-Based Approach: Push for Participation and 
Decentralisation 
Since the early 1980s, there were complaints that the state-led approach had led to poor 
performance, a degrading of the conditions of schemes due to a lack of proper operation 
and maintenance, and had had negative environmental and poverty impacts, albeit the 
basic needs approach had emphasised tackling poverty at large. It was felt that state 
leadership would need to be either replaced, or augmented, by a local management of 
resources, and locally led decision-making (Mansuri, Rao 2004, 4-5). The community-
based approach contested the principles of the state-led approach, by changing the 
responsibility for the water supply and sanitation schemes to the users and minimising the 
role of government at local level. Thus, its basic emphasis was on a decentralised delivery 
of water services, and the participation (Chambers 1983) and empowerment (Sen 1985; 
1999) of users in the planning, construction and management of the schemes (Cernea 
1991). The central government and donors were provided with a role as facilitators and 
sources of funds. This thinking turned the whole development thinking upside-down (from 
top-down to bottom-up).  
5.2.2.1 International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade (1980-1990) 
The first ideas of increasing community responsibility in the management of water supply 
and sanitation facilities, were expressed during the International Drinking Water Supply 
and Sanitation Decade (IDWSSD, 1980-1989), declared by the United Nations139. Since 
the 1970s, some donors had realised that the past state-led policies, which emphasised the 
building of large-scale, technically demanding schemes, had left the legacy of expensive 
and non-functioning systems, all over the developing world, which could not serve the 
poor. Therefore, the poorer communities in rural areas needed to be provided with simple 
technologies, that are affordable to developing countries, such as handpumps, wells and 
boreholes. However, in a centralised system of operation and maintenance, the repair of 
these stand-alone facilities, located in distanced areas, did not function, and once these 
broke down, they remained broken down (Black 1998, 13-4). As a solution, it was 
suggested that the communities should be in charge of the operation and maintenance of 
water supply and sanitation facilities.  
The Decade Programme not only focused on community-based operation and 
maintenance, but it also induced other important policy shifts. It emphasised that the 
servicing of rural areas, together with urban slums, as being the areas at that time that 
were more populous than the city centres of the main towns. The slogan of the Decade 
was 'Water and Sanitation for All', echoing the basic needs approach slogan 'Health for All 
2000'. Improving the health situation was the driving force behind the Decade, and 
                                                 
139 The IDWSSD was designed and declared at the World Water Conference organised in 1977, in Mar del 
Plata. Other global conferences held in the 1970s that also shaped the thinking in the water sector were the 
UN conference on Human Settlements, in Vancouver, in 1976, and the UN conference on Primary Health 
Care, in Alma Ata, in 1978.  
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therefore, in addition to the traditional supply of water, sanitation was made an integral 
part of all water supply projects140. The aid agencies also wanted to have clear targets for 
improvements in the sector, and demanded that all governments set national targets for 
reaching a universal water supply and sanitation coverage, and introduced the ambitious 
target of having universal coverage in safe water and sanitation reached by 1990. This, 
however, was not achieved (Black 1998, 4-15, 24). 
In Nepal, the Sixth (1980-85) and the Seventh Plans (1986-1990) coincided with the 
IDWSSD. The Sixth Plan did not specifically mention the Decade, presumably because it 
was prepared ahead of its formal declaration. However, as suggested by the IDWSSD, the 
DWSS, together with the WHO141, prepared a national document142, intended to be used 
as a planning reference tool in the drinking water and sanitation sector. It listed objectives 
on how to develop the water supply and sanitation sector, according to the focus points of 
Decade, and to extend the coverage to the rural areas of Nepal. The report echoed the 
learning of donors by outlining that 
“(…) recipient communities should be responsible for the operation and maintenance of 
their own supplies (…) the communities in practice do not have the technical expertise to 
operate their own supplies and thus it is left to the responsible sector agency to supply 
competent personnel and retain responsibility for the supply.”  
HMGN/DWSS 1980, 5-6 
A closer look at the report also gives a glimpse on the politics of policy in Nepal. Exactly 
as emphasised by the IDWSSD, the report focused on sanitation – atypical for Nepalese 
planning documents. However, unlike the IDWSSD, the part of the report on sanitation 
emphasised the hardware-based view on development, reflected in the presentation of 
progress for urban areas, as the number of sewerage systems for rural areas and the 
number of latrines built (HMGN/DWSS 1980, annex 10). The discrepancy between the 
focus points must relate to the manoeuvring between the authors of the report: the WHO 
and the DWSS. The hardware focus can be viewed as a DWSS influence, which had 
aimed to guarantee that its expertise as an engineering agency was taken into account. It 
had an interest for technical engineering, over the design of simple technologies, or 
softside techniques to provide water and sanitation, whereas the WHO wanted to highlight 
the importance of sanitation along global priority lines. Furthermore, the report set a 
universal target for extending the coverage of water supply and sanitation, and abolished 
the rural-urban divide, along with the example of the IDWSSD, however, less ambitiously 
than the IDWSSD. The Nepalese target for national water supply coverage by 1990 was 
69 per cent, in which 94 per cent of the urban areas were covered, and 67 per cent of the 
                                                 
140 The Steering Committee meeting of the Water Decade, held in Interlaken, Switzerland, in 1987, 
encapsulated the decade priorities as strengthening the skills and capacities of public health engineering 
bodies; developing community financing mechanisms to recover costs; better balancing of inputs between 
water and sanitation, and between city centres and rural and poor urban areas; operation and maintenance; 
community participation and hygiene education, especially among women; and greater coordination and 
cooperation among the various players (Black 1998, 24-5). 
141 The WHO had been made internationally responsible for monitoring the Decade. 
142 Ten-Year Plan for the Provision of Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation (HMGN/DWSS 1980).  
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Globally, the lesson of the Decade was that if communities had a larger role in the scheme 
of operation and planning, they would have the ownership of them when the schemes were 
maintained (or not maintained) by the government (UNDP-World Bank 1989, 15-7; 
Cairncross 1992). This suggests, basically, the decentralisation of water supply and 
sanitation scheme planning, operation and maintenance to lower levels. This learning 
widened the community-based approach to move further than just operation and 
maintenance, and started to include the role of users in the planning, management and 
monitoring of the schemes. 
5.2.2.2 From Community-Based Maintenance to Community-Based Management 
and Planning 
“Community management goes beyond simple participation. Community management is a 
key to sustaining services for the rural poor and is a viable option for the poor urban 
settlements. Government should support community management through legislation and 
extension and give it priority in national sector strategies for the 1990s. Communities 
should have prominent roles in planning, resource mobilisation and all subsequent aspects 
of development.”  
New Delhi Statement 1990 
The community-based approach, as outlined in the New Delhi Statement at the global 
consultation on Safe Water and Sanitation, held in New Delhi in 1990, was adopted by the 
donors as their new blueprint for development. The approach highlighted a decentralised 
delivery of water and sanitation, which confirmed that the government should move from 
that of provider, to that of promoter and facilitator. By this, the signatories of the 
statement meant that in the future, governments should do less to provide services, and 
instead enable other institutions – public, volunteer or private – to deliver and run them. 
The government would not need to finance and build on the same scale but it would need 
to do all of the things that ensured that services could be supplied (Black 1998, 44-6). 
In Nepal, the principal objectives of the Eighth Five Year Plan (1992-1997) continued 
the framework set by the Seventh Plan, but it also applied the principle of decentralised 
development management, however, being quite vague about how it was perceived:  
 
“The proposed methodology will create a basis for sustained development by promoting 
development initiatives at the community level by enhancing the awareness for self-
development, fostering civic responsibility and self-reliance. In order to fully translate such 
development process into practice, the Government will adopt the policy of 
decentralization. (…) In accordance with the policies of democratic socialism, the 
formulation of plans will eliminate the top down approach to be replaced by the bottom up 
approach.”  
NPC 1992, 86-7 
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not possible without paying attention to the governance issues in the developing world 
(Bøås, McNeill 2003, 60-8; Riddell 2007, 247).  
The Washington consensus refers to the neo-liberal belief that the combination of a 
democratic government, free markets, a dominant private sector, and an openness to trade 
is the recipe for prosperity and growth. It turned its back on state-led development and 
stressed that the state should only play a minimal role in the development, leaving space 
for market forces to lead (Pender 2001, 398-9). These principles were embodied in the 
structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) of the World Bank and the IMF. The SAPs 
included a large number of conditionalities, requiring wide-ranging reforms in national 
policies. Nepal implemented two SAPs, in 1986 and 1989, with a loan provided by the 
World Bank146. 
These issues were augmented with the concept of good governance. In international 
debate, according to Villadsen (1999, 17), a consensus seems to have developed on the 
inclusion of the following seven features in the concept of good governance; democratic 
accountability; transparency in the public sector; public participation at all levels of 
government; a functional division between administration and politics – clear political and 
administrative roles; the legal protection of a citizen’s rights; a service-oriented civil 
service; and, financial accountability. However, there was disagreement on several other 
components, such as anti-corruption work. The UN definition of good governance is 
exactly as composite as the composite approach: “good governance has major 
characteristics. It is participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, 
responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive and follows rule of law. It 
assumes that corruption is minimized, the views of minorities are taken into account and 
that the voices of the most vulnerable in society are heard in decision-making. It is also 
responsive to the present and future needs of society”. (UNESCAP 2010). 
The capacity-building perspective, on the other hand, has become since early 2000, 
increasingly to describe the process of institutional expansion, improvement, and reform 
needed at all levels – from national to local level – to make these services work effectively 
(Black 1998, 54). In 1991, a UNDP Symposium in Delft, the Netherlands, defined the 
concept of capacity building for water and sanitation activity and articulated a strategy for 
applying it at the country level. The concept embraced three areas: the creation of an 
'enabling environment' via policy, legal and regulatory frameworks; institutional 
development, including community participation; and human resources development, 
including training and education. Black (1998, 54-5) presents that the novelty of this 
approach was the breadth of its scope, and the idea that all areas should be addressed in a 
mutually reinforcing framework. Capacity building could be aided by certain tools: 
comprehensive water assessments; policy and institutional reforms to reallocate functions 
and bring in private entrepreneurs; and education to develop new skills and up-to-date 
thinking. 
Even though the Post-Washington Consensus added a strong emphasis to the 
strengthening of state structures and institutions, it did not imply a return to the state-led 
                                                 
146 On structural adjustment loans, see Mosley, Harrigan and Toye 1991; Cammack, Pool and Tordorff 1993. 
For a background of the SAPs and their implementation in Nepal, see World Bank 1996a and Gyawali 2003, 
76-80. 
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approach, as encapsulated in the World Development Report 1997 “the state is central to 
economic and social development, not as a direct provider of growth but as a partner, 
catalyst and facilitator” (World Bank 1997, 1)147.  
I label this as a composite approach, because of the multiple nirvana concepts (e.g. 
good governance, capacity-building, participation, sustainability, among others) that 
commenced to characterise the development thinking. There was not a single clear 
‘narrative’, or a counter narrative, in the thinking, but it was characterised by several ideas 
that were attached to the previous thinking instead of dismissing some of the older 
priorities and advocating for a real policy change148. In the Nepalese water supply and 
sanitation sector, the focus set by the community-based approach on participation and 
decentralisation, as well as the ideas of cost-recovery, capacity-building and good 
governance149, have characterised the sector development since the introduction of these 
themes in the 1990s.  
 
Component Emphasis Origin 
Participation and 
empowerment 
Community responsibility and 
ownership 
Criticism on the State-led 
Approach by Chambers and 
Sen 
Role of women Focus on women (opposite to 
men) 
Community-based Approach 
Water as finite resource Environmental thinking Brundtland Commission 
Water as an economic good Cost-effectiveness and cost-
recovery 
Washington Consensus 
Capacity-building of officials Effectiveness of the state Post-Washington Consensus 
Governance of water 
resources 
Effectiveness Post-Washington Consensus 
Sanitation  Health; environment; reduced 
number of days sick, leading 
to increased productivity 
Community-based Approach, 
Brundtland Commission, 
Washington Consensus 
Table 5.5: Emphasis and Origin of the Components of the Composite Approach  
                                                 
147 Bøås, McNeill (2003, 77-8) explain, that particularly the regional development banks, including the 
ADB, were not well-equipped to deal with these new thematic issues, deriving from the governance agenda, 
and if they had had their way, they would have continued funding the old style infrastructure projects. They 
also mention that the ADB saw that the western countries that fund the ADB forced these issues on it. 
148 Kanbur (2003, 7) has made similar observation and writes that the development discourse is at a high 
state of synthesis, with most of the elements of the previous debates being present. Maxwell (2003) speaks 
of the ‘New Poverty Agenda’, referring with it to a people-centred human development agenda, that gained 
momentum in the 1990s, especially through the series of UN development conferences, departing from the 
conditionality-driven Washington consensus (cited in Fukuka-Parr 2012, 9-10). Fukuda-Parr (2012, 11) 
connects the composite approach with the birth of the Millennium Development Goals by writing “But in 
the absence of a clear alternative policy path, the basic framework of Washington Consensus policies 
focusing on macroeconomic stability and liberalization continued to be pursued, and continued as a part of a 
broader agenda, behind the headline of ending poverty as the objective”. 
149 Molle (2008, 132) presents the origin of the good governance as a nirvana concept: “the concept of good 
governance emerged as a model in which inefficient, corrupt, biased and discriminatory governments – 
would “as a result of” or “through” growing transparency and power-sharing  - become accountable to their 
populations and act for the common good.” 
 
 
 
 
137
In the water sector the core principles of the composite approach were most succinctly 
articulated at the International Conference on Water and the Environment, held in Dublin, 
in January 1992, in the run-up to the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development in Rio de Janeiro, also known as the Earth Summit150. They were expressed 
as follows:  
 
 Fresh water is a finite and vulnerable resource, essential to sustain life, 
development and environment; 
 Water development and management should be based on a participatory approach, 
involving users, planners and policy-makers at all levels; 
 Women play a central part in the provision, management and safeguarding of 
water, and; 
 Water has an economic value in all its competing uses and should be recognized as 
an economic good (The Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Development 
1992). 
 
An important part of the composite approach was the Integrated Water Resources 
Management (IWRM), which by its name, integrated several components related to water 
sector under one roof151. It was defined at the Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable 
Development 2002 “as a process, which promotes the coordinated development and 
management of water, land and related resources in order to maximize the resultant 
economic and social welfare in an equitable manner without compromising the 
sustainability of vital ecosystems”. The IWRM nirvana concept embodies the argument of 
Molle (2008), of a dynamic interplay between nirvana concepts, narratives and models. He 
writes that the IWRM concept provides justification for river basin management and river 
basin organisations – models, according to him, that call for demand management and 
pricing policies anchored in several storylines – meaning narratives. These concepts are 
translated into concrete action on policies, technical assistance grants, and development 
projects.  
The main changes in the water sector, between the composite approach and the state-
led approach, are described in the table below. The issues relate to the different focus 
                                                 
150 These principles and action areas were, subsequently, endorsed at the post-Rio Ministerial meeting on 
water and sanitation, in Noordwijk, in the Netherlands (1994). The World Bank expressed these views in its 
influential report entitled ‘Infrastructure for Development’ (World Bank 1994). The report outlines the 
failures of infrastructure utilities across the Third World under their hitherto predominantly state-run 
regimes, and shows how their typical features (such as a focus on capital investment at the expense of 
maintenance, chronically low capacity utilisation and overstaffing) derive from decisions being made on the 
basis of political expediency rather than sound utility-management principles. It identifies three core 
instruments for improving the efficiency of public sector infrastructure utilities: corporation, a new pricing 
strategy, and contracts between governments and private entities (Cited in Coelho 2005, 175-6). 
151 The World Water Council was behind the idea. In its conference in Hague, in 2000, called the Second 
World Water Forum, the approach was put on the global arena and further discussed in the International 
Conference on Freshwater, held in Bonn, in 2001 (Conca 2006). The concept had been coined already some 
decades earlier, but in Bonn it was designed as a global paradigm for the water sector (Conca 2012, 123-
165). 
 
 
 
 
138
points introduced by the Brundtland Commission, Washington Consensus and Post-
Washington consensus. 
 
State-led approach    → Composite approach 
Water as a social good    → Water as an economic good 
Centralised management and    → Decentralised management and 
administration       administration 
Government (state) provision   → Government facilitation 
Administrative domain    → Service domain 
Supply driven approach    → Demand-driven approach 
Water supply      → Water services 
Production (agency) orientation   → Customer orientation 
Hardware projects     → Software projects 
Table 5.6: Major paradigmatic changes in global water and sanitation policy thinking (modified 
from Seppälä 2002, 372) 
In Nepal, the composite approach, particularly its liberalisation and privatisation 
programmes, was hastily adapted by the government under pressure from donors, to move 
Nepal onto the right track152 (Gyawali 2003, 77). The Eighth (1992-97) and the Ninth 
(1997-2002) Plans, in addition to the community-based approach, put a focus on the post-
Washington Consensus issues, such as the promotion of sustainable economic growth, 
through market-oriented liberal economy, poverty alleviation, and a reduction in regional 
imbalances (NPC 1992; 1998). In the water sector, the emphasis on economic 
development led to changes, especially in the hydropower sector. The Hydropower Policy 
(1992) abolished the government’s monopoly in investing in hydropower, aiming to 
attract private investment in the power sector, and to provide electricity before the biggest 
hydropower project of Nepal, Arun III153, could be made operational (HMGN 1992, 1). In 
Arun III, the interests of the multilaterals and the government met: the donors aimed to 
liberalise and privatise the economy, and the government was keen on having large 
infrastructure projects implemented in the country – for energy provision, and for possible 
kickbacks from various subcontracted works.  
                                                 
152 Harper, in his study on tuberculosis reform in Nepal, has found out that the principles subsumed here, 
under the composite approach, also guided the aid agency funded health reform in the 1990s; and exactly as 
in the water supply and sanitation sector, the attempt to decentralise the health sector did not succeed, due to 
the highly centralised and state-controlled tuberculosis strategy (Harper 2005, 142-45). 
153 Gyawali (2001) criticises that Arun III, mainly funded by the World Bank, was too expensive for a small 
country like Nepal, and argues, exactly like some international and national NGOs, campaigning against 
Arun III – Gyawali having been active in the campaign himself – that it would be better for Nepal to have 
several smaller hydropower projects, instead of one big project (Gyawali 2001, 66-86, 148-152). The donors 
and the Nepalese government justified the building of the hydropower plant by Nepal's enormous need for 
energy, not only for the citizens, but also for industry (Mahat 2005, 243-57). The situation escalated into a 
conflict, and ended up in the withdrawal of the World Bank from the project, ending the whole project, due 
to a lack of finances. This experience changed the direction of World Bank policy in Nepal: it turned 
towards rural water supply and sanitation.  
Other policies and acts to support the privatisation of hydropower were the Electricity Act 1992, the 
Industrial Enterprise Act 1992, the Foreign Investment and Technology Transfer Act 1993, the Industrial 
Policy 1992 and the Foreign Investment and the One Window Policy Act 1992.  
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In the Nepalese water supply and sanitation sector the emphasis, on the economic 
value of water, through cost-recovery, as well as capacity building, and governance 
shaped the work in the sector154. The Ninth Plan (1997-2002) suggested emphasising cost-
recovery to make the sector financially more self-sufficient, applying the principle also to 
low-income communities. This required that people would make financial contributions, 
to cover the costs of, at least, operation and maintenance. In addition, for the sake of cost-
effectiveness, the decentralisation of service provision that was emphasised in the Eighth 
and the Ninth Plans, demanding that NGOs, local bodies and the private sector would be 
involved in construction, management, and operation and maintenance of schemes, and by 
this, decreasing the demand on central level government to be involved in these activities 
and to invest in the schemes. To echo the market-driven and governance-focused language 
of donors, both Plans confine the roles of central public agencies in policy formulation, 
technical support, monitoring and evaluation, and let the private sector take care of the rest 
(NPC 1998, 694; 1992, 529-30). 
                                                 
154 Donors considered capacity-building and governance questions, important in Nepal, because they viewed 
Nepal as a country with weak governance, and the absence of citizen participation in the decision making 
processes; both of these issues had led to slow progress towards decentralisation, as well as government 
administration, with a tendency towards low transparency and accountability (UNDP 2002).  
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5.2.3.1 Towards Partnership 
The priorities of the composite approach have remained dominant in development 
thinking; however, they have been supplemented with a revision of the aid modalities and 
practices. Since the mid-1990s, donors and aid recipient countries have been discussing 
the nature of their relationship, instead of coming up with new priority sectors to fund. 
The aim of this discussion has been to develop the relationship towards a partnership, by 
focusing on the coordination of development efforts, the harmonisation of their modalities, 
and alignment with the recipient country’s policies and practices. The idea behind this 
thinking was to make aid more effective.   
The most important global policy papers that outline the building blocks of the 
partnership thinking are the OECD/DAC publication ‘Shaping the 21st Century: The 
Contribution of Development Co-operation’ (OECD 1996), and the statements from 
several development conferences held around the millennium. The OECD/DAC 
publication (1996) sketched that  
 
 The need for aid recipients to take control of the development process, for aid to be 
integrated into recipient-owned and -led policy frameworks, developed with the 
co-operation of local civil societies; 
 The need for recipient countries to foster internal accountability for their activities. 
 The need for strong and effective partnerships between donors and recipients;  
 The need for donors to work more closely together by coordinating and 
harmonising their aid activities, and by providing aid on a more reliable basis;  
 The need for all activities and policies of donors to be harmonised and consistent 
with their aid and development policies;  
 The emphasis to be given to the building of institutions and capabilities (Riddell 
2007, 40-1). 
 
The document influenced the inputs feeding into the Millennium Development Summit of 
Heads of State, convened by the UN in 2000, which paved the way for the adoption of the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in the following year. These quickly became the 
central yardstick against which the development efforts were subsequently to be judged 
(Riddell 2007, 40-42).   
The international conferences that shaped the formulation of the partnership idea were 
the International Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey, Mexico, in 
2002, and the High Level Forum on Harmonisation in Rome, in 2003, leading to the 
endorsement of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005. Three years later, in 
2008, the Third High Level Forum in Accra, Ghana, took stock of the harmonisation 
process, and built on the Paris Declaration to accelerate the pace of change (OECD/DAC 
2008). The fourth High Level meeting in Busan, Korea, in 2011, established by all 
delegates agreed framework for development cooperation based on the partnership idea. 
Until now, the most influential of these documents has been the Paris Declaration, which 
articulated the principles of this thinking: effectiveness, partnership, ownership, 
harmonisation, alignment, capacity building, results and mutual accountability 
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(OECD/DAC 2005). The focus on government ownership, and leadership in poverty 
reduction efforts, was aimed to be increased through the formulation of the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), which were meant to be produced by the recipient 
countries themselves, based on consultations with, and inputs from, domestic interest 
groups, including civil society, and in partnership with donors. In practice, many of these 
documents have been criticised as being externally driven, and in some cases, externally 
written; the similarity of many being cited as evidence of their Washington/World Bank 
origins (Riddell 2007, 46-7; Gould 2005; Fraser, Whitfield 2009, 84).  
In Nepal, the donors brought these principles to the aid discussion in 2000 at the Nepal 
Development Forum (NDF)155. The preparations for the NDF, and the commitments 
made, set a new direction, and were strongly echoed in the 2002 formulated Foreign Aid 
Policy. The guiding principles of the policy were:  
 
 Alignment with the national goal of poverty reduction; 
 Moving from individual projects to harmonised (sector-wide) support; 
 Foreign aid as integral to the mobilisation of resources for development; 
 Transparency in the supply and utilisation of ODA within and outside the 
government system; and 
 The long term aim of self-reliance by enhancing domestic resource mobilisation.156  
 
The greater harmonisation and coordination attempts taken by donors and the government, 
led to the establishment of broad based sector-wide approaches in the health and education 
sectors, including a Joint Financial Mechanism, by which the government and donors can 
provide financing behind a common programme. The government and donors plan to 
establish further SWAPs in agriculture, rural roads, local development, alternative energy, 
as well as rural water -sectors. However, as stated in a MoF evaluation document, this is 
problematic, because of inconsistency in aid management across line ministries, and weak 
sector coordination mechanisms, with a continued preponderance of projects. The projects 
are not always well coordinated and have been developed in an ad hoc manner (MOF 
2010, 34).   
In Nepal, the partnership idea, together with the continued influence of the composite 
approach, became to dominate periodic development plans. The Tenth Plan (2002-2007) 
was formulated as Nepal's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP)157, presenting 
                                                 
155 Nepal Development Forum, previously known as ‘Nepal Aid Group Meetings’, started in 1976. 
Altogether 15 meetings have been held to date, including Nepal Donor Consultation Meeting held in 2008, 
in the form of a mini-NDF. Twelve meetings from 1976 to 2000 were held abroad and the subsequent 
meetings have been conducted in Nepal. In these meetings Nepal’s development partners meet with the 
representatives of government to discuss issues related to Nepal’s development. 
156 MOF 2010, 32; 2002; and Nepal Development Forum 2000  
<http://www.ndf2004.gov.np/aboutndf2000.php>. 
157 The Tenth Plan included all the characteristics that were prerequisite for a PRSP, such as preparation with 
wide consultation, Medium Term Expenditure Framework, Immediate Action Plan, and a policy matrix 
(Pyakuryal et al. 2008, 32). Other priorities included limiting the role of public sector and prioritising public 
interventions; enhancing participation of the private sector, NGOs, INGOs, and community-based 
organisations in development activities; developing alternative delivery mechanisms, particularly through 
greater devolution of functions, responsibilities and resources to local bodies; and greater community 
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poverty reduction, and improving governance through civil service reform, and 
decentralisation, as significant steps for Nepal's development (NPC 2003, 3). In the water 
supply and sanitation sector, it focused on setting the right kind of legal and policy 
framework, as suggested by the partnership focus, as well as reform, and consolidated the 
institutional mechanisms and approaches to service delivery158 (NPC 2003, 108-9). The 
Plan followed the blueprint set for these PRS papers, and was supplemented by the donor-
advocated Medium Term Expenditure Framework, which links the annual budget with the 
plan, and consultations with interest groups (NPC 2003, 5-7). The Three Year Interim 
Plan159 (2008-2010) also continued to adhere to the objectives of the existing PRSP; 
however, the PRSP label was left off the document. Instead, it is aligned with the other 
fashion of the time, the Millennium Development Goals. The MDGs quickly started to 
dominate the development jargon of Nepal160, and the aid agencies commenced to 
measure their success and effectiveness against the MDGs. In the water supply and 
sanitation sector, the Interim Plan was the first document to openly argue for a sector-wide 
approach by demanding to “introduce necessary policy, institutional and legal reforms for 
adopting the Sector Wide Approach (SWAP) through effective coordination between the 
stakeholder agencies” and “a uniform mode of project implementation amongst the 
different agencies in this sector” (NPC 2007, 309-1). As will be shown in the next chapter, 
the push for a SWAP in the water supply and sanitation sector has been strong; nearly all 
of the main players in the sector have attempted this, however, they have been 
unsuccessful. This has been seen as the most influential component of aid harmonisation 
and coordination efforts in the Nepalese water supply and sanitation sector.  
                                                                                                                                                   
involvement in the formulation and management of key programmes aimed at meeting the needs of the rural 
population (NPC 2003, 3).  
The country strategies of Nepal's donors also spoke the language of the PRSP during that time. JICA's 
Country Program based on the PRSP and so did DFID's Country Assistance Plan, ADB's Country Strategy 
and Program and the World Bank's Country Assistance Strategy (World Bank 2005a, 208). The need for an 
overall governance reform in Nepal was brought up by Nepal's donors in the Nepal Development Forum, in 
2002. In addition to the typical issues like civil service reform and the capacity building of civil servants, it 
included measures for anti-corruption, as well as for motivating the key civil servants (HMGN 2002). The 
same priorities were repeated in the UNDP-authored Nepal Development Report 2001 (UNDP 2002). 
158 Otherwise it followed the principles of the composite approach by suggesting to “increase sustainable 
access to basic drinking water in rural areas and basic sanitation in both rural and urban areas. (…) The main 
strategies are to encourage NGOs, community-Based Organisations (CBOs) and the private sector to 
actively participate in the planning, designing, implementing, operating and maintaining water supply and 
sanitation schemes with the support from NGOs and the private sector and to formulate and implement 
necessary legislative reforms and cost recovery policies, among others” (NPC 2003, 55-6). The emphasis on 
sanitation follows the Global WASH Campaign (administered by the UN), which was launched as a 
response to the failure of world leaders to recognise sanitation as a target at the UN Millennium Summit in 
2000. http://www.sanitationandwaterforall.org/aboutswa.html Accessed 15.12.2010. 
159 The Three-Year Interim Plan was formulated with the assistance of UNDP, which work in Nepal focuses 
on governance and capacity building.  
160 A consultant said to me about the MDGs “they are our bread and butter, if we don't talk them, there is no 
work for us”. Interview with an ex-high-level government official, currently consultant, on Jul 23, 2009.  
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5.2.3.2 Conclusions 
 
In this section, we have seen how the global policy ideas have become global political 
currency, and are in turn “invested in, and reappropriated by, various constituencies as a 
means of forwarding their agendas or as a smokescreen for business-as-usual strategies” 
(Molle 2008, 150). The nirvana concepts have been adopted through snowballing, 
referring to the process, in which a growing number of dispersed actors, projected in 
professional events, such as the UN conferences and circulated in academic literature, 
gradually become established as a consensual and controlling idea (Molle 2008, 143), 
after which they are incorporated into a narrative and later on supporting an investment 
model. Molle (ibid.) further analyses that  
“nirvana concepts, narratives and models are disseminated and promoted by number of 
mechanisms inscribed in the professional, social and political sets of incentives faced by 
many decision-makers. They also tend to reflect the ideologies and interests of powerful 
parties and include more active processes of snowballing and paradigm maintenance by 
which concepts may become hegemonic and fuel a normative and prescriptive policy-
making.” 
 
The global level policy making through informal groups of actors come close to what 
Haas (1992) has termed epistemic communities, that is “a network of professionals with 
recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to 
policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area” (Molle 2008, 143). The 
global policy ideas were developed via a process through which consensus was reached 
within the given domain of expertise, and this consensual knowledge and belief was 
diffused, to be carried forward by other actors, exactly as shown here in the case of Nepal. 
The focus of the epistemic community was the political influence on collective policy 
making, and not on the correctness of the advice given (Haas 1992, cited in Molle 2008, 
144).  
Therefore, global policy thinking has been trickling down to the Nepalese periodic 
plans, however, often with only a short time lag. The Nepalese government has not openly 
opposed donor influence; yet, in some documents, it is possible to discern contestation, 
particularly by the construction-oriented DWSS, which seems to be sensitive about 
loosing its professional identity, because of donor demands for government facilitation, 
and putting emphasis on the more soft-side activities than that the DWSS is used to 
dealing with. At policy level, the state-led approach was first replaced by the community-
based approach, and then after this with the composite approach, however, in the leading 
governmental water supply and sanitation agency – the DWSS – the state-led approach 
never perished.  
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5.3 Donor Influence on Nepalese Water Policies 
The global policy trends, introduced in Nepal by the international aid agencies in the 
periodic development plans, also characterise the Nepalese water supply and sanitation 
sector policies. However, they do not parallel the water supply and sanitation policies to 
the extent as they do in the periodic plans, even though nearly all of the policies in the 
sector have been initiated by a donor, and formulated by either the donor, or by a 
consultancy team hired by it. Rather, the policies correspond with the policy framework of 
the donor that funded the policy formulation. The policy priorities stem from global 
approaches, yet they typically focus on certain components within the approach, which is 
then reflected in the particular water supply and sanitation policy. A special feature in 
policy formulation is that donors have conditioned the policy formulation to the funding of 
development projects, and the same donor has formulated many of the policies to match a 
development project in the pipeline. Thus, I view that the policies have been formulated 
for legitimising the donors’ operating frameworks, rather than by guiding the national 
development of Nepal, as prioritised by the government.  
Certain aid agencies, in particular, have influenced policy making in the water sector 
in Nepal; each of them having their own focus point that they have tried to institutionalise 
in Nepalese water policies. The World Bank has focused on the overall water sector, with 
the interest to introduce the IWRM; the ADB has been active in the water supply and 
sanitation sector, and has been interested in advancing the privatisation of water supply 
facilities, particularly in the urban water supply and sanitation sector. UNICEF has 
influenced the policy, especially in the sanitation sector. The compartmentalisation of the 
donors is not because of official coordination between them, but it is based on 
territorialism between each of them, each of them looking for a gap within the areas where 
their institutional priorities are, and where they could fund their projects. The territories 
are not set, but there is some overlapping and cooperation, such as in the case of the 
formulation of the policy, and strategy, for the rural water supply and sanitation sector, 
whereby the ADB, UNICEF and the DFID – the British bilateral development agency – 
were all involved in (discussed in detail in Chapter Seven). 
5.3.1 The World Bank and the Quest for Integrated Water Resources 
Management 
The World Bank’s focus in the formulation of water policies in Nepal since the early 
2000s, has been on the integration of the water sector, by institutionalising the IWRM 
approach. Its method for institutionalising the IWRM has been the formulation of policies 
and the building of institutional capacity. The IWRM, a component of the composite 
approach, has been officially adopted in the Nepalese water sector policy documents, yet, 
at the implementation level, the IWRM approach has not been able to replace the sector-
focused thinking in Nepal.  
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The World Bank's efforts to institutionalise the IWRM in Nepal started at the turn of 
1990s and 2000s, through the formulation of the Water Resources Strategy (formulated 
between 1995-2002) (HMGN/WECS 2002) and the National Water Plan in 2005 
(HMGN/WECS 2005). These documents are the overall guiding policies for the whole of 
the water sector. The Nepalese strategy formulation team was guided by two professionals 
chosen by the World Bank, namely, a Harvard professor, Peter Rogers, and a World Bank 
employee, Guy LeMoigne, who had also authored the World Bank guidelines on how to 
formulate a National Water Resources Strategy (LeMoigne et al. 1994), which was used as 
background document for the strategy formulation. The Water Resources Strategy 
formulation process was furthermore influenced by the recently formulated World Bank's 
Water Resources Strategy (in 2003 and a later version in 2004). Hence, it appears that the 
World Bank had a strong interest to steer water sector development into the direction of 
the IWRM. Before Nepal, Jordan and Sri Lanka had been advised by the World Bank to 
formulate the Water Resources Strategy161. The pressure on the Nepalese government to 
formulate the strategy was linked by the World Bank staff to the future investments in the 
sector: “so they started saying now we would not work with any country unless that 
country prepares a water resources strategy”162. According to some Nepalese government 
officials, the strategy was introduced in a very top-down manner and under pressure, due 
to the conditionality of future funding on the formulation of the strategy, leaving them 
little possibility to decide otherwise, or to consider other priorities, describing the pressure 
by the World Bank with “they bullied us”163.  
Due to the strategy's focus on the IWRM, it provides little regulation on the water 
supply and sanitation sector. Otherwise, the strategy argues for the composite approach in 
water sector development, including decentralisation, participation of all, effectiveness in 
the sector through cost-recovery, and reforms at the institutional level (HMGN/WECS 
2002). The strategy also states “The existing emphasis on large centralized line agencies 
to construct and manage projects in the water sector is no longer appropriate for 
sustainable water resource infrastructure” (HMGN/WECS 2002, 41). This probably did 
not resonate well with the Nepalese hydrocracies, which base their institutional identity on 
constructing and managing projects in the sector; but due to the linkage of strategy to the 
future funding of projects, the agencies had at this point, no other choice than to go along 
with the World Bank demands.    
In 2005, the second policy document advocating for the IWRM, and funded by the 
World Bank – the National Water Plan – was framed as the Action Plan for Water 
Resources Strategy. Its formulation was led by the Water and Energy Commission 
Secretariat (WECS), which had been 'created' by the World Bank and the Canadian 
International Development Agency (CIDA), during the formulation of the Water 
Resources Strategy, as a policy making and coordinating body for the water sector164 
                                                 
161 Interview with an ex-high-level official at the MoWR on Jun. 29, 2009.  
162 Interview an ex-high-level official at the MoWR on Jun. 29, 2009. He remembers that this was the first 
time he heard the term 'Water Resources Strategy', before this policy papers in Nepal had been called 
policies. 
163 Interview with an ex-high-level official at the Nepal Electricity Authority on Jun.29, 2009. 
164 Both World Bank and the CIDA were providing financial and technical assistance to the WECS, to 
enable it to take over this task. The CIDA had an existing project called the 'WECS Institutional 
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(HMGN/WECS 2002, 3-4). The formulation of the National Water Plan reflected the new 
modalities suggested by the partnership idea, and the parallel running formulation of 
Poverty Reduction Strategies. The National Water Plan formulation included a wide 
consultation process, with regional and national seminars, with the aim of guaranteeing 
government ownership. The process was led by a consultancy team that consisted mostly 
of Nepalese retired officials and professors (HMGN/WECS 2005, 9). Contrary to the aims 
of the World Bank, it was reported that these national consultants did not understand the 
underlined thinking in the IWRM concept, because of which, the background papers 
prepared for the workshops did not have an integrated approach, but were sector-
focused.165 The same problem was faced by the cabinet after the finalisation of the plan, 
where some ministers objected to the integrated approach of the document, leading to the 
cabinet nearly not approving it.166 Opposite to the general assessment of the IWRM 
concept as “something desirable and uncontroversial, and official documents suggest that 
governments can resort to it abundantly and at ‘no cost’” (Allan 2003; cited in Molle 
2008, 134), in Nepal, the IWRM was a controversial idea that seemed to threaten the 
identities of hydrocracies. They were afraid that it sidelined their jurisdictions and de-
sized their respective ministries, departments and line agencies.  
Evidently, sectoral thinking was still dominant among Nepalese decision-makers and 
bureaucrats, and even though the World Bank had detailed plans on how to establish the 
IWRM doctrine in the Nepalese water sector, in this regard little has taken place within 
the Nepalese water bureaucracy. Several people in different positions, working in the 
water sector, told that the implementation of the Water Resources Strategy and the 
National Water Plan is limited or non-existent167. Thus, the pressure set by the World 
Bank on the Nepalese water bureaucracy led to the formulation of two policy papers, but 
not to their implementation. The identities of the different hydrocracies are 
compartmentalised, and they are in a constant struggle over resources and prestige in the 
water sector. I think that the World Bank ignored this issue and their disinterest for 
implementing the IWRM. Thus, the hydrocracies opted for the strategy of non-
implementation (see Chapter Seven for elaboration). The documents provide a framework 
for the water supply and sanitation sector, by setting targets for their coverage in both 
rural and urban areas, and confirm the direction set by the composite approach. However, 
neither the governmental, nor donor agencies working in the water supply and sanitation 
sector, refer to these documents as guidelines for their work. Rather, they refer to the sub-
sectoral policies and guidelines. These sub-sectoral documents, on the other hand, do not 
                                                                                                                                                   
Development Project’, which provided Canadian consultants to assist the WECS with strategy formulation 
and capacity building. Interview with CIDA Nepal representative on Aug. 6, 2009. (). 
165 Interview with a member of the formulation team, an ex-government official, on Jul. 7, 2009. 
166 Interview with a high-level official (at the time of the formulation at WECS) on Jul. 31, 2009 
167 Interviews with a representative of a water organisation, close to government, on Jul. 6, 2009; a 
representative of WECS on Jul. 2, 2009; Dipak Gyawali (reseacher) Jul. 23, 2009; a representative of the 
World Bank on Aug. 7, 2009. See also World Bank 2008, x, which gives a similar opinion: “The ISP led to 
adoption of a new National Water Strategy in 2002 and a National Water Plan in 2005. Despite these 
significant achievements, and the passing of legislation to enable their implementation, Nepal still lacks the 
capacity to engage in integrated and comprehensive water resources management. Intersectoral coordination 
remains almost non-existent and each sector agency continues to plan water resources management and 
development independently”.  
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make any reference to the integrated management of water resources. It seems that 
sectoral thinking sits firm in Nepal. 
The formulation of the Water Resources Strategy and the National Water Plan were 
funded through the Nepal Irrigation Sector Project (NISP) 1997-2004 (HMGN/WECS 
2002, 4)168. The reading of the project documentation, and the explanation given by a 
World Bank official, hint that the IWRM component was added as a self-standing 
component, to a project that had already been prepared as an independent irrigation 
project, but once the need for funds for the policy formulation arose, a new component 
was included in the project169 (World Bank 1997a; 2005b). Thus, from the documentation 
and the interviews with Nepalese ex-officials, I understand that the World Bank had 
decided that a Water Resources Strategy needs to be developed in Nepal, and that the 
funding for it was to be taken from a project that was under preparation for the water 
sector, probably as this was administratively easier than to seek funding for strategy 
formulation only. Even though the IWRM approach has not been easy to institutionalise in 
Nepal, the World Bank has not abandoned the doctrine and is currently funding a 
continuation project for the NISP170. 
5.3.2 Asian Development Bank: Water Marketisation 
The ADB’s primary interest in the Nepalese water supply and sanitation sector has been to 
highlight the economic value of water and to privatise water management in the sector171, 
in accordance with the leading idea of its own water policy (see Chapter Seven on an 
analysis of ADB’s water policy). The ADB’s approach in Nepal (and globally) resembles 
what Conca (2006, 215-6) calls ‘water marketisation’, referring to the process of creating 
the economic and policy infrastructure for treating water as a marketed commodity. It is 
not synonymous with water privatisation, but refers, rather, to a broader set of linked 
transformations related to prices, property rights, and the boundary between the public and 
private spheres. In the water supply and sanitation sector, the ADB has been involved in 
                                                 
168A World Bank official explained that the initial drafting of the WRS was funded through the Japanese 
Grant Fund, but as these funds were quickly exhausted, new funds were allocated from the NISP. Interview 
with a World Bank Nepal representative on Aug. 7, 2009.  
169 The NISP consists of three components, which seem to have little in common: 1. Formulation of Water 
Resources Strategy and development of Integrated Water Resources Policy; 2. Irrigation Sector 
Infrastructure Improvement and Development; and 3. Institutional Strengthening and Development of 
sectoral departments, such as the Departments of Irrigation and Agriculture, but not providing assistance to 
WECS. The World Bank Project Information Document (PID) neither specifies that the aim of the 
institutional strengthening component would be to bring these departments closer to each other nor does it 
guide them in moving towards an integrated approach. One reason for not providing assistance to WECS 
might be that this was already done by CIDA. 
170 The project combines the components of irrigation and IRWM, called the Irrigation and Water Resources 
Management Programme. An Integrated Water Resources Policy is supposed to be funded under this 
programme and to be formulated under the supervision of the WECS. The policy was originally planned to 
be formulated before the formulation of the National Water Plan, but for unknown reasons, the Plan was 
developed before the policy. Interview with a World Bank Nepal representative on Aug. 7, 2009. 
171 Before the ADB, the World Bank had had some interest in privatising the water sector in Nepal. It had 
established the Water Supply and Sanitation Board in 1974, which it transformed into the Nepal Water 
Supply Corporation in 1989.  
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all sub-sectors, the urban, rural and peri-urban areas, with the aim of marketing water. Its 
focus has been on the idea of “getting the price right” (Conca 2006, 219-20). Behind the 
idea lies a narrative according to which pricing water correctly will help allocate scarce 
resources among competing uses and users. With higher prices that reflect opportunity 
costs, the narrative goes, low-value activities are phased-out, thus releasing water for high-
value uses and raising social welfare (Johansson 2000; Molle 2008, 137). According to 
Molle (2008, 138), this narrative took a hegemonic character in the development 
establishment that was hard to contest, becoming a resilient narrative (Roe 1991).  
The ADB’s interest is to fund development projects, which materialise this thinking, as 
well as to fund policy and legislation formulations supporting this. Therefore, the ADB 
projects have normally included a policy reform component. With this practice, the ADB 
aims to guarantee the approval of the project in its headquarters, by supporting it with a 
matching national policy framework. In Nepal, the ADB has influenced the formulation of 
the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Policy 2004 and the Urban Water Supply and 
Sanitation Policy 2010. Currently, it is involved in revising water legislation and 
formulating an Integrated Water Supply and Sanitation Policy and an Integrated Water 
Supply Act. All policies are linked with the funding of a water supply and sanitation 
project. The Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Policy, Strategy and Action Plan 
formulation process is discussed in Chapter Seven, thus I do not elaborate it here, but 
focus on showing how the ADB’s focus to privatise water supply has proceeded in Nepal; 
as well as presenting the similarity in the project funding and policy formulation pattern 
through the Urban Water Supply and Sanitation Policy and the Second Small Towns 
Water Supply Project.   
Already, before the formulation of the Urban Water Supply and Sanitation Policy in 
2009-2010, the ADB had been one of the main donors in the urban water supply and 
sanitation sector by funding the Melamchi Water Supply Project (since 2000), which aims 
to bring drinking water to the Kathmandu Valley through a tunnel from the Melamchi 
river, north of Kathmandu, and through the Kathmandu Valley Water Services Sector 
Development Program (since 2006). Both programmes have included several conditions 
requiring privatisation of provision and management of the water services in the 
Kathmandu Valley, under a performance-based management contract (Corral 2007, 1). 
Under these projects the Kathmandu Valley operations of the Nepal Water Supply 
Corporation, the public utility company, have been split into (1) an asset-holding entity, 
the Kathmandu Valley Water Supply Management Board; (2) a service provider (currently 
the contract is held by Kathmandu Upatyaka Khanepani Limited (KUKL); and (3) a 
regulatory agency, the Water Supply Tariff Fixation Commission (ADB 2006a, 1), 
combined with corresponding legislation of a Water Supply Tariff Fixation Commission 
Act 2006 (ADB 2008, 5). This tendency will continue in a new project, the 'Kathmandu 
Valley Water Supply Improvement Project', which started in 2012. In addition to 
improving the water supply distribution system in Kathmandu Valley, it will also raise the 
financial and asset management capabilities of those agencies overseeing the sector172.  
                                                 
172 The ADB website <http://www.adb.org/projects/34304-043/details>. Accessed on Feb. 21, 2013.  
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The Urban Water Supply and Sanitation Policy (2010), funded by the ADB as part of 
the preparation for the Second Small Towns Water Supply Project173, did not focus 
directly on the privatisation of water facilities. It highlighted another priority of the ADB, 
the cost-recovery of construction and operation and maintenance cost from the 
communities living in the peri-urban areas. In addition, it highlighted the sector 
effectiveness through institutional reform, particularly related to the role of DWSS as a 
facilitator; user involvement in decision making and management through the 
establishment and strengthening of water users' groups; and to promote public private 
partnerships (GON/MPPW 2009; ADB 2008). Due to the focus of the Small Town Water 
Supply Project in the peri-urban areas, the community-based approach was emphasised, 
both in the policy and the project, instead of the direct privatisation of water service 
delivery. Practically, this makes the policy a policy for peri-urban areas, and not an Urban 
Water Supply and Sanitation Policy, particularly because in the urban areas of Nepal, the 
privatisation of water facilities has been the preferred form of management, also by the 
ADB. Thus, it seems that the policy was formulated to correspond with the needs of the 
Small Towns Water Supply Project. This is illuminated when one compares the policy 
with the draft that had been prepared by JICA in the early 2000s, which focuses more on 
corporate-based management. One of my interviewees opined that the JICA draft 
corresponded to the needs of the Melamchi Water Supply Project, where the JICA was 
one of the funding agencies, instead of focusing on the needs of the whole urban water 
supply and sanitation sector174. The project preparation, and policy documentation, 
suggest that the focus on peri-urban areas has also been the favoured approach by the 
ADB-paid consultant who formulated the policy. The need by the ADB for the policy was 
substantiated in an interview with an ADB official who told me that the ADB funded the 
policy formulation, because the Small Towns Water Supply Project was developed as a 
sector development programme, along the development trend of establishing sector-wide 
approaches, requiring guidance from a policy to be able to be implemented effectively175. 
Hence, the government needed to approve the policy, prior to the project funds could be 
released by the ADB.  
                                                 
173 Before the preparation of the Second Small Towns Water Supply Project, the First Small Towns Water 
Supply Project had been evaluated. This evaluation report was critical about the alleged success of the 
project and according to some of my interviewees, a staff member of the ADB Nepal felt that this report 
criticised this staff member for not doing the work well. The staff member had namely advertised the project 
with its success and had even got a prize for managing such a successful project. Because of the 
controversial result, the report was not made public, nor was it made available to the consultants preparing 
the second phase of the project by the ADB. The consultants decided to carry out an own rapid assessment 
of the first phase, and found out that there were little safety-nets for the poor and disadvantaged in place, that 
the cost-recovery had been too high for the poorer segments of the people to participate in the project and 
that there had been occasions of corruption. These issues were taken into account in the design of the Second 
Small Towns Water Supply Project. Interviews with an international consultant in the WSS sector on Aug. 
12, 2009 and a NGO representative on Jul. 15, 2009.  
174 Interview with a NGO representative on Jul. 6, 2009. 
175 Interview with a representative of ADB Nepal on Aug. 10, 2009.  
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5.3.3 UNICEF Advocating Sanitation 
UNICEF has been working in the Nepalese sanitation sector since the IWDSSD (1980-
1990). Its focus has been on the community-based approach, which has guided its policy 
and work since the CWSS programme started in the 1970s. Being an UN agency for 
children's well-being, it justifies its involvement in water supply and sanitation in Nepal, 
with its close relationship to the health of women and children. In general, UNICEF is not 
a big funding agency in the sector; its focus is not on funding large projects, but piloting 
new ideas, and trying to institutionalise approaches that it finds work well in the Nepalese 
context of government and donor policy (Steering Committee for National Sanitation 
Action 2000, 20). This explains its persistent involvement in influencing policy: it aims to 
get its ideas to other donors and government agencies, which fund the work in the 
sanitation sector. 
The UNICEF-led donor influence on Nepalese policy making commenced in 1980 and 
focused on the principles of the Drinking Water Decade. First, it put the focus on 
widening the sanitation coverage in rural areas, and UNICEF, and the funding agency the 
CWSS, were eager to introduce this approach at the DWSS, under which the project was 
shifted in 1987176. Second, UNICEF advocated for integrating sanitation in all water 
supply projects, and third, making communities responsible for the operation and 
maintenance of their schemes (UNICEF 1990b, 12-3). Already before this, UNICEF had, 
together with the MPLD177, tried to put pressure on the DWSS178 through funding the 
formulation of two policies, namely the Policy for the Maintenance and Repair of 
Community Water Supply and Sanitation Systems in Nepal 1982, and the Policy for 
Sanitation in 1982. However, the policies did not focus on defining priorities, but 
delineated roles and responsibilities at different levels, starting from villages up to 
ministry level (Dixit and Crippen 1993, 72-4; Sharma 2001, 91; HMGN/MPLD 1982a; 
1982b; UNICEF 1990a, 21). 
UNICEF’s influence continued in the 1990s, with its aim to set a policy framework in 
Nepal which aligned with its global priorities on sanitation and hygiene education. 
Similarly, the National Sanitation Policy, formulated in 1994 with the assistance of 
                                                 
176After the establishment of the Ministry for Housing and Physical Planning, in 1987, all rural water supply 
and sanitation programmes were brought under it, making the DWSS the lead government department in the 
sector. Hence, it also became the agency responsible for the UNICEF- and Helvetas-supported CWSS 
programme (Sharma 2001, 94; 2004, 53). According to a UNICEF representative, UNICEF was, 
subsequently, able to influence the newly established ministry to change towards the community-based 
approach and to put more emphasis on sanitation (interview with a UNICEF Nepal representative, on Sep. 
13, 2010). 
177 The Community Water Supply and Sanitation Programme (CWSS) was administered by the MPLD until 
1987, when it was shifted under the DWSS.  
178 Sharma (2001, 94 fn 60) and Bihari Krishna Shrestha (interview on 23.7.2009) explain that UNICEF got 
indirect assistance from a government official, Bihari Krishna Shrestha, who wrote a guideline on the 
approach, and managed to bypass the DWSS in the approval process, by getting it first approved by the 
minister, using his acquaintance with him. Sharma quotes another government official who confirms that  
Shrestha played an important role in the introduction of the community-based approach in the MHPP and 
the DWSS. The guidelines made two significant points: first, it called for a change in the role of the DWSS, 
from an implementer to a facilitator, and secondly, it required the department to establish a working 
relationship with users’ groups and to construct smaller, more decentralised schemes (Sharma 2001, 93-4; 
2004, 52). 
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UNICEF, emphasised sanitation and other principles of the community-based approach 
rather than the contemporaneous composite approach,  
“1. Changing people's unhygienic sanitary behaviour and practice related to personal, 
household, and environmental hygiene through environmental health education, 
information and mobilization of community (…). 2. Ensuring community involvement, in 
particular women's involvement in water management, hygiene education, and other 
sanitation promotion activities. 3. Encouraging the participation of non-governmental 
organisazation and volunteers as partners in development.”  
HMGN/MHPP/DWSS 1994, 2 
Even though the policy included detailed guidelines for planning, and the implementation 
of a sanitation programme, a UNICEF representative reported that it was never followed 
up properly, mainly because the DWSS focused on water supply rather than on 
sanitation179. However, the increasing number of aid projects on water supply, that started 
in the mid-1990s180, included sanitation as a component in their designs. 
The formulation of the Water Supply Sector Policy in 1998 highlights the role of aid 
agencies in initiating policy formulation in Nepal and the politics of policy. The World 
Bank and UNICEF initiated policy formulation, which even though being a policy only 
for water supply181, made sanitation an integral part of all water supply projects 
(HMGN/MHPP 1998, 4). This can be interpreted as UNICEF's influence on policy 
formulation. The policy continued to base itself on the priorities of UNICEF in Nepal, 
particularly in decentralisation. However, it also included other components of the 
composite approach, such as minimising adverse environmental impact, improving the 
situation of women and children, and using local resources and materials, as well as 
seeking for cost-recovery (HMGN/MHPP 1998, 4-6). Even though the policy formulation 
was not officially linked with any project preparation, nor prepared by a project 
preparation team of donor paid consultants, it was formulated at the same time that 
UNICEF funded project the 'Decentralized Planning for the Child Programme' (currently 
called Decentralized Action for Children and Women, DACAW). The project focuses on 
improving the life of rural women and children, one of its main components being water 
                                                 
179 Interview with a UNICEF Nepal representative on Sep. 13, 2010. 
180 In the development projects, the community-based approach had became the dominant approach by the 
mid-1990s, when nearly all rural water supply and sanitation projects were implemented through this 
modality, demanding that the integration of the sanitation component affected all water supply projects, and 
the communities' participation in the construction, and in the subsequent operation and maintenance. Three 
main donors applying the community-based approach were the World Bank with the JAKPAS/Fund Board, 
the Finnish government with the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Project in Western Nepal and the DFID, 
which funded local NGOs. However, the ADB funded the Third Rural Water Supply Sector Project (1992-
1997) and the Fourth Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Sector Project (1997-2001), which were 
implemented by the DWSS, did not follow the community-based approach as strictly as the other donors 
(Sharma 2001, 95; 2004, 54, 61).  
181 In the literature on water supply and sanitation in Nepal the policy is often mistakenly referred to as the 
National Water Supply and Sanitation Policy, due to its abbreviation 'NWSSP'. However, the second s-letter 
in the abbreviation does not refer to sanitation but to sector, thus, the policy is not a policy for sanitation, but 
only for water supply. The introduction of the policy states that there is a National Policy on Sanitation 
(1994), but a policy on water supply is still lacking.  
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supply, sanitation and hygiene education (UNICEF 2007). The community-based focus of 
the policy has definitely supported the legitimisation of the DACAW project, but I was not 
able to find any evidence to assess whether there was a direct influence from the project 
design.  
UNICEF’s influence on institutionalising sanitation as an integral part of water supply 
and having hygiene education as a part of it, increased in the 2000s. Since 2000, it has 
been involved in the formulation of five policy papers in the sector. The National 
Sanitation Policy 2000182 was formulated based on UNICEF's conviction that the 
traditional policy of combining sanitation to water was no more pursuable, as it had failed 
to deliver the anticipated results. Thus, the two needed to be separated in future planning 
and programming (Steering Committee for National Sanitation Action 2000, 73). 
Astonishing, in this statement, is that until then, UNICEF had advocated the integration of 
sanitation in all water supply projects. It had opined that these two fields should not be 
separated, particularly because both of them are so closely related to health issues – a 
focus of UNICEF's work in Nepal. Further, by 2000, there had not been a common policy 
for water supply and sanitation in Nepal, which could be separated into two separate 
policies. There was only the National Water Supply Sector Policy from 1998 and the 
National Sanitation Policy from 1994. This statement must have referred to UNICEF's 
experience in other countries, and it was assumed that a combined policy for water supply 
and sanitation would also fail in Nepal. Another plausible explanation for UNICEF’s 
advocacy for a separate sanitation policy could relate to the nature of the DWSS as an 
organisation. Maybe it was afraid that the focus of the DWSS on water supply would not 
provide adequate priority for sanitation, which UNICEF wanted to guarantee.  
UNICEF argued for the formulation of the Sanitation Policy (2000), because the first 
national policy on sanitation in 1994, had provided only a meagre guidance to the 
concerned agencies, that had as a result, implemented sanitation programmes in their own 
ways. Therefore, UNICEF found it important to have an updated policy, to guide the work 
in sanitation related matters (DWSS/ESS/UNICEF/NECMAC 2000, 2). As a solution, 
UNICEF offered its new approach to sanitation, which it introduced in the Nepal Status of 
Sanitation Report 1999/2000183. The approach was called the Basic Sanitation Package 
(BSP). The idea of the BSP was to pay attention to the fact that sanitation is not purely 
about building latrines, but a package of activities, including software components. 
UNICEF considered that by including the BSP into the policy, it would bring about 
uniformity and standardisation in the development programmes (SACOSAN 2003, 7; 
Steering Committee for National Sanitation Action 2000, vi-vii, 54). The policy also 
included a new component: it mentiond the role of schools in sanitation, which is also a 
                                                 
182 The policy followed for UNICEF typical arguments of decentralisation of sanitation services to local 
level and to NGOs; behavioural change; health related issues; gender sensitivity; and integration of 
sanitation to all water supply projects (DWSS/ESS/UNICEF/NECMAC 2000). 
183 The report was officially written by the Steering Committee for National Sanitation Action, but at the 
UNICEF office, a staff member referred to the report as 'our report'. I suspect that the report was written by 
UNICEF staff, and has been made official under the name of the Steering Committee, to put a government 
flag on it.  
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UNICEF-developed approach184 (DWSS/ESS/UNICEF/NECMAC 2000, 3-6). The policy 
was never submitted to the cabinet. The official reason given to me was the frequent 
changes of Directors General at the DWSS, who was supposed to approve it, and after his 
approval, forward it to the cabinet. I think that this was the DWSS maneuvering against a 
policy, which focused too much on soft-side development, hence going against its 
interests as a hydrocracy. UNICEF, understanding the problem, and knowing how the 
DWSS ‘thinks’, revised the policy slightly in 2002, by putting more focus on the 
contamination of water sources, and on urban and semi-urban areas 
(HMGN/MPPW/DWSS 2002), and submitted it anew to the DWSS. But the DWSS 
remained stubborn, and this policy also never reached the cabinet.185 The DWSS must 
have been, at that point of time, well funded by other donors and therefore, it was able to 
challenge UNICEF on this front.  
The politics of policy between the DWSS and UNICEF continued throughout the first 
decade of the 2000s. The struggle, was based on previous dynamics: UNICEF coming up 
with a policy and the DWSS finding a way to block it. In 2004, the case was about the 
ADB funded formulation of the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Strategy, in which 
UNICEF funded the work of a sanitation specialist. Nevertheless, UNICEF was not 
satisfied with the sanitation-related issues. Hence, after the approval of the Rural Water 
Supply and Sanitation Strategy, it revised the 2002 Sanitation Policy, together with the 
sanitation cell within the DWSS, and renamed it the Draft National Hygiene and 
Sanitation Policy, Strategy and Guidelines 2004. Exactly as in earlier occasions, the 
DWSS’ Director General was against its approval, arguing that there was a recent policy 
for rural water supply and sanitation; thus, a new policy was not required.186 UNICEF – 
not wanting to leave the game as loser – decided to rename it, from a policy to guidelines, 
and then, the document would not require cabinet’s approval, and it could be officially 
approved by the ministry187, and seeing this as an opportunity to bypass the unwilling 
DWSS. The Guidelines institutionalised the UNICEF-advocated sanitation approaches of 
school-led sanitation, community-led total sanitation188, Basic Sanitation Package and 
National Sanitation Week189 (HMGN/MPPW 2004c, 2-5). My interpretation is supported 
                                                 
184 UNICEF developed a school-led total sanitation approach, based on the experience of Water Aid and 
NEWAH, and on its own child-to-child approach, which was developed by the UN International Year of the 
Child, in 1979. The school-led total sanitation approach bases itself on the experience of previous related 
approaches, such as school-led sanitation, school sanitation and hygiene education, and child-to-parents and 
child-to-community approaches in promoting sanitation (SACOSAN 2003, 6-7). 
185 Interviews with a UNICEF representative on Sep. 13, 2010 and a consultant to UNICEF on Sep. 5, 2010. 
Email correspondence with the consultant on Oct. 9, 2010. 
186 Email correspondence with a consultant on Oct. 9, 2010.  
187 Interview with a UNICEF representative on Sep. 13, 2010.  
188 The 2004 and 2005 policies consolidated the community-led total sanitation approach, which had been 
introduced to Nepal by WaterAid Nepal and NEWAH. Currently, most aid agencies in Nepal follow this 
approach. It advocates for making all Nepalese villages and districts as open defecation free (ODF), 
practically meaning that all households have latrines and are using them.  
189 UNICEF had started the National Sanitation Week in 2000 as a means to draw together local leaders, 
CBOs and development workers to increase public awareness of hygiene and sanitation. The first two times 
the Week focused on construction of latrines, but from 2002 on it has been linked to Nepal's WASH 
campaign and has focused on 'soft' issues such as promoting handwashing and engaging national media to 
hygiene education (Tayler et al. 2005, 22). 
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by the observation of Tayler et al. (2005, 20), who mention that the sanitation-related 
workshops that they organised, revealed some scepticism among the DWSS engineers, 
about the relevance of the Community-Led Total Sanitation Approach in a Nepalese 
context190. I, therefore, think that the purpose of UNICEF funded policies has been to 
institutionalise the UNICEF approach to sanitation. In addition, a study of the guidelines 
text shows that it does not make any reference to the dominant aid themes, such as the 
MDGs or PRSPs, but only focuses on the sanitation approaches initiated by UNICEF.  
By the end of the decade, the global focus on sanitation increased, especially through 
the UN International Year on Sanitation in 2008. The Nepalese governmental agencies felt 
this through the South Asian Conference on Sanitation (SACOSAN), in which the 
government was a member. On the domestic front, the NGOs and donors that participated 
in the SACOSAN preparations, kept on reminding the government about its commitment 
on the formulation a National Sanitation Master Plan191. This materialised in 2008-2011, 
funded by UNICEF, the Fund Board and WaterAid. In the formulation of the Plan, 
UNICEF had a pivotal role. In an interview with a UNICEF officer, he told that the whole 
basis of the Master Plan was an outcome of UNICEF model concepts, referring to the 
Total Sanitation and School-Led Sanitation Approaches192.  
It seems evident that UNICEF’s aim has been to institutionalise its own thinking on 
sanitation in Nepal. This claim, I support with two observations: (1) several of the policy 
papers do not focus on providing clear objectives, or defining roles and responsibilities, in 
the sector193, and (2) in UNICEF funded policies, there is little reference to global 
priorities, the composite approach and partnership thinking. Rather, the policies are based 
on UNICEF’s own thinking and priorities. With the formulation of the policies, it has 
attempted to institutionalise a sanitation framework it believed in, and that it had piloted in 
the Nepalese context. Its aim was not to institutionalise an approach to support its own 
projects, nor to make their approval in UNICEF headquarters possible, as had been the 
goal of the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank.  
The policy making of sanitation policies also highlights the politics of policy 
perspective, and illuminates how the Nepalese government has found ways to manoeuvre 
against unwanted policy change. Even though, the policies are donor-centred, the 
Nepalese government has not been indifferent about them, or subsumed under the donor 
influence, without resistance. There are signs for skilful manoeuvring on both sides: 
                                                 
190 Another reason for the disinterest by governmental agencies towards sanitation could be explained 
through the fact, that they perceive sanitation as a social sector activity with low returns to investments, thus, 
not bringing the expected economic benefits, which is a high priority for the government. For the 
bureaucrats, dealing with sanitation projects, these are just low-return projects, with limited possibilities for 
kickbacks, or consultancy work. The sanitation projects emphasise social aspects, whereas the DWSS 
hydrocrats are engineers. 
191 The Nepalese government committed to this in the 2003 SACOSAN conference in Dhaka, Bangladesh. 
The civil society and donor community came together under the End Water Poverty Campaign to advocate 
for the formulation of the Master Plan. Interviews with a NGO representative on Aug. 20, 2010, a NGO 
representative on Sep. 1, 2010, a consultant to UNICEF on Sep. 5, 2010. 
192 Interview with a UNICEF Nepal representative on Sep. 13, 2010.  
193 Here, I find that particularly the National Sanitation Policy 1994, the Water Supply Sector Policy 1998, 
the National Sanitation Policy 2000, and the Draft National Sanitation Policy 2002 lack proper guidance for 
central level organisation.  
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UNICEF, allied within the sanitation cell in the DWSS, led by a sociologist (not a 
technically-oriented engineer), were successful to gain support for its efforts within the 
government. However, at the higher hierarchical levels of the DWSS, the directors general 
have come up with explanations to block the eager UNICEF and its sanitation policies.  
In summary, as seen from the table below, the aid agencies working in Nepal have 
been actively involved in the funding of policy formulation processes in the water supply 
and sanitation sector. It summarises the main policies guiding the water supply and 
sanitation sector in Nepal, including the agencies that funded the policy formulation in 
question. In addition, the table explains which policy narrative is behind each of the policy 
formulations, and reflects upon the background of those policies. 
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Policy 
 
Funding Agency/ 
Donor 
Policy Narrative 
 
Focus of the Policy International Background 
 
A Policy for Sanitation Policy 
1982  
 
UNICEF 
 
 
Community-based 
 
 
Devolving responsibility to users 
 
 
Donors' learning of the 
ineffectiveness of the state-led 
approach 
A Policy for Maintenance and 
Repair of Community Water 
Supply and Sanitation Systems 
in Nepal 1982 
UNICEF 
 
 
 
Community-based 
 
 
 
Main responsibility for O&M at 
district level, central level only 
supervising 
 
Donors' learning of the 
ineffectiveness of the state-led 
approach 
 
National Sanitation Policy 1994 
 
 
 
UNICEF 
 
 
 
Community-based 
 
 
 
Health improvement; involvement 
of women; participation of 
communities, NGOs and private 
sector 
Donors' learning of the 
ineffectiveness of the state-led 
approach 
 
Water Supply Sector Policy 
1998   
 
 
 
World Bank and 
UNICEF 
 
 
 
 
Composite 
 
 
 
 
Water supply to all; involvement of 
women; 
health improvement; cost-
effectiveness; private sector 
participation 
Community-based approach; 
Washington-Consensus 
 
 
 
National Sanitation Policy 2000 
 
 
 
UNICEF 
 
 
 
Community-based 
 
 
 
A package of activities: hardware, 
software,  
environment, sustainability 
 
Increased focus on sanitation, 
(WASH, Water and Sanitation for 
All); UNICEF's approaches to 
sanitation 
Water Resources Strategy 2002 
 
 
 
World Bank 
 
 
 
Composite 
 
 
 
Provision of water and safe 
sanitation for all by 2017; capacity-
building; cost-effectiveness; 
environmental protection 
Officially IWRM, in practice post-
Washington consensus and 
sustainability  
 
National Sanitation Policy 2002 
 
 
 
UNICEF  
 
 
 
Composite (only partly 
following) 
 
 
As in the 2000 policy 
 
 
 
Increased focus on sanitation, 
holistic approach (WASH, Water 
and Sanitation for All), UNICEF's 
approaches to sanitation 
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Rural Water Supply  
and Sanitation Policy, Strategy 
and Action Plan 2004 
 
 
ADB (main donor), 
DFID, UNICEF and 
the Fund Board 
 
 
 
Composite 
 
 
 
 
Provision of water and safe 
sanitation for all by 2017; 
community-led approach;  
capacity-building; cost-
effectiveness; environmental 
protection 
Dublin Conference 1992; IWRM; 
focus on decentralisation and 
capacity-building 
 
 
National Guideline for Hygiene 
and Sanitation Promotion 2005 
 
 
UNICEF 
 
 
 
Community-based (only 
partly following) 
 
 
Community-led; gender sensitive; 
poor-focused; use of NGOs, CBOs 
and private sector in sanitary issues 
 
Increased focus on sanitation; post-
Washington consensus; MDGs; 
UNICEF's approaches to sanitation 
National Water Plan 2005 
 
 
 
World Bank  
 
 
 
Composite 
 
 
 
Provision of water and sanitation 
for all by 2017; capacity-building; 
cost-effectiveness; environmental 
protection 
Officially IWRM, in practice post-
Washington consensus and 
sustainability  
 
National Urban Water Supply 
and Sanitation Policy 2009 
 
 
 
 
ADB 
 
 
 
 
 
Composite 
 
 
 
 
 
Socio-economic development, 
improved health to urban 
populations; social inclusion; 
provision of sustainable water 
supply and sanitation services; 
protection of environment. 
Post-Washington consensus, 
sustainability 
 
 
 
 
National Hygiene and Sanitation 
Master Plan 2010 
 
 
UNICEF, WaterAid, 
Fund Board 
 
 
Composite (only partly 
following) 
  
 
Enabling environment for 
attainment of MDGs; ODF; 
decentralisation of decision-making 
to local bodies. 
 
Increased focus on sanitation 
(SACOSAN conferences); MDGs; 
UNICEF's approaches to sanitation 
Integrated Water Resources 
Policy (under formulation) 
World Bank  
 
Composite 
 
n.a. 
 
n.a. 
 
Integrated Water Supply and 
Sanitation Policy  
ADB 
 
Composite 
 
n.a. 
 
n.a.g 
 
Table 5.9: Policies regulating rural water supply and sanitation in Nepal since 1980s
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5.4 Conclusions 
5.4.1 The Influence of Aid Agencies on Policy Making in Nepal  
This chapter shows that there is a long-term influence by donors on policy making in 
Nepal. Thus, a pattern has developed on how policies are formulated in the rural water 
supply and sanitation sector in Nepal. The influence starts from global policy narratives, 
which reflect the latest perspectives and ideologies of the donors on how the development 
should proceed, but it is disguised as knowledge by the donors. This knowledge is the use 
of expert power. These narratives should be pursued in developing countries, and are 
typically applied in all aid recipient countries equally, as blueprints. These new aid 
doctrines have influenced Nepalese periodic development plans and later, the sectoral 
water policies. In sectoral policies, the influence has not only limited itself to the broad 
lines of aid priorities, but certain aid agencies have had more specific agendas for the 
water supply and sanitation sector, and have pushed for these issues. UNICEF considered 
sanitation as an advocacy point, the World Bank focused on the IWRM, while the ADB 
emphasised the economic value of water. Thus, I conclude that the official Nepalese 
policy papers have been influenced by the priorities of donors. Despite the donor 
influence, the Nepalese governmental agencies have not adopted all policies and/or policy 
principles, but have ignored them by not focusing on the implementation of the policies, 
or have resisted the approval of the final documents, when the priorities have not been in 
line with the interests of the governmental agencies and bureaucrats.  
5.4.2 Dominant Policy Narratives in Nepalese Water Supply and Sanitation 
The second point this chapter makes is to identify dominant narratives in a Nepalese 
context. In the Nepalese water supply and sanitation sector, I identify three of them, 
operating in different domains. The first dominant narrative was developed in the late 
1940s and early 1950s, by the developmentalist school, that emphasised the role of the 
state in service provision. It was believed that a centralised state – with line agencies at the 
local level – should lead the planning, implementation and the maintenance of the water 
supply and sewerage services. The planning was supposed to be carried out through 
periodic development plans. These plans allocated the task of implementation to the 
relevant ministries, departments and line agencies, which constructed the schemes and had 
the responsibility for their maintenance. The users of the water services were seen as 
passive beneficiaries, and had no role in the process. This thinking led to the formulation 
of the state-led approach. In the Nepalese water supply and sanitation sector, the approach 
is followed by the governmental lead agency, the DWSS. 
The second dominant narrative in the sector, is the critique of the state-led approach. 
This critique, raised in the 1970s and 1980s, advocated that the inclusion of users in the 
planning, implementation and maintenance of the schemes, would bring better results, 
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with fewer resources, than leaving this task to the state. Thus, it was argued, that the users 
should be involved in all phases of the water supply and sanitation service delivery, and 
that the governmental agencies should respectively withdraw from the construction and 
maintenance of the schemes. According to this story, the involvement of the users would 
make them feel like owners of the schemes, as they had themselves been heard in the 
planning phase, had constructed the schemes, or at least had commissioned the 
construction, and after this, were in charge of the maintenance. This belief was supported 
by the requirement that the users took part financially, or through their labour force in the 
construction and operation & maintenance. It reserved a new role for the state, namely, 
that the government departments should facilitate user participation in service provision. 
The belief led first to the formulation of the community-based approach, which is in 
Nepal, the basis of nearly all water supply and sanitation projects in rural areas. 
The third dominant narrative evolved from the community-based approach in the 
1990s. The basic principles of the community-based approach were supplemented with 
other elements, such as economic factors, environmental protection, a focus on 
governance, and building capacity, both at central and local level, and an emphasis on 
sanitation and hygiene; forming the composite approach, and highlighting the politics of 
policy making at a global level. The composite approach was formulated in the global 
policy making arenas, where it obviously had evolved out of attempts for consensus in 
policy negotiations. In addition to the community-based approach, the other underlying 
theme in the approach, bases itself on market supremacy and its maintenance. Here, it was 
thought, that the market could not regulate itself, but that the state should play a role in it. 
Because many of the developing states were perceived as weak, it was considered that 
their governance would require assistance to be able to deal with the economic challenges. 
The components of good governance and capacity building were designed for this 
purpose. The donors also realised that economic and other policies would not be 
successfully implemented, unless the government would have ownership of those. 
Therefore, a new focus point was added to the composite approach, namely, the 
partnership idea. Through donor – aid recipient government partnerships the principles of 
neoliberal market maintenance would not be imposed on the government, but be agreed 
upon in partnerships and in dialogue. Through this, the government would ‘own’ these 
ideas and reforms. Furthermore, the neoliberal market presupposes effectiveness and 
sustainability. To ensure this, new aid modalities and practices were designed: 
harmonisation, alignment, coordination and the sector-wide approach. In Nepal, the 
sector-wide programme is supposed to solve the fragmentation of the rural water supply 
and sanitation sector, which stems from having several actors, with differing 
implementation modalities, operating in the same field, making the work ineffective and 
unsustainable. In Nepal, the composite approach is advocated and followed by the 
international aid agencies.  
These approaches are also dominant in specific domains. The state-led approach 
dominates the hydrocracies. The community-based approach has been the basis of 
UNICEF’s work in Nepal, and most sanitation-related policies are founded on 
decentralisation ideas, and the idea of community participation. The composite approach, 
having several composite objectives, is advanced by the multilateral and bilateral donors. 
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However, the multilaterals have put more emphasis on economic principles, and the 
market maintenance, whereas, the bilaterals believe in the principles of the partnership 
idea.  
 
Time 
 
State-led approach  
 
Community-based 
approach  
Composite 
approach 
Global dominance 
Dominance in 
Nepal 
1950s – 1980s 
1950s – to present 
1980s – to present  
1990s – to present 
1990s – to present 
1990s – to present 
Narrative/story 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Central level of the  
state should lead 
technical and 
infrastructure-based 
water supply 
developments; health 
important in water 
supply and sanitation; 
water should be free or 
subsidised  
 
 
Communities should 
have a central role in 
the decision-making, 
management and 
operation and 
maintenance of water 
supply and sanitation 
activities in their 
localities 
 
 
 
 
All water supply and 
sanitation schemes 
should focus on 
participation; O&M 
through community 
involvement; 
environmental 
protection; cost-
effectiveness; 
governance; 
partnership between 
the donor and the 
government; aid 
coordination 
International 
origin 
 
 
 
 
 
Truman's Point Four 
Programme and 
Colombo Plan, Basic 
Needs 
 
 
 
Critiquing narrative of 
state-led approach; 
donors' learning from 
the state-led approach  
 
 
Brundtland 
Commission; 
Washington-consensus; 
post-Washington 
consensus; 
OECD/DAC papers, 
High Level Forums on 
Aid. 
Effect in Nepal  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strengthening of a 
central level, 
infrastructure-based, 
department to lead  
water supply with line 
agencies at the local 
levels 
 
 
 
 
Decentralisation of 
power to local bodies; 
establishment of user 
groups; use of NGOs, 
CBOs, and private 
sector companies in the 
water supply and 
sanitation; financial 
contributions from 
users 
Introduced PRSP and 
MDGs to Nepal and 
privatised WSS in the 
urban areas; focus on 
sanitation; attempts by 
the aid agencies to 
coordinate the sector 
and have a national 
programme in the 
sector. 
Status in Nepal 
 
 
 
Officially abandoned,  
in practice followed  
by the DWSS 
 
Officially followed by 
the governmental 
institutions. Applied in 
all aid projects by 
bilaterals and NGOs 
Officially followed by 
the governmental 
institutions and 
advocated by the 
donors. 
Table 5.10: Dominant Policy Narratives in Nepal 
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Like in many places in the world, the ‘irony’ seems to be that donor-led policies and 
programmes, with all of their composite objectives, have not been able to outplay the 
state-led approach, as the most preferred approach of the government agencies in Nepal 
(see e.g. Araral 2008; Suhardiman 2008). Two issues are significant factors; namely, the 
focus points of the state-led approach on the centralisation, and infrastructure 
development. These offer possibilities for holding on to power and rent-
seeking/kickbacks. In a centralised system, the donor money is allocated to the 
ministry/department level, which handles the procurement for building material through 
its local level offices, which again are directly controlled by the central level. With this 
practice, the donors actually reproduce the centralised control of the ministries, instead of 
‘building capacity’ at the local level. In a decentralised system, where these local level 
offices should have independent power from central level control, local level offices are 
replaced by elected bodies, which cannot be controlled by the central level ministries, or 
as advocated in Nepal, to be abolished to a large extent, and be substituted by private 
sector companies or NGOs. As explained in Chapter Four, because government salaries 
are low, often officials have a felt need for some extra income, to be able to have a 
middle-income based on living standards, and therefore, are on the look out for the 
possibilities for kickbacks, from the procurement of development projects. This also 
explains the government's lack of interest for operation and maintenance (as well as 
donors’ interest for it). As long as it is possible for government institutions to focus on the 
construction of new schemes, they have little incentive to promote regular operation and 
maintenance. The composite approach, as advocated by the donors, tried to abolish these 
two important focus points of the government system, by demanding a decentralised water 
supply and sanitation delivery, and focusing on the so-called soft-side of development. 
This means, having less focus on infrastructure development, and more emphasis on 
capacity building and behaviour change among government officials and beneficiaries. 
The government institutions have objected to these donor priorities. In addition to the 
general resistance by government institutions towards decentralisation, the different 
decentralisation modalities followed by donors, have failed to provide the government 
with a single example on how decentralisation should be established in Nepal. Instead, 
they have all followed their own ideas, and at the same, tried to pressure the government 
to adopt their favoured decentralisation model194. 
The current practice in Nepal corresponds to the concept of a metanarrative (Roe 1994, 
156), which “is the intertext that accounts for how two policy narratives, each popular 
opposite of the other, can both be the case at the same time”. In Nepal, the water supply 
and sanitation policies place the final responsibility for the planning of service delivery, to 
the government; however, mentioning that the planning should be based on the plans 
developed at local level. The government's interest to lead implementation efforts is 
tolerated by the donors; however, in their own projects, they prefer the community-based 
                                                 
194 The Finnish projects prefer to work directly with the local government bodies, the DDCs and the VDCs, 
whereas the Fund Board directs the financial resources to the users via NGOs, CBOs and the private sector. 
In addition, there are national NGOs, which work directly with the users with their own implementation 
modalities, and the ADB, which continues to support the DWSS and its line offices in the districts. In 
addition, only few of the projects have been able to evolve from the community-participation approach to 
community-management approach (Sharma 2001, 101).  
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approach. Thus, it seems that these two practices live next to each other. The conflicting 
issues between the two narratives are raised in talks between the government and donors, 
but have never really been tackled with determination. This might be because of the 
politics of policy making between the two parties: the government has received funds for 
the development through the development projects that have followed the approval of the 
policies, and the donors get a policy framework that serves their needs, when getting their 
own development projects approved in their headquarters. Even though there are attempts 
to find consensus for the sector through coordination, and the sector-wide approach, these 
issues have not been clarified. Hence, the establishment of a national programme has not 
succeeded until today, as will be shown in the next chapter.  
 
 
 
 
165
6. Catching Fish in Muddy Waters 
 Alliances for Partnership, Leadership and Legitimacy 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter gives insights on how the global push for harmonisation, alignment, 
coordination, and the idea of a single approach for the sector – encapsulated in the sector-
wide approach195 – has led both aid and governmental agencies to attempt to coordinate, 
and lead the sector, and to build alliances within the agencies. I analyse the alliance 
building for a national programme through the concepts of story-line (Hajer 1995; Rein, 
Schön 1986) and core beliefs (Sabatier, Jenkins-Smith 1993)196. These I see to have 
originated from global narratives, and consist of various elements of the narratives that the 
actors have chosen. The story-lines for the national programmes stem from the core 
beliefs of each institution. The core beliefs are values that the agencies rarely compromise 
on, and on which they define their institutional character. The story-lines, on the other 
hand, facilitate the reduction of the discursive complexity of the global narratives, and 
create the actors with possibilities for problem closure. I find that through the core belief, 
and the related story-lines, the actors illustrate where their work fits into the global 
discourse on development.  
 
The main findings of this chapter are: 
 Sector coordination has been donor-driven. The donors have defined the problems, 
introduced the idea of a national programme, and made the first plans for it; the 
role of governmental agencies has at best been a partner in the attempt.  
 The attempts to establish a national programme have been called sector 
coordination, even though there has been little happening in this regard. 
 Instead, the aim by the sectoral actors in the establishment of the national 
programme has been to secure a position as sectoral leader, and to legitimise their 
own story-line for the national programme. Therefore, I label the alliances formed 
for this purpose as legitimacy alliances. 
 Yet, none of the donors, or the government, has taken a clear leadership role. The 
donors are viewed as to be constrained by their own guidelines and working 
modalities, to be able to fully harmonise their working modalities with other 
donors, and the governmental agencies have been hindered by unclear institutional 
arrangements and instability in the country. 
                                                 
195 In Nepal, this is called a national programme for the rural water supply and sanitation sector, as well as a 
single approach for the sector. The donor advocated programme-based approach (opposite to the project-
based approach), is a pre-form of the sector-wide approach. Here, I use all terms identically, referring to 
them with the attempts to have a single approach in the sector, with some form of a fund through which all 
donors would jointly fund the sector activities.  
196 Similar analyses could be made by using the concepts of episteme or paradigm (Haas 1992; Kenis 1991). 
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 There is not a common view on how the sector development should proceed, but 
the actors have own interpretations on global priorities and are trying to secure 
leadership on this basis: they are catching fish in muddy waters. 
 
This chapter is organised into four sections that analyse the alliances by donors, and 
governmental agencies, in the rural water supply and sanitation sector. After this 
introduction, section two presents the alliances for establishing a national programme. 
Section three argues that these attempts to coordinate the sector have actually been 
attempts to lead the sector, which has been the hidden motive in the attempts. It also 
explains how both aid and governmental agencies have been constrained to take up the 
role of a leader in the sector. Section four concludes the chapter.  
6.2 Alliances for a National Programme 
In this section, I argue that the attempts to establish a SWAP have been donor-driven. I 
show how global pressure has guided the thinking of donors in Nepal, how they have 
identified the problems that support its establishment, and have led attempts to coordinate 
the sector, including presenting themselves as leaders of the national programme. Even 
though the push for a national programme stems from global narratives, in Nepal, the 
donors have justified its necessity with domestic reasons, such as the fragmentation in the 
sector. 
The push for establishing a national programme for the Nepalese rural water supply 
and sanitation sector started with the emphasis on cost-effectiveness, exclusion of 
government in the water supply and sanitation delivery, and improved donor coordination. 
They were, after this, further augmented by the partnership idea at the turn of the 
millennium. The recently found common goals for donors articulated in the Paris 
Declaration on Aid and the Millennium Development Goals and Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers, focused the thinking of donors towards unifying and harmonising their 
practices. They opined that common goals would be best reached through a single 
approach in the sector.  
The donors legitimise the national programme, by fragmentation in the sector, which is 
presented as a consequence of having a large number of donors and NGOs working in an 
uncoordinated way, as well as the blurry responsibilities of ministries and departments for 
the sectoral issues. Furthermore, the donors considered that the national programme would 
solve problems that derive from the project-based approach that had dominated the rural 
water supply and sanitation sector. Because of the project-wise implementation, all 
sectoral actors had their own implementation mechanisms for rural water supply and 
sanitation projects197, causing confusion, particularly in the villages and districts (see e.g. 
                                                 
197 The implementation modalities had competing views, especially with regard to how to implement 
decentralisation: some followed the government's LSGA (1999), and focused on working with the local 
bodies, whereas the Banks viewed that working with the NGOs, and the private sector, was more efficient 
and would bring more sustainable results.  
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Whiteside 2005; GON/MPPW/WSSD/SEIU 2011; Ringskog et al. 2011). The DFID's 
analysis of the sector summarises the donors' arguments: 
“From an institutional standpoint, over 20 international organisations are active in the 
sector providing around 67% (2003/4) of total investments. As a consequence, the sector is 
frequently characterized as being NGO dominated, fragmented and over projectised with 
weak linkages to government at all levels. As is now widely acknowledged, project based 
approaches tend to create a lack of coherence at policy and budget level including: 
fragmentation, inconsistency, duplication and distortions inspending; high transactional 
costs through multiple management units; lack of ownership and misplaced accountability, 
and the creation of islands of excellence involving high technical and service capacity that 
cannot be replicated in the sector at large.”  
Whiteside 2005, 13, 23198 
The first three endeavours to establish an alliance for a national programme were initiated 
and managed by donors alone. From the mid-2000s onwards – in the three following 
endeavours, the donors have tried to involve governmental agencies into the alliances and 
the design of the national programme. This, however, has not changed the fact that the 
attempts have been donor-driven. Another factor, making a distinction in the alliance 
building, is the role of the DFID. During the first endeavours, the DFID was involved in 
all alliances. However, in 2005, it withdrew its aid from the sector, leading to a new type 
of alliance, which was characterised through joint donor-government alliances. The table 
below provides an overview on these alliances, depicting the lead agency, members, and 
the result of the alliance. The alliances are elaborated in the following parts.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
198 For similar views, see also SEIU, SOPHEN 2009, 2; SEIU 2010a; UNICEF 2011, 1; Basnet, Jaishi 2009, 
1.  
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cooperation with the governmental system stemmed from its experience of having 
implemented four large water supply and sanitation projects under the WSSB and the 
NWSC. During this time, it had realised that the work style of the governmental agencies 
was not efficient, and there had been a leakage of project funds (HMGN 1987). Therefore, 
the World Bank opted for the creation of the Fund Board, as a semi-autonomous body, 
bypassing the government system. Believing in this model, the World Bank tried to 
convince the other donors to join in funding it.  
The bypassing of government’s operational framework did not entirely work. The 
Fund Board needed to be established under the Development Board Act, which outlined 
that the board of the organisation shall be appointed by the government. Hence, the 
MPPW was able to man the board with its own people, or people known to be loyal to its 
interests201. Through this arrangement, it was able to influence the selection of the 
managing director of the Fund Board, and subsequently, the internal issues of the 
organisation. 
As shown here, the Fund Board’s story-line (table 6.2) was based on the conviction 
that the governmental agencies would not be able to deliver water supply and sanitation 
services effectively, or sustainably, thus, the delivery modality should be changed, giving 
this responsibility to the actors at the local level: to communities, assisted by the NGOs, 
the private sector and the water users groups. The World Bank was, at that time of the 
Fund Board formation, an advocator of the Washington Consensus approach, and 
accordingly, supported those delivery modalities that met with the ideas of privatisation 
and liberalisation.  
 
Fund Board’s Story-Line 
Central government's hardware focused on service delivery and this has not been effective due to 
dilatory and irregular fund management. Therefore, central government's role needs to be replaced 
with a community-based approach, in which the beneficiaries have the responsibility for WSS 
services. They should be assisted by the NGOs and the private sector. The mechanism for this is 
the creation of the Fund Board, through which all investments in the sector would be coordinated, 
directly to the communities, without government involvement. 
Core Beliefs 
Priority is placed on the demand-led provision of water supply and sanitation, privatisation and the 
liberalisation of the economy, downscaling the role of government, and providing a central role for 
the private sector and civil society, in the scheme implementation. Cost-recovery is an important 
aspect in the provision of WSS services. Water and sanitation is seen as a basic human need. 
Relation to Global Narratives 
Criticism on state involvement in WSS delivery, (Washington Consensus); focus on community-
based approach.  
Table 6.2: Fund Board’s Story-Line 
                                                 
201 In the Fund Board, the board was appointed of seven government officials and one representative from an 
NGO and one representative from a private sector company; later, it was slightly changed, to include 
representatives of the local level bodies (interview with a World Bank representative in Nepal on Sep. 10, 
2010). One NGO director claims that the so-called independent representatives of the board, coming from an 
NGO and the private sector, have been relatives, or close affiliates, of government officials, and thus, have 
not performed as independent as portrayed (interview on Sep. 1, 2010).  
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During the first phase (1996-2003) of the Fund Board, the main aim was to establish its 
preferred approach as the model approach to the sector, and to create a fund, through 
which all donors active in the sector could jointly fund the sector development; however, 
at this phase, it was unsuccessful. The World Bank’s reasoning for the creation of the 
Fund Board did not make reference to further partnership, ideas outside of donor 
coordination, as these were not yet clearly defined in the global arena. The reason for 
donor coordination was to improve cost-efficiency (World Bank 1993, x). Despite the 
failure to attract other donors to fund the Fund Board, the World Bank found that through 
the organisation it had been able to establish, its interpretation of the community-based 
approach in the sector, it was convinced that a national programme should be established 
on the basis of the Fund Board experience. This was its main aim during the second phase 
(2004-2010). The World Bank was able to attract the DFID202 and WaterAid Nepal, to 
join and to finance the Fund Board. The DFID had originally planned to allocate all of its 
resources to the rural water supply and sanitation sector through the Fund Board, making 
the Fund Board a common project of the DFID and the World Bank. As the DFID's 
strategy in the rural water supply and sanitation sector was to allocate funds through the 
NGOs, it found it important that the Fund Board would also be able to attract larger 
national NGOs under its roof, and by this, bring all the big sectoral players to support a 
common approach.203 But the NGOs opined that the Fund Board's internal culture was not 
compatible with their working style. They considered that there was too much internal 
politicking within the Fund Board; it was unable to cooperate and coordinate with the 
other donors and the NGOs, and it was perceived as unwilling to revise to its 
implementation modality, to meet the differences in the modalities between the NGOs and 
the Fund Board.204 In the end, the DFID realised that without the involvement of these 
national-level NGOs, the sector would not generate the desired results, and concluded that 
it would withdraw from funding the Fund Board.205 The ADB had also declined to fund 
the Fund Board. I believe that the ADB did not want to be 'just' a funding agency in a 
World Bank-initiated project. It questioned the sustainability of the Fund Board as a 
leading sector agency, due to its dependence on World Bank funding, and portrayed it as a 
World Bank project, instead of as a national programme206.  
Even though confronted with setbacks, the World Bank did not give up on its plan to 
establish a national programme around the Fund Board. Instead, as a new measure, the 
                                                 
202 DFID started to fund the Fund Board already in 2002. I assume this was because of its interests for sector 
coordination. 
203 Interviews with a NGO director on Sep. 1, 2010 and an ex-DFID representative in Nepal on Sep. 10, 
2010.  
204 Interviews with a NGO director on Sep. 1, 2010, and two consultants in the WSS sector on Aug. 18, 2010 
and Sep. 1, 2010.  
205 An interview with an ex-DFID representative in Nepal on Sep. 10, 2010. WaterAid also withdrew its 
funding from the Fund Board, most likely because of its close links to the DFID, as one of WaterAid's 
funding agencies. This was not the only reason for DFID's withdrawal from the sector. Other reasons given 
by other interviewees related to DFID's internal priority changes. Nepal's difficult political and security 
situation, as well as DFID’s disappointment with the attempts to establish an M&E unit within the MPPW. 
Interviews with two consultants in the WSS sector on Sep. 1, 2010 and Aug. 18, 2010.  
206 Interview with an ex-DFID representative in Nepal on Sep. 10, 2010, a consultant in the WSS sector on 
Aug. 12, 2010.  
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World Bank and the Fund Board sought for consensus among stakeholders for its main 
implementation modalities, through their involvement in the formulation of the Sector 
Strategy in 2002-04, led by the ADB, and subsequently, by initiating the formulation of a 
sector policy (the formulation processes are discussed in Chapter Seven). By this, it was 
able to streamline the Fund Board piloted issues of community contributions and O&M 
into the government system207, and guarantee the components of the composite approach – 
the participation of the NGOs and the private sector – were included in strategy and 
policy208. 
Albeit, there were efforts to streamline the Fund Board’s approach into the government 
system, and to attract other donors to support the formation of a national programme under 
the Fund Board. By 2010, the World Bank had decided to assess its funding of the Fund 
Board209. There are two reasons – one internal and one external – for the World Bank's 
decision to stop the funding. First, it had reassessed the implementation modality through 
the NGOs, and realised that many of the NGOs were corrupt and politicised. Second, due 
to the heavy involvement of government in the operations of the Fund Board, through its 
presence on the board of the Fund Board, the World Bank was not interested in continuing 
with the funding under this arrangement210. In addition, its attempt to establish the Fund 
Board as the central sector agency had not succeeded, because it had not been able to get 
other donors onboard. 
 
                                                 
207 Interview with a World Bank representative in Nepal on Sep. 10, 2010. See also Committee on 
Recommending Policy Changes in Community Contribution to Rural Water & Sanitation Projects for 
Bringing Uniformity 2002.  
208 Interview with a consultant in WSS sector on Sep.1, 2010, and the homepage of the Fund Board 
<http://www.rwss.org/contents.php?mainid=13>. Accessed on Mar. 25, 2013. 
209 The funding to the Fund Board came to an end in August 2012. If not renewed, the Fund Board will most 
likely be exclusively funded by the MPPW (Ringskog et al. 2011, a).   
210 Interviews with a high-level official at the MPPW on Aug 17, 2010 and a NGO director on Sep. 1, 2010.  
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Figure 6.1: Fund Board's funding relationship 
6.2.2 ADB Contest: Community-Based Water Supply and Sanitation Project
 
In 2002, the ADB contested the Fund Board with a project called the Community Based 
Water Supply and Sanitation Project (CBWSSP). It was also designed as a national model 
project for the sector, aiming for a SWAP under the ADB leadership211. Similarly to the 
Fund Board, the project structure included the establishment of a central fund, a 
Designated Sector Account under the Ministry of Finance. The ADB’s story-line (table 
6.3), for which it pursued others to support, had similarities to the story-line of the Fund 
Board, but it also differed in parts from it. The main difference was the stand towards 
local bodies. In addition, the ADB envisaged that its story-line was best legitimised 
through the formulation of a sectoral strategy, and after this, implemented by the 
CBWSSP.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
211 ADB's interest for a SWAP was confirmed by an ADB representative in Nepal on Aug. 10, 2009.  
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CBWSSP’s Story-Line 
Core problems are the slow growth in the sector, including limited resources, and lack of 
accountability and collaboration with stakeholders. A clear strategy for the sector needs to be 
developed, to avoid redundancies, and to identify potential synergies, as well as to develop a 
project that is truly community driven. The strategy should reduce the role of central government 
at the local level, meaning that planning and management should be done through local 
government, and that communities should be involved in the implementation. This implied a 
community-driven WSS service delivery, which should be established as the main approach, 
within all sectoral actors, with agreed implementation modalities. These are to be implemented in 
the sector model project (CBWSSP). 
Core Beliefs 
Priority is placed on downscaling the role of central government, and for providing a central role 
for local governmental bodies, the private sector and with civil society in the implementation. 
Cost-recovery is to be a central part in the WSS delivery. Water supply and sanitation are seen as a 
basic human need. 
Relation to Global Narratives 
Lack of efficiency, alignment, harmonisation and coordination (partnership idea), and too much 
focus on the central level agencies as implementers (Post-Washington Consensus). Advocacy for 
community-based approach. 
Table 6.3: CBWSSP’s Story-Line 
The ADB’s tactics to legitimise its story-line and to contest the Fund Board approach 
included the formulation of a sector strategy – a kind of a policy paper for the sector (see 
Chapter Seven), the formation of official groups to coordinate sector activities, and design 
the CBWSSP as a national programme. Through these, the ADB aimed to legitimise its 
preferred approach – or story-line – to the sector development. The alliance building for 
ADB’s story-line included a consultative process for strategy formulation, with the aim of 
bringing all sectoral stakeholders together to jointly decide on the approach. The ADB 
was able to get co-funding by the DFID and UNICEF, both of which saw their 
involvement as an opportunity to influence the strategy and the design of the new ADB 
project. The DFID was also interested to fund the CBWSSP, however, this did not 
materialise212.  
The official coordination mechanisms included in the ADB's alliance building effort 
was the set-up of two bodies, the Sectoral Stakeholder Group (SSG), meant to coordinate 
all sectoral stakeholders, and the National Coordinating Committee for Water Supply and 
Sanitation, consisting of government agencies. The SSG followed the structure of an 
informal donor, and the NGO group that had convened under the leadership of the DFID 
(see next section). The ADB considered that a closer cooperation of donors and NGOs 
with governmental agencies would be beneficial to the sector development. Thus, it 
brought the DFID-led group under government leadership and included governmental 
bodies as members.213 The main task of the SSG was to assist the MPPW in sectoral 
                                                 
212 Interviews with an ex-DFID representative in Nepal on Sep. 10, 2010 and a member of the PPTA 
consultancy team on Aug. 18, 2010. 
213 Interview with a member of the PPTA consultancy team on Aug. 1, 2009. The membership of the SSG, 
which was formed under the MPPW, includes MLD, MoHP, MoES, DDCs, VDCs, multilateral and bilateral 
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policy formulation and sharing knowledge among the members of the group. However, its 
placement under a ministry's leadership, as well as its large size214, led to problems and to 
the inactivity of the group.  
Despite the exhaustive plans for gaining support for the model project, ADB's attempt 
to lead the sector did not succeed. It was not able to convince the other donors to join with 
funding for the model project, neither through strategy consultations nor the design of the 
project. Currently, only ADB money flows to the Designated Sector Account and in 
project implementation, the CBWSSP had little cooperation with other projects215. The 
ADB – just like the World Bank with the Fund Board – decided to stop funding the 
CBWSSP in 2010. The official reason given for this is that the ADB saw it more 
important to move to the semi-urban and urban areas, and found that the rural water 
supply and sanitation sector dis not require the ADB's support any longer216. Obviously, 
the ADB must have been disappointed that its plan for the national programme did not 
succeed. As an official reason, the ADB gave that it had drawn the conclusion that the 
mechanism of working through the NGOs has not been efficient enough217. Nevertheless, 
the administrative capacity had also seemed to be weak on the side of the CBWSSP’s 
administration: some local NGOs involved in the CBWSSP project implementation, 
complained that the CBWSSP’s staff has been asking for a commission from the projects 
they granted to NGOs. In addition, there was political interference in project 
administration from the side of local political figures218.  
 
                                                                                                                                                   
donors, the Fund Board, national and international NGOs, as well as private sector organisations, active in 
the rural water supply and sanitation sector (HMGN/MPPW 2004a, 11; 2004b, 13).   
214 Interviews with a member of the PPTA consultancy team on Aug. 1, 2009 and Sep. 3, 2010; a high-level 
official at the MPPW on Aug. 4, 2009 and a NGO director on July 15, 2009. The consultants had envisaged 
that the SSG should meet at east once every two months (ARD Inc. 2003d, 1-10).  
215 The CBWSSP’s staff particularly mentions that there is no cooperation with the Fund Board, even though 
the two projects have many similarities in their implementation modalities. Interview with members of the 
CBWSSP staff on Sep. 5, 2010.  
216 Personal communication with a consultant in the WSS sector on Apr. 14, 2011 and interview with 
members of the CBWSSP staff on Sep. 5, 2010.  
217 Interview with an ADB representative in Nepal on Aug. 10, 2009. The World Bank made the same 
experience with regard to the Fund Board.  
218 Interviews with two local level NGO leaders on Sep. 7, 2010.  
 
 
 
 
175
 
Figure 6.2: ADB and CBWSSP funding relationship + Competition with the World Bank and the 
Fund Board 
6.2.3 The DFID's Sector Alliance 
The DFID's attempt to establish a SWAP in the rural water supply and sanitation sector 
was driven by its belief in the partnership ideas of coordination, harmonisation and 
alignment. It found that the sector was too fragmented, and opined that a SWAP would 
make service delivery more efficient by bringing actors together. It viewed that the Fund 
Board as being the most suitable body for all donors to co-fund, and hence, promoted it as 
the basis for a national programme219. Its focus was on the macro level. It did not aim to 
have an own project as a national programme, but tried to bring the sectoral actors 
together under an existing programme. The DFID’s story-line (table 6.4) focused more 
than the previous alliances on the idea of harmonisation and alignment, leading to a 
partnership between the stakeholders over time. Yet, in its argumentation for the national 
programme, it did use the partnership jargon, but justified it with the need to improve 
                                                 
219 Interviews with an ex-DFID representative in Nepal on Sep. 10, 2010 and a NGO director on Sep. 1, 
2010. At this point, the CBWSSP did not yet exist, thus, the Fund Board was the only large programme in 
the sector, outside of the Finnish government funded project, which was administered under the Dolidar. 
This had probably spoken against the DFID’s decision to name it as the lead project (it also was not 
designed as one). WaterAid Nepal took part and showed an interest towards the SWAP plans. Interview with 
a consultant in WSS sector on Aug. 12, 2009. 
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service delivery in the rural areas, seeking legitimation for this demand from the World 
Development Report 2004, which focused on the same thematic (World Bank 2004c). 
Furthermore, it more clearly than others stated that the focus of aid should be shifted to the 
excluded groups, which were not able to express themselves as clearly as those who had 
power.  
 
The DFID’s Story-Line 
The problems in the sector stem from the fragmentation due to large number of actors, all having 
their own working modalities, and that the focus of the work had not been on the excluded groups, 
but beneficiaries had been those best able to express demand, namely high caste and economically 
stable, educated groups. Because of this, harmonisation of working approaches between 
implementing agencies, improved linkages with government, and a shift from infrastructure to 
institutional reform were required. This should take the form of a sector-wide approach and 
include the organised coordination of all sectoral stakeholders, leading to an institutionalisation of 
coordination. 
Core beliefs 
Priority is placed on the harmonisation of sector modalities, to reach a more  
(cost-)effective service delivery, through the establishment of a sector-wide approach.  
Water and sanitation were seen as a human right; that was translated into a pro-poor service 
delivery, and focus on the excluded groups (Composite Approach). 
Relation to Global Narratives 
Harmonisation, alignment, coordination: Partnership idea 
Inclusion of all stakeholders in the service delivery: Composite Approach 
Table 6.4: DFID’s Story-Line 
The DFID’s alliance building concentrated around an informal forum for donors and 
NGOs, which it had named as Sector Alliance. The Sector Alliance discussed how – on a 
coordinated and harmonised basis – to deliver water and sanitation services, as well as to 
move from a project-based approach, to a sector-wide approach. The Sector Alliance 
comprised of three DFID partner organisations, which it funded at that time: The Gurkha 
Welfare Scheme, the NEWAH and the Fund Board, and as a non-funded basis the ADB’s 
CBWSSP. Together with the World Bank, the DFID wanted to win the ADB's trust, and 
convince it to join the Sector Alliance as a full-member220 (Whiteside 2005, 5, 17). The 
Sector Alliance was the only sector coordination effort that was able to attract other 
donors to join its alliance, even though one needs to take into account that all of these 
organisations depended financially on the DFID.  
In the mid 2000s, the DFID realised that its plans to organise sector investments under 
the Fund Board would not work out, due to some donors and most national-level NGOs 
that showed a disinterest in supporting the Fund Board, for reasons mentioned earlier. The 
DFID found that its efforts did not bring results, and were particularly not leading towards 
a SWAP, which was its main objective. It pulled out of the sector in 2005, and even 
though reasons for this have not been publicly shared, I assume that the above-mentioned 
factors had contributed to it. In addition, it is also likely that the decision was linked to the 
                                                 
220 Interview with an ex-DFID representative in on Sep. 10, 2010. 
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political changes in Nepal221. The DFID used the same argumentation as the ADB, by 
stating that there were enough donors in the rural water supply and sanitation sector, thus, 
its funds would be better used in another sector. Therefore, its focus in Nepal was shifted 
to rural roads222.  
Until its withdrawal from the sector, the DFID can be viewed as the sector leader 
among the donors. It was involved in all coordination attempts, showed an interest 
towards funding other attempts to establish a national programme, but at the same time, 
had its own Sector Alliance designed as a framework for donor and NGO cooperation. 
Due to its ability to convince other donors to join its effort, it had a stronger position in the 
sector than the other donors or the NGOs. As the DFID was not busy with the 
establishment of its own programme, it was actually able to focus on coordinating the 
sector and be a leader. Because of not playing the project politics, the DFID did not have 
as many hidden motives as the ADB and the WB had, because of their need to seek 
legitimisation for their projects.  
 
Figure 6.3: DFID and its partners' funding relationship 
                                                 
221 The king carried out a coup in 2005, after which the DFID pulled its aid from the Nepalese water supply 
and sanitation sector, maybe as an action to reduce its aid volume in Nepal.  
222 Interviews an ex-DFID representative in Nepal on Sep. 10, 2010 and a consultant in WSS sector on Aug. 
18, 2010.  
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Figure 6.3: DFID's Sector Alliance's Management Arrangement (modified from Whiteside 2005, 28) 
After the DFID's withdrawal from the sector, the position of sector leader became vacant 
and several parallel efforts emerged to fill it. The new characteristic of the endeavours for 
a national programme was that the donors started to search for a partner within 
governmental agencies, such as Finland, with its partner agency the Dolidar, the ADB 
with the MPPW and the DWSS, and UNICEF’s parallel with the National Planning 
Commission (NPC) and the DWSS. At the time of the writing of this thesis, two of the 
efforts are still underway, thus, it is not possible to assess their success yet.  
6.2.4 The Dolidar and Finland 
Finnish bilateral aid and its partner agency the Dolidar were both interested in leading the 
sector towards a SWAP. The Dolidar focused essentially on the establishment of a single 
programme, under its wing, and by this to challenge the position of the MPPW and the 
DWSS as lead sector agencies, whereas Finland, aimed to form a coordination group, and 
slowly start formulating a SWAP. As partner agencies, they advocated for sector 
development that proceeds through local bodies. Even though they were both working 
towards the same goal at the same time, my data does not make any reference to a joint 
effort. As they are partner agencies, I assume that there has been a link between these two 
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efforts, but this should not be interpreted as a common attempt to coordinate the sector, 
which cannot be evidenced.  
The story-line of the Dolidar and Finland (table 6.5) focused on capacity building of 
local level bodies and the decentralisation of water supply and sanitation to the local level. 
An approach manual for rural water supply and sanitation programmes prepared by the 
Dolidar, envisaged a central role for the DDCs in the planning of the water supply and 
sanitation services, and after this, by the implementation and management by the water 
users’ groups. The planning should start from the District Water Use Master Plans – an 
instrument that had been introduced in Nepal by the Finnish funded water supply and 
sanitation programme in Far Western Nepal (GON/Dolidar 2009). The manual paved the 
way for the Dolidar’s plans for a single approach in the sector, including a basket fund. 
With this, it aimed to harmonise approaches and modalities in the water supply and 
sanitation sector, and presented it in a consultative meeting at the Dolidar, and in regional 
level workshops223 (Basnet, Jaishi 2009, 1-2). Due to the competing position for sector 
leadership with the DWSS, the Dolidar asked the NPC for an approval for its effort to 
form a SWAP. The NPC did not give permission and argued that the DWSS was the lead 
agency in the water supply and sanitation sector, meaning that a SWAP should be led by 
the MPPW and administered by the DWSS.  
 
The Dolidar’s and Finland’s Story-Line 
There are many actors with their own implementation modalities, which cause confusion. The 
current sectoral leader (the DWSS) has not been able to align these, which has led to 
fragmentation. A single approach / national programme for the sector development is required 
under the governmental – the Dolidar’s – leadership, giving a central position for local bodies in 
the planning and water users groups in the management – as envisaged by the LSGA.  
The Dolidar suggested the establishment of a single approach / sector-wide approach, including 
measures to coordinate the sector actors.  
Finland suggested measures to coordinate the sector, and shadow align its projects and by this 
prepare for a programmatic approach. 
Core Beliefs 
Development was possible only through poverty reduction and enhanced sustainability, which 
was best achieved through local level development. Finland viewed water and sanitation as 
providing security for the people. 
Relation to Global Narratives 
Harmonisation, alignment: Partnership idea 
The WSS service delivery was to be through decentralisation: Composite Approach 
Table 6.5: Dolidar’s and Finland’s Story-Line 
On a practical level, the Finnish efforts to coordinate the sector and establish a SWAP, 
have not brought much result. There are only a few signs that these had proceeded any 
                                                 
223 The participants in the consultative meeting came from the DWSS, UNICEF, the WHO, the Fund Board, 
the CBWSSP, NEWAH and one Finnish funded WSS project (Basnet, Jaishi 2009, 1-2). Even though not 
being part of the Dolidar coalition, the DWSS and the Fund Board participated in the meeting. I assume that 
this did not mean that they supported the single approach, presented by the Dolidar, but that they were 
interested in hearing what the Dolidar had planned.  
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further, from a report written by an MFA advisor and a Nepalese consultant. As a measure 
for a SWAP, the report recommended shadow alignment of the two Finnish funded rural 
water supply and sanitation programmes. This meant bringing their planning and 
implementation modalities closer together in a quietness, so that these projects could form 
the basis for a SWAP. The report also suggested the splitting of the total programme 
finance into two: Technical Assistance (TA) and Investment Financing. Under this 
arrangement, it was suggested that the TA financing to be channelled via consultancy 
accounts, and investment financing to be channelled from the MFA Finland, to the 
Treasury's Designated Sector Account, which had been established by the CBWSSP 
(Rautavaara, Neupane 2008, 25). To which extent these recommendations have been 
followed has not been assessed in this thesis. However, it is known that the approach of 
the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Project – Western Nepal, is to support the 
government’s efforts to move towards a SWAP in the sector, by harmonising the sector 
modalities in those districts that the project works, including the setting up a WASH fund 
at district level, through which all investments to district-level water supply and sanitation 
services would flow. The project tried to attract other donors that work in the same area to 
join the fund. The project claimed to support the local bodies’ own WASH strategies, 
which, however, have been developed with the financial and technical assistance of the 
project224 (GON/MLD/Republic of Finland/MFA 2009, 1-4), illuminating well, how the 
process conditionality functions, and shows its embeddedness in the project work. I 
believe that the Finnish attempts to shadow align the water supply and sanitation projects 
are supported by the Dolidar. The approach taken in the Dolidar’s Approach Manual also 
supports this view, as it gives the Finnish supported modality, a central role in the 
envisaged SWAP. This, I interpret as a teaming up between Finland and the Dolidar on 
establishing a SWAP. The difference to the other alliances is that in the Dolidar-Finland 
alliance, the governmental agency had the lead. It was the more active partner in the 
alliance, particularly if compared with the lack of activeness by the MPPW in the next 
alliance to be presented. 
 
                                                 
224 A Dolidar representative said in the District Coordination Committee, on Aug. 28, 2010, that the WASH 
Plans are similar to those made by the other Finnish project, even though that project calls them Water Use 
Masterplans.  
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Figure 6.5: Dolidar and Finland  
6.2.5 Sector Efficiency Improvement Unit 
Contrary to the weak evidence of internal coordination between Finland and the Dolidar, 
the ADB and the MPPW openly worked together in the design of a new coordination 
mechanism for the urban water supply and sanitation sector, which followed the 
unsuccessful attempt by the ADB to lead the rural water supply and sanitation sector. The 
Sector Efficiency Improvement Unit (SEIU) was formed by the ADB and the MPPW in 
the mid-2009s, to improve sector delivery and to coordinate the sector activities (ADB 
2009a). It was placed in the premises of the DWSS, and the director of the SEIU was 
seconded from the DWSS staff. Its design and funding was included in the preparation and 
funding of the Second Small Towns Water Supply and Sanitation Project, exactly as the 
previous effort by the ADB had been funded through the CBWSSP. The improved 
coordination between the sectoral actors was presented by the ADB consultants as a 
possible guarantee for the success of the Second Small Towns Water Supply and 
Sanitation project225.  
In addition to coordinating the sector through the SEIU, the ADB and the MPPW 
aimed for the establishment of a SWAP under their leadership. The strategies for bringing 
uniformity for a SWAP included influencing policy making by the renewal and review of 
                                                 
225 Interview with a consultant in the WSS sector on Aug. 18, 2010.  
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policy, laws and regulations, in the form of an umbrella Water Supply and Sanitation Act, 
and a Water Resources Act, and on improving sector coordination through the SEIU226, 
exactly as the ADB’s previous working modality in the water supply and sanitation sector 
suggested. As funds for the work of the SEIU and the preparation of the SWAP were 
supposed to come from the Small Towns Project, the ADB and the MPPW envisaged that 
the work of the SEIU should focus on the urban water supply and sanitation227; but after 
the SEIU had started its work, its jurisdiction was enlarged to include rural water supply 
and sanitation. This change might derive from the fact that the SEIU was named as the 
secretariat of the SSG. Many of its donor members were active in the rural WSS sector 
(the World Bank through the Fund Board, UNICEF and Finland) and thus, were interested 
in including the rural water supply and sanitation sector, within the scope of the SEIU. 
Otherwise, its membership of the groups is a mix of representatives of government 
agencies, donors and NGOs and its work would be carried out by specialised working 
groups (SEIU 2010a). This changed the original idea of the SEIU; that being of leading 
the urban/peri-urban sector development, into the direction demanded by the Small Towns 
Project. The inclusion of the rural water supply and sanitation sector in the scope of the 
SEIU also increased the possibilities of influence for the ADB. The SEIU became an 
organ for donors to influence policy, on all fronts, and it has later become an arena for the 
power battle for donors. It has been observed that, e.g., UNICEF is attempting to capture 
power within the SEIU.  
The design of the national programme, as outlined in a report in 2011 
(GON/MPPW/WSSD/SEIU 2011), focused on a decentralised service delivery at the 
district level, through the District Water Supply and Sanitation Coordination Committee 
(D-WSSCC), which was to be chaired by the Local Development Officer (LDO), who was 
appointed by the MLD, and the WSSDO, acting as a member secretary – the WSSDO 
being under the DWSS. The inclusion of the WSSDO in this arrangement speaks for a 
larger role for the DWSS in the rural supply and sanitation sector, and sets a counter-force 
against the MLD; and it also hints at a manoeuvring, based on the good relationship 
between the ADB and the DWSS. There seems to be a common understanding between 
the sectoral stakeholders, that the DDC and the Water Supply and Sanitation Coordination 
Committee under it are the central agencies for planning and for the leading of the work at 
the local level. However, in the report, the issue of central level arrangements have been 
left with less attention, e.g., the issue of the DWSS becoming a facilitatory agency is not 
                                                 
226 Ibid. 
227 See, e.g., the Second Small Towns Water Supply and Sanitation Project's Grant Agreement (ADB 2009b) 
on the SEIU, which states that the SEIU will support the implementation of the Urban Water Supply and 
Sanitation Sector Policy; and Report and Recommendations of the President to the Board of Directors (ADB 
2009a) which states that the SEIU will develop and efficient, effective, and accountable urban water supply 
and sanitation sector by establishing and implementing policies, establishing service standards, and 
enhancing coordination.  
The governmental agencies in the urban water supply and sanitation sector, the Nepal Water Supply 
Corporation and the Department of Urban Development and Building Construction, were also invited to join 
the SEIU, but they refused. A NGO director that I interviewed suspected that this was because these 
agencies do not want to expose the others their financial resources, due to the competition between them. 
The interviewee believed that the NWSC does not have many funds, whereas the DUDBC, has plenty 
(interview on Sep. 2, 2010).  
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discussed; nor whether the MLD should provide support to the districts. The inclusion of 
the WSSDO into this arrangement must have been a tactic by the donors, to have the 
DWSS onboard, in order to be able to move forward. The story-line of the SEIU (table 
6.6) likewise emphasises the role of local level actors in the water supply and sanitation 
service delivery, and demands a reduced role for central government.  
 
The SEIU’s Story-Line 
Core problems are the inefficiency in the sector, and weak collaboration within the stakeholders. 
These should be solved by establishing a better coordination mechanism, and taking measures to 
improve the sector’s efficiency, particularly through a performance-based system, and by 
improving policy and legislature framework. The sector stakeholders needed to be coordinated 
through an organised group called Sector Efficiency Improvement Unit, which suggested measures 
for a sector-wide approach. In the SWAP, the government should only play the role of a facilitator, 
whereas the districts and the WUSC will be central in the WSS delivery. At the local level, the 
central agency for the WSS delivery is the DWSSCC, which is run jointly by the LDO and the 
WSSDO. 
Core Beliefs 
Priority was placed on the privatisation and the liberalisation of the economy, working through the 
local level actors, and downscaling the role of central government. Cost-recovery was a central 
part of the WSS service delivery. Water and sanitation were seen as a basic human need.  
Relation to Global Narratives 
A lack of efficiency, a need for alignment, harmonisation and coordination:Partnership idea. 
Decentralisation of the WSS service delivery, focus on private sector involvement: Composite 
Approach 
Table 6.6: SEIU’s Story-Line 
The ADB's involvement in the work of the SEIU follows the same pattern as in the SSG 
and other coordination efforts; meaning that it was active in the setting-up of the new 
coordination mechanisms, according to its priorities, but that it has not been actively 
involved in the work of the SEIU, after the Small Towns Project was approved by its 
headquarters, and its implementation had begun. This seems to confirm my assumption 
that the ADB's primary motive in the sector is to legitimise its story-line through 
coordination of other actors, and by implementing projects, preferably with other donors, 
along these principles. The ADB has not shown to be particularly interested in following 
up the work of the SEIU after this. The leadership in the group has, therefore, been 
captured by UNICEF, which currently acts as the chairperson for all donors (or 
development partners, as they are called in Nepal)228. The SEIU has remained active 
through the working groups, which have included a large number of members on quite an 
equal basis, for solving sectoral problems229. 
                                                 
228  A Finnish WSS consultant suspected this to stem from the fact that the person representing UNICEF in 
sector coordination, and hence, being the central person in this regard towards other stakeholders, was a 
former employee of the DWSS, having therefore close links there. This has enabled UNICEF to find 
common ground with the DWSS, advancing its interests, even though being a representative of all of the 
other actors. Interview on Nov. 22, 2012. 
229 Naturally, some members are more active than others; for example, there seemed to be difficulties in 
getting the JICA involved in the work of the SEIU; also the ADB-funded CBWSSP did not take part in the 
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Figure 6.6: ADB and SEIU 
6.2.6 UNICEF and the NPC 
Coincidentally with the SEIU, and bypassing both the SEIU and MPPW, UNICEF teamed 
up with the National Planning Commission, to prepare a national WASH sector 
programme, in order to solve the fragmentation in the rural water supply and sanitation 
sector. UNICEF's reasoning for this was that an improved sector performance, requires 
solving the overlapping institutional responsibilities in the urban and rural setting. The 
NPC, being hierarchically above all sector ministries, was viewed as the right 
governmental authority to deal with institutional reform (NPC/UNICEF 2011, 2). The aim 
of the NPC-UNICEF effort was to address critical barriers, that prevented the achievement 
of universal and sustainable sanitation and drinking water for everyone. These barriers 
included insufficient political prioritisation, a weak sector capacity to develop and 
implement effective plans and strategies, and uncoordinated and inadequate 
investments230. UNICEF and the NPC got support from the Finnish Embassy, the World 
Bank and the Asian Development Bank231 (NPC/UNICEF 2011, 2). 
                                                                                                                                                   
work of the SEIU. Interview with members of the CBWSSP staff on Sep. 5, 2010 and a JICA representative 
in Nepal on Aug. 24, 2009. 
230 These issues are similar to the focus points of the global partnership called ‘Sanitation and Water for All’, 
in which UNICEF is a key member. The government of Nepal is also a member of the partnership, and in 
October 2010, it was selected to the Steering Committee of the partnership. Sanitation and Water for All 
website <http://www.sanitationandwaterforall.org/aboutswa.html>. Accessed on May 25, 2011.  
231 The MoU also stated that there was a possibility that the JICA, the DFID and Australian Aid, might be 
joining the effort (NPC/UNICEF 2011, 2).  
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The aim of the NPC-UNICEF exercise (see for their story-line table 6.7) was to carry 
out a WASH sector assessment and to formulate reform options232, with the full 
participation of concerned ministries, departments and donors, under the NPC leadership, 
and the preparation of a coherent national WASH sector programme, including the option 
of a SWAP for the rural WASH sector, as outlined in the Approach Document for the 
Three Year Plan (2011-2013) (GON/NPC 2010). UNICEF and the NPC also wanted to 
ensure that the resources in the sector were organised to meet global and national targets, 
and in case needed, new financial resources could be found (NPC/UNICEF 2011, 2; 
UNICEF 2011, 2). They emphasised the importance of financial resources, because the 
two main funding agencies in the sector, the World Bank and the ADB, had signalled to 
withdraw their aid and focus, only on the urban/peri-urban water supply and sanitation 
sector (NPC/UNICEF 2011, 2).  
 
UNICEF’s and NPC’s Story-Line 
The sector was fragmented due to the large number of actors, which has led to a duplication of 
work. In addition, the functionality of the schemes is not as high as the stated coverage. A WASH 
Sector Assessment needed to be carried out, to find a shared vision for sector development, to 
improve performance and effectiveness in the sector. The assessment would serve as a basis for the 
design of a national programme, and include a possibility for a sector-wide approach, which was to 
be designed to meet the global and national commitments, and targets for implementation. 
Core Beliefs 
Priority was placed on the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals for Water and 
Sanitation by 2015, and having universal access to water and sanitation by 2017, as well as on 
‘reaching the unreached’, and those vulnerable from physical remoteness and/or economic and 
social deprivation. Water and sanitation were seen as a human right.  
Relation to Global Narratives 
Harmonisation, alignment and coordination: Partnership idea 
A focus on the MDGs and sanitation: Composite Approach 
Table 6.7: UNICEF’s and NPC’s Story-Line 
From the experience of the SSG, the NPC and UNICEF, it had learned that a larger 
coalition of government agencies, donors and civil society, would not work well without 
an effective Steering Committee. They thought that the sector reform and planning for 
future operations should not come from donors only, as had been the trend in the past, but 
that the process should be led by governmental institutions. Therefore, they established a 
high level inter-ministerial Steering Committee, comprising of six secretaries from the 
relevant ministries (MPPW, MLD, MoF, MoEnv, MoHP and MoWCSW) to lead the 
work. The Committee was assisted by a Technical Group, consisting of international and 
national consultants, whose task was to carry out an independent sector assessment, and 
formulate reform options. However, the ultimate leadership in the effort seemed to be in 
                                                 
232 What this meant was that recommendations for continued cooperation, and a harmonised support, was 
effective beyond 2011 in the sector. The assessment would primarily focus on the evaluation of current 
institutional and implementation arrangements, in relation to cost effectiveness, sustainability 
considerations, as well as equitable access (UNICEF 2011, 2). 
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the hands of the funding agency, UNICEF, which led and coordinated technical assistance 
for the sector study (NPC/UNICEF 2011, 2).  
The suggestions in the Sector Assessment Report (Ringskog et al. 2011) for the 
national WASH programme signalled UNICEF’S influence. The report, in the part for 
sector reform, states (ibid., 25), “The government of Nepal should consider: Developing a 
Sector Wide Approach (SWAP) out of the MasterPlan with a dedicated sanitation and 
hygiene fund (a common basket) allocated against equity but also formal performance 
criteria (…)”. The report confusingly suggests a SWAP for sanitation, even though the 
task of the UNICEF-NPC alliance was principally supposed to solve problems in the water 
supply and sanitation sector. The authors designed the SWAP around the Sanitation 
Master Plan, (funded by UNICEF), and the idea of Open Defecation Free districts, also 
advocated by UNICEF. In water supply, the only reference made was on the issue of 
functionality, envisaging a National Functionality Program to improve this. In addition to 
the National Sanitation Program, and the National Functionality Program, a third national 
programme was also suggested for water quality. This was a sub-sector, where UNICEF 
had been active, because of its direct link to heath issues, having been involved in the 
formulation of the Water Quality Standards, and funding its formulation. Therefore, for 
me, it seems that the role of the NPC has been limited in the assessment, and that UNICEF 
has dominated the priority setting and influenced the recommendations. The report does 
not support the image of a powerful National Planning Commission that would take care 
of the interests of the various ministries and other actors in the sector, but has succumbed 
under the domination of a donor, for unknown reasons.  
Likewise confusingly, the sector assessment was supposed to analyse exactly the same 
issues as the SEIU working groups. As a matter of fact, there were four reports produced 
at the same time on similar topics, with only slight variations in their focuses. These were 
the SEIU’s Sector Status Report (GON/MPPW/WSSD/SEIU 2011), UNICEF’s Sector 
Assessment Report (Ringskog et al. 2011), a report produced by the consultancy support 
for the SEIU, named as Assessment Report on the Current Condition of Nepal’s Water 
Supply and Sanitation Sector (ADB/MPPW 2011), and a study on the functionality issue 
(NMIP/DWSS 2011). This is definitely not a sign for a successful coordination of the 
work, but rather signals everybody’s desire to position themselves as sectoral leaders, and 
institutionalise their agendas, through their own assessments of the situation. From the 
NPC-UNICEF documentation, it does not become clear why they commissioned a study, 
that obviously overlaps with the responsibility of the SEIU, and even included the same 
members as in the SEIU study, without making a reference to the cooperation in it. The 
bypassing of the SEIU, can only be understood as a means of to improve coordination and 
harmonisation, and assessing the strengths and weaknesses in the interaction between 
sector stakeholders, by including the work of the SEIU in the assessment. In any case, 
UNICEF bypassed a functional coordination mechanism, and commissioned a study that 
doubled the responsibility of the SEIU. 
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Figure 6.7: NPC and UNICEF  
Generally, when looking at alliances in the water supply and sanitation sector, I consider 
that there are no signs for a common understanding on what constitutes a sector. The ADB 
through the SEIU, wanted the sector to grasp urban and peri-urban areas233. In its thinking, 
the peri-urban areas have more similarities with the urban areas, than with the rural areas. 
Therefore, not advocating for rural areas to be included in the scope of the SEIU. 
UNICEF, on the other hand, seems stubbornly to push for an increased focus on 
sanitation. I believe that if any of the donors wants to establish a SWAP successfully, then 
the aid agencies should see that they cannot only focus on their thematic, or regional 
priorities, but to focus on seeking a common approach for the whole rural water supply 
and sanitation sector. Evidence, however, shows that the actors have not been able to be 
coordinated, because they have had their own interests in leading the sector. The 
establishment of a national programme has been a competition, between the donors, and 
upon whose terms the sector will be led. This will be discussed in the next section.  
                                                 
233 The ADB is also active in the urban and peri-urban areas, outside of the Small Towns Project. It funds, 
together the UN-Habitat, the formulation of the Water Resources Act – UN-Habitat being the UN agency for 
the improvement of human settlements, and focusing its work in Nepal, more on the urban areas. In addition, 
the ADB funds the water supply and sanitation development in the municipalities, through the Urban 
Environment Programme under the DUDBC. Interview with a NGO Director on Sep. 2, 2010.  
 
 
 
 
188
6.3 Sector Leadership 
This section concentrates on analysing the hidden motives of the attempts to coordinate 
and create a national programme, namely the desire to lead the sector. I argue that 
although the attempts to coordinate the sector under the leadership of a donor, none of the 
donors (or governmental agencies) have taken up an explicit role as sectoral leader, 
including positioning themselves as leaders, and negotiating with others on the terms of 
the leadership. As reasons for the inability, or unwillingness, to take up the leadership 
position, I view, from the governmental side, its political instability, and on the side of 
donors, their attachment to their guidelines and working modalities. In addition, because 
of their interests to institutionalise their approaches in the sector, it seems that none of 
them truly wanted to be led by another party. This has not enabled them to fully harmonise 
the working modalities with the other sectoral actors. 
6.3.1 Constrained Leadership 
I argue that the attempt to lead the sector has been a hidden motive of the donors and the 
governmental agencies. This was never openly mentioned as their motive; rather, the 
establishment of a national programme was stated as a motive for improving service 
delivery through coordination. The formation of the Fund Board, as a sector coordination 
agency, was a vested attempt by the World Bank to have control over the sector, without 
having to take an official leadership position for itself. Thus, the Fund Board was created 
as a semi-autonomous body to lead the sector instead. Due to the competition between the 
World Bank and the ADB in the water sector, on the role of the largest and most powerful 
donor, the ADB, after the establishment of the Fund Board, designed the CBWSSP, to 
challenge the position of the Fund Board, including the building up an alliance, to support 
this, through the formulation of sector strategy, and the formation of two coordination 
mechanisms.  
The same hidden sector leadership motive was also behind Finland's coordination 
efforts, through a shadow alignment of the projects, and the preparation of a national 
programme, along the Finnish modality of delivering water supply and sanitation services 
in Nepal. However, on a practical level, the Finnish coordination and leadership attempts 
did not bring many results. It seems that the talk of leadership, remained as an internal 
issue within the Embassy and the MFA Finland. Through the interviews and the document 
study, it also became clear, that there are different opinions about the applicability of a 
SWAP in the rural water supply and sanitation sector, between the MFA Finland and the 
Embassy. This might be one reason for the slow progress in the coordination; e.g., a 
donors group, under Finnish leadership, was never established234, even though it was one 
of the main points of the MFA report. The Dolidar, on the other hand, aimed to challenge 
the position of the DWSS as sectoral leader. It resorted to its responsibility for the rural 
                                                 
234 Interview with an official at the Finnish Embassy in Kathmandu on Sep. 3, 2010. The official was also of 
the opinion that Finland was not going to have sector leadership, but would take part in all coordination 
efforts.   
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infrastructure, and argued that this made it a sectoral leader. However, the NPC saw the 
situation differently.  
The DFID can be viewed as the only real leader in the sector, due to its interest in 
building a more stable alliance in the sector, coordinating all donors and NGOs, and in 
addition to this, monitor and evaluate sector development. On the other hand, it did not 
officially want to pose itself as a sector leader but argued for an equal representation of all 
in the sector235. Even though, it did not openly have any desire to lead the sector, in 
practice, it pushed the sector in its desired direction, through its involvement in all 
coordination efforts, and by funding the Fund Board. After the DFID’s withdrawal from 
the sector, UNICEF has slowly moved towards being the sectoral leader among the 
donors, and it has been appointed as the chairperson of the development partners.  
6.3.2 Constraints to Sector Leadership  
Even though some of the donors were interested in taking up the leadership role in the 
sector, both donors and governmental agencies were also constrained in this regard. The 
donor agencies were held up because of their working modalities and their headquarter’s 
policies and practices, whereas the governmental agencies were constrained by the 
political situation, and the frequent changes deriving from the unstable political situation. 
In addition, they were held back because of the ambiguous responsibilities, and the 
competition236 that derives from ambiguous division of work between the actors. I first 
explain how the fuzziness in the institutional arrangements and the unstable political 
situation, hindered the governmental actors from seizing the leadership, followed by how 
the donor working modalities, prevented them from fully leading the sector.  
6.3.2.1 Constraints to Government Leadership 
For decades, the two leading governmental agencies, the MPPW and the DWSS, have had 
a competition between themselves, and with the MLD and the Dolidar, over leadership in 
the rural water supply and sanitation sector. The MPPW's stand is that the DWSS, as a 
government department, cannot be the sector leader, but that this position should be 
allocated to a ministry. The MPPW has had several possibilities to become the sector 
leader, for example, through its involvement in the Fund Board, the CBWSSP and the 
SEIU; however, it has not been able to actively involve itself in their operations. Its 
hindrance is its dependency on the donor money. As a result of this, it needed to stay on 
good terms with all of them, trying to please them, or at least, not trying to upset any of 
                                                 
235 Interview with an ex-DFID representative in Nepal on Sep. 10, 2010. Cf. Whiteside 2005, 18. 
236 The competition between the governmental agencies, and even between the governmental and aid 
agencies, is displayed in the interview with the DWSS Director General on Aug, 23, 2010, who presented all 
of the other actors in the sector, as competitors of the DWSS. Under this situation, it has proved difficult to 
coordinate the work with other agencies, as well as to cooperate with them. 
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them237. The DWSS, on the other hand, is a powerful department, particularly at the local 
level, but it has not been able to act as donor coordinator, because of its position as a 
department, coordination being the task of a ministry. As a hydrocracy, it has not been 
possible for it to share the latest approaches to sector development, as advocated by the 
donors. Neither of the institutions is able to truly coordinate, and lead the sector, because 
of the undefined division of responsibilities between the MLD and the MPPW, which has 
led to competition between them, instead of the efforts of cooperation. Currently, as they 
are barely talking to each other238, cooperation between them, and the coordination of the 
donors, as divided under these two ministries, seems difficult.  
In addition to the unclear government responsibilities, the unstable political situation in 
the country has put some constraints on government leadership. Its energy and resources 
have been limited by the Maoist insurgency, and the constant changes in the government 
set-up, leading consequently to changes in the ministry, together with department 
leadership, and local level leadership. Particularly, the personnel changes in the 
administration, both at central and local level, have greatly contributed to the 
government's inability, to lead the rural water supply and sanitation sector239. The aid 
agencies, also viewed, that the political context the government, was too unstable to be 
able to lead and coordinate the sector, which gave them a justification in attempting to 
capture the sector leadership. They viewed that the government lacked the capacity to 
initiate, and thought that through an external – and coordinated – push, they might be 
possible to move the government (Whiteside 2005). For example, Finland wanted to 
organise a group for only donors and NGOs to influence the government. The DFID 
gathered a donor and NGO alliance to support its view on sector development, and the 
World Bank tried to overcome the governmental system, by the creation of the Fund 
Board. At the time of the Maoist conflict, the conflict situation was an additional reason 
for the donors to cooperate. They were worried about their own operations in the country, 
and wanted to find ways on how to work in conflict-affected areas. They opined that 
provision of basic services, such as water and sanitation, was a key to overcoming the 
conflict, by equalising the disparities in the countryside (Whiteside 2005, 5; Rautavaara, 
Neupane 2008, 8).  
6.3.2.2 Donors' Working Modalities 
The working modalities, and the policies of donor headquarters, have constrained donors’ 
attempts to lead the sector, because for the harmonisation of working modalities, each 
donor agency needs to address the issues at headquarters level: their policy and working 
                                                 
237 Interview with an ex-DFID representative in Nepal on Sep. 10, 2010. This is further explained in Chapter 
Seven having a similar pattern in a different context.  
238 Interview with a SNV representative in Nepal on Sep. 6, 2010. 
239 Informal talk with UNICEF representatives on Sep. 13, 2010. The Joint Secretaries in the ministries are 
shifted approximately every six months, due to transparency and accountability issues. At local level, the 
LDOs are also shifted around on a frequent basis. If there were elected representatives in the DDCs, then 
these could monitor the central level bureaucrats, and to deliver services, but currently, this is not 
functioning (ibid.) 
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modalities are normally decided at headquarters, not in country offices. Even though 
donors officially advocate for the harmonisation and alignment at policy and 
implementation levels, on a practical level, they still flag for their national or 
organisational achievements through projects, and want to have an identifiable character 
in their operations. Obviously, by leading the sector development, through a sector-wide 
approach, would be considered beneficial for this, but being led and coordinated by 
another aid agency, would not correspond to these aims. The example of Finland shows 
how, sometimes, headquarters and the embassy do not assess the situation similarly, which 
can constrain work in the recipient country. In this case, it was not headquarters that held 
up the coordination and leadership attempt, but the embassy, which viewed that Nepal was 
not yet ready to move for a SWAP, and had a more realistic picture of the capacities of 
Finland to lead, than headquarters. Indeed, under current circumstances, Finland’s and the 
Dolidar’s chances, to lead the sector, and establish a SWAP, are limited. The Dolidar is 
not a powerful department, and does not enjoy the backing of other donors, thus, its 
possibilities to challenge the DWSS are not good. Finland, being a partner of the Dolidar, 
is, therefore, a marginal donor among the aid agencies.  
The aid agencies are also constrained by their own priorities, which define the focus 
points of their work, and which cannot be changed without a change in the development 
policy of the agency. Particularly, if their core values (or normative core beliefs as called 
by Sabatier, Jenkins-Smith 1993) are contradicting, harmonisation can become tricky. 
Similarly, as shown in section 6.2, all of the donors had an own story-line for the SWAP, 
and they tried to attract other donors to join in. They were not able to come up with a 
common story-line, which led to failures of the endeavours in establishing a national 
programme for all to jointly fund. This shows that the fragmentation of the sector, also 
labels the attempts to coordinate the sector, and not only service delivery modalities.  
Donors are also constrained by the way their projects are planned.240 These projects 
and programmes are typically planned several years ahead, based on agreements signed 
between the two governments (bilateral projects), or the recipient government and the 
funding agency, such as a multilateral bank. This limits the aid agencies to do any large 
changes in the design of their projects in the coming years, and subsequently, affect their 
ability to harmonise their practices. The issues of harmonisation and coordination have 
been brought up in coordination meetings for over a decade, with little practical results. 
The project-wise implementation mechanism continues to characterise the work, and the 
donors' own guidelines, channel the work. It nearly looks like it that the donors are hiding 
behind their headquarters guidelines and working modalities, and use these as excuses for 
not needing to take up action for real harmonisation and leadership.  
                                                 
240 This problem in the Nepalese context was expressed particularly at UNICEF. Interview a UNICEF 
representative in Nepal on Sep. 13, 2010.  
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6.4 Conclusions 
In this chapter, I have shown that the attempts to establish a national programme, in the 
water supply and sanitation sector, have been initiated by donors, and was meant to 
legitimise their preferred story-lines for a SWAP. Additionally, through the national 
programme, donors wanted to secure their leadership in the sector. They allied with other 
donors and governmental agencies for this purpose; however, none of the attempts in this 
regard have so far proved successful.  
The attempts for establishing a national programme in the sector have been donor-
driven. The donors call this coordination, however, all large donors in the sector have tried 
to establish a SWAP under their own wing; referring to competition over leadership, 
rather than referring to coordination. They have not been able to come together, and act 
together, but they are all trying on their own – or with their governmental partners – to 
capture the leadership. The donors have had different tactics for legitimising their own 
approach: through policy formulation and to institutionalise it within the government 
system; establishment of coordination committees, in which their approach is advocated; 
through the design of a sector-wide approach; and overcoming other competitors, through 
resorting to the NPC as a governmental institution, above the ministries.  
As everybody is primarily interested in legitimising their approach, no common 
approach to the sector development, which in other words would not be contested by some 
party, has emerged, leading also to weak coordination. The DFID has been the only 
exception in this regard. It was also the only aid agency that was driven by partnership 
ideas, and not by competition with others. The coordination attempt in the sector, is better 
illustrated, as games over leadership: when one attempt has failed, the next donor has 
seized the opportunity, and made its own bet for sector development leadership.  
The idea of a partnership – in the form of donor-government alliances – does not seem 
feasible in Nepal under the current situation, because of a power imbalance between the 
donors and Nepal. This imbalance derives from Nepal’s poverty: Nepal being a country 
with little financial resources, and a lack of transparency in its development management. 
In addition, it has been politically unstable for the past two decades. Therefore, the 
governmental agencies and donors do not possess equal powers, but one is more powerful 
than the other, possessing resources that the other one is in demand of. This provides the 
donors power over the governmental agencies. As donors’ operations are guided by their 
priorities, and Nepal is the ‘weaker’ partner in the partnership arrangement, the technical 
solutions to the developmental problems of Nepal, provided by donors, tend to correspond 
to donors’ needs rather than those of Nepal’s. For example, the Paris Declaration identifies 
country ownership of development efforts as the central challenge in making aid more 
effective. Practically, this means that aid recipient countries need to take the lead in 
deploying both domestic, and external resources, to support the implementation of 
development efforts. In principal, ownership refers to the kind of political leadership, 
developmental vision, and a willingness to transform state structures. However, the Paris 
Declaration reduces those needs, by the setting up of a particular kind of technocratic 
planning apparatus, based on lengthy texts, monitoring matrices, and information systems 
(Overseas Development Institute 2008, 2). 
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Furthermore, these technical solutions do not meet the neopatrimonial interests of 
Nepal's bureaucracy and politicians, which are often anti-developmental, by seeking only 
incentives for the politicians’ and bureaucrats’ own inner circles. At the same time, these 
are the people who are in charge of development efforts in Nepal, and the management of 
developmental budgets. One reason for the failure of the attempts to establish a national 
programme in the rural water supply and sanitation sector, could relate to the incentives 
the aid agencies are providing to the decision-makers of Nepal, which do not match with 
the decision makers’ interests. Therefore, the decision-makers have also their own 
interests in not changing policy direction. For the same reason, the government has 
remained unclear about its own priorities in the water supply and sanitation sector.  
The donors are most likely aware of this problem, and thus, have not pushed for a full-
scale design of a sector-wide approach. For them, it is easier to remain advocating for 
global policy paradigms, instead of addressing the real problem – the nature of the 
Nepalese state – they introduce various technical solutions to the problems they wish to 
address. These issues are raised again and again in the various alliances that were created 
to ‘coordinate and harmonise’ the policies and practices, as shown here. These issues can 
apparently be brought up in each new forum, without having the need to decide anything 
about it. History shows that the issues can be left open, and then continued in the next 
round of discussions. 
6.4.1 Legitimacy Alliances 
In the attempts to establish a national programme, the aim of the donors has been to 
legitimise their priorities, visible in their story-lines for a SWAP. Due to global priorities, 
the donors feel a need to harmonise, and align, their policies and practices, and have, 
therefore, sought to ally with other donors, or their governmental partner agencies. 
Through the alliance building, donors are considered to be stronger, and better able, to 
attract others to join the alliance, and by this, support their story-line on how the sector 
development should proceed in the future. I call these ‘legitimacy alliances’, as their 
ultimate purpose has been to legitimate their own priorities in Nepal, by getting other 
sectoral stakeholders to support this, forming a national programme, along their 
interpretation of the problems, and possible solutions, and even engaging themselves in 
the policy formulation.  
These legitimacy alliances have similarities to policy communities and sub-systems 
(Richardson, Jordan 1979), discourse coalitions (Fischer 1993; Hajer 1995), issue 
networks (Heclo 1978), epistemic communities (Haas 1992), and advocacy coalitions 
frameworks (Sabatier, Jenkins-Smith 1993). Nevertheless, they are not fully applicable to 
the situation in Nepal, because of their stand towards policy change.  
I identify two types of trends in core beliefs to be legitimised. First, the World Bank's 
and the ADB's view on development, bases itself on reducing poverty, through economic 
development, which focuses on growth. Here particularly important, is to privatise and 
liberalise the economy in the aid recipient countries, including the reduction the role of 
central government in aid implementation (ADB 2004a, 5-6, which is a review of ADB's 
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strategies in Nepal 1988-2003; ADB 2004b, i; ADB 2001; World Bank 2004a, v; World 
Bank 2004b; World Bank 1998a, 8; World Bank 1989b). This view is reflected in the way 
the national programmes have been designed in the water supply and sanitation sector. 
The World Bank funded the Fund Board, based on the total reduction of government 
involvement in the scheme implementation, and instead, it advocated for a larger role for 
water user groups, the NGOs and the private sector companies. The ADB, in its 
formulation of the CBWSSP, focused on a reduction of the central government 
responsibilities in project implementation, moving the planning to local bodies, and 
followed the example of the Fund Board, by moving these responsibilities to the users, the 
NGOs and the private sector. Both of these approaches corresponded the community-
based approach to development. The focus of the Banks, on the privatisation and 
liberalisation of the economy, has particularly impacted on the urban water supply and 
sanitation sector, however, some of the changes are trickling down to the rural water 
supply and sanitation sector, due to the ADB's strong position in the urban sector, and the 
changes it advocates through the SEIU. In both rural and urban sectors, it advocates for 
outcome-based aid, increasing public-private partnerships, and developing benchmarking 
and performance-based indicators, to assess the overall performance of the sector, and to 
provide data for aid disbursements241. Even though the Banks have similar core beliefs, 
this has not automatically led to the cooperation between themselves in Nepal, but rather, 
there has been competition over power between them, as depicted by the establishment of 
the Fund Board and CBWSSP as model projects with similar designs.  
The core beliefs of the bilateral donors and UNICEF, focus on poverty reduction from 
a holistic perspective, not forgetting the economic factors emphasised by the Banks. 
However, the bilaterals and UNICEF emphasise harmonisation and coordination, 
according to the Paris Declaration, and meeting the Millennium Development Goals242 
(Ulkoasianministeriö 2009; United Nations Country Team Nepal 2002; Department for 
International Development 2004; Whiteside 2005, 17). In Nepal, they view the inequality 
in service delivery as a problem that should be rectified, as well as to highlight the 
fragmentation of the sector, and as a problem standing in the way of a successful 
implementation of a national programme. Like the Banks, the bilaterals and UNICEF 
emphasise the necessity to devolve more power to the users, and to the importance of 
building capacity at local level. Their advocated holistic approach to development, has 
caused the change in the sector, towards more of an emphasis on capacity building, and 
institutional reform, as well as on the soft-side of water supply and sanitation, such as 
UNICEF's focus on improving sanitation, and Finland's, on capacity building at the local 
level.  
Yet, as shown in the presentation of alliances, these have been possible, over two 
different types of core beliefs, as indentified above. The story-lines, which stem from core 
beliefs, are not carved in stone, but there is a space for changes and modification, the most 
                                                 
241 Interview with a consultant in the WSS sector on Aug. 18, 2010.  
242 Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland  
<http://formin.finland.fi/Public/default.aspx?nodeid=15318&contentlan=1&culture=fi-FI>. Accessed on 
June 30, 2011. Department for International Development (DFID) <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Global-Issues>. 
Accessed on June 30, 2011.  
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important factor for the donors being that it looks like it, they are advocating the story-line 
(Hajer 1995, 63), presenting a similarity to the double-sided view of aid, which has both 
official and unofficial motives. I suggest that as donors, they are also aimed to legitimise 
themselves as sectoral leaders; they need to give space for the modification for their story-
lines. Thus, they have been vague about the outline of the national programme, in order 
not to shy away others, and leaving room for discussion243.  
The legitimation of core beliefs and the story-line, for the single approach, has been 
done through three main methods: alliance building, programme design and policy 
formulation. In this chapter, I have illuminated legitimation through alliance building and 
programme design. In the next chapter, I will show how this is done through policy 
formulation.  
                                                 
243 The only exceptions to this are those coalitions that developed a model project, such as, the Fund Board 
and the CBWSSP, as well as, the Dolidar, which outlined its view on the single approach in a manual.  
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7. The Politics of Policy  
The Making of the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Policy, Strategy 
and Action Plan  
7.1 Introduction 
The Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Policy, Strategy and Action Plan244 have been 
touted by donors and bureaucrats in Nepal, as a stakeholder-led policy process, referring 
to decision-making by all actors involved in sector governance. Yet, there are signs for 
different results. Therefore, my interest is to analyse why, and how, multiple policy 
documents in the rural water supply and sanitation sector were formulated in Nepal, at one 
go, and to understand the motives and interests of the actors involved in this process. I 
also aim to assess how the composite approach, described in Chapter Five, and the global 
pressure for establishing a SWAP, (Chapter Six) impacted policy making. This chapter 
focuses on analysing the interaction between donors, and the government, in negotiating 
policy and projects, and highlights the inter-linkage between policy formulation, and 
development project preparation, through the ADB-funded Community-Based Water 
Supply and Sanitation Project. I argue that the policy process was not led by stakeholders, 
but by donors; however, at the same time providing evidence that the governmental actors 
were not powerless in front of the donors. I show here, that the Nepalese governmental 
agencies had several strategies that they could resort to, in order to avoid unwanted donor 
influence, speaking against the common view of Nepal being dominated by its donors.  
My data consists mainly of different reports, produced by the consultants, who were 
hired to formulate the strategy and action plan, various drafts of these documents, 
workshop material, as well as interviews with consultants and participants of these 
formulation processes. The workshops and plenaries, which provided the substance for the 
strategy formulation, took place in 2003. That was before my fieldwork. Therefore, I am 
not able to describe the discussion from my own experience, but need to rely on 
interviews with participants, and on my understanding of the interests and principles of 
their organisations.   
 
The main findings of this chapter are:  
 The strategy formulation process in Nepal is donor-centred, however, not donor-
dictated. The donors and their consultants had a significant role in the initiation of 
the strategy formulation, setting the agenda for the strategy, and leading the 
formulation process.  
                                                 
244 The Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Strategy and Action Plan was formulated by the ADB, UNICEF 
and the DFID. After the finalisation of these documents, the Fund Board (funded by the World Bank) and 
the MPPW, formulated the policy as a means of balancing suggestions by the strategy and action plan. In 
this chapter, when speaking of a policy process, I refer to the formulation of any of these documents, using it 
as a general term for formulating policies. 
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 The governmental agencies were not active in the initiation, or in the formulation 
process; nevertheless, some of them captured the strategy in the finalisation phase, 
and manoeuvred to secure their, and other donors’ interests, by resorting to various 
strategies. 
 These strategies of the governmental agencies are: remaining vague about policy 
priorities and allowing donors to lead; knowing what is important and not 
important for the donors; tactic of wait and see; the non-implementation of 
policies; foot-dragging in policy implementation with a number of excuses; and 
alliance-building.  
 The institutional issues became the hot potato in the consultations, and, albeit 
discussed intensively by participants, they were not solved, due to reasons related 
to power, alliances and leadership in the sector. 
 
This chapter is organised into 7 sections. After this introduction, I turn to discuss the 
interests and motives of the main actors in the process: in the second section the donors, 
particularly the ADB, in the third section, the consultants, and in the fourth, the 
government’s interests and motives. The fifth section focuses on analysing the politics 
around the design of the development project, that was prepared parallel to policy 
formulation. The sixth section presents the institutional issues that were put on the agenda 
in the policy formulation process, and analyses why these issues were not solved. The last 
section analyses the interests of the donors and the government in the policy process, their 
influence on the outcome of the process, and presents the strategies used by the 
governmental agencies and donors, and revises the understanding of a donor-centred 
policy process.  
7.2 The ADB: Initiator of the Strategy Formulation 
In this section, I argue that the ADB initiated strategy formulation and because of its 
interest, to have a compatible framework for its upcoming project in the sector. Thus, 
through the strategy and the project, it desired to have a strong position in the rural water 
supply and sanitation sector of Nepal. This led the ADB to set the ground for strategy 
formulation and be a leader in the decision making process.  
Since 1985, the ADB had funded four water supply and sanitation programmes in the 
rural areas of Nepal, and had gained a powerful position in the sector. As the 4th Rural 
Water Supply and Sanitation Sector Project (1997-2002) came to an end in 2002, the ADB 
was criticised about its too centralised implementation modality, and a lack of beneficiary 
involvement. The ADB realised that it could not continue funding the rural water supply 
and sanitation programmes in this style anymore, without losing its position in the sector. 
It viewed that it needed to shift the new project towards the composite approach, which 
was well established among the donors in Nepal. By renaming the project as the 
Community-Based Water Supply and Sanitation Project (CBWSSP), the ADB efforts in 
the sector were to focus on community-based management, targeting its assistance to the 
most needy population segments, increasing stakeholder participation in project 
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development and implementation, mobilising the NGOs and the private sector, and giving 
more focus to hygiene education and sanitation (ADB 2002, 3). This project was supposed 
to become a nationwide model project for the rural water supply and sanitation sector (a 
national programme for the later establishment of a SWAP); a project which could be 
jointly funded by all donors and, according to the ADB, based on the best practices of all 
donors working in the water supply and sanitation sector in Nepal (ADB 2002, 3-4). By 
following the composite approach, and designing the strategy, and the project, 
accordingly, the ADB wished to attract other donors to fund the project, and to participate 
in the strategy formulation, and by this, secure the leadership position in the sector. The 
ADB's motivation for the design of a national programme may also have been to challenge 
the position of the World Bank in Nepal. 
An ADB-financed consultancy team was hired for the Project Preparation Technical 
Assistance (PPTA) for the design of the CBWSSP and the formulation of the Rural Water 
Supply and Sanitation Strategy and Action Plan – a component of the PPTA. The 
consultancy team was a large one, consisting of 20 consultants, including six international 
experts245 (ADB 2002, 5). In addition to the ADB-paid consultants, the team included an 
institutional expert paid by the DFID and a sanitation expert paid by UNICEF, who were 
half-time members of the PPTA team. In the preparation phase, there had been discussion 
about possible co-financing of the CBWSSP by the DFID and UNICEF, which gave them 
an impetus to be part of the design; however, this never materialised (ADB 2002, 10). The 
PPTA was carried out in 10 months and it was divided in three phases. Phase One, which 
ran from July to October 2002, focused on mapping the sector and identifying needs. 
During the Phase Two (November 2002 – January 2003), called 'Design Through 
Consensus', an extensive consultation process, including ten facilitated thematic 
workshops, and three major plenaries, were organised by professional facilitators to 
formulate the sector strategy and action plan, and to find an implementation framework 
for the ADB loan project (ARD Inc. 2003d, 7-3, 4). In the Phase Three (February – May 
2003), the CBWSSP was designed on the basis of the results from the consultations (ADB 
2002, 3-4, 11; ADB 2003a, 9). The Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Policy was 
prepared by the Fund Board after the Strategy and Action Plan had been finalised by the 
ADB and the MPPW; its formulation was not part of the ADB paid PPTA, but the policy 
formulation was a co-effort by the MPPW and the Fund Board, to correct some by the 
Fund Board perceived shortcomings in the ADB prepared strategy. The Finnish 
government funded a regional consultation in Butwal, where it supported a rural water 
supply and sanitation project. 
A detailed timeline of the strategy formulation and project preparation is depicted in 
the figure 7.1 below. 
                                                 
245 The international experts consisted of a team leader, financial economist, gender and participation 
specialist, consensus-building specialist, water and sanitation engineer and GIS specialist, whereas the local 
experts included a water supply and sanitation engineer, social development specialist, financial analyst, 
environment specialist, GIS specialists and professional facilitators. 
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Figure 7.1 Timeline of the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Policy, Strategy and Action Plan formulation
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The ADB presented two interlinked needs for the strategy formulation. First, it wanted to 
solve the fragmentation of the sector, and second, it was interested in clarifying the roles, 
and the responsibilities, together with the institutional roles of the main sectoral agencies 
in addition to find an agreement on how to operate under the unstable political situation 
and the Maoist insurgency (ARD Inc. 2003b, 7-1; 9-10). These problems, the ADB 
wanted to address together with the main donors, the NGOs and the government agencies 
in the strategy formulation process246. The consultations, organised to identify issues to be 
addressed in the strategy, were designed to bring all stakeholders together, to find a 
common understanding on the future of the sector (ADB 2002, 2)247. But, as shown in the 
next section, the common understanding was supposed to be found within a pre-
determined framework, set by the ADB, and its consultants.  
Due to its commitment for the composite approach, the ADB wanted to fortify the 
government's decentralisation agenda in the project and strategy, in the spirit of the Local 
Self-Governance Act 1999. It argued that in the strategy and project, local governments 
should have leading facilitation roles, enabling the implementation of the CBWSSP within 
the government framework, because of the existing water supply policies (1998), and 
sanitation policies (1994), had been formulated before the LSGA. The ADB found that it 
would take too long a time to develop and endorse a new policy; hence, it opted for a 
strategy formulation, instead of a full policy, and considered this as feasible, within the 
duration of the Project Preparation Technical Assistance248.  
Through reading the ADB’s own water policy, called Water for All, it becomes 
obvious that the RWSS strategy formulation was actually guided by the ADB’s own water 
policy (formulated in 2001). The policy emphasised ADB's view on water as a socially 
vital economic good and reforming its developing member countries' national water 
policies and water bureaucracies (ADB 2006b, 8, 13): “ADB will support DMCs in 
ensuring that water projects are guided by effective national water policies that link water 
to national development goals and protection of the environment” (ADB 2001, 15). 
According to the ADB, the national water sector reforms were to include adopting 
effective national water policies, water laws, and sector coordination arrangements, as 
well as improving institutional capabilities and information management (ADB 2001, 13-
                                                 
246 The main participants in the strategy formulation were the representatives of the MPPW, the MLD, the 
DWSS, the Dolidar, the NPC, the ADB, the WB, UNICEF, the WHO, the DFID, USAID, MFA Finland, 
Plan Nepal, Helvetas, WaterAid Nepal, Care Nepal, Nepal Red Cross, NEWAH and Gurkha Welfare 
Scheme. In the regional consultation the participants included representatives of local bodies and political 
parties. Between 35 and 85 people attended the workshops. Altogether more than 160 of the invited 
representatives of various organisations participated in at least one of the workshops, representing 82 
organisations connected with RWSS and health development in Nepal (ARD Inc. 2003d, 7-11). The 
consultations were on invitation basis. The executive agency for the technical assistance was the MPPW, 
however, it did not have an active role in the project and strategy preparation, remaining as a participant. 
Each of the main government agencies provided a counterpart staff to the PPTA team. In the MPPW this 
was the joint secretary for water supply and sanitation, in the DWSS an engineer, and in the Dolidar a senior 
divisional engineer. These people officially assisted the consultancy team. In addition, staff from the ADB 
offices in Kathmandu and Manila headquarters was involved in the strategy formulation and project 
preparation (ARD Inc. 2003a, i). 
247 Interview with a member of the PPTA team on Aug. 1, 2009 and a representative of ADB in Nepal on 
Aug. 10, 2009.  
248 Personal communication with a member of the PPTA team on Feb. 19, 2011.   
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4). By this, it aimed to evolve the developing countries' approaches, from a short-term 
project-driven approach, towards the principles of the composite approach: establishment 
of a long-term programmatic approach, and the development of mechanisms for long-term 
partnerships with clients, e.g., policy-based lending for long-term umbrella water 
programmes (ADB 2006b, 35). These reforms should form the basis for new development 
projects in the sector, and link these to resources, and to be guided by the ADB's country 
operational strategies and programmes (ADB 2004c, 2). In Nepal, the Rural Water Supply 
and Sanitation Strategy and Action Plan were formulated in conjunction with the ADB’s 
loan negotiations for the Community-Based Water Supply and Sanitation Project in 2003. 
An ADB official in Nepal confirmed to me that the Water for All policy obliged the ADB 
to include the formulation of the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Strategy and Action 
Plan, with the project preparation of the CBWSSP, because the ADB found that an official 
framework for the project was necessary249. 
 
1. The Asian Development Bank will help develop comprehensive water policies in the DMCs.  
2. Assistance for undertaking water sector assessments will be provided to ensure that policy 
formulation and sector reforms are well grounded.  
3. Because project planning and implementation are commonly fragmented among many 
institutions, ADB will support the optimisation of agency functions for planning and 
implementation. It will also focus on the development of effective cross-sector coordination 
mechanisms, such as neutral apex body that can oversee the policy formulation and sector reform 
process.  
4. Support will be provided for the review and revision of water legislation particularly in the 
areas of water rights and allocation among competing uses, water quality standards, groundwater 
use, demand management, resource conservation, private sector participation, and institutional 
responsibilities for water sector functions at national, regional or basin, local, and community 
levels.  
Table 7.1: ADB's Water Policy Actions: National Policies and Reforms (ADB 2004c, 15. The policy 
actions are extracted from ADB's water policy) 
The second main issue influencing the formulation of the Rural Water Supply and 
Sanitation Strategy in Nepal, was ADB's view on water as a socially vital economic good. 
The policy states (2003, 24): “Conservation of water and its sustainable use are 
increasingly critical factors in managing a scarce resource. Governments and civil society 
need to see water as an economic good.” The ADB links the view on water as an 
economic good, with a decentralised service delivery. Water, being a finite resource, 
needs to be delivered in an efficient manner. The efficiency, according to the ADB, is 
guaranteed through decentralised water delivery, which includes cost-recovery. The state 
                                                 
249 Interview with a representative of ADB in Nepal on Aug. 10, 2009.  
In the urban water supply and sanitation sector the ADB has funded the formulation of the Urban Water 
Supply and Sanitation Policy in 2008-09 in the conjunction of the PPTA for the Second Small Towns 
project. Here, many interviewees opined that the policy was required by ADB’s headquarters, so that the 
project could be approved. Interviews with a representative of ADB in Nepal on Aug. 10, 2009, a 
representative of JICA in Nepal on Aug. 24, 2009, a NGO leader on Aug. 11, 2009. 
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should not provide water alone, but the water provision system should include private 
sector companies, the NGOs and water user groups. The ideal role for the state was to act 
as a facilitator, and not be directly involved in water service delivery (ADB 2001, 21-6; 
ADB 2006b, 16). In Nepal, many of these issues were central in the stakeholder 
consultations, and influenced the strategy formulation process.  
In this part, I have shown, that the policy formulation process was a donor initiative, 
and behind the initiative, was the ADB’s necessity to have a domestic policy in place to 
support the implementation of the CBWSSP. The formulation process was based on the 
predetermined issues set by the ADB’s water policy, and the composite approach, which 
portrayed the latest global ‘knowledge’ advocated by the donors. The government 
agencies were not actively involved in this phase of the process. I next move to describe 
how the donor-paid consultants pursued this donor-centred modality.  
7.3 Consultants: Aides of the Donors 
The consultancy team hired by the ADB to draft the strategy and the design of the new 
water supply and sanitation project, continued within the framework set by the ADB. I 
view the consultants as an aide of the donors in strategy formulation, even though they are 
officially employed by the government. I reason for this because their payroll comes from 
the donor, whom they actually view as their employer. In addition, the consultants are 
dependent on further assignments provided by the aid agency, not by the government, 
hence, their loyalty is towards the donor (these issues are discussed in Chapter Four). I 
consider the consultants as being key people leading the development of policy, because 
they decide on the structure of the consultations, the methods used, who were to be invited 
and what topics would be in the consultations. They organised the workshops, and 
together with the ADB, set the agenda. 
At the early phase of the strategy preparation, the consultants produced an Issues 
Assessment, which set the ground for stakeholder consultations that were to assist the 
consultancy team in strategy and project formulation. The assessment highlighted the 
focus points of the composite approach (ADB 2002, 4, 11-3), and set the decentralised 
modality as the preferred service delivery model, which they argued, would work best in 
the current situation, with the evolving institutional responsibilities of the government 
sectoral agencies at district level. Further, it was preferred by the donors, including a 
variety of organisations (government, NGO, private sector), that have demonstrated their 
capacity and their capability for developing community-based WSS facilities and services 
(ARD Inc. 2002a, viii).  
After the Issues Assessment, the consultants wrote the first draft of the sector strategy, 
which reflects the issues identified (see table 7.2 below). The focus of the strategy was to 
move away from the supply driven provision of water supply and sanitation services, and 
to ensure that these were provided only if there was a demand expressed by the 
community. The demand was assessed through the interest of the community, to be 
financially involved in the project implementation, meaning that they were willing to pay 
for services, co-finance construction costs, and take over O&M costs (ARD Inc. 2002b, 1-
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Thus, when the consultations with stakeholders started during Phase Two, there was 
already a baseline for the discussion ready, and the consensus that was sought for, was 
articulated on the basis of issues defined in the first draft sector strategy. The consultants 
tried to present the issue identification, as a more bottom-up process than it was, and their 
report made it sound as if the first draft had been written after the stakeholder 
consultations. They write, “these eight issue areas were presented, discussed and agreed to 
at the 1st plenary. Thus, the thematic areas explored in workshops and ultimately 
incorporated into the draft RWSS Sector Strategy genuinely arise from and reflect 
stakeholder consensus” (ARD Inc. 2003b, 11).  
The PPTA team combined the formulation of sector strategy, with project preparation 
during the Phase One workshops. I suspect that this, most likely, affected the participants’ 
thinking in the Phase Two consultations, and hampered their independent thinking 
regarding the most fitting strategy in rural water supply and sanitation sector. This also 
shows that the consultants were not thinking of these two issues as separate processes, but 
saw them as interlinked. The Phase Two report mentions that the ADB pointed out to the 
consultants that these were separate processes. The consultants write,  
 
“at the urging of ADB staff it became clear that a major task was to build consensus on a 
RWSS Sector Strategy prior to focusing on the particulars of the investment project, such 
as financing mechanisms, projected costs, detailed project implementation plans and the 
like. Keeping to this objective presented a challenge throughout Phase II, as discussions 
frequently veered towards how to structure a Bank-financed project as opposed to 
developing a cohesive structure for the sector as a whole”.  
ARD Inc. 2003b, 11 
As a method for the stakeholder consultations, the PPTA team decided on a participatory 
workshop approach for building consensus, calling it 'Design by Consensus'. The 
consultants viewed this approach, as an alternative to a series of mediated discussion 
meetings, or by having experts develop a model for comment. It was decided to use 
consensus building and conflict resolution methods in the consultations because “Several 
RWSS sector issues in Nepal are quite sensitive, especially in regard to which government 
institution will control project resources and field level contracting operations. These 
issues have been exacerbated by the confusion arising from line agency policies and 
practices conflicting with decentralization strategies” (ARD Inc. 2003d, 7-4). The 
consultants also decided to structure the consultations in plenaries, for all participants, and 
thematic workshops, for the issues identified in the Issues Assessment. These workshops 
were supported by thematic papers, prepared by consultants and participants251 (ARD Inc. 
2003d, 7-4, 7-5; ARD Inc. 2003b, 13). According to the consultants the most contentious 
and complex issues were concentrated around the institutional framework in which the 
rural WSS services would be delivered (ARD Inc. 2003b, 14; ARD Inc. 2003d, 7-6). The 
                                                 
251 NEWAH prepared a document on gender and poverty, which was taken into account in the strategy. This 
thematic, obviously, is central in the composite approach, and therefore, does not state anything about the 
real possibilities for the NGOs to influence the policy process.   
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stakeholder workshops supported a nearly unanimous view of the donor and consultant-
advocated composite approach, regarding decentralisation and community 
contributions252.  
In the workshop, the issue of compulsory cash contributions, raised heated discussions 
between the participants. The discussions were based on the recommendations of the 
Committee on Recommending Policy Changes in Community Contribution to Rural 
Water and Sanitation Projects for Bringing Uniformity253, that had convened in 2002, 
under the leadership of the Fund Board and the MPPW. Some of the NGO representatives 
felt, that there was a push that all of the parties adopt the Fund Board approach as a 
consensus approach. I was told that the secretary of the MPPW, who chaired the 
workshop, said that the workshop should not concentrate on the poor, but on those who 
could afford to pay for the WSS services, referring to the demand for a cash contribution 
by the Fund Board254. The committee suggested that the community contribution should 
be a minimum of 20 per cent, and that the total community contribution should not be less 
than 10 per cent, and that a minimum of one per cent of the contribution should be in cash. 
Subsidies were allowed for disadvantaged groups (Committee on Recommending Policy 
Changes Changes in Community Contribution to Rural Water and Sanitation Projects for 
Bringing Uniformity 2002, 7; HMGN/MPPW 2004a, 21). These suggestions were 
adopted, and included in the final policy document, prepared by the MPPW and the Fund 
Board, which shows that the MPPW and the Fund Board had no real interest to discuss the 
approach with the workshop participants or to modify the approach from by the Fund 
Board advocated approach. The suggested approach was also adopted by the CBWSSP255 
and the Fund Board; however, the Fund Board required even a higher cash contribution, 
namely 2.5 per cent256. As a consensus was not found on the issue of community 
contributions, different practices continue to exist.257 
Surprisingly, the consultants wrote that the workshop on policy formulation, planning 
and budgeting, was the least controversial item within the framework of the institutional 
workshops. In choosing consensus building, and conflict resolution as the method for the 
stakeholder consultations, the consultants had anticipated that there would be struggle 
over line agency roles and responsibilities, particularly related to the control of funds. 
However, in the workshop, the roles and the responsibilities for national level policy 
formulation, planning and budgeting, were easily discerned and agreed upon. The 
                                                 
252 Interview with a NGO leader and a workshop participant on Sep. 1, 2010. 
253 The committee was established to support the project preparation of the second phase of the Fund Board 
(3rd draft Jan. 2003, 14). Interview with a representative of the World Bank in Nepal on Sep. 10, 2010.  
254 Interview with a NGO leader and a participant in the workshop on Sep. 1, 2010. 
255 Interview with representatives of the CBWSSP on Sep. 5, 2010. The Committee also recommended the 
establishment of a one-year planning phase, which also was written down in the strategy and adopted by the 
CBWSSP. Interview with a representative of the WB in Nepal on Sep. 10, 2010.  
256 Interview with a representative of the Fund Board on Sep. 15, 2010. 
257 Not all agreed on the 20 per cent community contribution, by arguing that the ultra poor could not afford 
it. Some NGOs do not take any community contributions, as they argue to work for the poor, and some only 
ask for a contribution towards the O&M. Some bilateral projects ask for more than 20 per cent. Interviews 
with a member of the PPTA team on Aug. 18, 2010; experts in the WSS sector on Sep. 5, 2010 and on Sep. 
1, 2010; a high-level official at MPPW on Aug. 17, 2010; two district officials in Syangja district on Aug. 
30, 2010. Observation in the RWSSP-WN Steering Committee meeting on Aug. 27, 2010. 
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NGOs and CBOs were the best-placed and 
experienced organisations for assisting local 
bodies in planning and site selection. 
The importance of proactively addressing the 
need to minimise problems in procurement and 
contracting, i.e., slow timing, “leakages” (as 
named by the consultants) and standards. 
 The effects of the ongoing conflict on the 
provision of RWSS services.  
Table 7.3: Institutional Arrangements: Agreements Reached and Issues to be Solved (ARD Inc. 
2003d 7-6, 7-7, 7-8; ARD Inc. 2003b, 14-5, 15-6) 
In their reports, the consultants tended to present the process as stakeholder-led and tried 
to cover their own, and the ADB's leadership in the process, similarly as in the Issues 
Assessment regarding the Phase One. In the final report the consultants presented the 
'Design by Consensus' process as a  
“unique opportunity to involve a wide spectrum of stakeholders in a genuine effort to 
arrive at a consensus regarding both broad sector strategy and specific elements of an 
investment program. (…) The effort was truly “bottom-up” and participatory in all 
respects. (…) stakeholders developed the basic elements of the sector strategy with 
implications for project design.”  
ARD Inc. 2003d, 7-11 
Even though there was a wide participation of different kinds of stakeholders, the process 
was not as bottom-up as presented by the government and the ADB. The consultancy team 
developed a preliminary design, and wrote the draft sector strategy, before the wider 
stakeholder consultations; hence, the stakeholders did not develop the basic elements of 
the sector strategy. In the final report, the consultants admit that the portrayed bottom-up 
approach had limits, by writing that if the stakeholders' contributions were going against 
the principles of the composite approach, by being unworkable, or did not adequately 
address key issues, the PPTA team was able to veto those (ARD Inc. 2003d, 7-11). 
Therefore, it seems that the politics in this strategy formulation process, was to cover up 
the influence of the funding agencies, and to avoid being open about their real interests of 
why the strategy was formulated, but instead, to present the process as something it was 
not: as a stakeholder-led policy process. The consultants had a significant role in shaping 
the process, and leading the practice of donor-centred policy making: they conducted the 
stakeholder consultations along the donor-set agenda, instead of letting the participants 
truly come up with issues to be included in the discussions; through the consultation 
process, they made it look as if the participants had decided upon the issues; and in the 
consultations, they guided the discussions to the ADB pre-determined path. 
The donor leadership in the strategy formulation is illuminated, when one examines 
the different versions of the strategy: since the formulation of the first draft during Phase 
One, until the submission of the final draft by the consultants, the sector strategy does not 
demonstrate any major changes. The objectives defined in the first draft, remained the 
same throughout the drafts, and only two issues were added in the second and the final 
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drafts (see table 7.4 below). Only the objectives in the final policy – formulated by the 
MPPW and the Fund Board, not by the ADB-paid consultants – are different from the 
strategy drafts, whereas the final strategy does not include any objections but focuses on 
outlining the roles and responsibilities. I suspect that the final strategy had been revised by 
the MPPW and the Fund Board, to match the policy document that they had formulated 
out of the final draft strategy.  
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and other support functions are 
properly utilized according to 
their capacity, capability and cost. 
required management, technical 
and other support functions are 
properly utilized according to 
their capacity, capability and cost. 
management, technical and other 
support functions are properly 
utilized according to their 
capacity, capability and cost. 
management, technical and other 
support functions are properly 
utilized according to their 
capacity, capability and cost.  
Attain financial viability of water 
user committees – through cost 
sharing, proper management of 
community cash and in-kind 
contributions for construction, 
appropriate water tariff structures, 
efficient tariff collection and 
utilization leading to improved 
system maintenance and repair, 
and consequently high quality 
services to customers.  
Attain financial viability of Water 
User Committees through cost 
sharing, proper management of 
community cash and in-kind 
contributions, enabling 
appropriate water tariff structures, 
efficient tariff collection and 
utilization leading to improved 
system maintenance and repair, 
and consequently high quality 
services to customers.  
Attain financial viability of Water 
User and Sanitation Committees 
through cost sharing, proper 
management of community cash 
and in-kind contributions, 
enabling appropriate water tariff 
structures, efficient tariff 
collection and utilization leading 
to improved system maintenance 
and repair, and consequently high 
quality services to customers.  
Attaining financial viability of 
Water User and Sanitation 
Committees through cost sharing, 
proper management of 
community cash and in-kind 
contributions, setting appropriate 
tariffs, efficient tariff collection 
and utilization leading to 
improved system maintenance 
and repair, and consequently high 
quality services to customers.  
 
 Integrate critical factors such as 
gender, caste and ethnic 
participation, technical options 
and community-based 
management into design and 
implementation activities in order 
to increase prospects for equity 
and long-term sustainability. 
Integrate critical factors such as 
poverty, gender, caste and ethnic 
participation, appropriate and 
affordable technical options and 
community-based management 
into design and implementation 
activities in order to increase 
prospects for equity and long-
term sustainability.   
Integrating critical factors such as 
poverty, gender, caste and ethnic 
participation, appropriate and 
affordable technical options, and 
community-based management 
into design and implementation 
activities to increase prospects for 
equity and long-term 
sustainability.  
 
   Supporting the poverty reduction 
strategies of HMG, ADB, World 
Bank, bilateral donors and NGOs 
supporting RWSS sectoral 
development in Nepal. 
 
Table 7.4: Comparison of Evolvement of Objectives in Different Versions of the Draft and Final RWSS Strategy (The differences between the objectives in 
the different versions are highlighted through italics in the table text)
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7.4 Government Manoeuvring for Funds, Alliances and Territory 
This section illustrates how the governmental policy making body, in the rural water 
supply and sanitation sector, the MPPW, has manoeuvred in the finalisation phase of 
strategy formulation, by seizing several strategies. Through allying with several donors, it 
has tried to please its various funding agencies, by trying to meet their demands. In the 
case of the formulation of the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Strategy, the MPPW 
first tried to satisfy the ADB, the DFID and UNICEF, by letting them formulate the 
strategy and action plan, according to their requirements. Once they had finalised their 
work, it manoeuvred to meet the interest of the Fund Board (and the World Bank), which 
it felt that it then had not been taken into account in the strategy formulation process; to 
the extent that it had wished for, and to secure that the World Bank’s funding in the sector, 
would continue. Thus, the MPPW and the Fund Board, jointly formulated the Rural Water 
Supply and Sanitation Policy.  
After the consultation process, the ADB-paid consultants submitted the finalised sector 
strategy, and its action plan, simultaneously to the ADB and the MPPW. The Fund Board 
staff, which had close personal connections with the MPPW, convinced officials at the 
MPPW, of the need for an additional policy. The official reason for the policy formulation 
was that it was developed, to substitute the old water supply and sanitation policies, with 
funding provided by the Fund Board. A member of the ADB consultancy team told that 
the policy was written, more or less overnight, by the director of the Fund Board, together 
with officials at the MPPW and the DWSS, meaning that the new priorities had already 
been decided earlier260. As the policy was squeezed out of the draft strategy, which had 
not been formulated to be revised into a policy, but was to facilitate the implementation of 
two older policies, the functionality of the policy became problematic. Despite this, the 
ministry and Fund Board did not want to start a new consultation and formulation process, 
but decided to formulate the policy by revising the strategy draft. This was considered in 
order to save investments and time for developing the policy document from scratch.261 
An important motive for the MPPW and the Fund Board, to join forces in the policy 
formulation, was the pressure to move the Fund Board under the Dolidar. The Dolidar had 
been established after the Fund Board (in 1998), and at this time, the Fund Board had not 
been moved under the Dolidar, even though the previous policies had outlined that 
projects that implement schemes with less than 1,000 beneficiaries, should be under the 
Dolidar, and schemes with more beneficiaries, should be dealt by the DWSS. The schemes 
implemented by the Fund Board selected the NGOs with less than 1,000 beneficiaries. In 
order to avoid future pressure to place the Fund Board under the Dolidar – and by this 
giving more power to the MLD – it was important for the two parties to manoeuvre this 
                                                 
260 Interview with a member of the PPTA team on Aug. 18, 2010; personal communication with a member 
of the PPTA on Feb. 19, 2011.  
261 Personal communication with a member of the PPTA on Feb. 19, 2011.  
 
 
 
 
212
issue in the policy framework262. The strategy (HMGN/MPPW 2004a7-8), therefore, 
outlines,  
“Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Fund Development Board will serve as a regular 
organization for facilitating the provision of rural water supply and sanitation services. The 
Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Fund Development Board will perform the following 
tasks: (…) Assist HMG in the reform of sectoral policy.”   
 
With this sentence, the MPPW and the Fund Board, made the Fund Board part of the 
governmental system, and placed it under the MPPW, through allocating it a task in policy 
formulation. Obviously, this was also a move against the World Bank’s decision to create 
it as an institution, bypassing the government system, and it must have contributed to the 
decision by the World Bank to withdraw its aid to the Fund Board in the future. I think 
that the MPPW dared to do this bold move, because of the ADB’s decision to continue 
funding the rural water supply and sanitation sector, thus, it knew that there would be 
future investments, or, very speculatively, I consider that the MPPW knew of the World 
Bank’s dissatisfaction with the Fund Board, and believed that it would not continue to 
finance the Fund Board in the future. 
The policy focused on the advancing private sector and the NGO’s participation in the 
implementation and management of the rural water supply and sanitation projects, and 
thus, it institutionalised the Fund Board’s advocated approach. It does not mention the 
local bodies being responsible for the planning of the schemes, but tried to shirk this by 
outlining vaguely that the “Service development and operation system will be adopted 
through leadership of the local community263, which will identify the necessity of the 
project, its selection, plan formulation, implementation and management by applying 
participatory approach” (HMGN/MPPW 2004a, 3). As seen from the table 7.5 below, 
because the strategy and the policy were prepared by different teams, and funded by 
different aid agencies. The main principles in the documents changed, so that they did not 
correspond with each other, highlighting their different approaches to decentralisation, and 
clarified in the next section.  
I suspect that the Fund Board was afraid that the strategy would correspond with the 
approach chosen by the ADB, and that it would need to revise its implementation modality 
accordingly. As many of my interviewees explained, the general unwillingness of the 
Fund Board to make any compromises on its implementation approach. and therefore, 
hindering some of the sector’s coordination efforts, this seems to me as the likeliest 
motive for the Fund Board to initiate the policy264. Particularly if one compares the policy 
with the Fund Board’s approach, there seems to be an overlapping in some essential parts. 
For the government, going along with the Fund Board’s suggestion to formulate a policy, 
it was a manoeuvring tactic to keep two of its largest donors in the sector satisfied. The 
                                                 
262 This was expressed in interviews with a WSSDO official on Aug. 11, 2010, an official at DWSS on Aug. 
17, 2010, and an official at the Dolidar on Aug. 19, 2010.  
263 My Italics.  
264 Interviews with a representative of the DFID in Nepal on Sep. 10, 2010; NGO leader on Sep. 1, 2010; an 
expert in the WSS sector on Aug. 18, 2010, who said “the culture of Fund Board is quite distasteful for most 
aid agencies”.  
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formulation of the policy was a win-win situation for both the Fund Board and the 
government: the Fund Board legitimised its approach in the rural water supply and 
sanitation sector, and the MPPW kept an important ally happy, and avoided a potential 
conflict over a policy matter. Furthermore, by approving the ADB-formulated strategy, 
and not revising it, the ADB also got what it had aimed for, and therefore, it could not be 
too upset of the sudden existence of a new policy. Through this alliance-building, the 
MPPW abstained to openly challenge any of its donors, and let them carry out those tasks 
that they found important265 (e.g. lead the strategy and policy formulation). Through this 
strategy, the MPPW was able to sustain a good relationship with all of the parties, and to 
gain from the process, that is, that both the ADB and the World Bank got a preferential 
framework to continue funding the development efforts in Nepal.  
Another powerful manoeuvring tactic for the governmental actors was the strategy of 
non-implementation (Rose, Fisher 1970; Scott 1985; Grindle 1989, 1999; Seppälä 
2002266), as expressed by several of my interviewees267. It referred to the tendency by 
bureaucrats (or as in Scott’s analysis the peasants) to avoid implementing those issues, 
which went against their personal, family, or class interests, and to find their way out of 
the unwanted donor influence. For the DWSS, the demand for moving towards 
decentralisation and facilitation, was an issue that it was not following, thus, ignoring the 
policy principle. Similarly, for the MPPW, the divergent implementation approaches 
regarding a decentralisation by the ADB and the World Bank, had led it to resort to the 
strategy of non-implementation. The strategy could also be labelled as a ‘strategy of 
ignoring’, maybe better characterising the situation in Nepal. This strategy links with the 
strategy of foot-dragging (Scott 1985), which in this case, refers to government officials 
finding excuses for a delayed implementation. In Nepal, the reasons typically relate to the 
difficult circumstances in the country, such as security, and the political situation268, or to 
a lack of interest in the districts to implement269, capacity problems270, and corruption at 
various stages271, as well as changing the priorities and staffing in the cabinet and  
ministry272, which had not enabled a peaceful environment in the transition to democracy. 
These were presented as issues that were widely outside of the government's ability to 
change, thus, an accelerated implementation was barely possible.  
At the local level, officials had used the strategy of non-implementation, because of 
two issues. First, the frequent change of policies at central level (originating from the 
                                                 
265 Scott (1990, 3) has identified a strategy that is similar to this. He calls it deference and consent, referring 
with it to “Subordinates offer a performance of deference and consent while attempting to discern, to read, 
the real intentions and mood of the potentially threatening powerholder.”  
266 See also Mollinga 2003; Mollinga, Bolding 2004; Koponen, Sharma 2004; Molle 2005; Mollinga, Bhat, 
Saravanan (eds.) 2010.  
267 Interviews with an official in Kavre district on Aug. 11, 2010; NGO leaders on Jul. 6, 2009; Jun. 20, 2009 
Aug. 7, 2009; Jul. 14, 2009; an ex-high-level official on Jul. 7, 2009; a high-level official at WECS on Jul. 2, 
2009; a high-level official at MoE on Jul. 31, 2009; two officials in Syanga District Aug. 30, 2010. 
268 Interviews with a high-level official at the MoE on Jul. 31, 2009; a high-level official at the WECS on 
Jul. 2, 2009, and a ex-high level official at the Nepal Engineering Council on Jul. 7, 2009. 
269 Interview with an officer of the RWSSP-WN programme in Syanga District on Aug. 20, 2010. 
270 Interview with a NGO leader on Aug. 7, 2009 
271 Observation of discussion in the District Coordination Meeting, Aug. 28, 2010.  
272 Interviews with a high-level official at MoE on Jul. 31, 2009; a high-level official at the WECS on Jul. 2, 
2009 and a NGO leader on Sep. 1, 2010 
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changing aid trends at global level) had made it difficult for the district and the village 
level officials, to follow policies as these were normally sent to the districts, without 
providing any practical guidelines or training, and hence, some of the district level 
officials, and the line agency staff, either did not understand the new principles of the 
policy, or were not able to change the implementation modality at the local level, as fast as 
demanded by the central level. In addition, many of the people working at district or 
village level were not even aware of all the policies that had been formulated, and hence, 
were not able to follow them273. Secondly, the district offices were confronted with 
multiple pressures that they needed to deal with. The communities had their interests to 
service, the local political leaders wanted to serve those communities that voted for them, 
or where they themselves came from, and the central government had its own power 
interests and wishes, that certain policies and practices were followed274. In order to cope 
with the constant priority changes at central level, as well as the multiple demands placed 
by the officials, the strategy of the district level officials, was to follow those policies that 
made their work easier and ignored the latest guidelines provided by the ministry; this was 
in case this went against their work practices at the local level, or by the interest of the 
officials in the districts.275 
 
                                                 
273 Observation through interviews with two district officials in Syanga district on Aug. 30, 2010. Neither of 
them understood my question about the various policies or their implementation. They were also not aware 
of all policies formulated at the central level.  
274Interviews with an expert in the WSS sector on Sep. 1, 2010 and a NGO leader in Kavre district on Sep. 7, 
2010.  
The Nepal Human Development Report 2001 (UNDP 2002, 58) provides an example of central government 
interests, affecting the work at the local level. It describes that the NPC set district budget ceilings, that often 
fall far below the minimum needs of the district, and that even within the total budget ceiling, sectoral 
ceilings are prescribed so haphazardly that the DDC cannot set its district budgetary priorities. Massive 
changes in district budgetary allocations and programmes occur in the line ministries and the NPC, and 
sometimes the NPC even changes district priorities, by allocating a higher amount of the budget to non-
priority programmes, and substantially reducing the budget for priority programmes (information based on a 
UNDP interview with the chairman of the Kavre DDC and president of District Development Council of 
Nepal).  
275 Observation through interviews with two district officials in Syangja district on Aug. 30, 2010. They 
expressed that of their opinion, the DDC is free to do decide upon its own policy, it only has to contribute 
towards to RWSS goals by which they meant the coverage numbers.   
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Institutional arrangements: DDCs will be 
responsible for implementation, coordination 
and monitoring of RWSS plans.  
Institutional arrangements: Central level 
government and local bodies will regulate, 
monitor and facilitate the implementation of 
the projects.  
Institutional arrangements: FB approach will 
be mainstreamed in the government system.  
Institutional arrangements: The Strategy does 
not specifically mention NGOs and private 
sector organisations as providers of WSS 
services (or anything else).  
Institutional arrangements: Service delivery 
mechanism of WSS by users' committees, 
CBOs, NGOs and private sector organisations 
in partnership with each other will be 
established.  
Institutional arrangements: Government has 
established the FB to gradually transfer the 
WSS service delivery responsibility to the 
private sector. With this objective, the FB is 
designed to operate in partnership with SOs 
and communities, and obtain the services of 
national SAs to provide it technical, 
institutional, and operational assistances in 
scheme implementation.  
Gender issues: Gender equity and service 
development will be insisted in planning, 
decision making, training, access and 
management or RWSS facilities/ services.  
Gender issues: Participation of gender, caste 
and disadvantaged ethnic groups will be made 
essential to all decision making processes 
regarding WSS services.  
Gender issues: One main objective of FB is to 
enhance the role of women in all aspects of the 
project. 
Financial aspects: Capacity and capability of 
the local government body, NGOs and the 
community will be developed so that they 
could themselves source financing and manage 
the projects independently.  
Financial aspects: Delivery of WSS facility 
will depend on effective demand. The type and 
level of service will be according to the 
'capacity as well as willingness to pay' by 
consumers, for which they will have to 
contribute to capital investment for such 
facility.  
Financial aspects: The FB provides two types 
of financing - one for the construction of WS 
schemes and for other complementary 
activities, and the other for SO staff and 
overheads.  
Sanitation: Sanitation has an own part in the 
strategy and is discussed there in detail.  
Sanitation: Health education and sanitation 
activities will be conducted together with WSS 
programme.  
Sanitation: One main objective of FB is to 
integrate hygiene and sanitation education with 
technically, environmentally and operationally 
sustainable water supply. 
Table 7.5: Comparison of the Strategy, Policy and Fund Board Approaches in Selected (Main) Issues (the similarities and differences between the 
strategy, policy and the Fund Board approaches are highlighted through italics in the table texts). 
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implementing agency to a 
facilitating agency. 
MLD Lead ministry at the local 
level development efforts 
/Participant in the 
consultations 
Coordinate with other 
ministries and departments in 
order to develop a RWSS 
strategy for Nepal. 
Become the lead ministry at 
the local level development, 
including RWSS. 
Securing decentralisation as 
the main approach, however, 
not appointed as the lead 
ministry. 
Dolidar Government department for 
RWSS / Participant in the 
consultations 
Coordinate with other 
ministries and departments in 
order to develop a RWSS 
strategy for Nepal. 
Become the lead department 
for RWSS. 
No significant influence over 
the Strategy. 
Consultants Responsible for formulating 
the Sector Strategy and the 
CBWSSP /Leading the 
Strategy formulation 
1. Promote decentralisation 
approach along the latest 
global understanding, 2. have 
a consensus-based 
consultation.  
Support ADB's, MPPW's and 
DWSS'  interests in the 
strategy formulation in order 
to guarantee further 
consultancies for themselves. 
Successful promotion of 
decentralisation and other 
principles of consensus 
approach. 
NGOs Civil society force / 
Participants in consultations 
Decentralisation, community-
based RWSS projects, 
inclusion of subsidies for poor 
and disadvantaged groups, 
emphasis on gender issues. 
Through their participation 
assess the possibilities to ally 
with other NGOs and donors 
and to influence the 
development direction in the 
country.  
Inclusion of subsidies for the 
poor and disadvantaged 
groups, focus on community-
based RWSS development. 
Other donors Funding agencies in RWSS 
sector /Participants in the 
consultations 
Find a common approach to 
RWSS in Nepal, particularly 
regarding decentralisation and 
to coordinate the sector 
efforts. 
Through their participation 
assess the possibilities to ally 
with other donors and to 
influence the development 
direction in the country.  
Successful promotion of 
decentralisation and other 
principles of consensus 
approach. 
MoE, MoHP, 
MoF and NPC 
Governmental stakeholders in 
RWSS /Participants in the 
consultations 
Little visible interest shown 
towards the Sector Strategy 
and its principles. 
n.a. No significant influence over 
the Strategy. 
Table 7.6: Policy Actors' Interests and Influence in the Strategy Formulation Process
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7.5 The Politics Around the Project Design  
The policy actors had differing views and interests, on how the Community-Based Water 
Supply and Sanitation Project should be designed, particularly with regard to its 
institutional arrangements to decentralisation. The consultants, who prepared the project, 
advocated for decentralisation along the Local Self-Governance Act 1999, which 
emphasised the roles of the DDCs and the VDCs. The ADB officially supported this view, 
because it was the official government policy, but in practice, it gave its support to the 
MPPW and the DWSS, which were not that open to the consultant’s suggestions, because 
of their fear of losing power at a local level. This politicking helps to understand the 
institutional arrangements of the CBWSSP, and shows that it was not an apolitical, 
technical exercise, but that it was guided by the interests of the actors involved in its 
design, that were rife with political motives. The analysis also includes an assessment how 
the CBWSSP was designed to correspond the strategy, which was the aim of the project 
design, as stated in the Final Draft Report (ARD Inc. 2003a). 
The objective of the CBWSSP is to reduce poverty, improve community health and 
welfare, and to strengthen the capacity for participating communities and local 
governments, through the active participation of the community, as well as of all of the 
stakeholders, in the planning, implementation, operation and maintenance. Furthermore, it 
emphasises a decentralised service delivery, as a mechanism for the efficient delivery of 
water supply and sanitation in rural areas (ARD Inc. 2003a, i, 6-8). These objectives 
correspond with the objectives outlined by the consultants, in the final draft of the sector 
strategy, showing a linkage between their formulations. There are also similarities to other 
government policy documents, such as the Tenth Plan, the LSGA and the National Water 
Supply Sector Policy (1998). The compatibility of government policies is important for 
the ADB, which lending policy requires, that all of the ADB-funded projects are in line 
with the government's own policies (ADB 2003a, 1). Thus, there was an obvious interest, 
for both the ADB and the government, to make the strategy and project, correspond with 
each other so that the project passed the screening of the ADB board.  
7.5.1 The ADB and the DWSS Manoeuvring Against the MLD and the Dolidar  
The long-term quarrel between the MPPW and the DWSS and the MLD and the Dolidar, 
also shaped the project design, and the old alliances played an important role in how the 
project was to be administered. The implementation modality of the CBWSSP was 
designed to support the government's decentralisation agenda and policies (ARD Inc. 
2003a, 6-8), yet, a closer examination of its modality, shows that in practice, there seemed 
to be a vested interest of strengthening the position of the MPPW and the DWSS vis-à-vis 
to the Dolidar. This was also understood and partly followed by the consultants. This 
interest derives from a long-term relationship, that exists between the ADB and the 
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DWSS. As they have been partners in water sector development, since the early 1980s, 
their relationship is well tested, having had its ups and downs277. This has led to mutually 
understood interests, based on a satisfying division of loans and grants in ADB aid to 
Nepal278. Hence, it is in the ADB's interest, to give support to the interest of the DWSS, to 
retain its power at a district level, and to find ways of how this, and the government’s 
decentralisation agenda, could be combined in the project they jointly manage.  
This manoeuvring by the ADB and the MPPW is illuminated in the discussions 
regarding which ministry should be responsible for the project. According to 
decentralisation thinking, the MLD should be in charge of the project, being responsible 
for local level development, including the small water supply and sanitation schemes. In 
the strategy formulation, the stakeholders had suggested to place the project under both 
the MPPW and the MLD, envisaging a slightly greater role for the MLD and the Dolidar 
(ARD Inc. 2002a, 95). I believe that due to the competition between the MPPW and the 
MLD, the ADB took the side of the MPPW, and opined that a power-sharing between the 
MPPW and the MLD would not work out. In the end, the MPPW became the responsible 
ministry, and it delegated authority to administer the Central Project Planning and 
Monitoring Unit to the DWSS.  
Due to the project's focus on decentralisation, and community mobilisation, the 
consultants suggested the establishment of two units, to be responsible for project 
planning and management at the district level. A unit for planning, the District Planning 
and Monitoring Unit (DPMU) was to be established, in each of the project implementing 
districts, and was to be placed under the DDC. This unit was to plan, and to coordinate, 
the activities and management of the Service Organisations (SO) and Service Agencies 
(SA), which provided assistance to participating communities (ARD Inc. 2003,a iv. 10). 
The second unit, as outlined in the LSGA, and recommended by the consultants, was a 
Water Supply and Sanitation Section, which was also to be under the DDC. The 
consultants demanded that, the hand-over of central government's sectoral tasks to these 
agencies and ministries, would withdraw line agency staff from the district (ARD Inc. 
2003a, vi, 11; UNDP 2002, 75-7). They opined that these two units form the core element 
of the decentralised provision of the RWSS services, and recommended that the DPMU 
would first form the basis for a WSS section, and by this, allow the section to be 
strengthened, until it had the required capacity, and capability, to take over the supervision 
of the water supply and sanitation schemes. The DDC formally has a unit, the District 
Technical Office (DTO), responsible for water supply and sanitation, but it does not have 
the capacity or capability to provide the support required by the project.  
Even though the consultants supported a decentralisation through the DDC to the 
extent possible279, in the district-level institutional arrangements, they did not fully follow 
                                                 
277 This analysis bases on an interview with Dr Sudhindra Sharma, who led a study team analysing the ADB-
funded WSS project in Nepal, on Aug. 12, 2010. See also WaterAid Nepal 2005b, 12.  
278 Sharma (interview on Aug. 12, 2010) opines that the ADB has understood that the interest of the 
government is to get loans over grants, because loans leave more space for manoeuvring for the government, 
than do grants.   
279 For this also speaks of the inclusion of the NGOs, and the private sector, into the service delivery 
mechanism, which was considered to be the most practical approach, during the unstable political situation 
in the country. In addition, it corresponded to the approach of the ADB.  
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the principles of decentralisation. The consultants planned to staff the DPMUs with 
seconded officials from the DWSS until a Local Government Service Act has been 
promulgated, allowing direct hiring by local bodies280 (ARD Inc. 2003a, 11). As it was not 
clear when this would take place, the arrangement practically meant that the seconded 
DWSS staff led the project at a district level. Therefore, this practice, only devolved the 
DWSS’ power from the central level to the districts, particularly, as the project 
documentation does not mention that the DPMUs would have included staff from the 
DTOs. It also does not support the learning of facilitation skills by the DWSS, as under 
this arrangement, the DPMU staff practically implement the project. I assume that the 
consultants’ original design, emphasising the role of the DDC as a coordinating body at 
the district level, did not get full support from the MPPW and the ADB. The DPMUs were 
changed to Water and Sanitation Support Teams (WSSTs), after the consultants had 
finished their work. The WSSTs were no longer based under the DDCs, but were designed 
as independent bodies, which assisted the DDCs and the communities, in project 
implementation. Regarding staffing, the DDC was provided with a possibility to second its 
staff to the WSST, however, if this was not possible, then the staff came from the MPPW, 
and external consultants would be hired to assist the team leader (WSSDO chief)281 (ADB 
2003b, v, 11-12).  
7.5.2 The ADB and the WB’s Concurrence over Sector Leadership 
Another interest of the ABD, for the strategy and project formulation, was to secure its 
position as sector leader. It therefore designed the CBWSSP as a model project for the 
sector, hoping that the other donors would join in funding the CBWSSP282. The ADB's 
attempt to challenge the Fund Board's position, as the national programme, in the rural 
water supply and sanitation sector, raised action within the Fund Board. Albeit there were 
many similarities between the projects, such as providing a greater role to the NGOs, and 
the private sector organisations in project implementation, following cost-recovery, and 
cost-sharing principles, and a phase-wide implementation mechanism283, the projects 
followed a dissimilar approach regarding their decentralisation modality. The CBWSSP 
was designed to operate closer to the DDCs, and have project offices at the district level, 
to guide implementation, whereas the Fund Board is centrally run, and in its 
                                                 
280 In Nepal, the personnel management of local governments is centrally managed. This means that the 
MLD centrally appoints civil servants as Secretaries of the VDCs, municipalities and DDCs. They are 
vertically accountable to the ministry in all respects, but are expected to perform according to the 
instructions of the respective (elected) local government chiefs (UNDP 2002, 75-6). Practically, this 
arrangement helps to keep the administration centralised. 
281 Interview with representatives of the CBWSSP on Sep. 5, 2010. They mention that the ADB funds flow 
to the DDCs, which then divert the money to the WSSTs.  
282As the consultants write, “All significant sector funding should support a single sector policy, strategy and 
expenditure program, under HMG/N leadership, adopting common sectoral development approaches, and 
progressing towards relying on government procedures to disburse and account for all funds. This modality 
is the SWAp.” (ARD Inc. 2002a, 40).  
283 This consists of a planning phase, a development phase, an implementation phase and a post-construction 
phase.  
 
 
 
 
222
decentralisation speaking, means working through the water user groups and the civil 
society. The consultants viewed that the CBWSSP should not ignore cooperation with 
local bodies, like in the design of the Fund Board, but made it compulsory, that all rural 
water supply and sanitation activities were included in the district plans (ARD Inc. 2003a, 
11). Here, however, the consultants were not clear whether this meant that the DDC first 
identifies the schemes, and allocates some of them to the CBWSSP, or that the CBWSSP 
identifies its own schemes, and then suggests these to be included in the district plan. The 
second option naturally does not support the aims of decentralisation. This ambiguity is 
reflected in the sector strategy as well, which states, “Only schemes selected through a 
participatory DDC/VDC planning process will be implemented. Essential but not selected 
schemes will also be implemented in consultation with the local bodies.” (HMGN/MPPW 
2004a, 4-5).  
Officially, both the ADB and the Fund Board spoke of attempts to harmonise their 
approaches through the formulation of sector strategy, and not of competing over sector 
leadership. The ADB consultants even suggested that the eventual harmonisation could 
lead to a common project management office of the CBWSSP and the Fund Board. 
Through this arrangement, the World Bank and the ADB would have supported a common 
approach, managed by a single sectoral agency at the central level (ARD Inc. 2003b, 36; 
ARD Inc. 2003a, 10). The harmonisation assertion becomes inconsistent though, when 
viewed in the light of ADB’s problem analysis in the Nepalese rural water supply and 
sanitation sector, in which it presents fragmentation of the sector, and the fact that there 
are so many actors and approaches, as major problems (ADB 2002, 2-3). In this situation, 
after all, the ADB opted for the design of a new project instead of joining the World Bank 
to support the Fund Board and making efforts to convince other donors to do the same. 
Therefore, the project politics do not seem to limit only on the design of a single project, 
but there seems to be politics that affect the design of water supply and sanitation projects 
in Nepal.  
One can also doubt whether the attempt by the ADB, to harmonise the sector through 
Sector Strategy formulation, and the CBWSSP project preparation, was sincere. A more 
sincere approach towards this, was shown by the consultants, who tried to include the 
MLD in the CBWSSP management, harmonise differences between the Fund Board and 
the CBWSSP implementation modalities, and follow the LSGA. For me, it seems that the 
ADB did not want to jeopardise its alliance with the DWSS, thus, it needed to leave out 
the MLD's involvement in the project, and focus on supporting the demands of the DWSS 
for its presence at a district level.  
7.6 The Conflicts and Inconsistencies Related to Institutional 
Issues 
In this section, I discuss those institutional issues that were raised in the consultations, and 
included in the final draft strategy, and the inconsistencies and conflicts between the 
practices and strategy suggestions. Most of the issues deal with the arrangements for 
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decentralising water supply and sanitation services. The main demand by participants was 
to decentralise rural water supply and sanitation, to the local bodies, and to have only one 
agency at the local level to assist the DDCs and the VDCs with the scheme’s 
implementation. There were conflicts related to the strong and statutory position of the 
DWSS, as well as to the role of civil society in the implementation of water supply and 
sanitation schemes. In addition, the duplication of work between the MPPW/DWSS and 
the MLD/Dolidar were debated284. The consultants, and many of the stakeholders, were 
for decentralisation, whereas the DWSS objected it, regardless of the LSGA obligation. 
Next, I turn to analyse the new, envisaged role for the DWSS, as advocated by the 
composite approach and consultants, namely to reform it to a facilitator in the water 
supply and sanitation sector. After this, I analyse the problematical relationship between 
the MPPW and the MLD (the DWSS and the Dolidar) and lastly, I focus on issues related 
to decentralisation through the local bodies (the DDCs and the VDCs), civil society and 
the private sector.  
7.6.1 The DWSS as a Facilitator 
Attempts to abolish the strong centralisation of water supply and sanitation provision in 
Nepal, existent since the start of the water supply provision by the Ranas, have been 
unsuccessful, notwithstanding the various policies and guidelines, emphasising 
decentralisation, and changing the role and responsibilities of the central level 
governmental agencies towards facilitation. A real change in the work style of the DWSS 
has not taken place. The new facilitating role envisaged for it, included policy formulation 
together with the MPPW, coordination efforts, provision of training, preparation of 
manuals and guidelines, creation of a database, assistance to the DDCs in preparation of 
district profiles, and to the donors in project preparation and research activities. The only 
task directly relating to engineering is to “Design, implement and monitor the schemes 
implemented in urban and semi-urban areas on the basis of cost-recovery principle” 
(HMGN/MPPW 2004a, 6-7). This implies that the DWSS needs to gradually withdraw 
from the rural water supply and sanitation sector. But inconsistently, the strategy also 
outlines that “The role of DWSS will be as a facilitator for rural water supply and 
sanitation services.” (HMGN/MPPW 2004a, 6). The action plan confirms it: “The main 
role of Department of Water Supply and Sewerage is to provide technical support in the 
rural water supply and sanitation sector.” (HMGN/MPPW 2004b, 4).  
As a solution to the inconsistency in the DWSS responsibilities, the consultants 
suggested that the DWSS prepares and implements a plan to phase out direct 
implementation in the rural water supply and sanitation schemes, and hands over 
ownership and responsibility for O&M for all of the schemes to local bodies and/or the 
WUSCs. The timeframe, for the DWSS for phasing out from the rural water supply and 
                                                 
284 The PPTA team concluded that the issue of work division between the DWSS and the Dolidar, as well as 
the decentralisation of funds, could not be resolved through consensus-building method, and recommended 
that these two issues are to be taken up in other forums, perhaps between the ADB and the government, 
because they require major shifts in current policy and higher level deliberations (ARD Inc. 2003d, 7-4). 
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sanitation sector should align with the National Framework Document for Decentralised 
Governance and Capacity Building, which is five years. In the final document, this 
formulation has been changed, so that the DWSS will cease to provide technical assistance 
through its Divisional Offices for the implementation of rural water supply and sanitation 
programmes, once the DDC becomes capable and sets up its own sectoral section. No 
timeframe is given for this (HMGN/MPPW 2004a, 6; ARD Inc. 2003g, 8). The DWSS 
had been ordered to form 25 Divisional Offices, instead of having an office in every 
district. The DWSS has manoeuvred against this, by establishing Divisional Offices, or 
Water Supply and Sanitation Subdivision Offices, in all districts of Nepal, hence, having 
effectively, a presence in all districts. The DWSS justifies this move through the lack of 
capacity in the VDCs to take over some of the tasks, and hence, the presence of the 
WSSDOs in the districts is needed, to compensate this shortcoming285.  
I find several reasons for the unwillingness of the DWSS to transform from an 
implementing agency, to a facilitator, and thereby, to withdraw, or even diminish its 
presence in the districts. First, the DWSS is a hydrocracy; most of its employees are 
engineers, which in Nepal is a highly respected profession. Hence, the change towards 
facilitation would require a large-scale re-schooling of its staff, in an area, in which the 
staff does not take pride. Second, due to the competition between the DWSS and the 
Dolidar (and their line ministries), on who is the provider of water supply and sanitation 
services in the rural areas; the withdrawal of the WSSDOs from the districts would 
weaken the position of the MPPW, by making the MLD the most powerful ministry for 
water supply and sanitation in the rural areas, because of it presence in all districts through 
the DTOs and the DDCs. Alike, it is not in the interest of the MPPW to push for a 
transformed role for the DWSS, because this would reduce its own power in comparison 
to the MLD. Third, closing offices at the district level would mean that the DWSS needs 
to scale-down on its staff, which makes it an organisation with less visibility and power, as 
well as having a smaller budget. Fourth, if the DWSS had no own projects to implement, 
its possibilities for procurement at the local level would decrease, which frankly means 
less chances for kick-backs for officials. This is a hard hit on those officials who have 
supplemented their small salaries with extra income through corruption. Fifth, many of the 
larger, technically complex projects, that were supposed to remain as the responsibility of 
the DWSS, are actually administered and implemented by the Kathmandu Valley Water 
Supply Management Board and Kathmandu Upatayka Khanepani Limited (KUKL). If the 
DWSS had withdrawn from the rural areas, it might have ended it up with no projects 
anymore, particularly in the field of engineering.  
I find that it was a short-sightedness from the aid agencies to try and reform the 
DWSS, into an organisation that it did not have the capacities to become. An organisation 
with an engineering-based identity, drawing on its pride of knowing how to plan, and 
implement complex technical projects, was not the right kind of organisation to be easily 
                                                 
285 Interview with a WSSDO official in Lalitpur on Aug. 19 2010. Due to the long distances to the VDCs, it 
would take even longer for the WSSDO staff to reach the VDCs when requiring assistance, in the case that 
offices would not be located in each district. In addition, he mentions that the VDCs tend to put all their 
money into roads and irrigation, hence, more of a presence from the WSSDO is required at the local level, to 
secure that some investment is made in water supply and sanitation as well.  
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transformed into a facilitator, or as an awareness-raiser, as the consultants had 
suggested286. It is understandable that there was resistance towards this kind of a change. 
Due to the decentralisation agenda, the donors supported this reduced role for the DWSS 
in the actual implementation of projects. Particularly, the World Bank supported this, 
because the World Bank viewed the DWSS as an obsolete and ineffective governmental 
institution (World Bank 1993, 21). 
The standing of the ADB towards the new role of the DWSS was complicated. The 
ADB’s Water for All policy, and the principles of the composite approach, obliged it to 
advocate a facilitatory role for the DWSS. However, at the same time, it had a special 
relationship with the DWSS, which it did not want to risk. Thus, the ADB tried to play its 
cards so that the relationship would not suffer, despite the double pressure it was facing. 
On the one side, global pressure to reform the hydrocracies, by decentralising them, and 
the making of the facilitatory agencies, and on the other side, its interest to back up the 
DWSS, in its wish to have a presence in the districts. The ADB also felt that the DWSS 
had been largely excluded from any active dialogue with the other sectoral stakeholders, 
nor had it much of a role on the many externally assisted projects (ADB 2002, 2). This is 
because the Fund Board worked outside of the DWSS sphere, and Finland had its project 
administration under the Dolidar. The ADB, being the only big donor under the DWSS, 
was afraid that the DWSS might lose its power, and consequently, weaken the ADB’s role 
in the rural water supply and sanitation sector. Thus, I think, the RWSS Strategy 
envisaged a facilitatory role for the DWSS, but due to the double pressure on the ADB, 
the strategy remained vague about the timeframe in which the DWSS needed to assume 
the facilitatory role. The result of the multiple manoeuvring, is a strategy, which does not 
provide any real guidance.  
7.6.2 Inconsistencies in the Roles of the MPPW and the MLD 
The aim of the consultations had been to discuss the work division between the MPPW 
and the MLD (the DWSS and the Dolidar), and to find a solution to the overlapping of 
responsibility between them, yet a sustainable solution was not found. The problematical 
relationship of the MPPW and the MLD, was solved in the strategy of appointing the 
MPPW, together with the DWSS, as a sector lead agency (sidelining MLD and Dolidar). 
However, inconsistently in the Action Plan, the MPPW is obliged to “Work in co-
ordination with MLD for determining the respective roles of MPPW and MLD with a 
view to initiating suitable working procedures in the light of the lessons learnt in the past” 
(HMGN/MPPW 2004b, 14-5). Obviously, the consultants and the participants of the 
consultations were not able to come up with a plan that would have suited both the MPPW 
and the MLD. This formulation left the problem unresolved.  
The strategy and action plan place central level responsibility on the MPPW, and local 
level responsibility on the DDCs, assisted by the NGOs, the private sector and the 
                                                 
286 The consultants had planned awareness raising campaigns also as a responsibility of the DWSS; however, 
this has been left out of the final strategy (HGMN/MPPW 2004a, 6-7; ARD Inc. 2003g, 8). 
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WUSCs. Strangely, despite of the fact that the DDCs are administered by the MLD, the 
local level arrangement outlined in the strategy, one might think, should demand a larger 
role for the MLD than to just “assist in the overall development works of the districts and 
villages by providing technical skills in line with the process of decentralization” 
(HMGN/MPPW 2004b, 4-5). This definition does not provide it with any role in sector 
development. Likewise, the Dolidar is not allocated any role in sector development; 
actually, it is not even referred to in the action plan, even though it is one of the funding 
agencies of the rural water supply and sanitation services. This was not suggested by the 
consultants, who actually saw a role for the MLD. The Phase One report (ARD Inc. 
2002a, 57-8) mentions that the MLD, as the principal ministry responsible for supporting 
and strengthening local government through the LSGA, “is likely to have an increasingly 
important role in coordinating the provision of WSS services, providing technical support 
and training to local government agencies, and assisting communities in organizing 
operation, maintenance, and repair.” Therefore, it seems to me that considering the close 
relationship between the ADB and the MPPW/DWSS, their interest has been to secure a 
powerful position for the MPPW and the DWSS in the sector, which consequently means, 
a lesser role for the MLD and the Dolidar. Hence, I believe, that they did not agree with 
the consultants’ view, and did not include it in the final version of the strategy or project 
document.  
Another inconsistency in the strategy is that the MPPW has been made responsible for 
the formulation of the rural water supply and sanitation policy, monitoring, and 
coordinating the sector, and at the same time, its line agency is encouraged to gradually 
withdraw its presence from the districts. Whereas the MLD has not been given any 
particular role in policy formulation, even though it is the ministry responsible for rural 
water supply and sanitation activities in the rural areas, through its supervision of the 
DDCs. By this arrangement, a ministry that should not have a department, involved in the 
local level work, is made responsible for policy making in the sector, and the ministry that 
actually is responsible for local level work has been sidelined. The role of the DDCs in the 
provision of water supply and sanitation in the rural areas, is even planned to be 
strengthened by the LSGA. The strategy, which suggests of the establishment of a WSS 
section, directly under the DDC, as the core agency, at a local level for water supply and 
sanitation provision (HMGN/MPPW 2004a, 6). The section has no institutional links to 
the MPPW. The Strategy also clearly states that the “DWSS will not provide technical 
assistance through its Divisional offices for implementation of rural water supply and 
sanitation programmes once the DDC becomes capable and sets up its own sectoral 
section” (HMGN/MPPW 2004a, 6). This means that the ministry responsible for policy 
making, does not have an institutionalised feedback mechanism, from a local level, as a 
basis for its policy making. To overcome this weakness, the strategy suggests an expanded 
role for the Fund Board. It is supposed to assist the MPPW in policy making, because of 
its long-term experience from field level work (HMGN/MPPW 2004a, 7). Thus, the Fund 
Board has been envisaged as the learning organisation for the MPPW, in the formulation 
of policies for the rural water supply and sanitation sector. Yet, the Fund Board is guided 
by the World Bank (and its interests), and therefore, its learning is based on the guidelines 
given by the World Bank, not the MPPW. Furthermore, the Fund Board’s existence is 
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dependent on the World Bank's willingness and interest to continue funding it, unless it is 
made a permanent body of the government system.  
The institutional arrangement, at the local level, is also left undefined in the strategy. It 
does not clearly state what should be the future role of the DTOs and the WSSDOs. 
Instead, it argues on the line of the LSGA, and supports a central role for the DDCs, which 
includes the establishment of a WSS section under the DDC287. The action plan 
(HMGN/MPPW 2004b, 14) states that the MPPW and the MLD should together remove 
the present duplication in the functions of DTOs and WSSDOs while implementing rural 
water supply and sanitation services at the community level288. This is, however, unlikely 
to happen, as the MPPW and MLD were not able to agree on how to solve the duplication 
between the ministries, both having their interests to stay represented at the local level. 
The fact that the strategy was not able to solve the issue, makes it unsustainable and 
counter-productive, as in practice it requires both agencies to maintain a scheme 
management infrastructure at the district level. Thus, it seems that the consultants were not 
able to find a solution to the problem, and have tried to overcome it by recommending the 
establishment of a WSS section under the DDC, within the next five years. Until now, the 
division of the work between the DTO and the WSSDO has been made through an 
arbitrary demarcation of covering communities, over or under a 1,000 population. This 
demarcation is confirmed in the action plan, even though the consultants and the 
participants recommended its abolition, because it has turned out to be inefficient, as 
neither of the organisations adheres to it289 (ARD Inc. 2003a, 19).  
                                                 
287 This is presented as the truly decentralised WSS delivery mechanism, because once the DDC is allowed 
to hire its own staff, the line agencies could withdraw from the districts. The WSSDO and the DTO are 
naturally against this plan.  
288 The second draft (ARD Inc. 2003e, 2) writes that there is an urgent need to resolve inefficiencies arising 
from policies that necessitate both the DWSS and the Dolidar to maintain multiple administrative and 
technical infrastructure in all districts. Particularly important this is because of the scarce resources and 
competing demands for their uses at the rural areas.  
289 Local level officials mentioned in the interviews (interview with two officials in Syangja district on Aug. 
30, 2010), that there was often political pressure, by the ministry and local level politicians on the DTO to 
implement a scheme in an area, which had a population of more than 1,000, and thus, went beyond their 
jurisdiction. Due to the pressure from higher levels, the DTO could not really say no, thus it implemented 
the scheme; even though it knew that it should not do it. They also added that the same situation applies to 
the WSSDOs, which also implemented projects in areas with less than a 1,000 population. 
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Figure 7.2: Planned Change in the Institutional Arrangements between MPPW and MLD 
7.6.3 The DDCs, the NGOs and the Private Sector  
The consultants considered the DDC as the key body at the local level for planning, 
coordination and implementation, and tried to direct the strategy formulation along these 
principles. However, the distinct interest by the DWSS and its partner aid agency, the 
ADB, did not support this line, and they instead pressed for a larger role for civil society 
and the private sector. Hence, the strategy does not correspond with the LSGA, and the 
thinking on how decentralisation should be promoted through local bodies.   
A discrepancy between the strategy and the LSGA is whether the DDC, or the VDC, 
should be responsible for rural water supply and sanitation activities. The LSGA 
recommended that local level development actions were directed by the VDCs290, whereas 
in the Final Sector Strategy, the responsibility for the implementation had been allocated 
                                                 
290 The VDC is responsible for preparation of drinking water projects for the supply of drinking water 
required within the village development area and to implement and operate the same, and to arrange or cause 
to be arranged for their maintenance; as well as to construct, maintain and repair or cause to be constructed, 
maintained and repaired wells, deep water, ponds, taps etc. within the village development area 
(HMGN/Ministry for Law and Justice 1999, 10). The DDC is responsible for the formulation and 
implementation and to cause to be implemented, such drinking water plans as are to benefit the people in 
more than one village development area in rural areas of the district development area (HMGN/Ministry for 
Law and Justice 1999, 60).  
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to the DDCs291, even though it claims to follow the LSGA: “DDCs will be responsible for 
implementation, coordination and monitoring of the rural water supply and sanitation 
plans in their respective districts by means of periodic planning and provision of technical 
assistance.” (HMGN/MPPW 2004a, 5). The consultants in the earlier versions of the 
strategy followed the argumentation of the LSGA and devoted the DDC with 
coordination, whereas implementation of rural water supply and sanitation schemes was 
allocated to VDCs in collaboration with WUSCs (ARD Inc. 2003e, 5-6; ARD Inc. 2003g, 
8). The reason for allocating more responsibilities to DDCs relates to the view of the 
consultants and workshop participants that VDCs do not yet have the required capacity to 
do this. Alike, it was noted that DDCs do not have the capacity to fully take over the local 
level planning and implementation, but after strengthening of the structures in the DDCs, 
there should be certain readiness to develop capacities and take over more responsibilities. 
The consultants opined that the government was still in a transition phase, with its 
decentralisation strategy, thus, some modifications needed to be made according to the 
situation in the country. Their point was that the rural water supply and sanitation 
implementation roles and responsibilities should rapidly be accelerated towards a fully 
decentralised system, as intended by the LSGA and the National Framework Document 
(ARD Inc. 2003e and 2003f, 5). The fact that the strategy did not clearly formulate what is 
actually meant by decentralisation, but presents local bodies, civil society, the private 
sector and the user groups, on the same line, became one of its main weaknesses. 
To compensate for the weak capacity of the local bodies, the consultants suggested that 
the NGOs, the CBOs and the private sector organisations, would assist local bodies, or to 
even partly take over their responsibilities, by the provision of rural water supply and 
sanitation services throughout Nepal (ARD Inc. 2003c, A12; ARD Inc. 2003f, 3). 
Similarly, the Fund Board initiated a policy that set the local bodies on the same line with 
user committees and the NGOs, to work according to the decentralised approach, which 
should help minimise the government's direct involvement in implementation of the water 
supply and sanitation projects (HMGN/MPPW 2004a, 4). The consultants argued that the 
NGOs could provide effective community-based support for the social mobilisation, and 
other community capacity, and that capability strengthening needed. Similarly, private 
engineering firms could supplement governmental agency capacity, to provide technical 
support for the water supply’s scheme design, the construction and O&M, especially in 
areas where agency staff might not be able to work (ARD Inc. 2003f, 4). In addition, due 
to the security problem at the local level, the local governments were targets by the 
Maoists; in this situation, the NGOs and the private sector firms, appeared to be the only 
organisations to be able to operate effectively in the conflict areas (ARD Inc. 2002a, 
                                                 
291 The first draft already makes the same mistake by stating that the DDCs' capacity needs to be built to 
enable them to successfully carry out their mandated roles in WSS development, as outlined in the LSGA 
(ARD Inc. 2002b, 7). However, the LSGA mandated role of DDCs in WSS development is coordination and 
not implementation. A couple of paragraphs later the draft states (ARD Inc. 2002b, 7), that the WSS services 
and facilities should be decentralised to the DDC level as suggested by the ongoing efforts of the 
government, meaning that the DDC should be the central agency for WSS services and not the VDC, as 
outlined by the LSGA.   
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25)292. The LSGA, on the other hand, stated that these bodies should coordinate the work 
of the NGOs and the CBOs, and could contract out work to private sector companies. But, 
it did not see an independent role for the NGOs, the CBOs and the private sector in the 
decentralised governance (HMGN/MPPW 2004a, 5-6). The fact that the NGOs and the 
private sector were separately mentioned as decentralised implementation mechanisms, 
could be seen as an influence by the ADB and the World Bank in the finalisation of the 
documents, because they relied on the civil society and the private sector in the project 
implementation. Other donors also used the assistance provided by civil society and the 
private sector, though, they did not bypass the local bodies to the same extent as the 
multilaterals. The governmental agencies, on the other hand, typically opposed the NGOs, 
as these were considered to compete with them over donor funding. Yet, the government 
could pick up those NGOs that could be seen to be loyal to it, due to the political 
affiliation, and due to cooperation, only with them.  
In sum, under this situation, it was easier for the DWSS to resist the demand to 
backtrack from the districts, and to justify its presence there, through the confusing 
institutional arrangements that currently exist in Nepal. Nor was the strategy and action 
plan, formulated by the ADB – together with the wide consultation process – able to bring 
any relevant change into the institutional setting in the sector. Despite the attempts by 
consultants to find a solution to these agonising issues, the politicking by the donors and  
the governmental agencies, watered down any attempts to solve them. In this policy game, 
the consultants obviously had their own personal and professional interests that they 
needed to consider, and to choose which side they were backing. The donors were 
reluctant to openly interfere in political issues in the recipient countries, most likely a 
reason for their aloofness to solve the division of work between the DWSS and the 
Dolidar. In the case of the formulation of the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Strategy 
and Action Plan, the consultants did not need to choose between the ADB and the MPPW, 
as both actors had combined interests, but rather, they needed to compromise on the global 
ideals on how decentralisation should best be carried out, and leave a possibility to the 
ADB and the MPPW to agree on vague formulations, which in the end, provide little 
regulation, but rather left all doors open.  
                                                 
292 The consultants nonetheless note, that there are negative aspects related to the NGOs. Their interviewees 
reported to them that not all NGO staff is sufficiently qualified, and that implementation of water supply and 
sanitation schemes has occasionally been poorly managed. Some respondents also felt, that some NGOs are 
profit-oriented, have excessive overheads, and do not coordinate their activities well at district level. 
Significantly, national NGOs often have a political affiliation (ARD Inc. 2002a, 25).  
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7.7 Conclusions 
7.7.1 Donor-Centred Policy Process 
The Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Policy, Strategy and Action Plan formulations are 
donor-centred (Mollinga 2007). Mollinga proposes this category complement the 
previously state-centred and society-centred policy processes, which implicitly assume the 
existence of sovereign states, within which these processes occur (see Grindle, Thomas 
1989; 1991). Mollinga writes that the society-centres approaches, are better suited for 
democratic regimes, with some level of organised and regularised public contestation and 
the shaping of public policy. In many developing countries (and in their water sectors) 
policy making, and the implementation processes, are highly ‘state-centred’. However, in 
some developing countries, the international development (financing) agencies have a 
strong role in national water policy making, which puts national sovereignty into question, 
posing a demand for a new kind of category. Mollinga, along with Jenkins (2002), views 
that the sovereignty of developing countries can be undermined, or otherwise become 
weak or eroded, through the increased involvement by the donors in the policy 
formulation, that has been particularly salient in the form of their structural adjustment 
policies and good governance policies. For me, the central role of the donors, in the policy 
process, does not put national sovereignty in question, even though the policies are 
formulated along the donors’ own priorities and under their leadership. Therefore, I do not 
think that the category of a donor-centred policy process refers evidently to the weakness 
of the recipient country in the policy process. As I have shown in this chapter, the 
governmental agencies can use donors, and by this, letting the donors guide policy 
formulation. This ensures that their interests are reflected in the policy, and getting what is 
for them more important than their own leadership in policy formulation, namely, securing 
development funds, that were conditionalised on the policy formulation. Therefore, I refer 
with the donor-centred policy process, to the donors’ central role in policy formulation. 
Similarly, even though I define the policy process as being donor-centred, I argue that the 
policy process was not donor-dictated or donor-dominated. Thus, albeit there are 
conditionalities attached to the projects, there is no direct dictation by the aid agencies at 
policy level, speaking against a definition as a donor-dictated policy process, but the 
influence comes through their own priorities, which the government voluntarily agrees 
upon (in principle)293.  
I also suggest that the donors should be included in the definition of policy elites. 
Grindle and Thomas (1991, 19), who build their arguments on the state-centred theories 
about policy choice, define policy elites as “those formally charged with making 
authoritative decisions in government”, yet, recognising that “policy elites are key actors 
in determining policy initiatives and choices” (Grindle, Thomas 1989, 223), excluding the 
                                                 
293All periodic development plans of Nepal echo global aid trends. They are formulated to please the donors' 
demands and to match with their plans (see chapter five for an detailed analysis; cf. Sharma 2001). In this 
way, it is easier for the donors to get projects approved, and they can argue that the projects are in line with 
the government’s own plans; therefore, the government gets the projects it wants/needs. 
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donor representatives and their consultants in their definition. In the donor-centred policy 
process, the definition of policy elite obviously needs to include donors and consultants, 
who, as shown here, are the central actors in the policy process. In Nepal, they performed 
tasks of policy elite, as explained by Grindle and Thomas (1989, 221),  
“policy elites often initiate reforms by placing issues on the agenda of government decision 
making. In doing so, they may shape the debate over such issues and use technical 
expertise to influence discussions within and outside government. Moreover, policy elites 
often shape reform strategies by influencing the timing and content of proposals so they 
are made more politically or bureaucratically acceptable.” 
 
My case illustrates that these tasks were taken over by the donor, not by the government. 
The policy process was initiated by the ADB, donors set the agenda, and donors and their 
consultants led the process. They used their technical ‘knowledge’ of development, in the 
form of the composite approach, to influence other actors that are presented as this in the 
global consensus. The donor leadership in the formulation was highlighted by the absence 
of governmental representatives, who only had a minimal role, limited to that of a 
participant, in the consultation process. Yet, as mentioned above, the donor-centred policy 
process does not mean that the governmental agencies were powerless in this process. In 
the finalisation of the policy and strategy, these agencies took a more active role, sidelined 
the ADB and its consultants, and allied itself with another of Nepal’s main donors in the 
sector, the World Bank (through the Fund Board). They did this to free themselves of 
certain policy principles that were conflicting, particularly for the main donors, the ADB 
and the World Bank, and to guarantee that government’s relationship, with any of its 
donors, is not jeopardised by the strategy and policy.  
As shown in this chapter, policy formulation and the implementation in the Nepalese 
rural water supply and sanitation sector, is awash with the politics of policy making and 
related power play. In the case of Nepal, one is not able to pit governmental agencies and 
aid agencies against each other, as they have certain common interests, but rather, the 
power play takes place between their alliances over territory and funds. As shown here, 
the Nepalese governmental agencies have secured their own interests through 
manoeuvring, and allying strategically with those donors, that best match their interests. 
Hence, in the end, the government has got what it wanted: the projects and money, but due 
to the decisive role of the donors, the governmental agencies do not emerge as the 
champion out of the policy game.  
From the behaviour of the governmental agencies, I draw the conclusion that for them, 
the policy papers do not have a very important role, and that what is stated in the 
documents is rarely significant. As such, they are not seeking a policy change, or an 
interest in having an ownership of the policy content. Therefore, they allow the donors to 
decide what is written in the document and lead the process. Rather, it seems that what the 
governmental actors are primarily concerned with, is the result after the policy 
formulation. For them, it is more important to retain their power bases, and guarantee that 
the aid flows, including development projects being implemented, and new ones are in the 
pipeline, having the right kind of framework to facilitate their approval. Because of the 
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multiple donors in the country, the governmental agencies juggle between them, and try to 
find ways of pleasing all of them. These manoeuvring tactics are called strategies, and 
they are next explained in detail. 
7.7.2 The Strategies of the Governmental Actors in the Policy Game 
The strategies of the government, relate to donors’ strategies, or are responses to those. In 
the first strategy, the government remains vague about its own priorities, and by this, is 
able to accommodate the demands of the various donors, and manoeuvre between these 
demands for its own benefit. However, this strategy leads to the government deciding 
upon issues, on an ad hoc basis, and not having any long-term planning. Part of this 
strategy, is to let donors be in charge, and count on it that in the later phase of policy 
making, there will be a chance for the governmental agencies to manoeuvre out of the 
unwanted influence. Likewise, the donors tend to be unclear about what their real interest 
is, hiding behind the composite approach, and their own multiple policy objectives. This is 
highlighted in the context of the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Strategy formulation 
as well: it was not part of any planning process; instead, the strategy formulation was 
initiated because of a donor’s interest to legitimise its own policy in Nepal. The strategy of 
the governmental agencies continues, by allowing the donor to lead the formulation 
process, and to remain outside of any active engagement in it. Instead, the governmental 
agencies consider that their possibilities for influencing the policy process come in a later 
phase, during its finalisation and implementation. Whitfield (2009b) in the study on 
African governments argues similarly by writing that  
“Aid is a vital resource with which these governments seek to deliver goods and services 
or other promises they have made. Thus they are unwilling to take stronger policy 
positions or to chart a development strategy outside of the purview of donors, as they are 
afraid of risking reductions in aid that could undermine their political support and/or cost 
them next election. The fragile domestic support of governments, combined with their 
dependence on aid to shore up their political legitimacy, therefore provides strong 
incentives for governments to remain in a subordinate position to donors.” 
 
The second strategy, also identified by Grindle and Thomas (1991), is that the 
governments normally know, what the really important issues are for the donors, among 
their vague list of priorities, and which issues the governmental agencies are able to 
escape from, meaning which are secondary to the donor. By this, the governmental actors 
know already, in the phase of negotiation of a loan or a grant, which of the donors’ 
principles to agree upon, to be able to secure the future development projects. They are, 
therefore, well aware in which framework they can operate. The third strategy, which 
relates to the perceived passivity of the government in policy formulation, is to wait and 
see. This stems from the donor tendency to change their priorities on a frequent basis. 
Therefore, the government can easily let the donor dominate in the policy formulation and 
agree – in principle – on the donor-suggested principles, as the government knows that 
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once the policy paper is ready, the priorities of the donors have already changed, and a 
new policy needs to be formulated (cf. Whitfield ed. 2009b). In case the policy principles 
do not change, the governmental agencies can still resort to the fourth and fifth strategies: 
the non-implementation and foot-dragging. By these, they can postpone the 
implementation of the unwanted policy principles. Donors are rarely monitoring policy 
implementation294, therefore, these strategies do not risk the government’s relationship to 
its donors, but through them, it is able to guarantee that their interests, such as securing 
funds for the country’s development, and for the ministry’s budget, boosting the standing 
of the ministry, and providing opportunities for bureaucratic rent-seeking (see e.g. Grindle 
1989, 225), are not overrun by the policy. Additionally, both the donors and the 
governmental actors have strategically allied with each other.  
 
 
                                                 
294 The aid agencies rarely follow up with policy implementation, after their funding for the policy (or 
related project) has seized. During the funding period, there are all kinds of benchmark studies, etc., carried 
out, to see where the policy implementation is going. Yet, the government has the means to resist policy 
monitoring. In the case of the RWSS Policy, Strategy and Action Plan, the ADB showed little interest 
towards monitoring its implementation, as the CBWSSP did not succeed as a national programme (SWAP to 
be monitored). The monitoring that had been demanded by the DFID; however, the DFID also failed in its 
efforts to monitor the policy implementation due to government's resistance. Interviews with an ex-DFID 
representative in Nepal on Sep. 10, 2010 and an expert in the WSS sector on Aug. 18, 2010. 
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8. Summary and Conclusions 
This study is about the politics between the governmental institutions of an aid recipient 
country and its donors in the rural water supply and sanitation sector. On one side of the 
relationship, is aid-dependent, neopatrimonial Nepal, which has had a rough start to 
democracy and is still waiting for democracy to be consolidated. On the other side, are the 
donors, operating in Nepal with large funds to disburse, and their requirements, set by 
their headquarters. Thus, there is an inherent asymmetry in the aid relationship. In this 
thesis, I have explored how this relationship functions, and more specifically, I have 
aimed to understand how policy is negotiated in this interface. An integral part of the 
analysis, was to understand what role the interests of these parties play in the aid 
relationship, how these shape their priority-setting, and guide the positions they take in 
policy negotiations. The study finds that the donor-Nepal power imbalance presented in 
earlier research, is not that straightforward, but that the parties have power over each 
other. This is shown through the strategies that the Nepalese governmental agencies and 
the donors have adopted in policy negotiations. The negotiation takes place through 
manoeuvring and the interests and incentives of policy actors shape the policy process. 
Thus, this study highlights the political aspect in the aid relationship, focusing particularly 
on the role of politics in policy formulation, and illuminates, thus, the theoretical 
perspective of the 'politics of policy'.   
 
The main conclusions in this chapter are: 
 The aid relationship between Nepal and its donors is characterised by a state of 
permanent negotiation, in which the actors regularly come together to discuss the 
development work, including policy making. 
 Nepal is not only aid-dependent, but also donor-dependent; simultaneously, the 
donors are dependent on the aid-dependent countries, which forms a mutual 
dependence between donors and recipient countries.  
 Aid is more political than generally presented: it has a built-in need to legitimise 
itself over and over again, thus, having its own political interests, conflicting with 
the non-political donor jargon. 
 The donor involvement in policy making changes policy dynamics: the donors’ 
aim in policy making is not to change policy, but to legitimise aid, and aid 
principles in the aid recipient country. Furthermore, under this situation, many of 
the policy network theories cannot be applied, as these typically assume that policy 
actors come together to change policy, according to a perceived need for this, 
which is not the case in Nepal’s rural water supply and sanitation donor-led policy 
processes.  
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8.1 Summary of Findings: The Politics of Policy 
The objective of the present study was to investigate national level policy dynamics in the 
rural water supply and sanitation sector in Nepal, the interaction between the 
governmental agencies and the donors active in the sector, and to analyse the role of these 
actors in the policy making process of the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Policy, 
Strategy and Action Plan. Furthermore, it aimed to provide empirical evidence and 
conceptual arguments, to demonstrate political dimensions embedded in policy strategies 
and the 'politics of policy'. It began by defining Nepal, as a neopatrimonial country, where 
governance is composed of a modern legal-rational bureaucracy, which, however, is beset 
with a history of patronage and clientelism. It then analysed how the aid system operates 
and contextualised aid in Nepal. It argued that aid in Nepal is a game, guided by the 
interests and incentives of the players, in which all actors try to manoeuvre their interests 
into the aid arrangements, with the aim of not needing to compromise too much. Their 
interests are not identical, even though the donor-advocated ideas of partnership and joint 
policy processes often imply this. After this, the study proceeded to analyse the nature of 
water supply and sanitation governance in Nepal, outlining that it is characterised by the 
hydraulic path dependency of the DWSS. Its unwillingness for reforms and institutional 
changes, has led to a competition over resources, prevalence and prestige, with the other 
sectoral agency, the Dolidar, and to its inability to accommodate itself into the changing 
demands in the sector. From here, the thesis continued to present how the global thinking 
on aid, through the donors’ interest to institutionalise the composite approach, has 
influenced policy making in Nepal, and argues that this again, has influenced the water 
supply and sanitation sector, by showing that the push for creating a national programme, 
under global pressure for sector-wide approaches, has shaped the dynamics in the sector, 
and led to various attempts to coordinate it. These attempts to establish sector-wide 
approaches are depicted as legitimacy alliances that seek to legitimise their own priorities 
in Nepal through influencing policy making. Last, through the case study of the policy 
making process of the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Policy, Strategy and Action 
Plan, it presented how global policy ideas guided the policy thinking, how the pressure for 
sector-wide approaches linked the policy with project formulation, and in the end, outlined 
the policy formulation process as a donor-centred policy process. The chapter highlighted, 
how the hypothetically donor-dominated Nepal, actually has power against the powerful 
aid agencies, and has identified strategies that the Nepalese governmental agencies have 
applied, in manoeuvring in the policy making process, such as building alliances, 
postponing the process, or policy implementation, allowing donors to lead policy 
formulation, in order to secure future funding for development projects, and 
accommodating donors’ demands, by being vague about their own priorities. Central in 
this negotiation process, was the policy actors’ interests, strategies, access to resources, 
and positions in the sector, all relating to power struggles in different ways.  
The analysis in this thesis has focused on how the actors have interacted in policy 
making. It has presented that the continuous and permanent negotiation, exercised by the 
donors, has enabled them to take part in the national policy making, in aid recipient 
countries, and has led to an increased role of donors in policy making. The study shows 
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that the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Policy, Strategy and Action Plan making 
process was donor-centred. This does not, however, automatically imply that the policy 
process was donor-dictated. The centrality of the donors, in the formulation process, is 
actually one of the strategies used by the Nepalese governmental agencies, to guarantee 
that the donors get a policy paper, corresponding to their demands for legitimising their 
planned projects (and related funds) in Nepal, and by this, contributing to the goal of the 
government to secure development funds for the country. The donor representatives need 
to justify their intervention in Nepal, to their own headquarters, and one mechanism for 
this, is a national policy, stating the priorities in the country, normally calling by them 
‘national priorities’. It is important for the donors that these priorities are in line with 
global thinking on aid, or their development-related priorities. This is illuminated in the 
donors’ and government agencies’ pursuit of ‘getting the policy right’. This overruns the 
urgency to solve institutional fuzziness in the sector – particularly the duplication of work 
between the DWSS and the Dolidar. This means that policy making – even though 
generally considered as anti-political – has actually got very political motives. These 
motives are rarely openly spoken of, but highlighted in this thesis, and discussed in detail 
in the next section.   
8.2 Aid Relationship: Permanent Negotiation 
The aid relationship discussed in this thesis refers to the international donors in Nepal, 
mostly consisting of bilateral and multilateral aid agencies, and to those Nepalese 
governmental agencies, that are in charge of the governance of water supply and 
sanitation. These actors come together to plan, implement, monitor and fund development 
work in Nepal, of which policy making has lately become an increasingly important 
component. I have shown that development efforts, and particularly policy making in 
Nepal, is donor-centred. Nonetheless, the Nepalese agencies are not passive recipients, 
despite of being characterised as aid-dependent. The donor-centredness refers to the 
donors’ practice of being constantly involved in policy making, by considering themselves 
as major ‘stakeholders’, taking an active role in consultations, injecting their own views of 
what is ‘realistic’ and what is ‘best practice’, on a process advertised as allowing local 
actors to develop their own solutions (Fraser, Whitfield 2009, 84).  
The donor’s interest to inject best practices, has not been limited only to the making of 
the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Policy, Strategy and Action Plan, but has been a 
pattern of continuous and permanent negotiation (Whitfield ed. 2009b) over policies, 
programmes, and projects between the donors and the government of Nepal and its 
agencies discernible. This has its roots in the principles of the Paris Declaration, which 
demands that donors build partnerships, with the aid recipients, to harmonise and align 
their practices with the recipient government’s practices and national policy priorities – all 
requiring coordination and cooperation. The demand for an increased interaction, has led 
to the design of new aid instruments, through which these tasks can be taken care of. 
Examples of these, are country consultations, sector-wide approaches, Poverty Strategy 
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Papers, and various working groups, that aim for finding a common basis, on how to 
administer the sector, such as the Sector Efficiency Improvement Unit and Sectoral 
Stakeholder Group. Yet, even though there are good intentions to improve the quality of 
aid, and make the interaction between the donors and governmental agencies like a 
partnership, the donors have not been able to overcome their need to influence domestic 
policy making in recipient countries, because of their internal incentives. Furthermore, 
their priorities seem to change, or at least they are augmented in short periods, making it 
difficult for the recipients to define their priorities. The changing of priorities, can also be 
seen as strategy by the donors, to keep the recipient governments within the process of 
permanent negotiation, and having the possibility of influencing domestic policy making. 
If there is no time for the government to think of its own priorities, then the injection of 
donor ideas into the government policy becomes easier. Thus, there is a double push for 
institutional entanglement from the side of the donors: the open motive to improve aid 
according to the Paris Declaration, and the hidden interest, to direct domestic policy 
making towards their own principles and on how to deliver aid effectively.  
As seen from the dynamics between the donors and governmental agencies in the rural 
water supply and sanitation sector, the governmental agencies do not accommodate 
themselves reluctantly to all donors’ demands, but resort to manoeuvring strategies, to 
avoid unwanted influence. Particularly, aid-dependent countries have needed to rely on 
these kinds of strategies (Fraser, Whitfield 2009, 97), as they do not want to risk the 
receipt of aid, by openly challenging the donors. I consider that despite the donor intention 
of increasing government ownership on aid and policies, the practice of permanent 
negotiation can actually have an opposite impact: in an already aid-dependent country, 
such as Nepal, it can lead to further dependence on the donors’ advice, and assistance at 
institutional level, through relying on the consultants in drawing the priorities, doing the 
planning and implementing the programmes and projects.   
8.3 Aid Dependence and Donor Dependence 
According to basic aid statistics, Nepal can be characterised as aid-dependent. It has for a 
long-time had large flows of aid; its development budget is, to a large extent (currently 
app. 60 per cent), financed through aid money, and until recently, most of the aid has 
come in the form of grants, which however, are slowly being replaced by loans. The 
financial dependence on aid, has been followed by a reliance on donors, technically and 
administratively, weakening the ability of the Nepalese governmental agencies to govern 
the water resources. In the context of the rural water supply and sanitation policy making, 
the consultants took the lead in the strategy formulation process, whereas the 
governmental agencies, subsumed to the role of a participant, having little vision or 
interest, to think how to plan water supply and sanitation in the country. Instead, the 
government put its efforts in pleasing the donors, by focusing on those topics that were 
important for the donors.  
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This attitude is possible, because the government officials know that the donors are 
exactly dependent on the aid recipients. Thus, I argue that the Nepalese governmental 
actors, are actually willingly aid-dependent, and use this as a strategy, to get more aid, 
which is required, e.g., for political survival. The aid dependence of Nepal has been 
moving from a fiscal or economic domain, to the political: no Nepalese government now 
feels that it can survive, without the increased levels of aid to support its political survival 
(Panday 2000, 3). Thus, aid provides not just a financial wherewithal, but a political 
legitimacy for the government. Senior political leaders, lobby with the donors, not with 
their governmental or political colleagues, so that projects that are of interest to them, or 
their constituencies, can materialise. Therefore, by portraying itself as an aid-dependent 
country, the Nepalese government can use it as a strategy. By reverting to strategies of 
allowing the donors to lead, decide and let them do the work, the government gives up on 
its main tasks, and opts for a ‘weak governance capacity’. The typical donor reaction to 
the observed weak governance capacity, has been to involve itself even more in the 
governance of the recipient countries, leading to control, institutional entanglement, and to 
permanent state of negotiation. The motive of the Nepalese government, to allow donors 
to entangle in the institutional issues, is that by this, it aims to guarantee that the ‘good’ 
relationship with the donor continues, aid money is disbursed and more aid commitments 
can be secured. I find that, in this kind of situation, where the aid recipient country is 
willingly dependent on donors to ‘do the job’, one should rather speak of donor 
dependence, than aid dependence. The government of the country is dependent on aid as a 
financial resource, but this is different from the dependence on the donors’ technical 
advice and the related work.  
 On the one side of the dependence, is the recipient government, as explained above, 
but from the other side, the dependency on aid, also benefits the donor, because of its 
pressure to disburse money, get new projects and stay in the business. The dependency is 
especially useful for bilateral donors, that have a small amount of countries that they can 
fund, and therefore, are under pressure to disburse the funds in these countries.  
The dependency on the technical advice provided by donors, helps the government in 
the administrative tasks of planning, monitoring and implementation, as it can trust that 
the donor provides consultants to help in these tasks. Through this donor-dependency, the 
donor is able to influence institutional development within the recipient country, into the 
direction that is most beneficial for its purposes, such as choosing the ‘right’ goals in 
policy making processes, and the ‘right’ implementation modalities, matching the 
approaches of the donor. Thus, countries which officially change their policies, are good 
countries for the donors, as these can be presented as reformers, even though, in the end, 
at a practical level, there is no change. This is also confirmed by the partnership concept, 
which refers to the need of both parties for each other. The mutual dependence is 
illuminated in the way that the governmental agencies and donors play the game of 
manoeuvring in policy making, and ally themselves, in the search for leadership in the 
sector. Therefore, the actors have power over each other, and there are shifts in the 
balance of power, as the dependency is working in both directions, and is not set in any 
predefined or unchangeable model. Thus, the power relationship is asymmetric. The 
donors have the money, which they can withdraw from the recipient country or decide not 
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to grant any. The recipient, on the other hand, cannot do this: it needs to opt for the money 
or opt out. Nevertheless, the recipient country has own power as well – this is the point 
highlighted in this thesis – through manouvering and resorting to the strategies, the 
recipient country can ‘fight back’ in the power game. Theoretically, the recipient countries 
can also decide to decline the aid provided by the donors, yet, I think that Nepal as aid and 
donor dependent country would not do this. Empirically, in the African context, the 
mutual dependence has been presented by Harrison (2001, 661), who importantly points 
out that mutual dependencies can be severely unequal, for which, they should not be 
mixed up with partnerships and donor discourse, or on recipient governments being in the 
‘driving seat’. Even though there is a mutual dependence between the donors and the 
Nepalese governmental agencies, the development activities in Nepal, have to a large 
extent been donor-centred, as in the case of the formulation of the Rural Water Supply and 
Sanitation Policy, Strategy and Action Plan. However, the power by the donors has not 
been unidirectional, but through the game of manoeuvring, the governmental agencies 
have been able to have power over the donor-drive in the policy making.  
This study has shown that Nepal is commonly characterised as an aid dependent 
country, aid dependence here referring to large flows of financial aid into the country, and 
the country’s budget being dependent on these financial means. The study has also argued 
that through institutional entanglement, the donors have entered into governance, 
rendering it, also, to be donor dependent, by taking over many of the tasks normally 
within the jurisdiction of the state. Thus, there is a mutual dependence between the donors 
and Nepal: the latter in the need of money and the second in the need to disburse it, 
combined with their interests to gain and give technical advice. My emphasis here is on 
two points: first, aid and donor dependence does not automatically make a country donor-
dominated. As presented in this thesis, the donors do not sit on the driver’s seat and the 
Nepalese bureaucrats only comfortably leaning back on the backseat, but there is a way to 
influence the driving from the backseat and even possibilities to stop the car, if considered 
necessary; and second, there is a mutual dependence between the donors and Nepal 
referring to the mutual needs of the parties in the aid game, yet it does not mean, that their 
relationship would based on equality, but that the aid relationship is inherently 
asymmetric. 
8.4 Aid: More Political than Presented 
My study on the dynamics of the rural water supply and sanitation sector in Nepal shows 
that sectoral development is driven by politics, played by the sectoral actors, in which 
donors have a leading role. Yet, the donors often seek political legitimation for their 
development interventions, by constructing themselves as being outside of politics, and 
relying on ‘mobilising metaphors’, such as participation, good governance, ownership, 
accountability and partnership, in order to ensure and justify their support and resources 
(Bebbington 2005; Ferguson 1994; Mosse 2004; cited in Büscher 2010, 29). This seeking 
for legitimisation by the donors, for their agendas and priorities as one of the main 
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motives of aid, is often overlooked in aid literature, and particularly, in aid conferences. 
These tend to focus on discussing the effectiveness of aid, partnerships between donors 
and other stakeholders, and the sustainability of development efforts; however, the need of 
aid, to legitimise itself over and over again, in order to stay within the business, has rarely 
been addressed. This – for me – relates to the apolitical chacracter of aid that is being 
advocated, within the aid circles, and manifested in which manner, the aid jargon is 
formulated.  
In aid jargon, these concepts have been formulated without a political connotation, in a 
depoliticised manner. In practice, however, as Harris (2002; cited in Büscher 2010, 29), 
points out, this often makes it more difficult for them, to effectively mediate the complex 
political dynamics that they encounter in their work. These views, have been elaborated by 
ethnographic research, and by having a critical view on development (such as Lewis, 
Mosse 2006; Mosse 2004; 2005; Quarles van Ufford et al. 2003; Ferguson 1994; Li 2007).  
Ferguson (1994) and Jenkins (2001a) present the anti-political dimension of aid as 
technocratic one. The development institutions are mandated, not to mingle in politics, but 
to stimulate ‘technical’ development. Hence, they portray their development work as 
being non-political. Nepal is a case of the technocratisation of aid: the donors and other 
actors are not seeking political solutions to the problems, within the development, or 
political support, of their decisions. Instead, these are approached through ‘social 
engineering’; the developmental problems, as issues, that can be solved through technical 
solutions. The social engineering approaches, tend to think of institutions as ‘things’, and 
refer to linear models for changing societies and organisations, rather than as relationships 
and processes (Mollinga, Meinzen-Dick, Merrey 2007, 704). Therefore, the decision 
making has been moved to the officials in ministries, and their departments, or to donors 
and their consultants. The political actors in Nepal, the democratically elected members of 
parliament, have been replaced by the populist participation discourses, which advocate 
for inclusion of civil society into policy making. Civil society organisations are portrayed 
as the representatives of the citizens of Nepal. The technocratisation runs through policy 
making, as well as programmes and projects, which are designed to implement these 
policies, as highlighted in this thesis. Thus, as defined by Büscher (2010, 34), anti-politics 
aim to do away the social, deliberative process, with which actors make decisions, that 
determine social or public outcomes, and to ‘predetermine’ decisions, and/or social and 
public outcomes. This kind of view on anti-politics, resonates with the technocratisation of 
aid, seen as a strategy by the donors, to reinforce the composite approach; in particular, its 
neoliberal principles, that are important for the economies of the donor countries 
(Ferguson 1994; Büscher 2010). By technocraticising the aid, the donors are able to seek 
technical solutions to the problems of development, through applying neoliberal 
principles, that they believe are correct to solve the problems, instead of promoting 
political change in the aid recipient countries, and allowing the recipient governments to 
make these decisions by themselves (Bebbington 2005, 940; Büscher 2010, 33).  
The depoliticisation of aid by the donors denotes also to the depowering of aid, politics 
being “any activity concerned with the acquisition of power” and marking “those 
relationships involving authority or power” (The New Collins Concise English Dictionary 
1982 cited in Mollinga 2008a, 8). In the donors’ attempt to present development as a 
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technical and administrative task, they actually denude the concept of development from 
power. Ferguson (1990) calls the depoliticisation as the side effects of aid. He considers 
that depoliticisation, is a rather an unintended consequence of that done with a purpose. 
Power for donors is political, and they are not interested in dealing with complicated 
political issues, or having an in-depth understanding of the political life in the country, 
thus, instead, it is easier for the donors, to present technical blueprint solutions to 
development, than to truly understand the political and social realities in each developing 
country. The question of power has, however, been pushed more onto the aid agenda after 
the Paris Declaration, which has several politics and power-related components; for 
instance ownership, accountability and partnership.    
I have shown that the aid industry has depoliticised aid, and made it to be based on 
nice-sounding and sanitised nirvana concepts, endowed with an almost unimpeachable 
moral authority (Cornwall, Brock 2005; Molle 2008, 132). However, through a closer 
examination on how aid works, it is evident that all of the actors involved in aid have 
political motives, and that the concepts deployed to legitimise aid activities have actually 
political dimensions. Below, I highlight how this becomes evident in the thesis, and how 
central concepts of accountability, ownership and partnership, and how problematic the 
depoliticised use of concepts is, in the context of Nepal.  
8.4.1 Accountability and Ownership 
Accountability, as a depoliticised concept, commonly refers to a responsibility (Wenar 
2006), instead of to political accountability, in which politicians are considered 
accountable to their constituencies, and which can hold the politicians accountable. 
According to the logic of the depoliticised view on accountability, officials in the 
ministries, and the donors involved in policy formulation and implementation, are made 
responsible for delivering aid, and for the drawing of policies for national development. 
Problematic in this definition, is that these officials cannot be held accountable for the 
failure of delivering services, and even if the donors present themselves as defenders of 
the rights of the poor, as agencies of Western governments, or as multilateral institutions, 
they cannot be held accountable by the poor. Their accountability lies towards their 
governments, and to those that donated the money – not to the beneficiaries of their work. 
In political accountability, on the other hand, the political actors would be involved in 
policy making, and thus, could be held accountable for their decisions by the people who 
had voted for them. However, because of donor involvement in policy making, these 
actors have been excluded from it, and policy making has been made a technocratic 
exercise, dealt with by officials in the ministries, or donors taking care of it by themselves: 
depowering the political actors and corresponding to Lukes’ (1974) view on power, in 
which some social forces, are prevented from being able to express their own views to 
challenge the status quo (Hyden 2008, 265). The donor dependence of Nepal has even 
exacerbated the situation: an accountability of the government to its citizens has been 
reduced, by the dependence on donors to carry out the tasks it should do.  
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The donors’ interest in keeping the political actors sidelined in policy making, has 
been legitimised, by including civil society in the policy making, as a voice of the people. 
By presenting the civil society organisations as representatives of the country, the donors 
undermine the democratic structure of the country. These organisations are not elected, 
and are often driven by the interests of certain groups – not of all of the citizens of Nepal. 
Generally, depoliticisation within aid is justified, either by the unconsolidated democracy 
in Nepal, or the tendency of Nepalese politicians, to first provide benefits to their clientele 
and patronage networks, and the primacy to secure their own political survival, over 
delivering services equally to all. Under these circumstances, the donors feel that civil 
society organisations, have a better grasp on the needs of the people in the villages, than 
the politicians who actually represent these people, as highlighted in their approach to 
decentralisation (compare, i.e., with the set-up of the Fund Board and the CBWSSP).  
Donor domination in policy making, and their tendency to push forward their views on 
how development should be achieved, and excluding the politically accountable people 
from the decision making, contradicts the concept of ownership. Ownership, as control 
over the process, means that the government takes the lead in policy making and aid 
activities, implicitly assuming, that the donors will then trust the recipient governments 
with this, relinquishing ownership to the government, and withdrawing themselves from 
the aid planning and management in the recipient countries. But, as shown above, and 
evidenced by Whitfield (2009b), the donors often lack this trust.  
Ownership by the Nepalese government is disturbed by two interrelated issues. First, 
the tendency by politicians to take care of their own needs first, has led to a weaknesses in 
long-term planning. Politicians have little time and incentive, to think about what is best 
for the country, as their clientelistic interests, or short-term goals to secure their political 
survival, stand in their way. This has led to the second issue, namely, increasing donor 
involvement and domination in Nepalese policy making, as the donors do not trust the 
politicians and bureaucrats, to be capable of ‘doing the job’. As shown in this thesis, and 
outlined in the section above, the donors have their preferred agendas and motives to 
influence policy making in an aid recipient country. As long as the donors have their own 
agendas that they push forward; this will not leave space, or encourage the recipient 
countries, to think for themselves, and define their own national priorities, and have their 
own political struggles, for seeing what is important for them. This creates additional 
obstacles for citizens in holding their governments accountable (Whitfield, Fraser 
2009,13-4). I suggest that these kinds of customs of donor influence and reliance, by the 
recipient government, on the donors knowing what is best, and doing the actual work, sit 
tight, and thus, this cannot be changed overnight. 
Furthermore, while the donors have been demanding for ownership from the recipient 
governments, they have done little to advance their side of the Paris Declaration – the 
harmonisation and alignment of their aid policies and practices. Albeit, there have been 
various, however unsuccessful, attempts for establishing a sector-wide approach to the 
rural water supply and sanitation sector, there has only been limited progress in the donor 
alignment of the recipient countries’ development administration, and strategies, as well as 
in the harmonisation of policies. A likely reason for this relates to my argument of 
depoliticisation: the donors have viewed this as a technical exercise, and did not consider 
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that there might be any political interests involved; also, on the donors’ side. Even though 
the developmentalist thinking, characterises the work of the donors, driving them to 
rethink their strategies for improving development work, I suggest that within this 
framework, the donors’ embedded political motives, influence their work, and at the same 
time, limit their interest for reforming the aid system. To be able to guarantee that these 
interests are taken into account, in development administration and policy making in the 
recipient countries, the donors have pushed for the depoliticisation of aid delivery, by 
searching for solutions that sideline politics in aid related activities.   
Under these circumstances, when the lines of accountability are mixed, Nepalese 
politicians are not promoting the welfare of the citizens equally, and the donors have their 
own interests that influence decision making in Nepal; the donor demands for country 
ownership do not seem to be justified, or to make any sense. However, if one depoliticises 
the concept of ownership as well, referring it to the commitment by the ministries to their 
policies, however they were arrived at (Whitfield, Fraser 2009, 3, my Italics), then the 
ownership should be towards donor formulated policies by the officials in the ministries 
and departments, that assisted the donors and consultants in the policy formulation. 
Subsequently, ownership is not with the elected members of parliament that were 
excluded from the policy process. In case ownership is seen as officials’ ownership to 
policies, which might take place, particularly, if these policies help them to meet their 
interests in increasing the budget of the ministry/department, and positioning them as 
more powerful than their competitors, then this kind of ownership is only instrumental, not 
the political ownership of the policy issues. The instrumental ownership has political 
characteristics, but this only relates to the political motives behind the ownership, not to 
the politically accountable people having ownership of the issues. If the interests of the 
officials are not met, then there most likely is not even an instrumental ownership of the 
policies, leading to a non-implementation of the policy.  
8.4.2 What Partnership? 
The idea of policy dialogue within which the donors and the governmental agencies of 
Nepal formulate policies, presupposes that there is a partnership between these actors; that 
they come together and as equal partners to make decisions. The donors have a rather 
naive assumption that there is an (global) agreement about what should be done – 
expressing itself in the idea of having a ‘power to’ authority, consensus and the pursuit of 
collective goals (Parsons 1957) – but in practice, it indicates rather a capacity, or ability, 
not a relationship (Hyden 2008, 263). This kind of definition does not make any reference 
to a possible conflict of interests and coercion of force. In this partnership, the donors, 
according to this interpretation, have a legitimate power as global knowledge holders, to 
use this power. The power in the partnership relationship is close to Foucault’s (1980) 
understanding of power being latent, in which certain ideas, or belief systems, gain power 
as they become more widely disseminated to people, and get treated as common 
knowledge. The donors’ global agendas, are representations of this kind of a hegemonic 
system of knowledge: it tells the aid recipient governments, what is right and wrong, 
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normal or deviant (Hyden 2008, 264). However, as shown in this thesis, these hegemonic 
belief systems can be contested, thus, power is not treated as unidirectional. However, as 
long as the donors’ self-understanding of themselves, corresponds with the view as global 
knowledge holders, the equality in the partnership idea is threatened.  
The partnership idea aims to undo the unequal relationship between the ‘funder’ and 
the ‘funded’, by counteracting inequalities of power, and access to information found in 
the funder-funded relationship (OECD 1996; Riddell 1993; Maxwell, Riddell 1998, 267). 
However, this inequality is not directly addressed by the donors rather, it seems that by 
making a reference to the partnership, they practically assume that by this, the inequality 
has been abolished. But, as long as there is development funding, the inherent inequality 
will persist between the ‘partners’. One of them will always be the ‘funder’, and the other 
‘funded’, having their own incentives, making the relationship political, and having 
implications to the power questions, between the partners. These incentives, the donors 
have attempted to downplay, by formulating the partnership in very general terms and 
depoliticising its definition.  
As presented in this study, policies in real life are not made in partnership between the 
donors and governmental agencies. In my case, the donors were the leaders in the 
initiation and formulation of the policy, and the governmental agencies manoeuvred in the 
later phase of the formulation. Due to donor-origin in policy issues, the governmental 
agencies needed to resort to manoeuvring, in order to secure their interests, and thus, not 
being able to participate as an equal partner, where they could openly express what its 
interests were in this policy making. There seemed to be no open discussion, between the 
donors and the governmental agencies, but they played the game of manoeuvring, 
contradicting the principles of partnership. 
When one inspects the concept of partnership more closely, in the context of Nepalese 
policy making, it actually reads as a form of conditionality. It expects a commitment from 
the side of government to certain principles as defined by the donor, based on the 
principles of the composite approach (resonating with the ‘ownership as commitment’ –
definition), and in return, rewards the recipient government, with a promise from the 
donor agency for development funds. There seems to be little real reciprocity in this 
practice; rather, it conditionalises aid on a donor-defined reform agenda. There is also an 
implication to accountability in the conditional partnership. Donors are not answerable to 
their partners, but the unidirectional partnership, only demands commitment from the 
recipient government and rewards it with aid. There is no possibility within this practice of 
partnership, for the recipient government to hold the donor accountable for its 
commitment. Furthermore, contrary to Jerve (2002, 389), who argues that there is a trade-
off, between partnership and ownership, because a strong recipient government ownership 
means less of a partnership, I find that a true partnership, evidently presupposes 
government ownership of the policies. If there is supposed to be some sort of equality in 
the partnership arrangement, then the government needs to be in charge of its own 
development, including policy making.  
The partnership relationship, actually resembles the above-mentioned mutual 
dependence of donor and recipient government, where the interests of the parties, lead 
them to cooperate, even if there is no equal relationship possible, as they perceive that 
 
 
 
 
246
there are possibilities to gain something. Thus, even though the ‘funded’ is seen as being 
forced to comply, this does not mean that it does not materially benefit from what the 
‘funder’ provides. Therefore, the concept of a partnership can also be inspected, without a 
reference to equality, but to view it, as being based on a long-term interaction with a level 
of investment (Rusbult, Buunk 1993; cited in Morse, McNamara 2012, 911). This implies 
that the partners need each other over the longer term, and thereby, in theory, encourage a 
more open approach to the relationship (Morse, McNamara 2012, 911). Yet, the donors 
have not openly admitted that the partnership relationship is political, depending upon the 
interests of the parties to participate and shaping the relationship accordingly, but instead, 
they adhere to their depoliticised definition. They, also, do not want to confront the fact 
that power is an important part of the relationship, and admit that the aid agencies have, 
and use power in this relationship, through their global agenda, that seems to justify aid-
related activities in the recipient country, by its hegemonic knowledge.  
What to do, then, with the aid? I believe that the aid system needs to admit that politics 
plays an important role in the decision making: it is not a technocratic issue. As long as 
there is development finance, there are also people who will have an interest in the money. 
Aid should focus on finding ways of how to deal with the political motives, that affect the 
development efforts and aid, and not to waste energy in trying to find ways to ignore it. 
There should, also, be more focus on trying to understand the political and social realities 
in the aid recipient countries (Leftwich 2010 analyses the same, through the concept of 
structure) and how, and why, decisions are made there, which can be different from the 
modalities in the aid-giving countries. Similar argumentation in the water sector has been 
made by Mollinga, Meinzen-Dick and Merrey (2007, 706), who write, “Water 
governance, management and use are embedded in processes and forces from outside the 
domain; therefore, both the causes and the solutions for water problems lie partly in other 
domains.” They suggest that water-management problems should be mapped from a 
‘problemshed’, rather than a watershed perspective (ibid. quoting Viessman 1998, 5) to 
avoid the faith of the several well-intentioned and rationalistic reforms, that have failed 
because of not having fully appraised the context of their implementation (Sampath 1992; 
Pigram 2001; Shah et al. 2001; Meinzen-Dick 2007; cited in Molle 2008, 149).  
In this dissertation, I have shown that Nepal, even though having officially a modern 
legal-rational bureaucracy, is guided by the traditions of patronage and clientelism. For 
donors, it would be helpful to better understand these dynamics, and how they function 
within the bureaucracy (and other organisations). The development administration in the 
aid-giving countries, and in the multilateral aid institutions, should also be restructured, so 
that the people in their administration, are not rewarded by the disbursements they make, 
and that their development work, could be carried out sustainably/long-term, without the 
pressure to disburse; these are the key issues that give rise to the perverse interests within 
the aid system. The evaluations of development projects, could start discussing political 
factors, and how the projects have been able to deal with these; to accumulate an 
understanding of the political factors in the development work, and to learn from these. 
Yet, as long as the solutions to the problems in development work are primarily sought in 
developing countries, and there is little or no discussion on the political and economic 
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motives embedded in the development funding, within the Western countries, then there 
are little possibilities for a change for the better.  
8.5 Donors and Policy: Implications for Theory 
The logic of policy making follows a different path in an aid recipient country than it does 
in a Western democracy, or in a developing country with its own ideas and policy 
generation. Therefore, it seems that the meaning of policy (as a paper, strategy) is different 
for the donor-dependent country and its policy stakeholders. In Western countries, new 
policies are made in order to change old perceptions to a problem or regulating an issue. 
Normally, behind the policy change is a perceived problem that needs to be tackled by 
changing policy. Examples of these are, for instance, the francophone education policy in 
Canada (Mawhinney 1993), airline deregulation (Brown, Stewart 1993), water policy in 
California (Munro 1993), environmental policy in the U.S.A. (Sabatier, Brasher 1993), 
and land-use in Denmark (Pedersen 2010). In these countries, concerned citizens, together 
with politicians, bureaucrats, and other experts, form interest groups, who push for a 
policy change, in order to correct the old, and for them, a flawed policy.  
Donor involvement in policy making changes these dynamics. When the donors 
initiate the policy, there is no domestic mobilisation behind the policy initiative. Hence, 
there is also no perceived problem in the country that would need to be changed. Rather, 
the issues that need to be changed, originate from global priorities, such as the market 
principles in the form of SAPs, or in the privatisation of water. Thus, the problems that 
want to be addressed, stem from issues observed at the global level, and the solutions to 
these problems are defined at the global level, not in the particular developing country. 
This is highlighted at national level policy making in Nepal. The domestic problems 
identified in Nepalese policies, were problems that could be solved through the solutions 
presented by the global policy ideas: the components of the composite approach. Thus, the 
problems to be solved through national policies had an instrumental value for the 
legitimisation of global policy ideas, which were served as solutions to these problems. 
The solutions were not the result of domestic action for a percived problem, as typical in 
Western democracies.  
Another issue, elucidated in this thesis is, that often, behind the donor-led policy 
processes is only an internal demand in the donor office to amend national policies, 
according to the changing principles at the global level. In Nepal, this is visible in the 
policy advocacy exercised by UNICEF. The sanitation policies have changed frequently, 
and the tendency has been to just add new focus points into the policies. Thus, the donor 
interest, to initiate the formulation of a new policy, lies in its own policy priorities. Behind 
the national policy formulation, can therefore be a change, or rather an amendment, in 
global development policy, which the donors wish to see, in place in the aid recipient 
country’s policies that legitimise their own priorities in that country. This has three 
implications: one, for how the purpose of policy as a paper is seen; second, for the 
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accountability in policy making; and third, for various theories on policy networks and 
policy communities.  
Other researchers have already pointed out that in developing countries, where donors 
are involved in the policy making process, the purpose of policy formulation has other 
meanings than in Western countries. Mosse (2005) presents that the purpose of policy is to 
have a paper that can be shown around, but the purpose of the formulation, is not the 
implementation of the policy in the first place. He analyses that it is enough to have 
people, who believe that it is implemented, confirming the observation of Quarles van 
Ufford (2003), of policy as a tool of ‘high managerialism’ in which through the existence 
of the policy paper, the donors are able to justify their agendas. Mosse writes that this 
indicates an instrumental understanding of policy making by the donors, believing in 
rational design and social engineering, which is further specified by Reis (2012, 193), who 
claims that the correct policy formulation (in the case of Vietnam) is understood to cause 
and even ‘ensure’ action; if policy is not implemented as intended, it is assigned to 
management problems, that can be tackled by the ‘mobilising metaphors’ of ‘capacity 
building’ and ‘training’. These views present how politics has been eliminated from 
development cooperation and policy making.  
The findings by the aforementioned researchers confirm my argument that for donors 
the most important issue in the involvement in domestic policy making in the aid recipient 
countries is to have their own priorities legitimised in those countries – not the 
implementation of policies. Due to the donor-initiation and the donor-centeredness in 
policy formulation, the policy papers have primarily been formulated to serve donor 
purposes, that is, to institutionalise their ideas and their priorities about development. 
These actors need national policies for legitimising the future development projects and 
programmes in the country. The policies show the donor headquarters that the donor and 
recipient priorities correspond with each other, thus, the donor intervention in this area is 
justified in the recipient country: it is assisting the country to reach its priorities. For the 
donors, this duplicitous behaviour does not seem to be problematic, because in the aid 
game ‘the end justifies the means’. For the recipient government, a policy formulated 
under the donor set terms, is a strategy to secure further funding, and with this, be 
instrumental in attaining its interests of staying in power, through servicing its clientele, its 
patronage based networks, and its constituencies, with directing projects to these areas, or 
being able to gain kickbacks, through the administration of developing funds, or providing 
more prestige to the agency, where the development funds will be allocated to. Therefore, 
I argue, that the purpose of policy, in the donor-centred policy making, is not to change 
policy to respond to a perceived problem and provide a solution for it, but to legitimise the 
global thinking on development in the aid recipient country, and by this, give justification 
for the donors to continue their development cooperation in the country. This serves their 
need to disburse of the budget, and their interest in keeping the aid business as an ongoing 
business. Their own survival is dependent on the continuation of aid. Thus, the creation of 
new ways of seeing poverty, tackling it and coming up with issues that are related to 
development, are instrumental in their work: policies are formulated at a global level; 
these ideas are injected into the policies in the recipient countries, new projects are 
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justified to be funded, and after this, the circle can continue from the beginning again: 
returning to new policy ideas. 
Second, the accountability in the Western, democratic policy making and donor-
centred policy processes in developing countries are different. The accountability of 
policy actors in Western countries, due to their focus on an outcome, that will affect policy 
making in the country at stake, and the mobilisation of policy actors or stakeholders in that 
country, is towards the citizens of the country, even when that accountability often 
functions imperfectly. In donor-centred policy making, on the other hand, the donors aim 
to legitimise their own agendas in the country, normally without any independent 
participant mobilisation, and any perceived problem that should be solved. The 
requirement for a policy change is external, and normally, the policy formulation takes 
place within a small number of people consisting of an urban elite. Therefore, the policy 
actors are not accountable towards the citizens of the country, but towards those that 
initiated the policy formulation, namely, the donor headquarters in the Western part of the 
world.  
The third implication relates to the theories on policy elites, policy network and policy 
communities, and their understanding of the importance of policy change (see e.g. 
Grindle, Thomas 1991; Sabatier, Jenkins-Smith 1993; Haas 1992; Stone 2008; van 
Waarden 1992; Klijn 1996; Zahariadis 1998; Thatcher 1998; Howlett, Ramesh 1998; 
Fischer 1993; Hajer 1995). These theories typically assume that the policy actors come 
together to change policy, according to a perceived need. Thus, there is an issue that 
conflicts with the current policy, and the different networks, coalitions, or communities, 
suggest different models on how to solve this problem. This solution is their suggested 
policy change. These kinds of networks are for instance the issue network (Heclo 1978); 
epistemic communities (Haas 1992); multiple streams (Kingdon 1995); policy 
communities and subsystems (Richardson, Jordan 1979); and advocacy coalitions 
frameworks (Sabatier, Jenkins-Smith 1993). None of these seem to be able to explain the 
dynamics in the Nepalese policy making process, for reasons relating to a wrong kind of 
an understanding of the actors, and their relations (the private sector does not play a role in 
Nepal, neither do parliamentarians); little detail is provided concerning the genesis of 
policy in terms of ideas and agendas (in Nepal the donor initiation is a crucial aspect of the 
analysis), and rather a minimal focus is on power and politics between the actors, which is 
an important component in the Nepalese policy making process. But, as explained above, 
even more than these reasons, their inapplicability to the Nepalese situation relates to the 
role of donors, and aid, in the policy process and the consequence of this involvement for 
the policy dynamics. 
The underlying assumption of the policy network theories seems to be that policies are 
changed by the issue-based advocacy, or interest groups, often comprising of a large 
amount of people who view that the old policy is flawed. This is true in the Western 
world, where policy making is outcome-focused, and represents the interests of citizens of 
the country. There are also policy processes in other developing countries, where these 
kinds of dynamics are taking place (see e.g. Rap 2006 on Mexico and Suhardiman 2008 
on Indonesia).  
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In donor-led policy processes, the participation is based on consultations, which 
normally are organised by the donor that is funding the policy formulation, and as in the 
case of the RWSSP formulation, were based on invitations. Hence, people participating in 
policy making are typically a small group of people, part of an urban professional elite. 
Sometimes, there are consultations arranged in the countryside to hear the voice of the 
people, but this does not have anything to do with citizen activism, or political opposition, 
as in the case of Western countries. In addition, the consultations in the countryside are 
mobilised by the donor, who chooses where the consultations are arranged, and who is to 
be invited. Gould (2005, 141) calls this the ‘politics of consultation’ where ‘the people’ 
are primarily involved in major policy decisions affecting their everyday lives, not through 
the ballot or referendum but, if at all, via ad hoc and discretionary modes of donor-
sponsored ‘workshopping’ (see also Gould 2005, 11). Because of the different kinds of 
dynamics in policy formulation, the applicability of the policy network theory is limited in 
donor-dependent countries295. As explained above, the salient role of the donors in the 
policy process, contradicts the basic assumption of the theories, that policies are initiated 
within the country, aim to change the policy, and include people who are truly interested 
in driving a policy change forward. When policy making is a game between the donors 
and the governmental (bureaucratic) agencies, there is no interest for a real policy change. 
Instead, the donors wish to legitimise their policy priorities in the country, and the 
governmental agencies try to manoeuvre to their best, to gain benefits for either the 
officials, or the agency. Obviously, because of this, there is also limited interest for the 
implementation of the policy. Implementation of the policy is not important, as it is not 
formulated with the intention to be implemented. This finding also conflicts with the 
theorisation of Grindle and Thomas (1991), who in their interactive model of policy 
process, focus on policy implementation as an important part of the policy process296.   
I believe that a better point of analysis for policy processes in aid-dependent countries, 
is by viewing policy networks as interrelated actors, who are connected to each other 
through the games that they play (Klijn 1996). He defines policy networks as  
“stable patterns of social relationships between interdependent actors, which take shape 
around policy problems or policy programs, and that are being formed, reproduced, and 
changed by an ecology of games between these actors. In these games, actors try to 
influence policy processes by strategic behaviour. This network is an interaction system 
reproduced by concrete practices, … called games, which at the same time forms the 
context of these practices. A network is not a static entity but changes over time as a result 
of the ongoing series of games. As a result of the ongoing series of games, some actors 
have an intense relationship with each other and some do not. Some actors have an 
intermediate position between other actors and a certain division of beliefs exists in 
networks. The network thus can best be visualized as the cumulative effect of all the 
connected games that are being played between sets of interrelated actors.”  
 
                                                 
295 A possible starting point for a policy network analysis in this situation could be the policy subsystems 
(Howlett, Ramesh 1998), which do not aim a revolutionary change the policy, but carry out gradual 
incremental changes. This resembles the donors’ suggested changes along the composite approach.  
296 The model bases on their case study in Mexico.  
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This understanding of policy networks at least captures the situation in Nepal. In the water 
supply and sanitation sector, there are alliances between different actors, which are stable 
patters of social relationships, that have taken place around policy programmes, rather 
than policy problems. As presented earlier, policy making and the aid relationship can be 
described as a game, due to the manoeuvring taking place on the side of the donors and 
the governmental agencies. As a consequence of this, some actors have become closer in 
their interaction through their common interests, such as the ADB and the DWSS, or 
Finland and the Dolidar, whereas others, have at times, been allied with others, and at 
other times not. The alliances have found common ground, which was analysed through 
their belief systems and the story-lines in Chapter Six.  
8.6 Why Water is not Governed Properly in Nepal? 
In this thesis, I have argued that there is plenty of water in Nepal, and water is viewed to 
have an economic potential, yet, this abundance of water, has not provided welfare for the 
inhabitants of Nepal. I presented that the problem lies in the governance of water. This 
portrays a paradox. If there is so much water in Nepal, having an economic potential, then 
why has water not been governed properly?  
As explained in Chapter One the rural water supply and sanitation sector is not one of 
the priority water sub-sectors for the government of Nepal. The lack of prioritisation stems 
from money: the sub-sector has less potentiality economically than the other water sectors, 
such as hydropower and irrigation. These sectors provide cash flow, or a rise in income 
through increased agricultural production, whereas the rural water supply and sanitation, 
does not have a direct impact economically. It is seen, rather as a social service to be 
provided by the government, and hence, investments in the sector are viewed as a 
withdrawal from the government budget, rather than providing profits. People require 
water for living, and therefore, would not live in places where there is no water, thus, as 
long as people get water, there seems to be no urgency to improve the access to water. 
The weak leadership by the government also hinders the governance of water. I have 
characterised the Nepalese government as neo-patrimonial, with interests related to 
patronage and clientelism. In addition, the leadership of the country is more concerned 
with political survival, as well as other organisational interests, than drawing long-term 
plans for the country’s development. Due to the preference of thinking mostly about the 
short-term interests and needs, the government is lacking clear vision. This obviously 
leads to bad planning, which is an essential component of governance. The leadership by 
the donors has also not been of consequent, but tends to serve other interests, such as 
having power, or following the guidance provided by their headquarters, rather than the 
improvement of sector governance.  
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Some of these reasons relate to the Nepalese tradition of ‘afno manchhe’, meaning 
one’s own people297 (Bista 1991; Kamata 1999). It is a horizontal dependency 
relationship, that joins people from similar ethnic, caste or regional backgrounds. These 
people can be approached whenever needs for a service arises. As Bista writes,  
“People who do not belong to one’s own inner circle are perceived as being non-persons 
and there is not real concern over what happens to such unrelated individuals. Time and 
effort is exhausted in taking care of one’s own people so that there is little energy or 
inclination left to be concerned about non-persons.” 
 
According to this view, this cultural/religious practice can contribute to people not feeling 
responsible for providing services to the poorer part of the people, particularly when these 
are not part of the afno manchhe. Typically, the poor people do not belong to the afno 
manchhe of the bureaucrats, who come from a higher caste background than do the poor, 
tribal, or ethnic people, in the rural areas. Afno manchhe -thinking relates to fatalism, a 
part of Hinduism. According to fatalistic thinking, those people who are poorer and 
socially worse off than others, deserve that position, due to their misdeeds in their 
previous life. The responsibility to help these people lies in the hands of the supernatural, 
and is not the personal responsibility of the bureaucrat. Similarly, one is never obliged to 
anyone else for anything, because everything occurs as it should. No sense of obligation is 
instilled (see e.g. Bista 1991; Macfarlane 1994; Kamata 1999). The lack of obligation, 
particularly within the governmental system, leads to an issue that I observed in Nepal, 
namely, not managing water as a public good. I have argued that the bureaucracies are 
often driven by self-interest, and not by the welfare of the Nepalese people, which I relate 
to other common issues, such as management of common resources as a public good. 
Traditionally, the Nepalese people have considered water as a common resource, but 
within the past decades, the tradition of managing it as a public good, has weakened. 
Instead, water has become a source for profit, which has led to competing demands on it, 
rather than having a joint approach to manage it. This is elucidated in the destiny of the 
WECS, which was designed to coordinate all activities in the water sector but it has 
succumbed to the competing interests and demands of the ministries dealing with various 
aspects of water and in their disinterest for coordination.  
Water supply and sanitation is also important for donors. It can be that they fear that 
Nepalese governmental agencies, particularly the DWSS, return back to the old style of 
delivering water. For the donors, water supply and sanitation is an important sector to 
fund, and lately, sanitation has become even a priority sector in Nepal. Their interest for 
the sector may have contributed to its governance problems. In Nepal, one of the main 
problems identified in the sector is institutional fuzziness, deriving from the multiple 
actors in the sector. The donors, having an interest in the sector, have thus, partly 
contributed to water not being governed properly with their  multiple approaches to water 
supply and sanitation. There have been attempts to streamline these through policies, 
                                                 
297 This is a form of clientelism. This kind of explanation that refers to cultural factors is not particularly 
popular in Nepal, and many reject the theses of Bista. I, however, feel that there is some there is some 
evidence to support Bista’s argumentation, as explained here.  
 
 
 
 
253
establishment of a national programme, various donor-funded programmes, and 
‘workshopping’, both in Kathmandu and in the regions, however, unsuccessfully. Many 
parties have identified this fragmentation of the sector as problematic for the sector 
development; however, the sectoral actors are too deeply rooted in their own practices, 
that they would be able to give up on their own approaches, or at least to adjust them, for 
finding a solution. All actors have their own interests on why they strive for a certain kind 
of implementation mechanism, and was it then providing support to the Nepalese partner 
agency (Finland to Dolidar, ADB to DWSS), the principles of the funding agency (Fund 
Board to the World Bank), or showing commitment to the funding agency (WaterAid 
Nepal to DFID, NEWAH to WaterAid Nepal).  
The institutional entanglement of the donors and their influence on policy has affected 
the governance of water resources negatively. Despite donor intentions, to assist the 
Nepalese government in governance, the donors have ended up weakening it. The 
government has relied on the strategy of acting like a donor-dependent country. It has 
relied on the donors’ endless support in taking care of the administrative tasks, of 
governmental agencies, which has not improved the skills of the officials in doing their 
tasks but in how to avoid doing the work. This has obvious implications on the ownership 
by the government, on the policies, the project and the programmes that are funded and 
administered by the donors.  
Therefore, I conclude, that the interests of the various actors in the water supply and 
sanitation sector, have not met each other, which has led to problems in sectoral 
governance. The following of their interests has turned into a game between the parties 
involved in the sectoral governance. As shown in this thesis, in that game, the most 
important factor is not to provide water supply and sanitation to the citizens of Nepal, but 
is to keep the aid business as an ongoing process: the show must go on.  
8.7 Identified Research Gaps 
The research on Nepalese political dynamics in the context of aid is limited. This might be 
because of the messiness of the political sphere, where the political set up is constantly 
changing, and subsequently, a (foreign) researcher is having difficulties in getting access 
to information. However, I still think that this is a field, where more insights in the aid 
negotiations in Nepal could be gained. It would be important to understand, how the 
Nepalese political parties are interacting with the donors, what is the power relationship 
between them, what are the interests that impact the negotiations, and what motivations 
the political parties have to interact with the donors (outside of the money, of course). 
Here, the analyses of their strategies, in dealing with the donors, could be an essential part 
of the research. Similarly, a more social science–focused study on how the economic 
situation of Nepal affects its capacity to negotiate with the donors would make interesting 
reading.   
The policy dynamics in the urban water supply and sanitation sector could also provide 
a deeper comprehension on the politics of policy-perspective. The sector seems to be 
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characterised with similar project politics, as in the rural water supply and sanitation 
sector – related to the Melamchi Water Supply Project and the Small Towns Water Supply 
and Sanitation Programme, both funded by the ADB. However, in the urban water supply 
and sanitation sector, the economic interest of the various parties might shed new light 
into sectoral development, conditionalities and policy dynamics.  
My research could be followed up with research on the journeying of policy ideas, to 
the level of everyday politics in water resources management, by analysing the role of 
district and village level players in policy formulation, and assessing how the policy 
process is continued through policy implementation. My research suggests that policies 
are not implemented in the rural water supply and sanitation sector in Nepal, or least this 
seems not to be a priority for the government, or the donors, but this does not imply that 
policies would not have any meaning at the village level. The donor funded water supply 
and sanitation projects operate at the grassroots level, and at least some of the policy 
principles are adopted (in one way or another) in these projects. What is their role in the 
projects, what are the reasons for their application, and how do these shape the sectoral 
dynamics, could be possible questions to look at. This could also include the attempts to 
decentralise the rural water supply and sanitation governance – a focus point of the 2004 
policy. On the other hand, this research could also be widened in the other direction, in 
looking at the journeying of policy ideas, namely a the global level. I think that there is not 
enough knowledge, on how policy priorities are decided in the global fora, and who are 
actually those that decide it. It is the ‘knowledge’ of the Western governments, and the 
international donors, that in central to these issues - what is the role of developing 
countries’ governments? This research would require access to the international 
conferences and high-level meetings on aid and development, where these discussions are 
taking place. Yet, it would provide important information, on the decision making in 
donor organisations, and the international politics of Western goverments in the context of 
development.  
The Nepalese water sector is actually full of interesting political research topics. I 
provide here just some ideas. In the early phase of my fieldwork, many people tried to 
direct me towards studying the hydropower sector. It seemed to provide numberless 
perspectives on how to design a research, such as the case of Arun III, of which there is 
plenty of material, but no thorough academic research has been carried out. This could 
illuminate the dynamics between the Nepalese governmental agencies, the (I)NGOs and 
the World Bank and other donors. There are also other controversial hydropower projects 
in Nepal that could be used as case studies for political or social science research. The 
failure of the IWRM concept in Nepal might also provide new information on the concept 
– defined in depolitical terms, but being profoundly political itself – the water governance 
in Nepal and the nature of the hydrocracies: why has it not been successful in Nepal, and 
what have been the reasons behind its resistance? Furthermore, the dynamics between 
Nepal and India, in the water sector, and their negotiation tactics, could increase our 
understanding on how the Nepalese state operates.  
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